



ESF/SCH Exploratory Workshop:

**Emotion, Consciousness and Self Consciousness**

*St John's College, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 21-23 March 2003*

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# Scientific Report

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## **1. Executive Summary**

### Aim and Academic Context

In both philosophy and psychology, emotions have recently been the subject of very extensive research. In both disciplines, it has also long been recognized that problems in explaining consciousness and self consciousness are key to an understanding of the mind. However, relatively few attempts have been made (within each discipline and across disciplines) to link those two areas of study in a systematic way, and to investigate in detail possible connections between emotions, on the one hand, and consciousness and self consciousness, on the other.

The aim of the workshop was to bring together a group of philosophers and psychologists who have a shared interest in the study of emotions, experience and the self. More precisely, the workshop set out to examine the question as to whether emotions can be seen to play a causal and/or constitutive role in different varieties of conscious experience and self consciousness.

Four cross-disciplinary areas of research in which this question arises were identified in advance of the workshop, each forming the basis for a symposium in which they would be approached from a number of different theoretical and empirical perspectives:

- Affect, Emotion and Conscious Experience
- Emotion, Identity, Autobiography and Self Awareness
- Emotion, Social Interaction and Moral Motivation
- Emotion, the Self and Other Minds

Discussion on topics related to each of these areas centred particularly on questions as to how philosophical concerns about the nature of emotions and their role in experience, action, and understanding of self and others, can be reconciled with work in cognitive psychology on the psychological mechanisms involved in emotions, as well as work in developmental psychology on children's developing understanding of emotions.

In particular, what emerged from discussions were three key core areas in which future research could achieve a genuine breakthrough on central questions of common concern: (1) Conscious Experience and the Unity of the Concept 'Emotion', (2) Emotions, Normativity and Interpersonal Relations, (3) Emotions, Self Consciousness and Causality. (See section 3, below, for more detailed information).

The workshop showed the centrality of future work in these three areas to making progress on a number of long-standing issues in both philosophy and psychology, as well as a tremendous amount of enthusiasm for and interest in pursuing such work

from within a cross-disciplinary framework involving collaboration between different centres of research on a multinational level.

### Background and Organisation

The workshop was organized by members of the Joint Philosophy and Psychology Project on Consciousness and Self Consciousness, based at Warwick University. Previous work within this project had been sponsored by a project grant (1997-2001) from the Arts and Humanities Research Board, UK, and had focussed particularly on the involvement of consciousness and self consciousness in spatio-temporal reasoning, memory, agency, joint attention and communication. During the course of this work, two issues had emerged as critical for moving forward in the study of consciousness and self consciousness: (a) methodologically, the importance of bringing together philosophers and psychologists who between them can devise a substantive theoretical and empirical framework within which to conduct research, (b) substantively, the importance of further theoretical and empirical work especially on emotions and their, often overlooked, role in experience, action and self-awareness. We were therefore delighted to be awarded an European Science Foundation grant to host an interdisciplinary Exploratory Workshop on Emotion, Consciousness and Self Consciousness.

The workshop was convened by Christoph Hoerl, with substantive help from Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler, and in particular from Stephen Butterfill, who acted as local organizer in Cambridge. The conference facilities and accommodation at St John's College in Cambridge provided an ideal environment in which to pursue an immensely fruitful exchange of ideas and intensive discussion on possible future directions in research.

The response to invitations had been extremely positive, with 14 experts agreeing to give talks during the three days of the workshop. One hour had been scheduled in for each speaker, but speakers had been asked specifically to leave at least 20 minutes of that for discussion. The opportunity to have time for discussion after talks and during the breaks was very much welcomed by the participants. There was also a concluding general discussion, which was taken up with much interest and engagement. The total number of participants was 41, including six doctoral students. From the start, it had been part of the plan for the workshop to give doctoral students an opportunity to participate, in order to foster research on topics related to the workshop at postgraduate level. We were therefore very grateful for additional financial support from St John's College, which allowed us to award six postgraduate bursaries.

## 2. Scientific Content of the Event

The workshop started with a presentation from **Sami Gülgöz** (ESF Standing Committee for the Humanities and Koç University), in which structure, aims and activities of the ESF were outlined, with particular emphasis on the role of the Explanatory Workshop Programme within the structure of support offered by the ESF.

**Christoph Hoerl** (University of Warwick) then gave a 15-minute introductory presentation, which aimed to identify a variety of different ways in which the relationship between emotions, on the one hand, and consciousness and self-consciousness, on the other, might be understood. In particular, he distinguished between two different kinds of claims: (a) causal claims, which suggest that certain forms of consciousness and self-consciousness depend for their development on the ability to enter into emotional engagement with the world, with others or with aspects of one's own life, and (b) constitutive claims, which suggest that such kinds of emotional engagement can themselves be seen as the vehicles for certain forms of conscious awareness and self-consciousness. He sketched three areas in which such causal or constitutive claims might be put forward: (1) in spelling out a sense in which features of the world must be able to gain significance for a subject herself, if that subject is to be ascribed a conscious point of view on the world, (2) in spelling out the specific way in which we relate to our own past in autobiographical remembering, and (3) in spelling out the kinds of social engagement with others that underlie our understanding of ourselves as one subject amongst others.

The topic of constitutive claims specifically about the relationship between emotions and consciousness was taken up by the first invited speaker, **Jane Heal** (St John's College, Cambridge). Heal highlighted a key problem with the very notion of a 'conscious state', which is that its interpretation requires a prior understanding of how the adjective 'conscious' is meant to modify the noun 'state', as there are numerous different ways in which this modification can be thought of. Similar problems, according to her, attend the notion 'what it is like', which is often used to illustrate the qualitative aspect of conscious experience. In particular, she argued that the notion of 'what it is like' is typically understood too narrowly, in a way that neglects the complex ways in which factors such as a subject's memories, interests and engagement with the world might be said to be involved in shaping her conscious awareness. This comes out, according to Heal, if we consider the sense in which even 'what it is like (for S) to be in Cambridge', for instance, can be understood to characterize a distinctive aspect of an individual's conscious point of view. It is in the

context of elucidating this more broadly understood notion of 'what it is like' that, according to Heal, claims about a constitutive involvement of emotions in consciousness might gain particular relevance and plausibility.

The following two talks dealt with psychological accounts of different aspects of emotion experience itself, and the way it is linked to consciousness. **James A. Russell** (Boston College) argued for and outlined an alternative to the standard assumption that emotion is a natural kind, that discrete basic emotions are biologically fixed universals, and that the consciousness of emotion is a raw primitive sensation. According to what he called a 'psychological constructionist perspective', three kinds of emotion-related events are instead distinguished: (1) Core Affect (a simple, non-intentional state always present, describable as feeling good or bad, activated or deactivated); (2) Perception of Affective Quality (the perception that some object has the ability to alter Core Affect); and (3) Emotional Meta-Experience (a self-perception as having a specific emotion such as 'anger' or 'fear', or 'amae' or 'fago').

The next talk was given jointly by **John Lambie** (Anglia Polytechnic University) and **Anthony Marcel** (MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge). Lambie started by setting out a taxonomy of different types of, or ingredients in, emotion experience, distinguishing in particular between 'first-order phenomenal experience', and 'second order awareness'. He argued that the content of first-order phenomenal experience, in the case of a given emotion, differs according to whether it is directed towards the self or towards the world. In the case of second-order awareness, content depends on three factors: (a) directedness to self or world, (b) mode of attending, and (c) focus on evaluation or action. Phenomenological considerations as well as clinical evidence were put forward in order to illustrate and substantiate these claims. In the second half of the talk, Marcel expanded specifically on the connection between attention and emotion experience. He argued that first-order phenomenology, although it can be affected by focal attention, is not in principle dependent on focal attention. Second-order awareness, by contrast, is created by focal attention. In particular, Marcel distinguished between different modes of focal attention which influence the content of second-order awareness. He argued that they can be distinguished along two dimensions: (i) analytic vs. synthetic, and (ii) detached vs. immersed. Again, clinical studies of a variety of different disorders of emotion and emotion experience were used in support of these distinctions.

The Friday afternoon ended with a talk by **Sabine A. Döring** (University of Essen), in which she defended a view of emotions as 'affective perceptions', based on

considerations about their distinctive role in rational motivation. The starting point for her argument was the intuition that theories of practical reason must meet a specific psychological requirement: normative, justificatory reasons must be shown to have motivational force and to be at least potentially explanatory of action. In any case where someone does act for a reason, Döring argued, the reason must also explain his action; otherwise he would not act for the reason, but only in conformity with it. The so-called 'belief-desire model' of action explanation, according to Döring, cannot account for the required internal connection between justificatory and explanatory reasons for action. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief-desire model, she claimed that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotion, according to her, contributes to both the explanation and the justification of action, and thus constitutes an irreducible category in practical reasoning, which is best captured by classifying emotions as affective perceptions. Döring's talk concluded by outlining a holist account of practical reason which emerges from that claim.

In the first talk on Saturday morning, **Peter Hobson** (Tavistock Clinic and University College, London) drew on extensive research involving children with autism to explore the role that specifically emotional aspects of interpersonal relations play in children's cognitive development. He suggested that symbolic thinking and imagination on the one hand, and self-awareness and knowledge of other minds on the other, develop in intimate relation to one another (emerging together in relatively sophisticated form around the middle of the second year of life in typically developing children). In particular, he argued that the special quality of thought and creativity that comes with symbolizing requires an awareness of connectedness but also separateness between the self as holder of attitudes and the 'objects' to which those attitudes are directed. This kind of awareness, according to Hobson, can only develop in social interaction with others, and requires an ability to relate to other people's relatedness to oneself and to a shared world. He put forward an account according to which one basic form of such relatedness is emotional; and that a special means to differentiate self from other and symbol from referent is through identification with other people's emotional attitudes to a shared world. Children with autism, he suggested, have particular problems identifying with the attitudes of others in this way. He presented empirical studies involving children with autism (conducted together with Gayathri Chidambi, also present at workshop), which lends support to his account.

The significance of emotional aspects of social interactions in development was also a theme of the talk by **György Gergely** (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest). Expanding on his 'social biofeedback model of affect-mirroring', he argued that empathic emotion-reflective displays of the caregiver during affect-regulative interactions serve a number of central functions during early socio-emotional development. Caregivers often react to children's emotional expressions with 'marked' (exaggerated and schematic) displays of the same emotion. According to Gergely's model, these displays serve as input to a modular mechanism of contingency detection and maximizing, which plays a crucial role in four separate (but related) developmental achievements: (1) Sensitization to primary, initially non-conscious, procedural emotion states; (2) Self-regulation of affects; (3) Establishing second-order representations for primary emotions, providing the first cognitive means for introspectively accessing and attributing emotions to the self; (4) Acquiring a generalized 'pretend-mode' of emotional communication. He also argued that this model can provide a theoretical framework for explaining the development of pathologies of emotional self-awareness and control in terms of deviant parental styles of affect-mirroring.

Whilst Hobson and Gergely had primarily focussed on the nature and development of what might be called a sense of self as one subject amongst others, **Peter Goldie** (King's College, London) examined in detail the way in which emotions are implicated in a narrative, or autobiographical, sense of self. Central to his account was the notion of 'narrative thinking', as a particular mode of thought typically involved in remembering our own past lives. In such narrative thinking, he suggested, we look back on ourselves as we were in the past, and on the things that we did and that happened to us, from a perspective that is external to the remembered actions and events. In particular, he argued that the ability to respond emotionally to these actions and events from the distance that this external perspective make possible is key to developing a narrative sense of self. This, he suggested, can explain particular disturbances in one's sense of self in contexts where one is unable to respond emotionally in the appropriate way, especially when looking back on traumatic or tragic events.

The talks on Saturday afternoon were all concerned with children's ability to understand and communicate emotions, and the role emotions play in children's assessment of social situations. **Gertrud Nunner-Winkler** (Max-Planck-Institute for Psychological Research, Munich) started off with a talk on the role of emotions in moral understanding. She distinguished four different views concerning the relevance

of emotions to morality, according to which the role played by emotions is either seen as being (a) constitutive, e.g. as suggested by Schopenhauer, who claimed that only those actions are moral that are committed from compassion, (b) functional, as is sometimes suggested in research on altruism, according to which empathy motivates moral behaviour, or (c) indicative, e.g. as suggested by Kant, who held that pricks of conscience after wrongdoing indicate a prior commitment to morality. Nunner-Winkler presented data on moral understanding from 2 studies (a longitudinal study of 4- to 17-year olds and a cohort comparison involving 20- to 30-, 40- to 50-, and 65- to 75-year olds), which she used to argue for the following claims: (1) As far as moral motivation is concerned, emotions play an indicative role only; (2) There is a sociohistorical change in the prototypical emotions experienced after wrongdoing: Guilt comes to be replaced by regret, which can be seen as reflecting a change in the way moral motivation is anchored in the personality.

The talk given by **Josef Perner** (University of Salzburg) focussed specifically on the understanding of emotions in children below the age of 4 years. He developed a theory according to which children up to 4 years understand feelings on the basis of what kind of situation a person is in or specifically associated with. The developmentally most basic distinction between happy and unhappy/sad, according to this theory, corresponds to being in a desirable (good) or undesirable (bad) situation. Perner argued that young children's ability to understand differing emotions in this way does not yet involve an understanding of subjectivity of emotion, i.e., that one person feels happy and another person unhappy about the same situation. In particular, their understanding meets its limit with competitive situations, where one has to grasp that winner and loser will have opposite feelings about one and the same situation: the outcome of the interaction. He presented a number of empirical studies using conflicting desires and competitive games to show that young children do indeed fail to understand these situations and the different emotions they give rise to. Such understanding, according to Perner, only emerges with the general appreciation that people can have different perspectives on one and the same situation (e.g., true and false beliefs) at about 4 years .

**Mark Meerum Terwogt** (Free University, Amsterdam) presented findings from studies conducted together with Carolien Rieffe (also present at workshop), which examined the connection between understanding of mental states and communication of emotions in the context of emotional problems exhibited by deaf children. He argued that a number of emotional problems in deaf children can be explained by an atypical theory of mind development. In particular he suggested that,



as a result of their communicative limitations, deaf children's theory of mind reasoning becomes mainly focussed on the desire aspect. According to this theory, deaf children give a high priority to expressing desires and needs unambiguously, due to the specific problems they encounter in daily communication with others. This, he argued, has repercussions on both their own emotional reaction patterns and the way in which they understand others' emotions.

In the final talk on Saturday, **Barbara Juen** (University of Innsbruck) presented and discussed results from three studies on conflict regulation between mothers and children from one and a half years to three years of age. The studies were carried out together with Eva Bänninger Huber (also present at workshop). The aim of Juen's talk was to argue for the claim that the development of moral emotions can only be explained from a relational point of view, taking into account the kinds of strategies that both caregivers and children use to reach a balance between conflictive tension and security of attachment. Her studies had identified a variety of different strategies used by caregivers, and a number of different forms of compliance and non-compliance used by children, to modulate conflictive tension. They had also indicated that different forms of smiling and laughter play a central role in enhancing attachment security. In particular, she argued that the development of feelings of guilt or shame, reflecting a specific kind of internalization of goals and norms, depends crucially on the caregiver's ability and willingness to support the child's growing self regulation of the balance between conflictive tension and attachment security.

The final two talks of the workshop, on Sunday morning, concentrated on possible links between emotions, social-communicative interaction and our understanding of our own and other's minds, a complex of issues that had already been of relevance in some of the other talks (e.g. Hobson, Gergely, Meerum Terwogt). **Paul Harris** (Harvard University) presented and discussed recent studies concerning the role of language in children's understanding of emotions, which had indicated that children's understanding of emotions correlates significantly with their language abilities. He argued that the findings of these studies could not be fully explained in terms of other factors, especially attachment security. However, he also argued that this left open a number of different ways in which the connection between language abilities and understanding emotion might be understood, especially with respect to the way in which language and communication might contribute to children's development of a theory of mind, and the way such a theory of mind is implicated in children's understanding of emotions.

The final talk was given by **John Campbell** (Corpus Christi College Oxford), who started off with a review of a number of the other speaker's talks. He argued that a common theme underlying a variety of proposals concerning the role of emotions in consciousness and self consciousness had been the idea of a connection between emotions and subjects' grasp of particular kinds of causal relations. He distinguished between an explicit and an implicit grasp of causation, and suggested that many aspects of engagement with one's surroundings show an implicit grasp of causation which does not require self consciousness, whereas self consciousness is required for an explicit grasp of one's own causal relations to one's surroundings. He focussed in particular on the kinds of causal relations between different subject's mental states involved in interpersonal interaction. Such causal relations, he argued, are neither governed by purely physical principles, nor by the kinds of rational principles that govern causal relations between mental states (esp. propositional attitudes) internal to one subject. Instead, he argued that emotions, especially the so-called 'self-regarding' or moral emotions, are a crucial factor in an explicit grasp of the way in which our own mental states can be causally connected to other people's mental states, and thus play a key role in informing self consciousness.

Two hours had been set aside for a concluding general discussion at the end of the workshop. **Michael Martin** (University College, London) had kindly agreed to introduce the discussion with some structuring remarks, identifying a number of common strands running through the various contributions to the workshop, and issues of debate between different speakers. During the discussion itself, as had already been the case in the discussions after individual talks, a set of key questions for future research emerged, which are summarized in section 3, below.

### **3. Assessment of the Results, Contribution to the Further Direction of the Field**

The workshop far exceeded expectations in the way it generated energy and enthusiasm for cross-disciplinary research and brought to light key questions of common concern, linking different existing strands of work, both empirical and theoretical, in a novel way. The exploratory nature of the workshop, in particular, was very much in the foreground during discussions, and the consensus at the end of the workshop was that a real breakthrough had been achieved in identifying avenues of future research which open up a new way forward in the study of emotions, consciousness, and self consciousness, and of the connections between them. Specifically, what emerged from discussion were three main directions for future research central to making progress in this area, each involving a set of questions (a) on which there is a great deal of empirical and theoretical work in adjacent, but as yet largely unintegrated areas in psychology, (b) which reflect long-standing and central concerns in philosophy, but ones which are often framed in ways that are unhelpful to cross-disciplinary exchange, and (c) which promise to yield great dividends within other areas of the study of the mind if explored within a framework that can unite psychological and philosophical approaches.

Furthermore, the workshop showed that research in these three areas could draw upon considerable expertise in existing centres of research in Austria, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, and strengthen international links by providing a distinctive, new agenda for collaborative work.

#### I. Conscious Experience and the Unity of the Concept 'Emotion'

The study of emotions is one of the areas in which the challenge of reconciling common sense and science comes into particularly sharp focus. A number of talks at the workshop could be seen as exploring the nature and development of our common-sense image of emotions. In this common-sense image, emotions are typically understood as playing a particular kind of explanatory role in, e.g., rational motivation, social interaction, or self consciousness (see, e.g., Campbell, Döring, Goldie, Hobson, Meerum Terwogt, Nunner-Winkler, Perner). Yet, it has sometimes been argued that, from the point of view of a scientific account which focuses on the operation of psychological mechanisms, no one thing that is able to serve this explanatory role can be identified. In other words, certain empirical findings seem to put considerable pressure on the unity of the concept of emotion (different perspectives on this issue emerged, e.g., from the talks by Russell, Lambie & Marcel, Gergely).

As became clear during discussions at the workshop, the issue as to whether there is a unitary, but empirically tractable, concept of emotion is particularly central to questions regarding connections between emotion and consciousness, in at least two respects: (1) Intuitively, our common sense understanding of emotions centres on their phenomenology. It is ultimately their nature as particular kinds of conscious phenomena that, according to this understanding, gives emotions their explanatory role; (2) On the other hand, there are also strong intuitions that emotions play a crucial role in making possible a conscious point of view on the world in the first place, by providing a background against which individual features of that world gain significance for the subject herself (see, e.g., Heal). Both of these intuitions seem to be in conflict with views according to which what we call emotions can be decomposed into a variety of more primitive phenomena, involving the relatively independent operation of different mechanisms. However, they might also provide a fruitful starting point for the development of alternative theories of the role such mechanisms (e.g. attention) play in emotions, from within a framework that seeks to unite common sense and science.

## II. Emotions, Normativity and Interpersonal Relations

The apparent resistance of values and morals to certain forms of naturalistic reduction has long been a subject of extensive debate in philosophy. In a largely separate development, closely analogous concerns regarding the irreducibility of intentional and/or qualitative aspects of conscious mental states have more recently become the focus of discussion regarding what has become known as ‘the problem of locating mind in nature’. Several talks at the workshop indicated that these two sets of issues may not be as separate from each other as they might seem. In particular, substantial benefits may be derived from examining in detail the (potentially interconnected) ways in which both normativity and consciousness essentially bring in the subject’s own point of view (see, e.g., Campbell, Döring, Heal, Hobson, Lambie & Marcel).

It also became apparent that any such approach, which seeks to link normativity and consciousness, is likely to give emotions a key role as a central linking factor.

Intuitively, it is difficult to ascribe a conscious point of view on the world to a creature without emotions, i.e. a creature whose activity is driven entirely by its given biological needs as an organism (see, e.g., work by Dickinson, also present at the workshop). Arguably, what stands behind this intuition is the thought that, in the absence of emotions, there is nothing in that world that could be said to be of any value for such a creature as an individual, nothing it takes a selective interest in for

itself. To get beyond intuitions in this area, however, detailed work, both empirical and theoretical, is needed that can shed light on the motivational force of emotions, and in particular on the way in which emotions are linked to attention and action. A related set of issues concerns the way in which emotions are involved in our understanding of ourselves as one subject amongst others, and in particular the awareness of normative dimensions of interpersonal relations (see, e.g., Gergely, Harris, Hobson, Juen, Nunner-Winkler, Perner). For instance, early forms of social interaction, such as social referencing, attempts at comforting others or teasing them, seem to involve a kind of engagement with others as subjects that can be present before the onset of a full-blown 'theory of mind'. Such engagement seems to centre particularly on others' emotional states, and the form it takes is itself essentially emotional. Crucially, however, such engagement can also often be seen as involving the communication, understanding or testing of norms. How emotions might thus serve as entry points for both an understanding of other minds and a grasp of, e.g., values and morals, and how these issues may be linked with one another, are questions requiring further empirical and theoretical study that could have a major impact on a range of long-standing concerns in both philosophy and psychology.

### III. Emotions, Self Consciousness and Causality.

Communication and other forms of social interaction involve the causal impact of one person's mental states on those of another person. As such, competence in them requires a grasp of causal relations rarely studied in current theoretical or empirical research on the development and nature of causal understanding. Such research instead tends to focus on the understanding of causal relations within the purely physical realm, between mental states and behaviour, or between mental states internal to one person. However, it can be argued that understanding the particular ways in which other people's mental states can be causally influenced by one's own, and vice versa, is crucial to possessing a concept of what mental states are, and thus essential to full-blown self consciousness (see, e.g., Campbell, Gergely, Hobson, Meerum Terwogt, for different forms such a claim may take). From this perspective, progress on questions regarding the development and nature of a 'theory of mind' and self consciousness are severely hampered by a lack of detailed attention to genuinely interactive aspects of cognitive-emotional development in current research. Emotions seem to play a key role in social interaction in at least two respects, each reflecting a particular kind of such causal understanding: (1) As was already remarked above, developmentally early forms of social interaction seem to centre specifically on emotions, with children responding to others' emotions, attempting to

alleviate their distress, or trying to provoke emotional reactions. These forms of interaction seem to indicate an implicit grasp of causal relations between the child's own mental states and those of others. (2) However, somewhat later in development, social interactions are also the prime context in which so-called self-regarding or moral emotions, such as pride, shame or guilt, emerge, indicating the development of an explicit grasp of the ways in which other's mental states can be causally influenced by one's own, and vice versa.

There is a great deal of, as yet largely untapped, research potential in studying what might be called the relational nature of self consciousness that these forms of interactive emotional engagement with others make apparent. New research paradigms, putting this relational nature of self consciousness centre stage, and investigating in detail the contributions made by the different kinds of implicit and explicit causal understanding sketched above, promise to shed significant new light on existing concerns in research on the development of a 'theory of mind' and its relation to the self.



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### **Final Programme**

#### Friday, 21st March

- 12:30pm*                      *Lunch*
- 2pm-2.10pm                  Presentation by ESF representative **Sami Gülgöz** (ESF Standing Committee for the Humanities)
- 2:10pm-2.30pm              Welcome and Introductory Remarks by **Christoph Hoerl** (Philosophy, Warwick)
- 2:30pm-7pm**                  **Symposium: Affect, Emotion, and Conscious Experience**  
Chair: **Naomi Eilan** (Philosophy, Warwick)
- 2:30pm-3:30pm              **Jane Heal** (Philosophy, Cambridge): 'Emotion and Consciousness'
- 3:30pm-4:30pm              **James Russell** (Psychology, Boston College): 'Core affect, emotion, and conscious experience: A psychological constructionist perspective'
- 4:30pm-5pm*                      *Coffee Break*
- 5pm-6pm                      **John Lambie** (Psychology, Anglia Polytechnic University) and **Anthony Marcel** (Psychology, MRC-CBU Cambridge): 'Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience'
- 6pm-7pm                      **Sabine Döring** (Philosophy, Essen): 'Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation'
- 7:30pm*                          *Dinner*

#### Saturday, 22nd March

- 9am-12:30pm**                  **Symposium: Emotion, Identity, Autobiography, and Self-Awareness**  
Chair: **Christoph Hoerl** (Philosophy, Warwick)
- 9am-10am                      **Peter Hobson** (Psychology, University College London): 'Emotion, identification and the self: Challenges from autism research'
- 10am-11am                      **György Gergely** (Psychology, Budapest): 'The Social Biofeedback Theory of Parental Affect-mirroring: The development of emotional self-awareness and self-control in infancy'

Saturday, 22nd March [contd.]

- 11am-11:30am *Coffee Break*
- 11:30am-12:30am **Peter Goldie** (Philosophy, King's College London): 'One's remembered past: narrative thinking, emotion and the external perspective'
- 12:30pm *Lunch*
- 2pm-6:30pm** **Symposium: Emotion, Social Interaction, and Moral Motivation**  
Chair: **Johannes Roessler** (Philosophy, Warwick)
- 2pm-3pm **Gertrud Nunner-Winkler** (Psychology, Max-Planck Institute for Psychology, Munich): 'Emotions and moral understanding'
- 3pm-4pm **Josef Perner** (Psychology, Salzburg): 'Young children's objective conception of emotions: 'happy' and 'sad' as consequences of being involved in particular situations'
- 4pm-4:30pm *Coffee Break*
- 4:30pm-5:30pm **Mark Meerum Terwogt** (Psychology, Free University of Amsterdam): 'Communication of emotions in deaf children'
- 5:30pm-6:30pm **Barbara Juen** (Psychology, Innsbruck): 'The development of guilt feelings in the context of early conflicts between child and caregiver'
- 7pm *Dinner*

Sunday, 23rd March

- 9:00am-11am** **Symposium: Emotion, the Self, and Other Minds**  
Chair: **Stephen Butterfill** (Philosophy, Cambridge)
- 9am-10am **Paul Harris** (Psychology, Harvard): 'Language and children's understanding of emotion.'
- 10am-11am **John Campbell** (Philosophy, Oxford): 'Self-Consciousness, Causation and Emotion'
- 11am-11:30am *Coffee Break*
- 11:30am** **Concluding General Discussion**  
introduced and chaired by **Michael Martin** (Philosophy, University College London)
- 1:30pm *Lunch*



## 5. Final List of Participants

1. Dr Anthony Atkinson, Department of Psychology, King Alfred's College, Sparkford Road, Winchester, Hampshire SO22 4NR, UK [email: A.Atkinson@wkac.ac.uk]
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## 6. Statistical Information on Participants

### Country of Residency

#### *All Participants:*

Austria	3
Germany	2
Hungary	2
The Netherlands	1
Spain	2
Turkey	1
United Kingdom & N. Ireland	27
United States	3

#### *Invited Speakers only:*

Austria	2
Germany	2
Hungary	1
The Netherlands	1
United Kingdom	6
United States	2

### Seniority

Doctoral Students	7
Postdoctoral Researchers	2
Lecturers	13
Research Scientists	1
Professors	18

### Age Profile

<b>Age</b>	<b>20-30</b>	<b>30-40</b>	<b>40-50</b>	<b>50-60</b>	<b>60+</b>
<b>Participants</b>	5	11	11	12	2

### Proportions female/male

<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
18	23
(44%)	(56%)