EUROPEAN SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Standing Committee for the Social Sciences

The Workshop Report

of the first Forward Look Workshop in the Social
Sciences

Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity and Collective Action:

Consequences of the Opening up of
National Borders in Europe

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The workshop programme and list of participants can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.

C O N T E N T S

Introduction

Robert Erikson and Amélie Mummendey

In the last decades Europe has undergone processes of social change, which have profoundly influenced the character of European societies. Prominent among these processes have been increased migration and the development of social movements based on regional issues, ethnic belongingness or religious beliefs. Together these developments have tended to be perceived as involving a progressive weakening and transformation of European nation-states.

A significant manifestation of such transformation of the nation-state is the increasing salience of hitherto non-salient social identities, whether, ethnic, regional, religious or transnational and their centrality in both national movement and international arenas. National societies are confronted with the transformation of meaningful social identities be it on the level of particularistic minorities or transnational superordinate common identities. These developments attest to the weakening of the" traditional" nation state and its basic components comprising citizenship, collective identities, the construction of public spaces and modes of political participation. The homogenising forces exerted by the nation states are challenged by the new conceptions of belongingness, be it minority or supranational social movements, which proclaim their right and entitlement to be represented in central institutions and their decision processes.

The contours and impact of these processes differ between European societies. These differences are partly influenced by differences in national immigration laws and policies. They can be seen also in the ways in which different European societies designate their respective minorities, e.g. 'foreigners' in Germany, 'racial minorities' in Great Britain, 'immigrants' in France, 'ethnic and cultural minorities' in the Netherlands.

These different processes and movements have been studied widely – especially in terms of growth of what has been called the politics of identity. But up to now, they have not been systematically and comparatively explored in terms of their mutual interactions and overall impact on the public sphere and political arenas In order to conceptualise and implement such a systematic and comparative approach towards the study of the complex processes of societal change in the different European nations, a major collaborative effort aimed at the development of joint multidisciplinary research programs is necessary. With its Forward Look the European Science Foundation (ESF) has created a new instrument which has the potential to enable us to develop precisely the type of ambitious programme that is needed in order to pursue the goals outlined above. The Forward Look instrument is intended to enable Europe's scientific community to develop, in interaction with policy makers, medium and long-term views of future research requirements in multidisciplinary topics. Consequently, following a suggestion originally made by Shmuel Eisenstadt and taken up by the Standing Committee of the Social Sciences, the ESF decided to devote a' Scientific Forward Look' to the topic of "Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity and Collective Action: Consequences of the opening up of national borders in Europe".

At the same time as national borders within the European Union have been opened up, Europe's external borders have become increasingly permeable. One correlate of permeable borders is migration. Mobility of single individuals or large-scale social groups has become a major feature of present day societies. Mobility and migration affect home and host societies in terms of both their fundamental structures and functioning. The Forward Look Workshop's aim is to outline and discuss challenges for social research relating to the political, institutional, structural and cultural consequences of the opening up of national borders in Europe for the diversity of its respective societies, for the identity of its citizens and the rise of collective action. From the varying perspectives of the social sciences (predominantly political science, sociology and social psychology) current approaches towards mobility and migration as large scale consequences of the opening up of national borders have been documented and analysed under four major headings, namely Diversity, Identity, Collective Action and Integration. These areas constitute the core topics of the workshop. Invited papers addressed

questions concerning concepts of diversity and integration which influence national immigration policies. They also reviewed the evidence concerning the factors underlying the creation and modification of group identities and intergroup relations, and the conditions under which cooperative, conflictual or ultimately hostile and violent exchanges between groups may be expected. Within the context of on-going debates relating to changing identities and the declining relevance of the nation state for citizenship and civil society, significant attention was focused on questions relating to the factors influencing political participation and mobilisation and the dynamics of social movements. A major aim of the workshop was to provide a forum for informed debate and speculation on the potential for future multidisciplinary research. Accordingly, particular attention was devoted to encouraging frank exchanges between leading members from different disciplines. One of the unintended outcomes of this process was the revelation of the extent to which even such experts were frequently ignorant of work and achievements in other disciplines. Overcoming such ignorance is clearly a prerequisite of the promotion of collaborative multidisciplinary research in this area.

Over and above enhancing such communication between academic communities, the workshop also set itself the ambition of creating an environment in which academic social scientific views would be confronted with the challenge of responding to the experiences of and questions posed by practitioners and policy makers active in the field of migration, cultural diversity and integration. Space was also provided for a more wide-ranging critical exchange of ideas between both sides relating to their respective framing of problems and research questions. One outcome of this exchange between the diverse backgrounds and perspectives was an acknowledgement on all sides of the importance of this first step in breaking down barriers and a strengthening of the resolve to continue this process through the initiation of new collaborative activities and the development of ambitious research programs in the broad area of Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity, and Collective Action.

Welcome Address

Enric Banda

I would like to welcome all participants of the workshop devoted to discussing this new and exciting ESF instrument, one that is aimed at expanding future multidisciplinary research far beyond the 'state-of-the-art' in the relevant areas and at providing platform for interaction between researchers and policy makers to produce a long-lasting impact in a field of common interest to scientists and practitioners alike.

The rationale behind this new instrument is to unite scientific foresight and national and European planning for research funding, and to gather key scientists and policy makers to determine how these groups can work together to create an infrastructure capable of responding to current and future demands. Traditional ESF instruments focus more on already identified directions of research with an intention to advance knowledge in the relevant areas, whereas the Forward Look encourages a substantial dose of innovativeness in order to truly reflect upon the realistic future and to deal with some important issues practically. This rational starting point by no means excludes a more adventurous approach, or 'thinking the unthinkable' – as you know, this has often proven to be more realistic than the generally 'accepted' view.

I am pleased to admit that this workshop is the first in a series of Forward Look workshops being organized by the standing committees that means that the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences is a pioneer in this respect. When the idea of the Forward Looks was presented, Robert Erikson – then Chair of the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences – immediately seized the opportunity and suggested a workshop along the line of ideas expressed on this topic in a paper by Professor Shmuel Eisenstadt. Subsequently, Amélie Mummendey agreed to co-chair with Robert the meetings of a preparatory group that was charged with the task of structuring this workshop thematically and organizationally. I would like to extend special thanks to all these – named and unnamed– persons for the enthusiasm and hard work they have put into developing the workshop programme and for their continued presence. I should perhaps also mention the good job done by the ESF unit but would prefer to leave it up to you as it is our, ESF staff, privilege to serve to you, representatives of the scientific community, effectively.

The topic of this workshop - immigration and a wide spectrum of issues related to international migration – currently belongs to one of the 'hot', indeed primordial areas for the future of Europe. I believe that the outcome of this meeting could have a big impact in years to come by attracting to a subsequent project both leading European scholars and international funding agencies, with perhaps a predominant interest of the European Union.

The ESF is committed to real, decisive action where a difference can be made or it is necessary to define a new policy. Let me therefore conclude by assuring you of the ESF's continuing support in developing an action plan to set goals and suggest means of implementation. And I wish you an interesting and fruitful meeting here in Menaggio. Naturally, I also look forward to hearing the outcome of the meeting and of any resulting agenda for prospective, joint science and policy collaborative projects.

Welcome Speech

Christopher Whelan

As Chair of the Standing Committee of the Social Sciences I would like to follow Professor Banda in welcoming all of you to this Forward Look Workshop. The plans for this workshop were well advanced when I took up office at the beginning of this year. The enormous effort involved in organising this occasion has therefore been entirely borne by the Organising Committee co-chaired by Amélie Mummendey and my predecessor Robert Erikson. However, in doing so I know they have been able to rely on the sustained support of the SCSS unit and. in this regard, I would like on their behalf to single out for acknowledge the efforts of Wlodek Okrasa and Rhona Heywood and Geneviève Schauinger.

One of the objectives of the Forward Look instrument is to bring together the best ideas and capabilities as a means for exploring new ideas and directions. This approach seems to be particularly appropriate to the theme of this conference. Here we were confronted with a set of issues relating to international migration, ethnic relations, diversity and multi-culturalism that transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries. The nature of the questions addressed is also such that any attempt to introduce a watertight distinction between research and policy questions or between academic and practical issues, must necessarily appear somewhat artificial.

A glance at the programme shows how admirably the organisers have succeeded in bringing together outstanding contributors in this area from within and beyond Europe. The participation of such an outstanding group of scholars in these proceedings ensures that the final record of the workshop will provide a valuable record of the state of the art. Valuable though this is, the ambitions of the Forward Look process go substantially beyond this. The workshop has been structured to encourage debate across disciples, across national boundaries and between academics and policy makers. It is intended therefore that the dialogue which emerges over the next four days will serve as a crucial input into a process that will lead to action plan for a much broader initiative in this area. Without seeking to anticipate the outcome of this workshop, it is already clear from the available inputs that an ambitious agenda will need to deal not only with the development of a European research programme but also with the impact of such research on policy formulation and the need to develop bridging mechanisms which facilitate reciprocal influence. I would like finally to thank all of you for the efforts that you have made to contribute to and participate in this workshop and to assure you of the ESF Standing Committee for the Social Sciences' determination to continue the process that has been initiated by this is event.

GENERAL SESSION

Introduction

Robert Erikson

In August 1914 the members of the German, French and British parliaments had to take a stand on the issue of financing the upcoming war. Those who were elected for social democratic parties, which were all included in the second international, had to consider whether they should remain faithful to the idea of an international working class in opposition to war or whether they should stand up for their nations. As we know they nearly all voted with their nations to finance the war. The identification with the nations turned out to be stronger than that with an international working class.

The Europe that appeared after the First World War was much more divided by borders than the one that preceded it. This new Europe of many independent nation states is now slowly vanishing, both because of the integration of the nations inside the European Union, and the projected enlargement of the union. Mobility between European nations is becoming much less restricted, while Europe is, if anything, raising its borders to many of those who want to come here. This happens at the same time as the population of Europe is becoming much older with decreasing death rates as well as with very low fertility rates. The burden on the active population to pay for the inactive one will become heavier and may lead to internal conflicts in many countries.

The economic viability of a single currency region depends on a work force that is willing to move from areas with lower productivity increases to those with higher rates of increase. This is another major challenge to the Union or more precisely to the European Monetary Union. That is, the lowering of the borders has made it easier for people to move within the Union and the currency reform has made it essential that parts of the work force actually take that opportunity, but will they really do so?

It seems to me as if Europe still very much consists of separate nations in the sense that identification with, and loyalty to, the nation are much stronger than to the overarching union. I would expect that a European soccer team taking on one from the U.S. will not raise the same strong feelings of enthusiasm and support as if two teams were engaged in an intra-union contest between, say, England and Germany. This strong identification with the nation is perhaps, ironically enough, especially true for the members of the working class. We may be moving in the direction of a situation with a European upper middle class and national working classes.

Despite the reluctance to accept immigrants from countries outside Europe, most European nations now include large groups of inhabitants of non-European origin. In Sweden more than one inhabitant in ten was born abroad, and many of them come from countries outside the European Union. Some of those could to a certain extent be said to remain in their old cultures. They hardly participate in Swedish social life, they live in areas where a many of their fellow countrymen also live, and they watch their homeland's television via satellite. The clashes between the old and the new culture may be tragic, in at least two severe cases young women have been murdered by relatives - an uncle and the father - because they could not accept the girls' wish to live like other young girls in Sweden.

Some have difficulties to adapt to the new environment, others soon fit in. Sons and daughters of Turkish and Greek immigrants to Sweden continue above compulsory level at school to a lesser extent than children to native Swedes and this is true also when we control for the social class and educational level of the parents. But it is also true that children to the same groups of parents more often continue to university than children to native Swedes, again if we control for the education and social class of the parents. Some young people obviously have difficulties in adapting to the Swedish society while others not only adapt but also seem to act rationally and take what probably is their best route to good living conditions.

This development leads to demands on the political system, but also on social science. We should be able to provide a knowledge base on which politicians can found their decisions, but the development also gives us opportunities to advance our understanding of societal processes.

Of obvious political interest is to what extent the integration of new immigrants should be monitored and directed by the state. At one extreme immigrants could be left to manage best they can after having been accepted into the country, at the other extreme the state could try to monitor every step in the new country, from where the immigrants should stay to which schools their children should attend. The more general question is to what extent the state should try to integrate immigrants in the new society – to try to make them adapt to the local culture – or to accept that the own society is being transformed in a multicultural direction. Is it to the advantage of the children to immigrants if they at school first are taught their parents' language or the language of the new country? There is a claim that one can never learn a foreign language properly without a thorough understanding of one's mother tongue, but this thesis is hotly contested and it seems worthwhile to investigate it further.

What rights should be awarded to immigrants and after what time? Should they have the right to vote, to social security, social assistance etc? Central to questions like these is the reaction of the indigenous population. Will social support to immigrants lead to negative reactions among large groups of people and how does the native population react to attempts to provide immigrants with jobs when unemployment rates are high? Will negative reactions to immigrants make it impossible to solve the demographic crisis of the European nations through immigration? One sometimes meets rather moralistic statements from the liberal upper middle class regarding workers' fear of losing their jobs to newcomers to the country, but it seems to me to be important to look into whether such fears are realistic or not – the Marxian idea of a reserve army may not be all that irrelevant. In these days of global trade the reserve army of workers may be available far away with the consequence that the wish may be not only to close the national borders to people but also to merchandise. And history shows that academics, like others, may react with demands for closure when the threat seems to be to their own jobs. If the political leadership does not take the fears of ordinary people seriously and if it does not react on minor clashes between native and immigrant groups, we may witness more political protest of a xenophobic character than we have already witnessed in Europe.

The issues I have raised mainly refer to national scenes, but similar questions can, of course, be asked about Europe. To what extent should we expect a collective identity as Europeans to be established and common European culture to appear? It seems as if the central authorities in Brussels are hoping for this to happen and are working for it, but under which circumstances will it happen and which other consequences follow if it happens? Will the inhabitants in some parts of Europe first of all regard themselves as Europeans while those in other areas firstly view themselves as, say, Scots, Germans or Catalan? Will it be, as I suggested earlier, that some segments of the population will say that 'I am a European' while others claim something like 'I am a Swedish worker'? If we can expect such differential development, which seems most probable to me, which will the consequences be for internal conflict within Europe – between regions and between population groups? And what will this in turn mean for European 'unionbuilding' and for possible 'regionbuilding'?

At this workshop we hope that issues of utmost importance to politics will be raised, and we have also several persons active in politics with us, expecting them to formulate demands on social science and to ask pertinent questions to the social scientists. But the purpose of the conference is only indirectly to give scientific advice to politics, the central aim is to promote social science. By bringing together scientists who work with similar problems from different perspectives and disciplinary angles and create a dialogue among them and a dialogue with persons, who meet these problems in practical life, we hope to give impetus to a productive development of scientific work in the field and in the long run to politics in the area. We want, by this, to try to look forward, to use the catchword given us by ESF.

Collective Identities, Public Spheres, Civil Society and Citizenship in the Contemporary Era [1]

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I

In the contemporary era there have been taking place in Europe – indeed throughout the world – far-reaching changes and transformation of public spheres, civil society and conceptions of citizenship, in close relation to the crystallization of new patterns of collective identity – processes which entail far-reaching transformations of some aspects of what has been envisaged as the "classical" nation-state or the decomposition of some of its components.

These far-reaching changes, decline or transformation of the ideological and institutional premises of the modern nation state developed in a specific historical context. The most important characteristic of this new context was the combination of first, changes in the international systems and shifts of hegemonies within them; second, processes of internal ideological changes in Western societies; third, the development of new processes of globalization; and fourth, far-reaching processes of democratization, of the growing demands of various social sectors for access into the centers of their respective societies, as well as into international arenas.

The most important aspect of the new international scene that developed in this period was first, the undermining of some of the "older" Western hegemonies and of the modernizing regimes in different non-Western societies; often in situations in which the perception of such weakening became relatively strong among active elites in the non-Western countries – as for instance after the October War and the oil shortage in the West. A crucial event on the international scene was the demise of the Soviet Union and of the salience of the ideological confrontation between Communism and the West – a demise which was sometimes perhaps paradoxically interpreted as an exhaustion of the Western cultural program of modernity and as signalling the end of "history." Concomitantly there took place continuous shifts in the relative hegemony of different centers of modernity – in Europe and the U.S., moving to East Asia and back to the U.S. – shifts which became continually connected with growing contestations between such centers around their presumed hegemonic standing.

Second, these developments were closely related to internal ideological changes in Western society – to the development of what has been called "post-modern" or "post-materialist" orientations; and to the concomitant continual decomposition of the relatively compact image of the "civilized man," of the styles of life, of construction of life worlds, which were connected with the first original programs of modernity, and the development of a much greater pluralization and heterogenization of such images and representations, and of new patterns of differentiation and syncretization between different cultural traditions, so aptly analyzed by Ulf Hannerz.

Concomitantly, on the structural-institutional level, there developed a weakening of the former, relatively rigid, homogenous definition of life patterns, and hence also of the boundaries of family, community, or of spatial and social organization. Occupational, family, gender and residential roles have become more and more dissociated from "Stande," class, and party-political frameworks, and tend to crystallize into continuously changing clusters with relatively weak orientations to such broad frameworks in general, and to the societal centers in particular.

On the cultural level these developments entailed first, a growing tendency to distinguish between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität, and to the recognition of a great multiplicity of different Wertrationalitäten. Cognitive rationality – especially as epitomized in the extreme

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forms of scientism – has become dethroned from its relatively hegemonic position, as has been the idea of the "conquest" of mastery of the environment – whether of society or of nature.

Third, there developed in this period multiple new processes of economic and cultural globalization, manifest in growing autonomy of world capitalist forces, of processes of intense social and economic dislocations of many social sectors, of growing gaps between different sectors of the population, between global and local cities; and the erosion of many middle-class sectors; of intense movements of international migrations, and of the concomitant development on an international scale of social problems, such as prostitution, delinquency, traffic in drugs and the like. In the cultural arena the processes of globalization were closely connected with the expansion especially through the major media of what were often conceived in many parts of the world as uniform hegemonic Western, above all American, cultural programs or visions.

Fourth, all these developments were at the same time connected throughout the world with growing demands of many social sectors to greater access to participation in the central frameworks of their societies – i.e. to growing democratization.

All these processes entailed a far-reaching transformation of the "classical" model of the nation and revolutionary states which were predominant in the earlier period. All these processes reduced, despite the continual strengthening of the "technocratic" rational secular policies in various arenas – be it in education or family planning – the control of the nation state over its own economic and political affairs. At the same time the nation states lost some of their – always only partial – monopoly of internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists without any nation-state or the concerted activities of nation states being able to control the continually recurring occurrences of such violence. Above all the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary states, of their being perceived as the major bearers of the cultural program of modernity and the basic frameworks of collective identity and as the major regulator of the various secondary identities, became weakened, and new political and social and civilizational visions developed.

All these processes and movements attested to a far-reaching shift from viewing the political centers and the nation-state as the basic arenas in which the charismatic dimension of the ontological and social visions are implemented. Concomitantly, these developments also entailed a very important shift of the utopian orientations predominant in these societies form the construction of modern centers to other arenas.

II

Among the bearers of the new political and ideological visions various new social movements were of great importance. The first, even chronologically, such movements were the "new" social movements such as women's and the ecological movements that developed in most western countries most of all closely related or rooted in the student and anti-Vietnam war movements of the late sixties and seventies. Instead of a conflictual-ideological focus on the center and its reconstitution or on economic conflicts, both of which characterized the earlier "classical" social movements of modern and industrial societies, the new movements emphasized the construction of new social and cultural spaces and identities which claimed, as against orientations to the center, growing cultural autonomy for the newly emerging local, regional, and transnational cultural spaces and conceptions of collective identity – in general in the directions of "postmodernity" and multiculturalism.

The second major type of new movements which started to develop, albeit somewhat later, in this period and occupied more and more the center stage on the international scene were the fundamentalist and communal religious movements which promulgated strong anti-modern, or anti-Enlightenment ones – and some of them also strong anti-Western themes. Although these movements developed above all in the non-Western societies – especially in different Muslim societies – and the communal religious ones – in the Hinduist and Buddhist ones, they became also visible in Europe and in the U.S. where indeed the first modern fundamentalist – Protestant – movements developed.

Concomitantly there developed in many societies new social sectors – the most important among which were the new types of Diasporas and of minorities which crystallized in the contemporary world. The best known among such Diasporas are the Muslim one – or ones –

especially in Europe and to some extent in the U.S. Parallel developments – yet with significant differences – are to be found among the Chinese and possibly Korean ones in East Asia and in the U.S. and also in Europe, as well as among Jewish communities especially in Europe. The new types of minorities that we refer to are best illustrated by the Russian ones in some of the former Soviet Republics – especially in the Baltics and in some of the Asian ones; and for instance such as the Hungarian ones in the former East European Communist states. These Russian Diasporas should be also compared with the Jews from different former Soviet Republics who came to Israel.

III

Within the framework of all these processes there took place the crystallization of new types of collective identities all of which went indeed far beyond the classical models of the nation state.

Truly enough, even in the period of the presumed hegemony of this model, there existed, even if often in subdued and sub-terranian ways, a much greater variety and heterogeneity of collective identities that was presumed in the homogenizing models of the nation-state. Regional, "cultural," religious, linguistic identities and cultural space did not disappear – and they would naturally be stronger in those societies like for instance England in which multi-faceted patterns of collective identity prevailed with its strong secular homogenizing premises. In other societies such as Imperial Germany, they could become foci of political contestation. Closely related was the continual reconstruction of seemingly "non-rational" romantic or esoteric of mystic modes of cultural experience.

But however strong these variegated patterns were, there is no doubt that during the heydays of the constitution of nation-states most of these identities – with the partial exception of the religious, especially the Catholic and the Jewish one – were in a way marginalized from the central public domain or arena. They were relegated to the private domain and at most accepted semi-publicly in a very limited way. They did not constitute major components of the central cultural and political program as promulgated by the central socializing agencies of the nation-state – such as the educational system, the army and the different mass-media – newspapers and popular books – in the earlier periods of the development of the nation state; of radio and television later on. Above all, they did not constitute the central pivot of the defining of formal membership in the nation-state – namely of citizenship, and of the various entitlements attendant on the acquisition of citizenship. Similarly in this period the ideological cultural and institutional relation between various immigrant communities with their mother countries were to a very large extent indicated by the images of the new nation state and by its model of citizenship presumably based on universalistic homogeneous criteria.

Truly enough, contrary to many implicit liberal assumptions, citizenship was never "culture-blind" or cultural neutral citizenship usually entailed the participation in a distinct community or "nation" and the acceptance of some at least of its ways of life and collective identities. But such ways of life and identities were usually defined in terms of the homogenizing premises of the nation-state and of the "civilizing" process or program of modernity connected with it. The promulgation of these homogenizing tendencies of the nation-state was closely connected with that of the ideal human type, the ideal civilized person, as the bearers of the civilizing processes and with the master historical and ontological narratives of modernity, be it of progress, especially of progress of reason, or is in the Romantic versions of the unfolding of the distinct cultural features of different collectivities.

IV

The collective identities which have been constructed in the contemporary era entailed far-reaching changes in this model of the nation-state. One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto "subdued" identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

The common denominator of both these new Diasporas and minorities – and closely related to the new visions promulgated by the various new movements – is that they do not see

themselves as bound by the strong homogenizing cultural premises of the classical mode of the nation state – especially by the places allotted to them in the public spheres of such states.

It is not that they do not want to be "domiciled" in their respective countries. Indeed part of their struggle is to become so domiciled – but on rather new – as compared to classical models of assimilation – terms. They want to be recognized in the public spheres, in the constitution of the civil society in relation to the state as culturally distinct groups promulgating their collective identities and not to confine them only to the private sphere. Thus they do indeed make claims – as illustrated among others for instance in the new debate about laïcité in France – for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity promulgated in respective states.

Moreover while the identities which they promulgate are often very local and particularistic – in many ways similar to many new ethnic ones – they tend also to be strongly transnational or transstate ones. This is very clear in the case of the Muslim one but in different ways this is true also of the other groups – including the new Jewish ones – especially in Europe. Parallel "trans-national" identities are promulgated by some of the new minorities. All these developments entail potential changes in the definition of citizenship and struggles and contestations about them.

All these developments enabled tendencies to the redefinition of boundaries of collectivities: and to the development of new nuclei of cultural and social identities which transcend the existing political and cultural boundaries, and of new ways of combining "local" and "minimal" transnational orientations. In many of these movements, as for instance among many of the New Diasporas or minorities – the local and the transnational often universalistic themes and orientations were often brought together in new ways. Thus while many of these new collective identities have emphasized local or particularistic themes – against the homogenizing universalistic premises of the nation states, but at the same time many of them promulgated broader – transnational or transstate identities – often universalistic orientations going beyond those of the nation state. Illustration of such orientations are new European ones; or those rooted in the great religious – Islam, Buddhism, even different branches of Christianity – reconstructed in the modern ways.

V

All these developments entail far-reaching changes in the constitution of public spheres and of the relations between civil society and the political sphere – both within different states as well as on the international scene – and in the concomitant conceptions of citizenship – round all these problems there develop in many societies intensive contestations and struggles.

They posit far-reaching claims to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it. They do make claims –both for the construction of new public spaces and for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity promulgated in respective states. Concomitantly there developed within these movements and sectors an important, even radical, shift in the discourse about the confrontation with modernity and in the conceptualization of the relation between the Western and non-Western civilizations, religions or societies. All these developments gave rise also to a great challenge to educational institutions which faced the problem of how to cope with class and the various multiple identities as against the traditional curricular rooted in the homogeneous conceptions of the different nation-states.

All these changes took place in most European countries, but their concrete contours and impact varied between European societies. These differences could be seen, for instance, as Dominique Schnapper has pointed out, in the ways in which such different minority groups are designated in different European societies, "strangers" in Germany, "racial minorities" in England, "immigrants" in France, "ethnic and cultural minorities" in the Netherlands and the like. These differences were influenced, among others, by the extent of the homogeneity of the different European nation-states; by the extent to which they were highly homogeneous, as in France, or in different mode in Scandinavian countries; or more multifaceted as in Great Britain and the Netherlands; by the place of religious symbols and traditions in the construction of nations' identities; by different ways in which State-Church religion relations have been worked out in these societies. They develop also, needless to say, in different ways in societies beyond Europe.

VI

One central theme promulgated in these movements and sectors has been the concern with the growing homogenization of global culture to the detriment or at the expense of more authentic cultural communities and traditions. One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto "subdued" identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

This concern constitutes also indeed one of the major butts of contemporary radical criticism of globalization. It is however important to remember that this theme of the danger attendant on the expansion of modern cultural and political program to the respective traditions of different societies and groups is not new in modern history and in the discourse of modernity. It constituted a basic component in the discourse and as it developed with the crystallization and expansion of modernity from its very beginning. This problematique did develop already within the very onset of the Western program of modernity with different centers and becoming the foci and targets of such and different countries and centers that were seen in different periods as constituting such major dangers as the bearers of the hegemonic tendencies. These confrontations continued as central foci of the discourse of modernity albeit in a different vein with the expansion of European modernity to the Americas. This confrontation became even more intensified with the expansion of European, the western modernity beyond the West – into Asian – Muslim, Chinese, Hinduist and Buddhist societies and into the many societies in Africa. The fear of erosion of local cultures and the impact of globalization and its centers was however also continuously connected in an oscillating way with an ambivalence towards these centers.

One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto "subdued" identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

All these themes were taken up again in the new contemporary scene, in the new settings and by the new movements. There are, however, some specific new elements which can be identified on the contemporary scene as compared both with earlier historical periods as well as with those in the earlier stages of modernity.

What is new in the contemporary era, is first the worldwide reach and diffusion of these themes, and their continual interweaving with fierce political contestations. These discourses moved in the centers of national and international political arenas – and when combined with political, military or economic struggles and conflicts could indeed have become very violent.

Second is the fact that in this discourse a very important shift has taken place in the confrontation between the western and non-western civilizations or societies. As against the seeming acceptance and of these premises combined with the continual reinterpretation thereof that was characteristic of the earlier movements, most of the contemporary fundamentalist and communal religious movements and also many postmodern ones as well as the more general discourse of modernity promulgated a seeming negation of at least some of these premises, a markedly confrontational attitude to the West, and attempts to appropriate the global system on their own terms couched in modern, but non-Western, often anti-Western, mode.

Third, in many countries there developed also intensive – even if milder confrontations between the interpretations of multiculturalism by the official representatives of the state who often opened up themselves to the multiculturalist demand but who were seen by other leaders of such groups as organizing such multiculturalism within the existing premises of the nation-state, as against claims for more authentic, autonomous definitions of the identity of such different groups, by these leaders. The confrontation, between these different leaders

were very about who could be, who would be the gatekeepers of the newly redefined boundaries of the collective identities of the communities, who would be the legitimate promulgator of their symbols, and as to the proper way of representation of these symbols.

In these movements the basic tensions inherent in the constitution of modern states, in the modern political program, especially those between the pluralistic and totalistic orientations; between utopian or more open and pragmatic attitudes, between multifaceted as against closed collective identities, are placed. The mode in which these tensions work out, especially whether they develop in an open pluralistic way as well as the opposite, highly aggressive and totalitarian directions, with growing inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflicts, depends greatly on the extent to which the aggressive and destructive potentialities inherent in these movements will become predominant or tamed and transformed.

The analysis of these developments and of their common characteristics as well as differences within Europe and in other parts of the world, should constitute subjects of systematic comparative research.

Rethinking Multiculturalism and the Swedish Nation State.
Striking a Balance between Diversity and Social Cohesion

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Abstract: I will address the issue of the policies Sweden has adopted to integrate its migrant population, and on the other hand its stand in relation to the indigenous Saami population. While Sweden has developed liberal policies of multiculturalism to incorporate its migrants (social, educational and economic equality, support for cultural maintenance etc., voting rights in local and county elections for permanently residing non-Swedish nationals, liberal naturalization conditions), it has traditionally been unwilling to recognize or accept Saami claims to special treatment in questions where land rights are concerned. A multicultural policy that does not consider the position of traditional ethnic and ethno-territorial minorities will not appear to have credibility. These two different policy approaches cannot be understood without a closer look at the formation of the Swedish nation state.

Issues that I want to address are about bringing together two different discourses. What happens when multiculturalism is imported into the older structure of the nation state? A lot has been written about multiculturalism and probably even more on the nation state. However, much of the work on multiculturalism is inspired by experiences in countries based on immigration (Australia, Canada, the United States). These experiences do not necessarily apply in the older European nation state context. On the other hand, most work on nation state formation departs from European experiences, but rarely addresses the issues of incorporating people of immigrant origin.

Multiculturalism, or diversity, which is the term currently in fashion, is not immediately compatible with traditional conceptions of the nation state. Values that relate to national identity, common history and common destiny, majority language and national/ethnic stereotypes are used, or may be used to create a sense of national/ethnic unity by excluding the Other. How is social cohesion achieved in a society moving towards diversity? How should the national story be rethought to include migrants as well as indigenous minorities? Can Human Rights serve as a value base in an ethnically diverse Swedish society?

My presentation is inspired by report from the Runnymede Trust entitled "The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain", which is a report from the commission with the same name chaired by Bhikhu Parekh. Many of the ideas discussed in this report are highly applicable to the Scandinavian and Nordic situation.

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The Swedish Model

Over a period of thirty years Sweden has developed a set of policies aimed to incorporate international migrants into Swedish society. Sweden has a number of instruments at its disposal that on the whole have proved to be operational. Nevertheless, when we step back and look at the immigration/integration policy context as a whole, it is quite apparent that current policies are in a state of muddle and even contradiction. In this paper I will outline the general context for policies. There is a need to sort out some of the confusion.

Ever since a commission in the late 1960s was appointed to draw up policies for the field of immigration, the authorities have been concerned about potential conflict. For many years now continued large-scale immigration has been regarded as fuel for social (or ethnic) conflict. Militant racist and neo-Nazi groups that for instance speak in terms of "the coming race war" confirm these fears. More importantly, even large sectors of the population that would never dream of siding with Nazi thugs are highly critical of immigration, thus putting the authorities on the defensive. The implicit but principal aim of policies in this field, it seems, has become to avoid conflict. Thus, since the early 1970s immigration policy is aimed to reduce immigration to a minimum.

The integration policy on the other hand is aimed to incorporate migrants into mainstream society. Making migrants less visible is then a complementary strategy to steer clear of manifest conflict. There is a problem though: Officially assimilation was abandoned as a policy goal in the mid-1970s and a form of multiculturalism through integration was officially accepted. Different words appearing in this discourse over the years—integration, pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity—all seem to stand for accepting (certain) differences but "doing things in the Swedish way". Unofficially assimilation is still seen as the best solution. Integration "the Swedish way" basically boils down to a form of subtle assimilation. What the authorities ultimately aim at is control of societal development. Reforms that are introduced, no matter in what social domain, imply and rely on some form of bureaucratic societal control mechanisms. Social engineering has served as the means to achieve ends.

Today the codeword is diversity. Key issues are: How much diversity can be accepted without overt expressions of social conflict? How much diversity can be accepted without loss of control over social developments? Public acceptance for diversity needs to be achieved, but social engineering is not well adapted to achieve this aim. One might put it that the concession that the authorities are willing to make to an ethnocentric public opinion in order to achieve an acceptance for diversity is to keep future immigration at a minimum. Diversity, however, is linked with immigration. If immigration is stopped, true diversity will come to an end. We need to realize that the aims are contradictory.

A concrete proposal addressed to Swedish policy makers is to reassess immigration policy. The official view of not accepting labour migrants from non-EU/EEA countries, and only accepting refugees who unquestionably meet the criteria of the Geneva Convention is hypocrisy. Everyone knows that international migrants find their way to Western countries, Sweden being no exception. It is all part of globalisation and transnational networks. Instead of being on the defensive, and thus appeasing the ethnocentric opinion, the authorities need to be on the offensive. Opening up for what can be agreed on as a reasonable immigration program is support for diversity. Diversity, then, is **not** a means to handle what is perceived as "problematic immigration". Rather, immigration needs to be seen as a positive means to achieve the goal of diversity. Opening up for a liberal refugee policy is in effect to support human rights values. All Western countries have aging populations. If welfare systems are to be maintained immigration of manpower will soon become an economic demographic necessity. Since all EU member states are facing the same problem, the freedom of movement within Schengen is not the long-term solution to the coming need for manpower.

The Saami

There is another factor in this equation that is usually addressed in a totally different context, namely the position of traditional ethnic and ethno-territorial minorities. The central problem for the Saami in Sweden is a lack of recognition in practice of their traditional right to use land for reindeer herding. In theory there is recognition. Yes, there is a reindeer herding act, and an amendment from 1989 to this act, which guarantees the Saami the right to use land for grazing of their herds, and moving herds from summer pastures to winter pastures. But interests of farmers, hunters, the forest industry, the mining industry, and hydroelectric schemes conflict with the interests of the Saami. Farmers and the forest industry are entitled to full compensation for damage caused to their plantations and seedlings by the reindeer. However, there is a certain amount of bureaucracy involved and to land owners things would be a lot simpler without reindeer herding at all. Inevitably there is tension. Basically the Saami

are not interested in land ownership as such but of land use according to rights sanctioned by traditional usage. The legal problem is the lack of historical documents testifying to this right.

The so-called *Taxed mountains case* 1966-1981 attracted a lot of attention, and rightly so. In this case the Saami claimed ownership to land in the province of Jämtland. The evidence attesting to this claim were documents proving that the Saami had paid tax to the Swedish Crown in the 17th century for this land. The district court in Jämtland ruled in favour of the Saami case. However the case was contested through all instances. The High Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish historical ownership of land, offering the interpretation that it was rather a kind of lease-hold arrangement. What is surprising is that precisely this type of evidence (having paid taxes on land) has been used to establish land ownership in other cases.

In 1992 the Saami were dispossessed of their exclusive right to hunt small-game in the mountain region and the land above the cultivation zone. The powerful hunter's lobby, enrolling 300,000 members as compared to the Saami minority of 17,000, and headed by the former party secretary of the Social Democrats, Bo Toresson, played an important role here. To the Saami this was yet another example of the Swedish nation state encroaching upon traditional rights to land and game. This was a case of greater symbolic than economic importance to the Saami, although the latter obviously cannot be dismissed. As recently as February 2002 the court of appeal in Sundsvall ruled in favour of Swedish farmers in their conflict with Saami herders about land usage in Härjedalen, a southern region of the county of Jämtland.

In 1986 an Ombudsman against racial and ethnic discrimination was established. The former ombudsman Frank Orton found that the greater part of the cases brought to his attention were raised by Saami complainants. Figures again: 17,000 Saami; 900,000 foreign-born migrants.

Sweden has not signed the ILO 169, the International Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989 (US, Canada, Denmark, Norway and New Zealand have, and soon Finland). However, some positive developments should be mentioned. First language recognition; in 2000 Saami was recognised as an official language, and secondly, the Saami have a reasonably high level of material standard.

Developing a multi-ethnic society

While a multicultural discourse is obvious in the policies of incorporation of migrants, a nation-state discourse is brought to the fore even in the quite recent history of Saami relations with the Swedish state.

As far as developing a multiethnic society is concerned, there are two lines of general policy that need to be pursued and maintained. The first one relates to a reassessment of what Swedish society is, and how it regards itself. If one really wants to tackle the root problems of discrimination and social exclusion, to combat obstacles in terms of mind-sets, attitudes, discriminatory practices, rules and regulations that give preferential treatment to ethnic Swedes, one has to look at the foundations of the nation state itself. This means to critically reassess national story of who belongs and who is accepted. If migrant minorities are to be incorporated while maintaining identity, language etc., the existence and rights of traditional minorities also need to be recognised. Cultural and ethnic diversity can be an enormous asset to society, but it can also become a cause of social tension and conflict. This highlights the issue of *social cohesion* in a multicultural society, a question that has not been adequately addressed by policy makers in Sweden. Religion, language and culture were traditionally factors working for social cohesion. In modern liberal democracies the myth of the nation state has served a similar purpose. However, there is no simple answer to the question of what social cohesion can be built around in a multicultural society. An essential element must be acceptance of universal values and principles. Human rights is a starting point.

The second line of policy is one of empowerment of those groups in society that are victims of social exclusion, discrimination and lack of opportunities. To a certain extent it is along these lines that Swedish integration and incorporation policies have operated. This goes back to the experiences of transforming a class-ridden impoverished rural society into a modern welfare state. Public education, adult education, social welfare benefits, public health services, political participation, interest organizations and active labour market interventions were policies that developed during the course of building the welfare state. Basically these same instruments have been employed for the purpose of integrating international migrants and their children.

Both these approaches are implemented, but not with the full commitment that is required. Anti-discriminatory legislation, when it at long last was enforced, proved to be rather toothless. Language courses both in terms of mother tongue instruction for school children and Swedish language courses for adults have suffered essential cuts in funding.

Integration, social cohesion and national identity

The concept of integration is conceptually problematic. In the immigration/incorporation discourse integration has quite often been understood as an individual property. This approach has been popularised by social psychologists (among others John Berry) that have operationalized integration in terms of participation in mainstream society in the economic (educational) sphere but maintaining traditional language and values in the private sphere. (Why is the issue put in terms of cultural maintenance and not in terms of cultural development?) Other acculturative options or strategies according to this theory are assimilation, separation and marginalisation. Berry's conceptualisation represents a static view. Milton Gordon offered a more dynamic, but still essentially individualistic understanding of integration. He proposed that integration might be understood as a stage on the way to full assimilation.

A more fruitful approach is systemic and holistic. According to this view integration is not a concept that refers to individual elements but to a system. It is the system that is more or less integrated, not its components. If we transfer this idea to sociology, integration refers to society as a whole (or subsections of society), not to individual people. A society can be more or less integrated, not the individual. This is a question with which the classic writers of sociology concerned themselves (Weber, Simmel, Durkheim). Weber's analysis of power and authority, and Durkheim's analyses of solidarity provide us with important insights into the workings of integration and social cohesion.

Swedish self-understanding

Swedish society is often stated to have been ethnically and culturally homogeneous before the onset of post-war migration. Immigration, it is claimed, ruptured this cultural, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. A very first step in the process of gaining acceptance for diversity policies must therefore be to question and problematize this national self-understanding as the basic myth upon which the Swedish nation state is founded.

The territory of the present Swedish state consists of seven core provinces around the big lakes of what is now regarded as central Sweden. Three provinces in the far south and three in the west were incorporated into the Swedish state through conquest in a number of 17th century wars against Denmark and Norway. The subjugation of the Danish and Norwegian populations was brutal but effective. Also the island province of Gotland, having had a semi-autonomous status since the Hanseatic days, was definitely incorporated into the Swedish state during the 17th century. During the course of several hundred years Swedish settlers colonized five Northern provinces inhabited by Saami and Finns. The discriminatory treatment of the Saami and Finnish speaking populations in the north has continued to this day.

By European standards Sweden has a small population in a large territory. In historical times regional differences were obvious. This is seen in a broad range of dialects. Linguists even

regard some of these dialects as separate languages. Traditionally language never served as an instrument for homogenisation. The one principal homogenizing factor was the Lutheran church. This was the one institution that virtually all citizens of the Swedish state had in common. Moreover, the church was strongly linked to political control. In fact, the reformation was used by Gustav Vasa (who reigned 1523-60) to centralize state power and control.

The myth of an historical cultural, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity needs to be understood as the construction it is serving to legitimate the power of the rising nation state. It is precisely this myth that racists and neo-Nazis have appropriated. Nationalists contrast this myth of a lost national cohesion and "solidarity" in the past with the allegedly chaotic consequences of multiculturalism today.

Citizenship

A crucial instrument in all this is citizenship. Although Swedish citizenship follows the *ius sanguinis* principle, policies have been to encourage and facilitate naturalization of permanent residents. In a European context Sweden has liberal naturalization rules; five years of permanent residence (two for Nordic citizens, four years for refugees), no language or knowledge tests are required.

However, in everyday language the term "Swedish" refers less to citizenship and membership of the state and more to an ethnic identity. As yet there exists no recognized way of distinguishing between "Swedish" as referring to ethnicity or to citizenship. Naturalized Swedish citizens tend not be regarded as real or genuine Swedes in the way that migrants to the US are unconditionally accepted as Americans once they have US citizenship. An essential task, which implies something more than inventing a new term, is to find a way of attributing Swedishness to all citizens of the state irrespective of culture, creed, skin colour or language. The problem is not one of finding an appropriate term. That can surely be done. The problem is one of ensuring popular acceptance for it, which can only be achieved if an understanding of what it means to be Swedish is reformulated. Basically, then, it means to rethink the national story taking account of the various historical events that went in to forming the Swedish state, the peoples that historically became part of its population either through immigration, conquest or colonization. The story needs to be brought up to date to include also those who have come to this country during the past fifty years. Moreover, Swedishness needs to be rethought in the context of European integration.

Rethinking the national story is a task that involves society as a whole. It is not merely about a limited number of policy recommendations. Rather it has implications for policies in every field of human interaction. Representation and visibility are two key issues. Differences should not be downplayed, hushed up or locked in. They should be seen as a normal state of affairs. Media representation is important in affecting general stereotypes, but even more important is political representation.

What should replace the nationalistic myth? Well, the answer is fairly straightforward and in line with moves that Sweden has already taken: respect for human rights, equality, equity, justice, solidarity, democracy, non-discrimination and the liberal freedoms of speech, the press, assembly and organization. These are core values that are necessary but not sufficient conditions for social cohesion in a multicultural society.

Avoiding conflicting interests and views, concealing them or ignoring them, does **not** bring about social cohesion. On the contrary, conflict in terms of differences in interest, perspective or ambition has a part to play in generating social cohesion. Thus, social cohesion is not the equivalent of consensus. The formidable task is to develop means of handling social conflict and differences of interest in a civilized way, which means respecting the opposite view and working towards a resolution that both parties may accept. We have obvious models right before our eyes in the parliamentary process, and in how labour market conflicts are handled. Social cohesion is brought about by mutual interdependence on a societal scale as Durkheim correctly observed. The broad policy objective of a society that professes itself an adherent of diversity is then to enable such interdependence. An important element of such an objective

is empowerment of those who are at risk, those who are vulnerable and those who are the underdogs of society.

A final observation

There is of course also an element of historical continuity that we need to see. In closing I cannot resist paraphrasing Gunnar Myrdal and point to **A Swedish Dilemma**. It is about the coexistence of and conflict between the historically based and popular egalitarian tradition on the one hand, and, on the other, a subtle but bureaucratic and sometimes arrogant exercise of power, often full of good intentions but almost always streamlining solutions that don't take the little man's experiences and wishes into account, nor those of marginalised minority groups. The sterilisation policy that was practised for forty years right up until 1976 is one example of this Big Brother ideology. It was precisely the absence of a feudal system that laid the foundations of an exceptionally strong central power, in earlier centuries invested in the Crown, in modern times in an independent, powerful, and centralised bureaucracy. The difficulties that multiculturalism has faced in Sweden must be understood in terms of these historically rooted contradictions.

Comments and Perspectives

Liberalism and Cultural Diversity

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Political and economic liberalism descend to us from ancient times after passing through the Scottish Enlightenment and the English Whigs. Political and economic liberalism were directed *at government intrusions*, which were to be stopped. Now in highly developed liberal societies that face diversity, much of it through immigration, people assert a liberalism of group rights. Indeed, Will Kymlicka (1989) and Yael Tamir (1993) insist that the protection of groups per se is justified on liberal grounds. The assumptions of political and economic liberalism are those of spontaneous individual creation and therefore liberation from the control of others; the assumptions of group liberalism are very different. Commonly, the defense of this liberalism requires that government intrude into individual lives to overcome deficits — economic, political, and cultural — that particular groups suffer. In particular, they require government support for forceful control of group members themselves or, at least, special exemptions from certain laws that otherwise apply to everyone.

With John Dewey ([1935] 1987), one could speak of stages of liberalism: liberation from despotic and oligarchic political control, liberation from government economic decisions over who is to work or produce or trade, liberation from the depredations of institutionalized private power, liberation from the dead hand of many social conventions, and perhaps other liberations. Dewey would put the first three of these in this historical order, although I think it is misleading to put economic liberalism in the order in which it was first articulated as opposed to the order in which it began to work its way on the scene (see further, Hardin 1999, chapter 2). To date, we have genuinely articulate accounts of only the first two of these and a still emerging account of the third. What we need for giving a liberal gloss to the protection of groups as such would be a theory that trumps Dewey's largely still unarticulated social liberalism. Social liberalism frees individuals from the dead hand of custom and social pressure; group liberalism requires subordination of individuals to group customs and values.

When political and economic liberalisms were joined in the same governments, especially beginning with that created by the US Constitution, they were joined without subordinating one to the other or curtailing the application of one on behalf of the other. Dewey's vague prescription — substantial government control of the economy — for a new liberalism in the 1930s would likely have curtailed economic liberty and perhaps, therefore, political liberty on behalf of a nascent welfare liberty. The welfare state that has grown up mostly after World War II in the West (although much earlier in Wilhelmine Germany) can, as the best experiences suggest, similarly be built alongside, instead of on the partial ruins of, the old political and economic liberalisms. Apart from making education and culture relatively available, no one has seriously proposed any scheme for generally breaking the hold of perverse social conventions.

Consider the strategic natures of these further liberalisms in comparison to political and economic liberalism. There are two issues. First is the role of government, whether it is to be constrained or put to use. Second is the game theoretic structure of the larger interactions at stake. All of the later liberalisms differ from the earlier political and economic liberalisms in that they virtually require government action in their support. On the other issue, however, they differ. Economic and political liberalisms, when they work, are coordinations on mutual advantage regimes. Because they are coordinations, they are self-enforcing. In this respect, these share the strategic structure of constitutionalism and democracy (Hardin 1999). The regime of institutional liberalism, at least as it would affect large institutions, might readily be mutually advantageous and self-enforcing in a

democratic society. Social liberalism, which involves the breaking of destructive social conventions, would also be self-enforcing *if once achieved*.

Unfortunately, group liberalism is not strategically analogous to political and economic liberalism. The maintenance of group autonomy for selected groups is not likely to be mutually advantageous for the most politically important groups in liberal societies. They do not serve the interests of the middle class and the politically influential, wealthy entrepreneurial class. Nor are resolutions of group problems likely to be self-enforcing the way the old liberalisms, once in place, are self-enforcing or the way a workable constitution is self-enforcing. The greatest threat to the survival of a group's ways is the next generation, whose interests are often not served by the group's static values and norms.

A striking fact about many of the new labels for ostensibly variant liberalisms is that those labels and their categories have been around for a long while — most of, or more than, a century — but that the liberalisms they represent have yet to have much effect. The original liberalisms reversed this history: Elements of them were long in effect before they were well understood, although there was arguably more invention in the case of political liberalism. Economic liberalism had been working piecemeal for centuries before Mandeville, Hume, Smith, and others began to figure it out. One might say with less conviction that political liberalism also had a past history that eased the task of Hobbes and Locke in coming to formulate its theory.

This different history is indicative of an important strategic difference between the original liberalisms and some of the later ones. The original liberalisms were and are self-enforcing because they are mutually advantageous to important, politically efficacious, large groups in the societies they influence. Because they were self-enforcing, they had survival power and they could take root and grow over time without their being yet understood. This is not true of the group liberalism of our time. Such a liberalism is still in want of an intellectual grounding, of a theory of how it can be made to work. We can be confident that merely constraining government cannot be a major part of any program of group liberalism, as it was for economic and political liberalism. In group liberalism, government is not the source of the problem but it must, rather, be a major part of the solution.

Out of the welter of categories of liberalism that have filled twentieth-century debate, three are fairly widely mentioned and are clearly relevant to fundamentally important aspects of liberal societies, and a fourth is widely asserted and at least arguably important. These are the following. First is what we can call social liberalism, which is liberation from the deadening weight of burdensome social conventions. Second is the liberalism that Dewey wanted and that we may call institutional liberalism, which is liberation from the snares of large private organizations on analogy with the liberation from the snares of government under political and economic liberalism. Third is what is commonly called welfare liberalism, which is primarily liberation from poverty and its concomitants. Fourth and newest is group liberalism, which focuses not on liberty for individuals but for groups. All of these sound close to the welfarist vision of traditional political and economic liberalism, whose point is to make life better, but they require very different strategic devices that go beyond constraining government. I will discuss social and institutional liberalism briefly in order to set up discussion of the very different problems of group liberalism. Indeed, it is not merely different, it is fundamentally contrary to the other liberalisms, perhaps most especially social liberalism, whose point is largely the ending of group control over individuals.

Social Liberalism

Social liberalism has had a long history, with articulate concern for it in Mill's *On Liberty* and other classical liberal works. It perhaps has some trace in the US Constitution in the prohibition of a state religion. Its greatest impact on any political program, however, has probably been in French revolutionary moves against the Catholic Church, Communist efforts to break the hold of religion and various customary constraints, the turn-of-the-century Chinese move to break the coercive custom of women's foot-binding, and other efforts, some of them worse than the ills they were intended to cure, as in Pol Pot's destruction of everything he could destroy in Cambodian culture, whether good or bad, at the cost of upwards of a million lives and the radical impoverishment of virtually the entire population. Most of these effects required government action, although the foot-binding in China was broken by creating an opposite norm from the ground up in one of the most remarkable social changes on record (Mackie 1996).

Social liberalism is typically contrary to notions of group autonomy. Breaking the hold of a social norm may mean loosening the hold of a particular community on its members. For example, undercutting destructive religious norms is likely to undercut ties to a religious community and even to create conflict within such a community, in either case causing a decline in group cohesion. Social liberalism therefore should be anathema to communitarians. Strangely, however, many of the Anti-Federalist opponents of the US constitution favored the introduction of a bill or rights that would specifically protect individuals. Such rights might indirectly protect communities through the protection of individuals who have communal values. The Supreme Court recently protected the Amish as a group, however, by ruling that individual Amish children could have their apparent right (in the state of Wisconsin) to at least a tenth grade education reduced in order, somewhat forcibly, to keep them loyal to their community (*Wisconsin v. Yoder, et al.*; see further, Hardin 1995, 201-3). Immanuel Kant (1983 [1784]) argued that for one generation to stifle the intellectual and moral development of a later generation in this way is to commit a crime against human nature. In this instance, the Court abused future generations in order to satisfy demands of the current generation of adult Amish or, arguably, primarily the leadership of the Amish order. One might have expected the Anti-Federalist communitarians to favor such group rights.

Institutional Liberalism

Dewey thought that the central problem in the established liberal democracies of our — or his — time, was the liberation of people from the impositions of large *private* organizations on individual liberty and welfare. He supposed that this was the new problem of liberalism. He also supposed that the problem must be handled by government action. We had long been liberated from governments that imposed aristocratic control of society and mercantilist control of the economy, and now we needed to be liberated from private power that had arisen under the regime of old liberalism. He wrote that, "after early liberalism had done its work, society faced a new problem, that of social organization" (Dewey [1935] 1987, 39; see also Lindblom 1977, 49-51, McConnell 1966). Because he was writing in the depths of the Depression, it is plausible that most of what Dewey thought we needed was what could be handled by social welfare programs that do not infringe old economic liberalism beyond the standard infringement of taxation, with which advocates of the old liberalism were always content.

Institutional liberalism was a response to crude aspects of economic life in the brightest moments of capitalism from, say, 1840 to 1929 in the United States and roughly the same period in England. The triumph of capitalism did not end grotesque poverty and inequality but, in the view of many, exacerbated them. Or, at the very least, one can say that economic liberalism and the market have benefited some far more than others, that they are not neutral in their impact. Dewey's most articulate statement of the need for institutional liberalism was delivered in 1935 during the darkest days of capitalism when, oddly, it was arguably beside the point for the problems that were most urgent then. These problems were still poverty and inequality, especially as aggravated by unemployment. But their solution was not, as in institutional liberalism, in liberation from the intrusions of large private organizations. The unemployed of the 1930s did not need to

be liberated from such institutions. They would, rather, have benefited from greater success of these institutions.

How can we fit Dewey's institutional liberalism with the earlier liberalisms? It was, of course, motivated by a concern for welfare, and in this it is similar to all liberalisms. The conceptual analogy with political and economic liberalisms is that it liberates. The earlier liberalisms liberated from arbitrary government intrusions into people's lives and from government control of the economy. The arbitrary intrusions that provoked political liberalism were star chambers, bills of attainder, arrests without warrant, billeting of troops without permission or recompense, seizure of presses, political imprisonment, and virtually anything else an uncontrolled government might choose to do or demand. The intrusions that were against economic liberalism were the panoply of practices of government economic control in the heavy-handed system of mercantilism, in which friends and relatives of the crown were given economic privileges and in which workers and producers were hassled by destructive regulations on what they could do and where they could do it. These regulations restricted mobility, closed off cities from independent artisans and traders, required long apprenticeships to qualify for work, gave strict monopolies to some, and blocked trade with foreign enterprises. Dewey's institutional liberalism was intended to overcome the similarly grim intrusions of large institutions other than government. It would liberate from the control of large private organizations.

Group Liberalism

In recent decades, there have been many demands for attention to group "rights" or group protections of various kinds. Virtually any other liberalism could be called group liberalism, but I will reserve the term for protections of specifically namable groups. For example, protection of an immigrant group's use of its native language in its dealings with government and in the education of its children would be an instance of group liberalism. All the other liberalisms canvassed work by protecting individuals. Group liberalism is very odd in that it somehow elevates the relevant group above its members by protecting the group, plausibly *against its own members*.

We could characterize demands for group protections in two ways. First, it might be an extension of some of the earlier demands for institutional liberalism to protect workers or consumers against private institutions. For example, workers are a group who can claim that they need general enforcement of a rule to enable them to mobilize against corporations.2 Similarly, government may determine limits on what can be the terms of contracts covering either relations between unequal parties or relations that have significant external effects on those not party to the contract. This facilitates what groups can do or protects them against harms. For such protections, a liberal government might adopt something akin to Mill's harm principle. But, unless group liberalism is to conflict with economic liberalism, government should not avoid harms by manipulating specific aspects of the economy. For example, government might protect workers as a group against the harms brought by economic change. But it should do this with worker specific programs rather than by artificially keeping a failing firm or an obsolescent industry in business.

Second, it might be an extension of the descriptive theory of interest group liberalism, which characterizes American politics in the quasi-Madisonian system of a plurality of interests engaged in trying to influence national policy. But in the pluralism of interests, the groups are typically contending for favor directly from the government. In the newer group liberalism, groups are demanding protections against government and private agencies. For example, they demand protection against government requirements on

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2Mill argued, as an example, that workers might require legal backing to enforce their unanimous preference for reduction from a ten-hour to a nine-hour day, because without legal enforcement, individual workers would have incentive to freeride on the abstinence of others and to work an extra hour for bonus wages, thus destroying the nine-hour day (Mill 1965 [1848], book 5, chap. 11, sec. 12, p. 958; see also Hardin 1988, 92-94; Hobhouse 1948 [1910], 32-33, 37-39.)

how to educate their children and against the freedom of speech of movie makers and television programming. Strategically, such liberalism is a hotch potch.

One of the demands of groups in our time is for the official protection of minority languages. In the United States such protection probably makes the first generation speakers of Spanish, Korean, or Vietnamese better off. But it might partially cripple the next generation because, typically, it means making sure that the next generation is educated in the minority language and plausibly made less able to assume a full role in the larger community. Hence, protecting the supposed group interest requires action against the interest and incentives of some group members. At the very least, this makes group liberalism a very complex version of liberalism. It can hardly be defended either on standard welfarist or autonomy grounds. And it conflicts with social liberalism and possibly with institutional liberalism.

Finally, advocates of group liberalism in its stronger variants demand impositions on the larger society and even their own members, and they often want government to manage these impositions. Hence, group liberalism is often profoundly illiberal in any sensible prior reading of that notion. Many who are not members of groups that want group autonomy defend group protections despite the illiberal implications. Their positive argument for group rights is, roughly, that giving groups status, even with some controls over individual group members, allows the group members to enjoy benefits that would otherwise be at risk from the corrosive effects of the larger society. Hence, government protection of a group is merely a means to protecting its members.

If the central meaning of liberalism is that it liberates, the meaning of group liberalism is, of course, that it liberates one group from the hegemony or control of another group or of other groups in combination. This would make it unlike any of the other liberalisms discussed here because it would be analogous to liberation of one individual from the control of another individual, rather than liberation of individuals from control by large social entities, such as governments, institutions, and powerful, widespread norms. We might conceive of group liberalism as protecting groups from government intrusions in their lives, and that can be an issue. It is only in this vision that it is analogous to other liberalisms.

Any "group" right that essentially protects a group against other groups or against government can be seen either as a particular application of the ordinary rights of all individuals to the rights, individually, of the members of the group or as *a protection of the norms or rules of the group largely against its own members' violation of those norms or rules*. For the first category, there need be no constitutional provision other than, as in the case of the rights of former slaves and blacks more generally in the United States, heightened attention to the claims of individuals in a relevant group. Such protection seems likely to be little different from the protection of individual rights more generally. The major difference is that the group whose members are protected might suffer simultaneously from prejudicial norms of the larger society, so that the government must intervene to help break that social imposition, as when it opposes and attempts to end racism.

Many groups — or at least many groups' leaders — insist on having group rights of the latter, stronger kind. The leaders of Inuit native populations in Canada and of Old Order Amish populations in Wisconsin have won the latter kind of group rights with the implicit or explicit enforcement of those rights by the Canadian and US governments, respectively. The Federal government of the US enforced the group right of the Amish to block their children's education against the government of the state of Wisconsin. The Canadian government much more actively supports the special legal claims of the Inuit and also funds the tribe and its tribal government.

Some philosophers and many advocates of the strong form of group rights claim that they are essentially liberal or are required by liberalism. Because liberalism is such a protean term, these claims might be nothing more than definitional. But some writers insist that traditional liberals should support the enforcement of such rights for certain groups

(Kymlicka 1989, Tamir 1993). I will argue against them here other than perhaps implicitly in showing how such rights conflict with individual rights that traditional liberals support. When there is such a conflict, then the claim that traditional liberals should support such group rights is specious.

Illiberal Groups
It is instructive to see how these various liberalisms come into play in an actual case. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States captures the whole range of concerns of the various liberalisms. That movement in the 1950s and 1960s was primarily a movement to extend political liberalism to cover a previously excluded group, and in this it was first directed at government: at Jim Crow laws and at courts that refused to enforce liberal laws that would give blacks easier access to politics and the market economy. Substantial success in this movement was inadequate to overcome the deeper problems of racism and, therefore, the movement also pushed for laws to force private institutions to end discrimination of many varieties. In this, its program was that of Dewey's institutional liberalism. Even this program, however, would be inadequate to overcome the inequalities of blacks in American society. Two further projects would be needed: ending the pervasive, non-institutional racism of social conventions and ending poverty. And some in the black community would go further and demand group rights, although they typically would want autonomy as a way of escaping racism and white institutional controls rather than as a way of protecting religious or other group-level values.

Other subnational groups have a very different agenda. They, or their leaders, want recognition as separate groups with special status in the larger society. That special status might go no further than to make it possible for a group to survive as such into future generations. The group, given such protection, would then take care of attempting to secure its own members' loyalty and of maintaining its values and its members commitment to those values. But the requisite special status might be almost that of a state within the state with substantial powers over its members, especially powers to coerce them. Such a subgroup is very unlikely to have a democratic structure, although its mores might be widely shared among many, especially older, members of the group.

Clearly, the urgent problem in the life of a subnational group that wishes state protection in sustaining itself is keeping its members loyal to it, so that they do not leave the group for the blandishments of the larger society. Those blandishments are likely to be especially attractive to the young of the next generation, who have yet to settle into the routines of the group's norms. The power of *Yoder* was that it secured the next generation's loyalty to the local Amish community by cutting off any chance of finding attractive employment in the larger society outside. In a society in which a high school education is virtually required even to be an unskilled worker or clerk, forcibly ending a child's education at age fourteen is a powerful move. When these are the concerns of group liberalism, it is impossible for it not to conflict with traditional liberalisms that protect individuals first and foremost.

Group liberalism with such a program is inherently illiberal on the traditional theories. Hence, we face the problem of justifying it despite its implication of sometime hostility towards and suppression of its own members. Let us divide the problem into two categories. The first is a liberal society into which illiberal groups immigrate; the second is an older society in which there are long extant illiberal subnational groups and into which a liberal constitution is introduced. The way we deal with an illiberal population may depend on whether that population precedes a liberal constitution. If the population immigrates into the nation and a liberal constitution is in place, then the new population can be assumed to accept life under the extant constitution. This does mean, of course, that the members of that population genuinely support the terms of the constitution but only that they have chosen to immigrate — perhaps despite that constitution — even though they could in almost all cases readily have stayed in their prior nation. If the immigrant population wishes to maintain some practice that violates the extant constitution, they can choose either to attempt to get the constitution changed to permit their practice or they can act illegally. If they act illegally, they are then subject to the law

of their newly chosen nation and may be punished for acting according to their illegal practice.

For an indigenous population that precedes the liberal constitution, one might expect that the constitution would make special provisions for their illiberal practices. For example, the current Indian constitution allows for Muslim practices of marriage and divorce by Muslims, while not permitting those practices for non-Muslims. Even then, however, the constitution might require liberal treatment of individuals who wish not to follow their family's practices.

Our chief issue therefore is how to handle illiberal immigrant groups. Consider a particularly harsh example. In early 2002 in Sweden, Fadime Sahindal, at age 26, was shot dead by her father in a so-called honor killing. He and her brother had threatened to kill Fadime for several years because she refused to give in to her family's plan to marry her to a Kurdish cousin. She had been in love with an Iranian Swede who had died in a car crash in 1998. After his death, she still refused to marry the cousin and she lived more or less as a widow. She became a public figure as an advocate of the right of immigrant women to choose their own lives (Wikan, personal communication, February 2002). In some Muslim nations, Sahindal's father's action would not be criminal and in many Muslim societies he would receive high praise and approval for his honorable action. In Sweden that action was murder.

In Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, with their relatively open immigration policies, such honor killings have become frequent events and forced marriages are very common. Forced marriages are apparently not punished, but honor killings are. And a woman who is a Norwegian citizen was protected against forced marriage even when her family had abducted her to take her to Morocco for an arranged marriage that she did not want (Wikan 2000).

Such cases of honor killings and the kidnapping of young women who do not conform to their parents' values are especially alarming to traditional liberals. Indeed, it seems inconceivable that a traditional liberal would want the state to grant group rights to do such things to individuals who do not conform to the group's norms. When Kymlicka and others defend group rights, they do not typically take up such issues, perhaps because their cases have more benign cultural practices than honor killing for refusal to marry a particular person. Even in their cases, however, there are commonly sexist practices that no contemporary liberal could defend. The very logic of traditional liberalism is contrary to allowing honor killings and coerced marriages for some groups in a society while governing the rest of the society through ordinary laws prohibiting murder and coercion.

The values of liberalism are inherently universalistic, not hand-crafted to different groups according to their labels. Indeed, a central appeal of liberalism is its universalism. The defense of group rights that imply coercion of the next generation is illiberal, and the arguments of Kymlicka and others in defense of group rights cannot, contrary to their sometime claims, be inferred from liberal principles. At most, groups can be granted modified rights that still exclude such actions as honor killing and marital coercion. If a group's members are systematically disadvantaged, for example economically, a liberal state can readily provide support to the group. It is in fact part of the universalism of liberalism that such a policy could be commended. To claim such support while, however, insisting on blocking universalistic principles in other realms is duplicitous. Such duplicity is much of the stuff of politics, but it wrecks any effort to give a justification of the contradictory policies.

Concluding Remarks

Where should an otherwise liberal state stand on its dealings with illiberal immigrant groups? I do not think there is a correct answer to such a question if it is essentially normative or moral. But there can be an answer practically, which is that for a universalistic liberal state to support illiberal practices in selected subpopulations is incoherent and likely to be destructive of the survival of the liberal order. We must choose

a generally liberal order or a generally illiberal order. It is not incoherent or immoral or impolitic to choose a generally liberal order if that is what we already have and if it is the likely choice of a majority of our society. Indeed, we can even choose not to allow substantial immigration of any population that would be profoundly illiberal and that would be destructive of our society. If we hear many stories such as those of Fadime and Nadia, we are likely to wonder at the cost generally of allowing migration of those who cannot adapt to moderately liberal customs and mores.

The conclusions here do not depend on any claim that liberalism is right or good in ways that trump other principles for social organization and interpersonal relations. Indeed, it is the absence of any such justification that makes the defense of liberalism (or any other social theory) inherently a matter of defending our life because it is good for us in particular. Any claim that we should give up that way of life on behalf of others who wish to have a very different way of life is as morally ungrounded as liberalism itself. Devout religious believers have as much claim to the morality of their vision as liberals do. But they have no claim to disrupt a liberal society. For liberals this is largely a welfarist concern. Our lives are good because we are in a liberal society.

Liberalism is a welfarist principle. It serves the mutual advantage of those who have the relevant concern with individual liberty and control of their lives. Many of the communal value systems, such as that which ruined the life of Fadime and nearly ruined that of Nadia are at least in part anti-welfarist. If it requires government action to secure those values, there is a contradiction. We cannot *in the name of liberalism* protect illiberalism. Those who insist that we must, as liberals, make a place for illiberalism in our society are incoherent. In general, this means in practice that we cannot allow, for example, kidnapping or murder on behalf of communal values. It is perhaps because they had grown up in liberal Norway that Fadime and Nadia suffered reprisals and coercions. The prior generation (and apparently the younger generation of males) of their families was still immersed in communal values of a very illiberal society; Fadime and Nadia were not.

If one wanted to assign responsibility for the fates of Fadime and Nadia and thousands of others in similar positions, one would have to note that it was the prior generation who chose to rear them in a liberal society with all its freedoms (or, if one prefers, with all its license). They chose to mold their daughters in ways that then offended them. Liberal Norway was forced to decide between the two generations. A liberal can make no other choice than to protect the adult or near-adult children of these families just as it would protect children from ethnically Norwegian families. A liberal society must be liberal in the treatment of those citizens and residents who wish to be treated liberally.

All of the talk of the rights or interests of groups per se has so far failed to bridge the generation gap. The *Yoder* case sharply focused on exactly that issue, and the US Supreme Court was in woeful default on the issue. Until it grapples with the next generation and the status of its members, the defense of group rights is dishonest and vacuous. Norwegian and other liberal societies cannot make room for state defense of honor killing by fathers who are offended at their daughters' behavior. The suppression of honor killing of various kinds and the transfer of social control in many often violent matters from the community to the state — including the invention of the legal idea of murder — arguably initiated the long historical development of liberalism. The original introduction of law to handle matters that were formerly handled by feud and vengeance was surely a change that served mutual advantage for almost everyone.

Some might initially have defended the prior practice of, say, vengeance as somehow inherently moral or right, but subsequent generations can only count the change as a good one. For example, the Corsican norm of vendetta was arguably part of the reason for Corsican economic backwardness and it brought enormous suffering and pain to many families, yet many in that society defended the practice as morally required (Mérimée 1989 [1840]: see also Hardin 1995, 133-6). At a slightly higher level of social control, the Greek practice of punishing people on the spot for various public offenses, which has led to the Islamic practice of instant punishment for women who reveal skin in the wrong places, even if accidentally, a practice that was especially harsh under the

Taliban in Alghanistan. The Greek official was "inspector of the market," or agoranomos. This was translated directly into the "Arabic amil al-suk or sahib al-suk, who had a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction; it was later, under the early Abbasids, to develop into the Islamic office of the muhtasib" (Schacht 1982[1965]), 25).3

At a later development of law, one would expect to see such unregulated forms of enforcement to be superseded by more nearly routinized, depersonalized systemic devices. Such depersonalization in the law is the height of liberalism. It would be a strange betrayal of the long history of the development of liberalism and depersonalized law to justify contemporary cultural practices that are brutally personalized and illiberal in the name of liberalism.

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3 I owe this reference to Paul Bullen (personal correspondence, 24 March 2002).

SESSION 1   DIVERSITY

Introduction

Jadwiga Koralewicz

The Contemporary world can be characterized by two opposing forces. On the one hand, there is the process of globalisation of economic, political and cultural sphere, which one would expect to lead to a greater degree of cultural homogeneity. On the other hand, the opposite tendency exists: the renaissance of ethnic identities and "tribalism". Most countries are not ethnically and culturally homogeneous. They consist of varied social groups and categories, which differ in respect of race, language, cultural patterns, historical tradition and expectations. This is what constitutes diversity.

Countries vary greatly in terms of the manner in which they deal with the paradox of development and diversity. However, there are discernable policy patterns which I wish to discuss briefly. Some countries simply try to diminish cultural and ethnic diversity. Jerzy Smolicz, the director of the Centre for Intercultural Studies and Multicultural Education at Adelaide University in Australia has documented this policy approach in great detail. For example, Turks refuse to accept the very existence of the Kurdish minority and of the Kurdish national identity; accordingly, the Kurds are labeled as Mountain Turks. Ethnic groups that enjoy a position of dominance often regard ethnic differences as a temporary phenomenon. Thus Smolicz observes that Germans regard Turks as temporary "guest workers", even though many Turks have resided in Germany for three generations. Similar cases have been documented in Asia, where the ideal of a mono-cultural nation-state based on a common racial and ethnic descent dominates.

In a distinct and very important set of cases, multi-ethnicity results in strong and sometimes violent territorial separatism. In several countries a strenuous effort has been made to "integrate minority groups out of existence". France seems to provide an example of this. Here the nation-state is viewed as "open". Once you enter France and decide to stay, you become a part of the French nation. Thus, the "obligation" to assimilate into the French culture is the main integration mechanism. Immigrants, who gain citizenship rights are recognized as formally equal, however, they do not necessarily automatically acquire an equal cultural status. In response to this, many nations have attempted to introduce policies of multi-culturalism that have a strong legal grounding.

This deliberate, state-sponsored multiculturalism recognizes the reality of cultural differences within the framework of shared values such as political democracy, the rule of law and market economy. Policies of this type aim at combating racism, ethnicism and "linguism". Discrimination, intolerance and prejudice thus become unacceptable at the level of state policy. The axiom of multiculturalism as a state-policy is not only that people differ but that they are entitled to differ and that much is gained from such diversity. Differences are the seeds of a "beautiful society".

Fortress Construction as National Policy: Lessons from the United States

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Abstract. In recent years there has been much talk about the construction of a Fortress Europe to prevent the entry of unwanted immigrants. Beginning in 1986, the United States embarked on its own policy of fortress construction by increasing the size and budget of the Border Patrol, criminalizing the hiring of unauthorized workers, increasing the penalties for illegal entry, and reducing the number of legal visas. Ultimately, however, the construction of Fortress America was unsuccessful as the probability of border apprehension fell and the rate of illegal entry was unaffected. To the extent that restrictive immigration policies had any effects at all, they were negative, transforming Mexican immigration from a seasonal flow of workers going to three states into a national population of immigrant families and undermining the wages and terms of employment for U.S. workers. This paper underscores the lessons for Europe of America's failed policy of fortress construction.

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Introduction

As the European Union moves into the 21st century, it has increasingly adopted a fortress mentality with respect to immigration. Even though fertility remains at below-replacement levels and national populations continue to age, and despite a persistent demand for unskilled labor and a growing shortage of high-tech workers, neither European politicians nor the public at large seem willing to accept the prospect of increased immigration. On the contrary, conservative politicians across the continent have achieved electoral success by mobilizing against immigrants, and EU authorities have put increasing pressure on front line states such as Spain and Greece to tighten border controls. In 1998, for example, the EU approved special funding to construct a new fence along Europe's southernmost border in Spanish Morocco (Harris 2002), and the German government provides substantial cash and technical assistance to Polish authorities to patrol their borders with the former Soviet Union (Andreas 2000). Italy, meanwhile has stepped up its naval patrols to intercept immigrants traveling by ship (Harris 2002).

European policy makers seem to believe that by creating a "Fortress Europe," they will be able to prevent the entry of unwanted migrants from the developing world. A similar fortress mentality has prevailed for some time in the United States. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of U.S. Border Patrol officers increased by 368% and the agency's budget grew by a factor of six (Nevins 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). As of the mid-1990s, the Border Patrol's arsenal for immigration control included 5,000 uniformed officers, 58 helicopters, 43 planes, 355 night-vision scopes, and a host of high-tech devices such as electronic intrusion-detector sensors, infrared radar, and microwave communications (Dunn 1996). By the year 2000, the number of Border Patrol officers had reached 9,200 and the annual number of border apprehensions was approaching two million for the first time in U.S. history (Nevins 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

Despite the massive build-up of equipment and personnel along the Mexico-U.S. border, however, undocumented migration has continued apace. If anything, the Fortress America strategy has backfired. Rather than deterring undocumented migrants from coming, it has promoted their settlement in greater numbers under conditions that are detrimental to the

United States and its citizens. Before the process of fortress construction goes too far in the European Union, people there should stop and ponder lessons from the U.S. experience.

In this paper, I describe the policies that America employed in an attempt to wall itself off from the rest of the hemisphere. I then draw on official statistics and data from the Mexican Migration Project to document the failure of this strategy. I show that building Fortress America failed to lower the probability of undocumented migration from Mexico or raise the odds of arrest while attempting an illegal entry, but it did yield a host of perverse consequences. Specifically, it transformed a seasonal flow of workers going to just three states into a settled of population of dependents spread throughout the country while it have reduced wages for American workers. I conclude by underscoring the parallels between the European and American immigration strategies and posit similar consequences for the EU if it does not shift away from its regime of fortress construction.

BUILDING FORTRESS AMERICA

Between 1986 and 1996, the U.S. Congress, the President, and several states adopted a remarkable series of policies in an effort to construct Fortress America. The foundations were laid by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which sought to combat undocumented migration in four ways. To eliminate the attraction of U.S. jobs, it imposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers. To deter people from entering the United States illegally, it allocated additional resources to expand the U.S. Border Patrol. To wipe the slate clean and begin afresh, it authorized an amnesty for undocumented migrants who could prove continuous residence in the United States after January 1, 1982, as well as a special legalization for seasonal agricultural workers who had been in the U.S. during the prior year. Finally, IRCA gave the president new authority to declare "immigration emergencies" if he believed that large numbers of undocumented migrants were embarking for the United States (Bean, Vernez and Keely 1989).

The next bricks in the wall were provided by the Immigration Act of 1990, for despite high expectations that IRCA would slow Mexican immigration, by 1990 it was clear that it was not working. With both legal and illegal migration on the rise, Congress passed another major revision of U.S. immigration law, authorizing funds to hire another 1,000 Border Patrol agents, further tightening employer sanctions, and streamlining deportation procedures. It also increased penalties for immigration violations and imposed new limits on the total number of immigrants that could be admitted in any year.

Although immigration is mostly a matter of federal policy, during the 1980s a variety of states also got into the act. Most policies were symbolic gestures that had few practical consequences, such as enacting laws to make English the "official state language." Prior to 1980, only five states had such a law, but by 1998 the number had swollen to 25 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). More important was California's Proposition 187, which sought to prohibit undocumented migrants from using public services and required state and local agencies to report suspected illegal aliens. It also made the manufacture, distribution, sale, or use of false documents a felony.

Early in the Clinton administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) evolved a border strategy that came to be known as prevention through deterrence. Great efforts were made to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border illegally to avoid having to arrest them later (Andreas 2000). The strategy had is origins in September of 1993, when the Border Patrol Chief in El Paso, Texas, launched Operation Blockade, which built wall of enforcement along the city's border with Juarez, Mexico. The blockade quickly deflected migratory flows away from El Paso and restored calm to the sector (Andreas 2000; Nevins 2002).

Officials in Washington took note of the operation's apparent success and after renaming it Operation Hold-the-Line to placate Mexican sensibilities, they incorporated it into the Border Patrol's strategic plan (U.S. Border Patrol 1994). In October of 1994, the INS launched a second operation along the busiest stretch of border in San Diego. Operation Gatekeeper installed high-intensity floodlights to illuminate the border day and night and built a two meter

steel fence along the 14 miles of border from the Pacific Ocean to the foothills of California's coastal mountains. Border Patrol officers were stationed every few hundred yards behind this formidable wall (which came to be known as the "tortilla curtain"), and a new array of sophisticated hardware was deployed in the no-man's-land behind it (Dunn 1996)

Of course, throwing up blockades in El Paso and San Diego did not really stop migrants from entering the United States, it simply channeled them to other, less visible locations along the 2,000 mile border. As a result, the agency was soon compelled to expand its operations geographically and to launch additional operations in other sectors. In 1995 Operation Safeguard was unleashed in Nogales, Arizona; in 1996, Operation Gatekeeper was extended to another 66 miles of border; in 1997 Operation Hold-the-Line was extended 10 miles west into New Mexico; in August of 1997, Operation Rio Grande was implemented along 36 miles of border in southeast Texas; and in 1999, Operation Safeguard was extended east and west from Nogales to Douglas and from Douglas to Naco, Arizona.

The construction of Fortress America was further enhanced by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Once again, legislation focused heavily on deterrence, authorizing funds for the construction of two additional layers of steel fence in San Diego and enacting tougher penalties for smugglers, undocumented migrants, and visa overstayers. The legislation also included funding for new military technology (magnetic footfall detectors and an electronic finger-printing system) and for hiring 1,000 additional Border Patrol officers a year through 2001 (Andreas 2000).

Although billed as a reform measure to "end welfare as we know it," the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 also contained provisions with far-reaching effects on immigration. It copied Proposition 187 in barring illegal migrants from most federal, state, and local public benefits and required the INS to verify the immigration status of aliens before they could receive any federal benefits. It also placed new restrictions on the access of legal immigrants to public services while providing states with greater flexibility to set eligibility and to exclude immigrants from both federal and state entitlement programs.

The explosive growth in the size and importance of the U.S. Border Patrol and the INS after 1986 is documented Figure 1, which shows the increase in their budgets since 1965. To capture trends on the same scale, I divided each series by its1986 value. As can be seen, the INS and the Border Patrol budgets changed little in the years before IRCA. Then suddenly they double between 1986 and 1992 and accelerate exponentially thereafter. By 1998, the INS budget was nearly eight times its 1986 level and the Border Patrol budget was almost six times its former level.

Figure 1. Nominal budget of the U.S. Border Patrol and INS 1978-98 (1986=1.0)

The additional resources and personnel allocated to the INS after 1986 had a pronounced effect on the agency's border enforcement efforts. Figure 2 graphs the number of linewatch hours and Border Patrol officers on duty, again expressing each series relative to its 1986 value. Linewatch hours are the number of person-hours spent patrolling the Mexico-U.S. border. After 1986, linewatch hours begin to grow and after 1992 they accelerated rapidly. By 1997 the Border Patrol was devoting twice as much time to patrolling the border as in 1986. As the figure shows, the number of Border Patrol officers likewise doubled between 1986 and 1998 and increased fourfold between 1965 and 1998!

Figure 2.   Linewatch hours and Border Patrol Officers on duty.

THE ILLUSION OF BORDER CONTROL

Prior to 1986, the brunt of Mexican immigration was directed toward California. In the late 1980s, 63% of all Mexican immigrants went to California, more than four times the number going to the next most popular destination, Texas, which accounted for just 15% of the flow, followed by Illinois at 5% (Durand et al 2000). By far the most active border sector was San Diego-Tijuana, followed in order of importance by El Paso-Juarez and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo. Among undocumented migrants apprehended for illegal entry by the INS in 1986, for example, 45% were arrested in the San Diego sector, 21% in the El Paso sector, and 17% in the Laredo sector.

Prior to IRCA, in other words, 85% of all undocumented migrants entered the United States through three narrow corridors, which together comprised a tiny fraction of the 2,000 mile border. Reflecting the geographic concentration of undocumented migration, the Border Patrol's enforcement resources were likewise concentrated. As described above, agency operations focused overwhelmingly on San Diego and El Paso, and when the massive militarization of the border began in 1993, these two districts naturally led the way. As a new "tortilla curtain" went up in these areas, migrants naturally began to go around the reinforced portions of the border, prompting U.S. authorities to extend their lines of enforcement outward.

This pattern of deployment, response, and counter-deployment influenced the geography of migration in two ways. First, Operation Gatekeeper, by far the largest deployment of enforcement resources, deflected migrants away from California toward new crossing-points in Arizona, New Mexico, and more remote sections of the Rio Grande Valley in Texas. Second, within heavily traversed corridors, such as San Diego/Tijuana, the new militarization channeled migrants away from built-up, settled areas and redirected them to more remote and desolate country.

Figure 3 illustrates the changing geography of Mexican immigration using data from the Mexican Migration Project, which surveyed migrants from 71 Mexican sending communities and U.S. destination areas using representative sampling methods (all data and documentation are publicly available at www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig/). The series indicated by the solid line at the top of the figure gives the proportion of migrants entering the United States outside of California. As can be seen, from 1980 through 1996 undocumented migration focused increasingly on this state. The proportion of undocumented migrants crossing into other U.S. states fell steadily from 64% in 1980 to 39% in 1996. Two years after the launching of Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, however, there was a very sudden and very sharp upswing in the proportion crossing into other states. From 1996 to 1998 the share of non-California crossings jumped from 39% to 58%, a swing of 19 points (49%) in just three years!

Figure 3. Apprehension probabilities and border crossing locations 1980-98

Not only were undocumented migrants deflected away from California, but those who continued to cross there entered at more remote sites, away from built-up portions in and around San Diego. The dashed line at the bottom of Figure 3 shows the proportion of California-destined migrants who crossed at points outside of the Tijuana/San Diego corridor. Prior to Operation Gatekeeper, Tijuana was the crossing point for the overwhelming majority of undocumented migrants. Fewer than 11% of all undocumented migrants chose another crossing point before 1994, and during the early 1990s nearly all (98%) California-bound migrants chose to cross in Tijuana. The post-1994 expansion of enforcement activities within San Diego brought a swift and instantaneous reaction on the part of migrants, with the share of non-Tijuana crossings rising from just 3% in 1993 to nearly 30% by 1998, a tenfold increase in five years. By the late 1990s, the San Diego sector had grown quiet, and to

citizens of southern California and the rest of the nation the border once again seemed "under control."

Tranquility in the San Diego sector did not mean that the Border Patrol's strategy of "prevention through deterrence" was really working. On the contrary, by pushing migration away from urbanized areas toward sparsely populated sectors, the Border Patrol effectively channeled migrants toward portions of the border where they were less likely to be caught, for in addition to being less inhabited, the new crossing points were also less patrolled.

Figure 3 also plots annual probabilities of apprehension (computed from border-crossing histories using methods developed by Massey and Singer 1995). Historically, studies have shown the odds of apprehension for undocumented migrants to be about one in three (Espenshade 1990; Singer and Massey 1998) and these were indeed the odds that prevailed during the pre-IRCA period. As indicated by the dotted line, the probability of apprehension was fairly steady at .32-.36 through the early 1980s. After 1986, however, the probability fell steadily to reach record lows of .20-.25 in the period 1990-94. Although the launching of Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in 1994 produced a short-term upswing, after 1996 the probability of apprehension fell once again and by the end of the 1990s was moving rapidly downward. There is little evidence, therefore, that the Border Patrol's string of post-1993 enforcement operations were successful in raising the probability of apprehension.

Under these circumstances, one would not expect much of a deterrent effect stemming from Operation Gatekeeper and its extensions. This expectation is indeed borne out by the figures graphed in Figure 4, which depicts the annual probability that Mexican males aged 15-35 took an initial undocumented trip between 1980 and 1998. From 1980 through 1984 his probability stood at around .02 per year. In 1985 the likelihood of migrating illegally shifted upward slightly to fluctuate between .025 and .030. After 1989, however, it declined and reached .018 in 1993. Then it rose to .021 in 1996 before falling back to .011 in 1998. This trend suggests neither a border out of control before 1986 nor much of a deterrent effect afterward. On the whole, the shifts have been relatively minor and the overall trend is one of constancy, with year-to-year fluctuations in the probability of undocumented migration that are not obviously connected to U.S. border policies.

Figure 4. Probability of of a Mexican male aged 15-35 taking first undocumented trip to the U.S. 1980-98

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES

The militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border made for great political theater. It provided politicians and government officials with useful props and photo opportunities to symbolically demonstrate their concern for immigration control. The deflection of migrant flows away from large cities such as El Paso and San Diego also meant that the migrants became less visible, as crossings increasingly occurred in remote mountains or deserts and were rarely seen, especially by members of the broadcast media. The tranquility prevailing in the reinforced sectors reassured the public that the border was indeed "under control." Whatever the political utility of the fortress approach, however, it came at a high price.

Wasted Lives

The diversion of undocumented migrants into rugged terrain between well-defended ports-of-entry not only lowered the odds of apprehension, it also increased the risks of injury and death, for in addition to being less populated and less patrolled, these desolate sectors were also more dangerous. Using cause-of-death statistics from vital registries in both Mexico and the United States, Eshbach and colleagues (1999, 2001) compiled a count of migrant deaths along the border for the years 1985-1998. I combined this time series with an estimate of the number of undocumented entries to derive an annual series of death rates. Since Eschbach et al. (2001) noted that deaths from suffocation, drowning, heat exhaustion, and exposure were most sensitive to shifts in border enforcement, I computed a death rate for these causes combined, along with unknown causes. Unknown causes are included because cause of death is often unspecified when people die alone in remote country and leave remains that are only found days, weeks or sometimes even months later.

Figure 5 shows the trend in the death rate from 1986 through 1998. In the years immediately after IRCA's passage, the border death rate stood at around 3-4 per hundred thousand crossings, but during the early 1990s it dropped below 2 per hundred thousand. Following the implementation of Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper in 1993 and 1994, however, the rate of death from suffocation, drowning, heat, cold, and unknown causes increased threefold to plateau at around 6 per hundred thousand in 1997-1998. This difference of 4 deaths per hundred thousand entries provides a precise means of assessing the cost of U.S. border policies in human lives. At current volumes of migration, approximately 170 people loose their lives each year simply to maintain the illusion of a controlled border.

Figure 5. Death rate from suffocation, drowning, heat exhaustion, exposure, and unknown causes along border 1986-98

Wasted Money

While undocumented migrants suffer mightily under the new policy regime, the Border Patrol profits handsomely. From an institutional backwater with budget of $151 million in 1986, the Border Patrol grew to become the nation's largest civilian police force, with more than 10,000 officers in uniform and an annual budget in excess of a billion dollars. As just shown, however, the infusion of resources has neither raised the odds of apprehension nor lowered the likelihood of undocumented migration. Together these facts suggest that U.S. citizens have been spending more but getting less in the way of actual border enforcement, and in the process they have been wasting a lot of tax money.

This conclusion is verified by Figure 6, which depicts the rising inefficiency of border enforcement. The first index considered is the ratio of Border Patrol budget to the underlying volume of undocumented migration. This ratio assesses the degree to which the supply of enforcement dollars matches the agency's ostensible workload, as measured by the estimated number of undocumented entries (see the solid line). The second index is the ratio of Border Patrol expenditures to the probability of apprehension, which may be interpreted as the marginal cost of border enforcement: what it costs to raise the probability of apprehension by one point (see the dashed line).

Figure 6. Relative cost of Border Patrol enforcement 1980-98

Prior to IRCA enforcement resources roughly kept pace with increases in the volume of undocumented migration to yield a constant apprehension probability. As a result, from 1980 through 1986 the ratio of Border Patrol expenditures to entries remained virtually constant at $50 per entry. Although the marginal cost of apprehension rose slowly, it stayed below $500,000 throughout the period. In other words, the cost to U.S. taxpayers of border enforcement was $50 per undocumented entry, or around half-a-million dollars per point of apprehension probability.

In the immediate aftermath of IRCA, however, both indicators began to rise rapidly. The cost of border enforcement rose from $50 per entry in 1986 to around $85 per entry in 1993. As the Border Patrol increasingly involved itself in drug interdiction (Andreas 2000; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002) and the underlying volume of undocumented migration actually fell in the wake of IRCA's massive legalization, the Border Patrol's budget grew in a way that was disconnected from its underlying workload. As a result, the marginal cost of apprehension accelerated rapidly after 1986, essentially tripling, going from around $500,000 per probability point in 1986 to roughly $1.5 million in 1993. With the launching of Operation Blockade and its various extensions after 1993, agency inefficiency really began to soar. The cost per entry went from $80 in 1993 to $260 in 1998; and over the same period the marginal cost of apprehension jumped from $1.5 million to $2.6 million dollars per probability point. In other words, by the end of the 1990s, U.S. taxpayers were buying apprehension probabilities that were no higher than in the early 1980s, but they were paying two to three times as much!

Reduced Wages

IRCA not only sought to deter Mexicans from leaving and crossing the border, it also attempted to neutralize the magnet of U.S. jobs by criminalizing the hiring of undocumented workers. IRCA for the first time required prospective employees to present documents confirming identity and a right to work in the United States. Employers had to fill out an "I-9 Form" that identified the prospective worker and listed the documents he or she had presented. IRCA sought to apply sanctions against employers who knowingly hired undocumented migrants, and the I-9 forms were devised as a means to define "knowingly." As long as an employer inspected some reasonable-looking documents and completed an I-9 form, he or she had satisfied his or her duties under the law.

Even though I-9 forms offered a huge loophole to employers seeking to evade IRCA's restrictions, the evasion came at a price. In sectors of the labor market characterized by rapid turnover, seasonality, and small profit margins, the need to fill out and retain I-9 forms for every worker created a significant paperwork burden that dramatically raised the costs of hiring. Moreover, even if they were seemingly protected by the I-9 form, employers were not sure that they were free from prosecution, especially in the early days, when it was not clear exactly how the new law would work. Although the objective risks to employers may have changed little as a result of IRCA, the subjective risks were much higher.

As a result of the increased costs and risks, some employers lowered the wages of their employees in compensation. Employer sanctions in essence imposed a "tax" on the hiring of workers in sectors of the economy characterized by significant undocumented employment, which bosses then extracted from their workers in the form of lower wages (Cobb-Clark, Shiells, and Lowell; Bansak and Raphael 1998). Contrary to what Congress intended, therefore, employers continued to hire undocumented migrants; they simply transferred the costs and risks of doing so to the workers themselves in the form of lower pay.

Other employers took a different route to assure continued access to undocumented labor. Whereas before IRCA most employers hired undocumented workers directly, afterward they shifted to a pattern of indirect hiring through labor subcontractors. Under a subcontracting arrangement, a U.S. citizen or resident alien contractually agrees with an employer to provide a specific number of workers for a certain period of time to undertake a defined task at a fixed rate of pay per worker. As the workers themselves are technically not employees of the firm but of the subcontractor, the employer avoids the need to comply with IRCA's burdensome paperwork requirements and escapes liability under the law. In return for providing this legal buffer, the subcontractor retains a portion of the workers' wages as income.

Such arrangements quickly became standard practice in industries characterized by high turnover, such as agriculture, construction, gardening, and custodial services (Taylor 1996; Martin 1996). As a result, the hiring process was completely restructured in sectors of the economy where immigrants worked. As indirect hiring became established after 1986, moreover, it was imposed on all workers regardless of legal status or citizenship. If citizens or legal resident aliens wished to get a job in agriculture or construction, they too had to work

through a subcontractor and forfeit a portion of their wages in return for the opportunity to work.

Thus, a perverse consequence of IRCA's employer sanctions was to lower the wages not only of undocumented migrants, but of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens as well. This shift is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the trend in real wages earned by documented and undocumented Mexican migrants on their last U.S. trip. The data once again come from the Mexican Migration Project and have been adjusted to constant 1983 U.S. dollars. As can be seen, IRCA had a relatively modest effect on the wages of undocumented migrants (see the dashed line). From 1980 through 1986, their wages trended slowly downward, going from around $4.10 per hour in 1980 to around $3.90 in 1986, a drop of about 3.3 cents per year. Over the next six years, however, the rate of decline accelerated to 8.3 cents per year, as wages fell to around $3.40 in the immediate post-IRCA period, for a total decline of 13% from 1986 to 1992.

Figure 7. Wages (1983 U.S. dollars) earned on last U.S. trip 1980-98

Among documented migrants, in contrast, the post-IRCA decline was much more serious. As with illegal migrants, those with documents experienced declining wages before the implementation of IRCA. Over the entire six-year period, the wages of legal immigrants fell from $6.75 to $5.50 per hour, a drop of 21 cents per year. However, a very large portion of the decline occurred between 1982 and 1983, a period of economic crisis and peso devaluation in Mexico, which in the space of a few months made the perceived value of U.S. wages skyrocket and, hence, dramatically, reduced Mexicans' reservation wages in dollar terms. If we exclude this one year for our calculations, the average decline over the period is only 9 cents per year. Whatever situation before IRCA, after 1986 the rate of decline accelerates to around 27 cents per year, causing a 35% erosion of value by 1993.

After 1993, the decline in migrant wages bottoms out and, starting in 1996, they rise once again for those with and without documents, reflecting broader trends in the U.S. economy. The late 1990s witnessed the first upturn in wages among unskilled workers in several decades, owing to record low rates of unemployment and strong labor demand (Uchitelle 1997). Given such a tight labor market, in March of 1999, Doris Meissner, the Commissioner

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, made official what had for some time had already been the de facto policy of the INS: the agency would cease internal inspections at worksites and only enforce immigration laws at the border and ports of entry (Billings 1999). Under these circumstances, wages of documented and undocumented migrants rose in the late 1990s, although as of 1998 they had not yet recouped the ground lost in the period 1986-1992.

Nationalizing the Problem

As if a massive wastage of lives, money, and wages in the service of an illusion were not enough, the consequences of the post-IRCA enforcement regime are actually worse than indicated so far. Not only have recent immigration and border policies produced a host of negative consequences, they have ensured that they will befall the largest number of people in the widest variety of U.S. regions. Although the post-IRCA enforcement regime may not have deterred many migrants, it was successful in transforming a circular flow of short-term migrants entering just three states into a nationwide diaspora of long-term residents settling within all states of the union. Whereas before 1986 Mexican immigration was a regional issue affecting a handful of states, post-IRCA policies guaranteed that it would grow to become national in scope.

The progressive "nationalization" of Mexican migration is indicated in Figure 8 by the growing percentage of Mexican migrants who go to a non-traditional destination. Once again the data come from the Mexican Migration Project, and for our purposes a non-traditional destination is defined as anyplace outside of California, Texas, or Illinois. During the period 1980-1986, the vast majority of both documented and undocumented migrants went to traditional receiving states: around 85%-90% of those with documents and 90% of those without. Although the relative number of legal immigrants going to non-traditional states began to rise before 1986, it surged in the years immediately after IRCA to reach 25% in the late 1980s before dropping back to 12% in 1992.

Figure 8. Percentage going to non-traditional destination on last U.S. trip 1980-98

The bulge from 1986 to 1992 reflects the behavior of newly legalized immigrants who, given the bleak situation in California, sought out new opportunities in different regions. Although we would not expect legal migrants to be much affected by the border build-up launched in 1993, we would expect them to respond to the nativist mobilization and anti-immigrant hysteria that occurred at the same time. The passage of Proposition 187 in 1994 thus led to another surge in the movement of documented migrants away from California toward non-traditional destination states, and as the economy heated up and labor shortages appeared in the northeast, midwest, and southeast in industries such as meat packing, poultry processing, seafood canning, construction, and agribusiness, the trend accelerated. By 1998, 30% of legal immigrants were avoiding the traditional "big three" destinations.

In the immediate post-IRCA period, undocumented migration was only modestly affected by the escalation of border enforcement, which proceeded rather slowly through 1992. Most migrants continued to make their way to California, Texas, or Illinois. As of 1992, on the eve of Operation Blockade, only15% of undocumented migrants went to a non-traditional destination. With the massive militarization of border enforcement in 1993, however, the stream of undocumented migrants immediately shifted away from traditional receiving states toward new destination areas. The share going to a non-traditional destination tripled between 1992 and 1998, rising from 15% to 45%. This remarkable spreading out of Mexican migration meant that the newly created negative consequences of repressive immigration enforcement falling wages and greater marginalization would affect a larger number of Americans than ever before. Encouraging Permanent Settlement

Not only were undocumented migrants dispersing more widely in the wake of the new enforcement regime, they were staying longer north of the border. A perverse consequence of draconian border enforcement is that it doesn't deter would-be migrants from leaving so much as it discourages those who are already in the country from returning home. The end result of a border build-up is typically longer trip durations, lower probabilities of return migration, and a shift toward permanent settlement. Geographic diffusion combined with a shift toward permanence guarantees that whatever the consequences of Mexican immigration were positive or negative their effect on the United States and its people were maximized.

There are two basic reasons that border enforcement pushes undocumented migrants toward longer trips and lower return probabilities. First, even though the costs of border-crossing are not increased to the point where migration becomes uneconomical, they are nonetheless increased, both in practical and monetary terms. We have already seen the rising toll in human life brought by the militarization of the border after 1993, and for every death there are many more injuries and serious mishaps that go undetected. Having run the gauntlet of border enforcement and survived, it is hardly surprising that migrants are loath to repeat the experience.

At the same time, tougher enforcement increases the out-of-pocket costs of border crossing. As more people turned to border smugglers, known as coyotes, and were forced to incur longer trips over more hazardous terrain, the financial costs of border crossing began to rise. Prior to IRCA, the cost of coyote rental was fairly constant and did not differ much between Tijuana and elsewhere. In Tijuana, the average cost fluctuated narrowly between $210 and $220, whereas at other crossing points average it trended slowly downward from $250 in 1980 to around $190 in 1986 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Not much changed in the immediate Post-IRCA period. From 1986 through 1991 Tijuana coyote prices remained steady at $210-$220 while non-Tijuana prices fluctuated between $150 and $200.

With the escalation of enforcement after1992, however, the world changed significantly for undocumented migrants, and the cost of renting a smuggler began to inflate rapidly. Coyote fees also rose because of geographic diversification, as they came to incorporate transport costs to ever more distant locations. In Tijuana, the price rose from its historical average of around $215 to reach $359 in 1998, representing an annual inflation rate of more than 7%. Away from Tijuana, the situation was even more dramatic as sleepy Mexican border towns overnight became major staging areas for clandestine border-crossing, creating a sudden imbalance between the demand for and the supply of smuggling services. From a low of $150

in 1990 the cost of a renting a coyote outside of Tijuana skyrocketed to reach $525 by 1998a remarkable price inflation of 250% in just eight years (averaging 11% per year).

In order to pay off this higher debt and move the trip toward profitability, migrants after 1990 would have to work longer. However long it took to amortize coyote fees before 1990, by 1998 it must have taken 2-3 times longer. The most accurate way to measure the shift from circulatory migration toward permanent settlement is to compute annual probabilities of return migration. Using life history data compiled for household heads in the Mexican Migration Project, I counted all person-years in which subjects spent any time north of the border and divided this total into the number who went back to Mexico during the person-year in question, yielding an annual probability of return migration. I then plotted these yearly probabilities for documented and undocumented migrants, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Probability of returning within two years of entering U.S. on first trip1980-98.

Undocumented migrants are indicated by the solid line at the top of the figure. As one might predict, the likelihood of returning home is much greater for them than for documented migrants (who are indicated by the dashed line at the bottom of the figure). Before IRCA, the annual probability of return migration for undocumented migrants varied between .25 and .30 per year. If 1,000 migrants were to enter the United States subject to a 25% chance of returning each year, 763 would return home within five years, yielding an average trip length of around three years and a median duration of 2.4 years. During the immediate Post-IRCA period, the annual probability of return migration rose slightly, fluctuating around .32 in the years from 1986 through 1990. Given this return probability, 86% of all migrants would be expected to return home within five years, yielding an average trip length of two years and a median duration of just1.8 years.

Beginning in 1990, however, the likelihood of return migration began to fall and then plunged massively with the border build-up that commenced in 1993. By 1998, the annual probability of return migration had fallen to just .10, some 70% below 1990 figure. Such a probability implies an average trip length 8.9 years and a median duration of 6.6 years. After five years, only 40% of migrants would be expected to have left the United States. In short, U.S. immigration and border policies after 1990 transformed what had been a circular flow of

temporary migrants into a settled immigration of permanent residents, as indicated by the shift in mean trip length from 2 to 9 years.

Although documented migrants were not directly affected by the massive increase in border enforcement during the 1990s, they were affected indirectly. Among households in the MMP sample that contained documented migrants, 46% also contained someone without documents. The presence of an undocumented migrant within a household meant that family members could not circulate together freely, as legal immigrants were reluctant to leave their undocumented relatives behind. As a result, the rate of return migration for legal immigrants, which was already much lower than that of undocumented migrants, fell even further after 1990. From a peak of around .20 per year in the late 1980s, the annual return probability reached .06 in 1998. However, return probabilities were falling more slowly for documented than undocumented migrants, and by the late 1990s the two groups were converging toward a figure somewhere between .05 and .10.

When documented and undocumented migrants are considered together, we find that the total probability of return migration dropped from a high of .260 in 1986 to just .075 in 1998. The pre-IRCA probability yields an average trip length of 3.3 years and a median duration in the United States of 2.3 years. If 100,000 Mexican migrants were to enter the United States each year subject to this rate of departure (.26), in the long run we would observe the formation of a stationary population of 3,343,000 Mexicans in the United States. In contrast, assuming the 1998 rate of return migration (.075) yields an average trip length of 12.8 years and a median duration of 8.9. Under this circumstance, the annual entry of 100,000 Mexican migrants would yield a permanent stationary population of 12,821,000 persons. In other words, by significantly reducing the probability of return migration, the Post-IRCA regime of border enforcement dramatically increased the ultimate size of the Mexican population in the United States, raising it by a factor of nearly four!

As the Mexican immigration moved from circular movement towards permanent settlement, the characteristics of migrants also shifted. As male migrants began to extend their trips to avoid the necessity of re-crossing the border, they naturally began to send for their wives, bringing about a feminization of the migratory population. Table 1 presents characteristics of documented and undocumented migrants leaving for the United States on their first trip before and after the implementation of IRCA. Although legal Mexican immigration has always been substantially female (45% before IRCA and 46% afterward), there was a pronounced increase in the propensity for women to migrate in undocumented status. Whereas before IRCA women constituted around a quarter of all undocumented migrants, afterward they comprised about a third.

Table 1. Characteristics of migrants on first U.S. trip before and after IRCA.

Category and Characteristic	Pre-IRCA Migrated 1980-86	Post-IRCA Migrated 1987-98
Undocumented Migrants		
% Female	25.7	33.5
% Aged 16+ Not Working	11.5	19.0
Documented Migrants		
% Female	44.7	46.2
% Aged 16+ Not Working	15.9	25.8

In concert with the feminization of undocumented migration, the percentage not working also increased. The proportion of undocumented migrants not holding a U.S. job increased by 58% between the pre- and post-IRCA periods, going from 12% to 19%. Moreover, even though there was no trend toward feminization among documented migrants, the percentage of non-workers grew by 63%, rising from 16% before IRCA to 26% afterward. Many of these

non-workers undoubtedly children, as at all times, a clear majority (55%-57%) of documented migrants were under the age of 13.

LESSONS FOR EUROPE

If the United States had set out to design a dysfunctional immigration policy, it could hardly have done better job than what it did between 1986 and 1996. U.S. taxpayers now waste billions of dollars annually in useless border enforcement and the efficiency of the Border Patrol is in rapid decline. The post-IRCA enforcement regime had no detectable effect either in deterring undocumented migrants or raising their probability of apprehension. It has been effective, however, in causing hundreds of needless deaths each year. It has also lowered wages for U.S. workers, native and foreign, legal and illegal and has exacerbated income inequality in the United States. Furthermore, it has guaranteed that these negative externalities will be widely felt by transforming a seasonal movement focused on three states into a national population of settled families dispersed throughout the country. In the end, the U.S. has given itself the worst of all possible worlds: continued migration from Mexico under conditions that are detrimental to the United States, its citizens, and the migrants themselves.

This colossal failure of U.S. policy offers several cautionary lessons to Europeans who believe that building Fortress Europe will somehow prevent immigration. First, it appears to be quite difficult to stop migratory flows from sources that are otherwise connected to receiving nations by ties of trade, investment, culture, and politics. With total trade at nearly $200 billion per year, Mexico and the U.S. are among each other's largest trading partners and together they have joined with Canada to create an integrated continent-wide market under the North American Free Trade Agreement. As a result, the Mexico-U.S. border is becoming increasingly permeable with respect to flows of all sorts: capital, information, services, goods, commodities, and, ultimately, people.

Likewise, immigrants to Europe also come from places with well-established economic, political, and cultural ties to EU member states (Massey et al. 1998). The most important sources of immigration to Britain and France, for example, are former colonies India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh for the former and Algeria for the latter. In Germany, the largest immigrant-sending nations are Poland, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, with the latter flow originating in a binational treaty that up to 1973 sponsored the annual circulation of hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers. Austria takes in foreigners mainly from successor states to the former Austro-Hungarian empire, while Italy receives its immigrants from its former colonies Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as from nations within its sphere of influence in the Balkans.

In general, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself. The poorest and least developed nations do not send out the most international migrants. If that were true, international migration would be dominated by sub-Saharan Africa, yet this region accounts for a tiny fraction of international trans-continental movement (Zlotnik 1998). Most international migrants originate in nations undergoing rapid structural change and economic development, and within those countries they come from the most rapidly developing regions.

When they enter developed countries, immigrants are responding to a strong and persistent demand for labor that is built into the structure of post-industrial economies. Owing to shifts in technology, the emergence of the welfare state, and the embedding of market relations in broader social structures, labor markets in developed nations have become increasingly segmented into a primary sector containing "good" jobs attractive to natives and a secondary sector of poorly paid "bad" jobs that natives shun. To fill the latter, employers turn to immigrants, often initiating flows through direct recruitment. If there were no demand for their services, immigrants, particularly those without documents, would not come, as they would have means of supporting themselves.

A fact that surprises many people is that migrants who enter developed countries as labor migrants generally do not wish to settle there permanently. Settlement intentions reflect underlying motivations for migration. The motivation that most people think of when they imagine immigrants is a desire to maximize lifetime earnings, which indeed involves a permanent relocation abroad; but other motivations are equally if not more important (Massey et al. 1998). Those seeking to overcome incomplete markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures migrate not to maximize earnings, but to solve economic problems at home. Rather than moving abroad permanently to maximize earnings, they seek to leave temporarily to generate earnings that can be repatriated to diversify risks, accumulate capital, and circumvent a lack of credit.

The diversity of immigrant motivations yields another basic observation: that international migration is often less influenced by conditions in labor markets than by the state of other markets. Assuming that immigrants come to maximize earnings, policies to date have sought to influence labor markets; yet if migrants are actually moving to self-insure, acquire capital, or substitute for a lack of credit at home, then lowering expected wages may not eliminate or even reduce the impetus for international migration (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). More leverage on migration decisions might well be had influencing other markets, particularly those in sending regions and notably those for capital, credit, futures, and of insurance.

Given that migrants generally come from source countries that are connected to receiving nations by well-established economic, political, and cultural ties; that migrants are typically not fleeing abject poverty but are responding to structural transformations and economic development in their home societies; and that the immediate motivation of entering migrants is not to settle abroad permanently but to circulate temporarily to solve economic problems at home, then fortress construction is precisely the wrong strategy. As long as the world's powerful, capital-rich economies are incorporated within global trade, information, and production networks, they will receive international migrants. In both theoretical and practical terms it is difficult to lower barriers to the movement of capital, information, and goods while at the same time raising barriers to the movement of workers. Immigration is simply the labor component of globalizing factor markets.

Although officials and the general public may believe that repressive enforcement can reduce the volume of unwanted immigration, evidence from the United States suggests that, in reality, it cannot. Erecting barriers to entry has a stronger effect on the composition of the migratory population than the volume of the inflow, pushing migrants towards clandestine settlement in a way that leaves them economically exploitable and socially vulnerable.

Rather that trying to stop international migration through unilateral repressive means, a more successful (and realistic) approach would be to consider immigration to be a natural outgrowth of a country's insertion into the global economy and to encourage its desirable features while working to mitigate its negative consequences. Repressive enforcement actions would be reserved for immigrants from nations that are otherwise unconnected to the receiving country by trade or investment relations. For immigrants coming from nations connected via well-established flows of capital, information, goods, and culture, policy makers would work to achieve outcomes that serve the interests of the receiving society rather than simply trying to suppress the flow: i.e., promoting shorter stays, limited settlement, and a high likelihood of return migration; protecting internal wages and labor standards; and encouraging economic development in sending regions.

These goals could be accomplished in a variety of ways. One is to make temporary work visas freely available, so that migrants can reasonably expect to migrate again should their economic circumstances warrant, thus lowering the incentives to stay on in the receiving country for fear of not being able to return. A portion of immigrants' wages might be held back and only paid to a foreign bank account upon return to the sending country. Interest rates might be subsidized in foreign accounts to provide a return above the market, thus luring back migrants and their money. Finally, since migrants are often motivated by lack of access to insurance and capital, destination countries might enter into cooperative agreements with sending nations to establish public programs and private businesses to meet these needs.

With state resources freed up from unproductive attempts to suppress immigration, receiving countries could increase internal inspections of work sites in sectors that employing large concentrations of immigrants, not to round up and deport illegal aliens but to assure employers' compliance with minimum wage laws, social insurance legislation, occupational safety and health regulations, tax codes, and mandated fair labor standards. This enforcement strategy has two advantages for the receiving society: it lowers the demand for immigrant workers by preventing employers from using them to avoid expensive labor regulations, and it prevents the formation of an underground, clandestine economy that puts downward pressure on the economic and social well-being of natives and immigrants alike.

Finally, since much international migration is brought about by the displacement of people from traditional livelihoods and an absence of well-developed markets for insurance, capital, and consumer credit, an indispensable part of any enlightened immigration policy should be the creation of binational programs to enhance markets and promote economic growth and development in sending regions. Some of the initiatives already proposed to encourage return migration simultaneously achieve these goals: namely, the creation of social insurance programs and development banks accessible to former migrants. Funds for these enterprises might be raised through a special tax levied on migrant workers and their employers. Developed nations might also work more broadly to finance development programs and promote balanced economic growth within the nation as a whole.

In sum, I suggest that it would be more efficacious to recognize immigration as natural part of global economic integration and work to manage it more effectively rather than attempt to prevent it from happening. Much as flows of capital, commodities, and goods are managed for the mutual benefit of trading partners by agreements such as GATT organization such as the WTO, labor migration can also be cooperatively managed to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs for both sending and receiving societies. Immigration policies should thus be developed cooperatively through multilateral agreements building on institutions such as the International Labor Organization. In an integrated world, nations have responsibilities beyond their borders and unilateral actions taken by one nation can have serious negative repercussions for others linked to it in the global system.

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The Politics of Diversity and Integration in Germany and the Netherlands: A Comparison

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Abstract: The Netherlands and Germany, two countries quite similar with respect to religion, socio-economic development and political system, have reacted quite differently to immigration. Whereas the Netherlands, after some initial problems, developed a consistent multiculturalist policy approach, in Germany, immigration became a subject of bitter party conflict, which affected the immigration atmosphere in a detrimental manner. Yet, when comparing policy outcomes with respect to education and job quality, we find that better results have been obtained in Germany than in the Netherlands. The conclusion is that integration processes can be very specific and that multicultural programs can carry powerful messages of exclusion.

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1.   The Comparison

Germans often look to the Netherlands as to a model country for integration policies of the last decades. Dutch experts are frequently invited to Germany, and expected to tell the Germans how to deal with problems of immigration.[i] Indeed, it is fascinating that two countries so similar with respect to economic development, Protestant-Catholic composition, a "Christian Democratic welfare state"[ii] and party systems composed of moderate centre-right and centre-left parties, have experienced politics of immigration looking so different:

- Germany, after a corporatist start, soon got into the heavy waters of political controversy, leading to a series of grand-style political conflict about immigration, and the identification of immigration and specific immigrant groups as a grand issue between the left and the right. This conflict moved to the centre of attention after the end of the Cold War, and repeatedly was a campaign issue, with the after-effect that in several waves of open xenophobia dozens of foreigners suffered arson attacks, beatings and even killings, leading to an infamous reputation of Germany world-wide, and a new point of German soul-searching.[iii]

The comparison is puzzling, and gives reason for several questions: Is the popular picture correct or should it be modified? Why are these developments so divergent? And what about the policy outcomes of such divergent political climates upon the social life, the economic situation and the relations between immigrants and the indigenous population, or, as the Dutch would say, *Allochthones* and *Autochthones*?

Let us, in a first step, look into the political history of immigration in the two countries.

2.   Germany: Party Competition about the Immigration Issue

German immigration after World War II had three principal sources[iv]:

Firstly, the expellees and refugees from former eastern Germany and the countries to the East. All in all, twelve million people were expelled to Germany in its reduced borders as decided at Yalta and Potsdam, and more than one million lost their lives during the expulsion. Ethnicity was the criterion for the transfer to Germany, and the people deported either held German citizenship or were considered Germans. The Basic Law of 1949 acknowledged a moral obligation to the Germans still in East European countries[v], and the founding fathers and mothers provided in the Basic Law a right for the acceptance of ethnic Germans from Communist countries who had made it to West Germany. In the refugee law, it was assumed that they were suffering persecution or its after-effects *(Vertreibungsdruck).* Consequently, the

reception was discontinued in the early 1990s, except for the Germans from the C.I.S. countries where Germans still are not allowed to move back to their pre-deportation homelands. At the same time, Germany began to accept Jews from the former Soviet Union as *Kontingentflüchtlinge*.

After some initial reluctance from regional parties, particularly the Bavarian Party and the CSU, against voting rights for the refugees, German public opinion was largely united about the moral ground to free ethnic Germans from oppression which was conceived twofold: totalitarian against everybody and particularly discriminatory against Germans.[vi] Consequently, party competition inside Germany was limited to the question of who and whose policy would be more effective in freeing Germans from the realm of Communism. In the 1970s and 1980s this was an important argument for or against détente policies. Thus Chancellor Schmidt in 1976 at the Helsinki summit made a deal with Poland´s Communist leader Gierek, offering Poland a soft (and lost) loan of one billion DM, against the promise to let 100,000 Germans go. Moreover, Germany paid 12.000 DM for every German from Ceausescu´s Romania.

Consensus also stood at the start of the second important of immigration: the recruitment of foreign workers from Mediterranean countries. The entrepreneurs´ and the government´s motives to recruit were the wish to balance the labour market, to prevent inflationary wage drifts, and to further growth. The trade unions, on the other hand, successfully demanded the complete equality of wages and working conditions under the German system of negotiated wage settlements, and subsequently tried hard to organize the foreign workers, in well reflected self interest.[vii] However, that tripartite consensus soon ran into trouble. As early as 1964, four years after the start of effective mass recruitment, chancellor Erhard, who had promoted recruitments as a minister of economics, told the public that foreign workers would not be necessary if only every German would work one hour longer.[viii] Thus he wanted to constrain the unions´ campaign for the 40 hour week which went on under the motto that on Saturday fathers should "belong" to their children *("Samstags gehört Vati mir")*. On March 31, 1966, the conservative tabloid *Bild* had a headline asking if foreign workers were more industrious than Germans, to the anger of German workers who organized a boycott campaign. One year later, the recruitment was stopped during the overheating crisis, and the numbers of foreigners decreased sharply.

The consensus to recruit was re-established in 1968. An "uncontrolled expansion"[ix] followed under the paradigm of growth, and in 1969 economics minister Karl Schiller even used the enhanced recruitment of guest workers as an argument for the revaluation of the DM. Only just before the oil crisis of 1973, the recruitment was halted again. The number of foreign workers fell, many of them returning to their countries of origin, but this time the all-in-all number of foreigners remained rather stable at 3.5 million, as families were allowed to join the workers and children were born.

After some discussions about rotation programmes, disguised as "Swiss system", development aid, or re-migration, and separate schools or classes for foreign children in the Southern states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg,[x] the issue became national in 1982. This was during the second oil crisis which caused a sharp rise of unemployment, up to two million in 1983, and was one of the core issues bringing the Schmidt government down and the Kohl government in. Whereas some right wing CDU leaders were openly xenophobic, Kohl demanded the number of "Turkish co-citizens to be reduced".[xi] *"Ausländerpolitik"* was proclaimed as one of four priorities in the official policy statement of the first Kohl government. Only half a year later, in the policy statement of the second Kohl government, it was hardly mentioned, and for some years it sank into oblivion except for a limited programme of return support and a long lasting controversy between the two smaller coalition partners, the liberals and the Bavarian CSU, concentrating on problems like the age of children who could join their families in Germany, but without much policy effects. At that time the public had come to believe - as could be documented in many polls - that the Social Democrats and the Liberals were "soft" on immigration and foreigners, whereas the CDU and particularly the Bavarian CSU were "hard".[xii]

It was the latter that brought the issue back when they put it at the centre of their campaign for the 1986 Bavarian diet elections and the national elections of 1987. They needed a new confrontative issue, as their charismatic leader Strauss had dropped his expressive anti-Communism, regularly visited East Germany's Honecker and other Communist leaders, and had arranged a billion DM credit for the ailing East German economy. Rumours were going on about kickbacks from deals with East Germany. The CSU lost 3 % in that election but still retained a comfortable 56 % majority in Bavaria. At the European elections of 1989, CSU and CDU again stressed *Ausländer* as an issue. However, this time they received the worst result at a European election ever, and the extremist *Republikaner* were able to gain their first major victory as a result of the CDU/CSU´s xenophobic campaign.[xiii] For part of the electorate, it had become evident that they were talking about reducing the number of foreigners, but not acting. Thanks to Gorbachev's liquidation of the Soviet empire, the issue disappeared in 1990, and was overshadowed by re-unification. However, it was brought back deliberately in 1991 when CDU/CSU started a campaign against the Germany's liberal asylum policies.

Asylum had an important symbolic place in the Basic Law but traditionally was conceived only for small political elites. Since the early eighties, however, it had developed into a mass phenomenon, and Germany in 1992 counted 438,000 asylum requests, or 52 % of all requests for West European countries. Forty percent were from East Central Europe. This then was the third immigration stream to Germany. As long as the asylum seekers came from Communist countries, Germany had a strong pro-asylum consensus and the refugees were welcomed in an outspokenly hospitable way, the state even establishing and supporting cultural exile institutions like the Philharmonia Hungarica and Hungarian schools. Asylum only became a point of extreme controversy when after the *putsch* in Chile leftist refugees applied for asylum. They where accused by the CDU/CSU of constituting a Communist and subversive danger.[xiv] This started a transposition of the immigration issue into left-right dimensions.

Not all immigrants but certain immigrant groups became the objects of negative attention. Whereas the anti-Italian feelings of the 1960s, uttered in jokes and slogans, were not politicized too much, every event since 1973 could be monitored on a left-right scale. The Christian Democrats campaigned against Chileans in the mid 1970s, against Turks after 1980, and against asylum seekers from 1986 on. The high point of xenophobia was in 1991/92 when the conservative government campaigned against the existing asylum laws, and forced the opposition to agree to the "asylum compromise" on Nicholas day 1992. Looking back, Kanther, the minister of the interior, described this as producing "heat degrees" *(Hitzegrade)*[xv] in the society, necessary to bring about changes. Chancellor Kohl himself spoke of a "state crisis".

The campaigns sometimes were close to open racism, although the term "race" is taboo in Germany after the Nazi experience. This taboo was once touched by Bavaria's Edmund Stoiber, then the CSU´s general secretary and "mine dog", and today its leader. He spoke of the danger of a *durchmischte und durchrasste Gesellschaft*, a society racially mixed, but backed down after a few days, accepting that the term "race" should not be used.

Obviously, there are limits to xenophobia and racism in Germany, and this can be illustrated by looking at the political process which led to the new Jewish migration into Germany.[xvi] Just before the anti-asylum campaign came to its height, the government agreed to accept Jewish migrants from the C.I.S. countries, giving in to the pressure from the Jewish Community in Germany, the Liberals and the oppositional Social Democrats and Greens (but against explicit opposition from the Israeli government). The new policy which built upon an invitation to Soviet Jews by the last (democratic) East German government was achieved without public controversy, and includes broad state funding of the new immigration. In the parliamentary debate early 1991, all political parties unanimously welcomed the Russian Jews. Later, the minister of the interior Wolfgang Schäuble would add that he would be glad if as many Jews would live in Germany as in 1933.

In the competitive German political system, party conflict about migration has become an everyday experience. The last episode is the CDU/CSU´s street campaign against the naturalization law of the red-green government which has been started in January 1999,

mobilizing the conservative political camp, with the liberal Free Democrats arguing for a compromise. Individuals sceptical about the respective party line on both sides are largely silent (with notable exceptions in liberal and religious CDU circles), thinking that critical statements would damage the party they belong to. This is even true for the Catholic bishops who can be proud of a pro-immigrant record but have a family feeling towards the Christian Democrats. The radical CDU approach against "double citizenship" opened a new round of principled conflict.

Not only the right, but also the left has found their scapegoats. Whereas in the post-war years many local Social Democratic party chapters in agricultural areas had been founded by refugees, and solid Social democratic traditions from Bohemia or Silesia had been transferred to Bavaria or Lower Saxony, Willy Brandt´s *Ostpolitik* produced a cleavage between the organized expellees and the left. The chairman of the exiled Silesians and SPD-deputy Hupka left the SPD and joined the CDU, and with generational turnover and détente enthusiasm the left developed a distrust against the Germans from the East. The Green Party, some of whose representatives had a political past in Communist splinter groups, were even more sceptical, and at the same time cultivated a rather romantic relationship toward the *Ausländer*. Lafontaine, the eloquent SPD candidate of 1990, brought this to the point when he pronounced that a persecuted asylum seeker had a greater right to come to the country than a non-persecuted *Aussiedler*[xvii], and complained about *"Deutschtümelei"* (Germanishness). From time to time, some leading SPD politicians have argued against the legitimacy of the ethnic Germans' claims of coming to Germany, as have some left intellectuals. Ironically, one commentator wrote: "If you beat my Ausländer, I shall beat your Aussiedler".

This policy, however, was badly conceived in two respects: firstly, it alienated the *Aussiedler* even more. Since they had the right to vote, and the *Ausländer* not, the overall results of such statements were counterproductive. Aussiedler were the critical group who decided the elections of 1994 for Kohl's CDU who made, assisted by his *Aussiedlerbeauftragter* Waffenschmidt, a successful effort to woe them. Some Aussiedler saw Kohl as the Moses who helped them to get out of the empire of evil. Moreover, the public, even if resentful of taking in a great number of *Aussiedler*, was even more sceptical about great numbers of asylum seekers (although most people whenever asked were sympathetic with individuals and their suffering).

Even when the Kohl government denounced the Social Democrats about their statements critical of *Aussiedler*, they themselves changed the policy. Categories of applicants were removed, and social assistance programmes were cut severely. In 1991, an unofficial quota of about 220,000 was introduced, and made official in December 1992. Over the next years, this quota was reduced more and more through administrative measures, and came down to 103,000 in 1998. In 1997, the government implemented a test in the German language, thus severely reducing the numbers incoming.

In most elections from 1983 on, immigration and immigrants have been an important issue in favour of CDU and CSU - profiting from developments reported in the media and themselves stressing the issue and producing news.

Figure 1:   Problem Solving Capacities of CDU/CSU and SPD 1998

Which party has the best competence to solve the problems that I read to you:
the CDU/CSU or the SPD – or none of them ?

Social Justice

Social Justice

Rest: „don't know / no statement", values in per cent. Basis: Voting population in Germany.
Source: Emnid.

In the elections of 1998, the Social Democrats took great care to neutralize the issue. Chancellor-candidate Schröder made some well-publicized remarks about throwing criminal foreigners out of the country, and the party was careful not to be dragged into a controversy about the deportation of a 14 year old Turkish boy with an extremely criminal record which was spectacularly directed by political CSU entrepreneurs in Munich. Even in the elections of 1998 which were won so clearly by the SPD, the "competence" for *Ausländer* and asylum was clearly attributed to the CDU/CSU. The SPD´s only chance of winning was to neutralize the issue. And the euphoria of the red-green coalition after its historic 1998 victory led to clumsy proclamations about double citizenship and a disastrous defeat in the diet elections in Hesse after only a hundred days.

In the interaction from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the highly competitive party system in Germany has produced a new cleavage in the society: *Aussiedler* are conceived as conservative and in the realm of the Christian Democrats, *Ausländer* are an object of care for leftists. Even naturalization is largely seen under these premises. Just before the elections, the CSU publicly warned that a red-green victory would lead to a regime change *("eine andere Republik")* Morevorer, the CSU warned of the dangers of a naturalization of 5.5 million foreigners, the "creation of voters" and in the end an "Islamic Republic Germany".[xviii] The warning was based on a survey of the *Zentrum für Türkeistudien* about nine of ten naturalized Turks in Germany voting for "Red" or "Green" (as all other polls show less dramatic proportions, these figures do not seem particularly reliable).

The controversy of the early months of 1999 about naturalization and the collection of signatures on the streets against "double nationality" thus was not only a desperate attempt of CSU and CDU to create a new popular issue. In this, they were very successful, winning a surprise victory in Hessen against all predictions.[xix] It is also a fight for or against the creation of a new electorate. As in many other cases, the cleavage[xx] definition is strange: the *Aussiedler*, largely working class, and state-oriented by socialization, are conceived as automatic followers of the centre-right, the *Ausländer*, many of them religious and the great majority not post-materialistic, are conceived as followers of the centre-left.[xxi] Political competition will, at least after some years, mitigate such politically created cleavages, if a large part of the foreign population gets the vote, and the integrative mechanisms of the German work and welfare society continue to operate.

3.   The Netherlands: Elite Consensus Policies

The first post-war immigrants to the Netherlands came from the former colonies. Besides some "whites" the majority of 280,000 was considered "brown" (and in popular language even "blue"), and can be termed post-colonial[xxii]. There were also a few thousand Chinese. By 1972 the numbers of this group had risen to half a million. One immigrant group, the Moluccans, who were aiming at creating an independent republic in their homeland, kept a special identity (today they are about 45.000 persons). While they traditionally had provided soldiers for the Dutch colonial army in the East Indies, they were dismissed from the army upon arrival, became stateless and lived in "abominable conditions"[xxiii], and were largely unemployed. The Dutch trade unions successfully requested their exclusion from the labour market[xxiv]. In the 1970s, young Moluccans were involved in a series of symbolic terrorist attacks, culminating in the spectacular hijacking of a train in 1974, to get attention for their complaints about unfair treatment, and thus made the public aware of their grievances.

A larger group of post-colonial migrants are the Surinamese who became full Dutch citizens in 1954 as the Netherlands tried to do away with colonialism and used this window of opportunity to migrate to the Netherlands before that status was taken away from them five years after independence in 1975.[xxv] Living under Dutch dominance for centuries, they are well accustomed to the Dutch way of life even if they are identifiable because of physiognomic characteristics. Some immigration is going on from the Dutch Antilles which still belong to the kingdom. They only number 3,000-7,000 persons a year but get a lot of negative attention from the media and politicians and are considered "black".

Although the Netherlands began recruiting Mediterranean workers later than the neighbouring countries, and proceeded slowly, a first outbreak of violence already occurred in 1961, in the textile cities of Enschede, Almelo and Hengelo in the East of the country.[xxvi]

In 1972, fighting broke out between Turkish immigrants and indigenous people in the Afrikaanderwijk of Rotterdam. The city acted quickly and changed police routines as well as housing policies, trying to spread the immigrants over the city to avoid ghettos, and at the same enabling them to keep social ties and relations: the policy of "concentrated deconcentration".[xxvii]

For the following argument it is important that it was not a kind of natural or traditional hospitality or tolerance that automatically made the Netherlands different from Germany. On the contrary, in the first years integration in Germany seems to have been more smoothly. In particular, this is true if we compare the acceptance of foreign refugees: in the fifties and sixties, the Netherlands were hesitant with respect to refugees and the number of refugees settling in the country was very limited. As late as 1985, Entzinger writes: "Quite surprisingly, given the Dutch tradition in this field, the number of refugees accepted is very low in comparison with the number accepted by most other Western European countries."[xxviii] However, the élite reaction was different. As early as 1961, the business paper NRC commented that the Twente riots were painful for the foreign workers, but that they also could become embarrassing for the Netherlands' image.[xxix] The newspaper expressed the fear of both the employers and the Dutch government that the publicity about the riots in the Italian and Spanish press would reduce opportunities for further recruitment in those countries.
The important reforms that the Netherlands introduced around 1980 were based on an elite consensus. It emerged during the debate about a total revision of the Dutch constitution, and the challenge of the Moluccan train hijacking, the unexpectedly high immigration from Suriname before and after independence and the uncertainty how to deal with the foreign workers after the recruitment stop. The government requested a report by the Scientific Council on minority policies in 1979 which then led to a provisional White Paper in 1981 and the *Minderhedennota* in 1983.[xxx] The concept consisted of four elements: stability of residence after five years, enlarged participation including easier naturalization and voting rights for foreigners in local elections, and special programmes for underprivileged minorities, including special assistance for them to organize and represent the various groups, and the fight against racist discrimination. After lengthy discussions, the large parties found a compromise about these points.[xxxi] While the leftist parties were clearly more open and engaged for inclusive reforms, and were arguing for voting rights for foreigners on all levels, there were also powerful voices in the Christian Democratic and the Liberal parties for a reform.

The first prominent figure to argue for local voting rights for foreigners living in the country was the Christian Democrat *éminence grise* and former president of the European Court of Justice, A. Donner, who argued in an article that foreigners living in the country should have the right to vote.[xxxii] His statement was taken up by the leftist coalition that ruled the country at that time.[xxxiii] It was particularly important that three consecutive ministers of the interior, one a Christian Democrat (CDA), one a Social Democrat (PvdA), and one a Liberal (VVD), spoke out in favour of the reforms.[xxxiv] There are indications that the centre-right parties agreed to local voting rights under the shock of the train incident mentioned earlier.[xxxv] On certain points, however, a majority of CDA and VVD in the First Chamber (elected indirectly) blocked reforms that seemed too far-reaching, as the principal openness for dual nationality, using the German law of that time as an argument.[xxxvi] Also, voting rights on all levels had been blocked in a package deal, in exchange for local voting rights.[xxxvii] Parliament records also reveal deep scepticism by many deputies concerning the belongingness of the immigrants. In practice, however, even at these points pragmatic compromises have been found. While foreigners in principal should give up their old nationality upon naturalization, an exception is made for eighty per cent of the potential candidates. In 1997, 57 % of the immigrants of Turkish origin held double citizenship, even when the principal of dual nationality was not included in the law. This was done in a consensual process of including more and more categories. For the third generation, automatic nationality by birth had already been introduced in 1953.[xxxviii]

The whole process was not without difficulties and contradictions.[xxxix] On the whole, however, an attitude of pragmatic compromise became prevalent, with rising optimism about the possibility to solve existing problems, and a sense of pride about the Netherlands as an open and tolerant country. In this sense, Kees Groenendijk argues that the educative effect of foreigners' voting rights in local elections have been more important than the effects on the foreigners.[xl] This is illustrated by the fact that in 1998 all three larger parties had immigrants elected as members of parliament, and ten of 150 members of parliament (Tweede Kamer) have an immigrant background[xli] (Germany only has one "red" and two "green" deputies with a foreign background, along with many post-war expellees). After the PvdA had taken an active interest in immigrants, and put immigrant candidates on their lists, and local voting rights and naturalization had created an interesting new group of voters, the CDA and VVD also actively began to look for candidates and voters among the immigrants. Whereas in the first elections most immigrants voted for the left, and in 1994 60 % voted for the PvdA and the Greens, the general distribution of votes in 1998 tend to mirror that of the indigenous population more closely.

The integrative process included moments of deep symbolism, e. g. when Ruud Lubbers, then prime minister and leader of the CDA, visited Muslim mosques and Hindu communities during the campaign for the first local elections in which foreigners could participate. Surveys demonstrate that the majority of the population originally was not in favour of granting voting rights to foreigners. However, a change occurred after the experience of the foreigners' participation in local elections, and there is a majority since that time.[xlii] International football matches and the like, won by Dutch minority stars like Ruud Gullit also contain an integrative symbolism. Gullit was the captain of the national football team, and the relationship between "black" and "white" players was discussed publicly. This may be particularly impressive for aggressive young men who in many countries engage in violence against minority groups on the streets.

In the early 1990s, the discussion has taken a turn. Particularly Frits Bolkestein, until recently the leader of the parliamentary party of the VVD (which is to the right of the CDA) has warned publicly against giving in too much to the cultural peculiarities of the immigrants, and argued that they should be expected much more to integrate into the Dutch way of life.[xliii] These remarks caused sensation and controversy, as they stood against the tradition of multiculturalism and legitimacy of difference that is so much a part of Dutch political culture in the tradition of pillarization.[xliv] Bolkestein became popular with such remarks, and this was important in winning the elections of 1996, becoming the leader of Europe´s most successful liberal party. Clearly, the ideological basis of these appeals and critiques was ethnocentric. Compared to campaigns in Germany, however, and even more to those of France and England, it was not only moralistic in the Dutch tradition but also more inclusive, at least in its wording. The message was that the immigrants integrate, and that there should be less emphasis on cultural diversity. Moreover, reliance on welfare was evaluated very critical. This fit into the remodeling of Dutch welfare in the 1990s and the attack on welfare dependency, although much more moderate than in some English speaking countries. Government programmes in the late 1990s became less multiculturalist and more integrative or assimilationist. The Dutch Scientific Council who had outlined a minority policy in 1979, opted for more "social and economic integration" in 1989, thus using the central German catchword. In Entzinger´s words, the minority model was replaced by the integration model.[xlv]

In the 1990s, "attitudes toward immigration and minority cultures appear to have become harsher - some would say more realistic - among certain segments of the population"[xlvi]. A particularly delicate turn of the public discourse occurred after the crash of an Israeli air plane at an Amsterdam suburb in 1992, killing about fifty persons. The awareness did not turn to the reasons of the accident, the poisonous goods on the plane (which have only been made public in 1998) but to the fact that many victims did not have a legal status but were undocumented aliens.

4.   Policy Outputs: Social Attitudes and Socio-Economic Success Rates

Compared to other immigration countries, the Netherlands clearly can be proud of a tolerant political climate and a civilized style of the political discussion. Dutch political leaders would not speak out against minorities like Strauss, Stoiber, Chirac, Giscard d´Estaing and Thatcher have done. The Netherlands do not have a Front National or Republikaner, and the extremist Centre Party has faded away. It had important successes in some local, but not much in national ones. Moreover, open violence against minorities clearly seems to be less widespread than in other immigrant countries, and is not connected to competitive and noisy politics. For the well-being of the immigrants and their daily life, as well as for the quality of the political process, this is an important distinction.

After a consensus about the minority policy had been established and the extremist Centre Party had succeeded in having some deputies elected to parliament, "the leaders of the main political parties made a gentlemen´s agreement to abstain from using immigration as an issue in electoral campaigns, and "not win votes at the cost of immigrants". This agreement held for almost ten years, until Bolkestein broke it on 6 September 1991, interestingly not in a speech at home, but at a meeting of European liberal parties in Luzern.[xlvii] In both the 1995 and 1999 elections to the Provincial Councils, two VVD leaders openly and successfully made negative statements on immigrants. In 1999, the leader of the Partij van de Arbeid in parliament tried to outdo them. However, the media were critical about these statements, and after the elections, the three politicians retreated from the statements they had made ten days earlier.[xlviii] This reminds of "playing the race card" in other countries but it has much less become a part of Dutch political culture than in other countries, and is still detested in the public. Until now it seems largely to be confined to side elections, that is elections that are not seen as particularly important by both the politicians and the voters. For some politicians this is an opportunity to pep up their campaigns, and for some voters to vote for extreme parties without much fear of consequences.

It is not surprising, then, that comparative measurement of blatant prejudice shows higher results in Germany than in the Netherlands: Germans express more open prejudice against Turks than their Dutch counterparts. Yet, the analysis of subtle prejudice reveals an inverse trend: German subtle prejudice against Turks is lower than that of the Dutch.[xlix] Pettigrew demonstrates that Dutch attitudes differ from that of their German, British and French neighbours:

> "In normative terms, this unique pattern outlines the famed `tolerance´ of the Netherlands. There exists a stern Dutch norm against *blatant* prejudice. But *subtle* prejudice slips under the norm, unrecognized as prejudice."[l] "Blatant prejudice is the traditional form; it is hot, close, and direct. The ten items that tap it involve open rejection based on presumed biological difference. Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant, and indirect. The ten items that measure it are not readily recognized as indicators of prejudice. They tap the perceived threat of the minority to traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences with the minority, and the absence of positive feelings towards them."[li] "Both the blatantly and subtly prejudiced are less educated and older. They report less interest in politics but more pride in their nationality. They less often think of themselves als `Europeans´. They are more politically conservative; but subtle prejudice is not, as some claim, simply a reflection of conservatism. The prejudiced also are more likely to have only ingroup friends. Finally, they reveal a strong sense of group, but not individual, relative deprivation. Thus, the prejudiced sense a group threat to `people like themselves´ from minorities, but not a sense of personal threat."[lii]

Which effects does such a unentality have concerning the life chances of immigrants? Pettigrew also mentions the Netherlands passing anti-discrimination legislation. However, he points to the inefficiency of such legislation, in the absence of powerful legal instruments like the American class actions.[liii] Comparing statistics on unemployment, the differences between immigrant groups and the indigenous population seem definitely worse than in Germany.

This is particularly true for the young (see table). For foreign women the unemployment figure was 24.3 % whereas it was only 8.2 % for indigenous women. In spite of the widely praised Dutch "employment wonder" of the 1990s, the unemployment figure of non-EU women was the second highest among all EU countries in 1995.[liv] In contrast to the high occupation rates of Dutch women, immigrant women from non-EU countries had very low occupation rates in international comparison.[lv] Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands also suffer particularly from long term unemployment.[lvi] In 1996, Dutch statistics show an unemployment rate of 7 % among "Europeans", 9 % among immigrants from the former Dutch East Indies, 16 % among Surinamese, 21 % among "Mediterraneans", 25 % among Moroccans, 28 % among Antilleans/Arubans, and 36 % among Turks. Unemployment of the autochthonous Dutch decreased to 5.4 % in 1996, but was "dramatic" at 19 % for the foreign born/foreign nationals.[lvii]

"In other words the majority of the Turks and Moroccans between 15 and 64 years do not participate in the labour market, and of the remaining 44 % (Turks), respectively 42 % (Moroccans) one third to one quarter are registered as unemployed. The employment growth is taking place largely outside the traditional immigrant categories."[lviii] Looking at the unemployment rates of Turks in the Netherlands, Germany and France, Doomernijk finds particularly large discrepancies with the indigenous population in the Netherlands.[lix] For 1997, the Dutch government gives the unemployment figures as 5 % for the indigenous population, but 14 % for Surinamers, 20 % for Antillians/Arubans, 21 % for Turks, and 22 % for Moroccans.[lx] Although unemployment has decreased for all groups from 1994 to 1997, the discrepancies have remained the same, and are higher then in other countries.

Table 1: Unemployment of the Indigenous and the Immigrant Population Compared

Year	(West) Germany				Netherlands			
	Indigenous		Foreigners		Indigenous		Foreigners	
	all	< 25	all	< 25	all	< 25	all	< 25
1983	6.0	10.1	11.3	18.2	11.3	20.4	24.5	37.2
1984	6.3	9.8	11.3	17.1	-	-	-	-
1985	6.4	9.3	12.0	17.4	9.8	16.9	27.1	37.6
1986	6.1	7.3	12.0	14.8	-	-	-	-
1987	6.3	6.9	12.5	15.4	9.4	16.1	24.9	38.9
1988	5.9	6.4	10.9	12.7	8.8	13.6	25.9	31.7
1989	5.4	5.2	9.3	9.9	8.0	12.3	26.6	37.0
1990	4.5	4.3	8.7	7.5	7.0	10.2	24.7	31.6
1991	5.1	5.2	8.4	8.5	6.6	10.2	25.2	34.9
1992	6.1	5.5	9.2	10.4	5.1	7.7	16.5	16.0
1993	7.1	6.8	13.3	14.3	5.7	9.7	19.6	25.5
1994	8.1	7.7	15.5	17.1	6.5	10.7	22.5	25.9
1995	7.5	7.3	15.0	15.7	6.5	11.5	23.5	26.9

Source: Kiehl/Werner 1998, table 3.2 and 3.4; EUROSTAT.

Moreover, the degree of separation of immigrants and non-immigrants in Dutch schools is rather high, due to the largely denominational structure of the Dutch school system. In the school year 1990/91, e.g., 47 % of all Protestant schools did not have even one single immigrant (allochthon) student.[lxi] Schools are openly labelled "black" or "white" which is quite uncommon on the European continent.[lxii] There is also a huge discrepancy between the school achievements of the children of indigenous and of immigrant origin: 8 % of the indigenous children left school without any qualification, but 35 % of the children of Turkish origin and 39 % of the children of Moroccan origin.[lxiii] Comparing the streams of the secondary schools, minority children disproportionately go to special schools for underachieving children which do not offer ways into prestigious careers or middle class status. In comparison, the disadvantage of children of immigrant background in Germany, although clearly existent, is not as strong as in the Netherlands. Moreover, there are explicit discrepancies between the German *Länder*, and if the Dutch patterns can be compared at all, it is to the rather exclusive Bavarian school system.

Table 2: Percentage of Minority Children in Secondary School Systems

	1992-93	1994-95	1996-97	1997-98
Special schools (VSO)	14.7	17.4	18.8	19.0
Individual preparation schools for job training (IVBO)	19.0	19.6	20.0	22.1
Pre-vacational schools (VBO)	8.5	8.9	9.0	9.3
General secondary schools (AVO)	3.8	4.3	4.9	5.0
Source: Minderheidenbeleid 1999, p. 49.				

Whereas the socio-economic status of the immigrants from the Mediterranean countries (former recruitment countries, including Turkey) in Germany is comparable to that of the German working class (blue and white collar workers, population insured mandatorily)[lxiv], the situation of the same group in the Netherlands seems to be worse than that. The same difference can be found with the performance in the educational system, with France showing a picture parallel to that of Germany.[lxv]

In recent years, the International Labour Organization has undertaken interesting experiments in a number of countries whose labour agencies were prepared to co-operate. Persons of the same qualification, one group of indigenous and the other of immigrant origin, were sent to companies who were hiring personnel. The process was followed through the various stages, and the performance of the two groups was compared. Summarizing the data on the Netherlands, the authors conclude that "discrimination has been proven to exist", and "that the possibility of actually getting a job is almost zero for the Moroccan applicant".[lxvi] From one stage to the next, more and more Moroccan testers were turned down, mostly in a polite way.

Figure 2: **Percentage** **of foreign** **students** **eligible** **for University** **Study** **or** **technical school** **in 1996 (in %)**

Source : Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 1: Allgemeinbildende Schulen,   School year   1996/97, Wiesbaden
1997, p. 32-40;   own calculation   . * incl . East -Berlin.   ** former West- Germany .

Figure 3: **Percentage of students eligible for University Study or technial school in 1996**

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 1: Allgemeinbildende Schulen, School year 1996/97, Wiesbaden 1997, p. 32-40; own calculation. *incl. East-Berlin; ** West-Germany.

On the other hand, the analysis of the data on Germany does not show significant discrimination.[lxvii] It is likely from the data that there is discrimination at the banking and insurance business, and with smaller companies. The figures for the various industries are, however, too small to become significant, and are balanced by other sectors, some with negative discrimination rates. The comparative tests fit well into the pattern that has been discussed above.

As mentioned above, the lack of economic success by the immigrants in the Netherlands has in the last years been brought into the centre of political attention, reminding - although less

straight forward - of the American campaigns about the "culture of poverty". From quite a different ideological position, Jan Rath has described and denounced Dutch policies as *minorization*[lxviii], the "social construction of ethnic minorities" stressing the difference between the minorities and the majority in every aspect of life. The theoretical approach was developed in parallel to the concept of *racialization* of British sociologist Robert Miles.[lxix] In a process of planned "social engineering", the "socio-cultural signifiers" and the dividing lines of the "ethnic groups" are stressed, and in a steady process brought to the public's attention. The very existence and the symbolic acknowledgement of "ethnic" organizations, modelled after the traditional Dutch *verzuiling* pattern that is fading away for the traditional "pillars" of society - Catholics, Protestants, Liberals - a process that may be made easier with the construction of new groups. "Ethnic" leaders are then coopted into the political system, and function as a buffer between "their" groups and the administration which has a strong influence on the process and can recognize and select the right representatives and organizations. Thus an "ethnic minorities industry"[lxx] (a term invented in parallel to the British "race relations industry") is created, and this institutionalization is a living proof of the existence of the underlying dividing lines, a reification of a concept, shaping the minds of the people, and their way of acceptance. "Group specific (proto-) political institutions are products of minorization and express the idea that 'ethnic minorities' are not full members of the Dutch imagined community."[lxxi] If they are not full members, they will be tolerated but not accepted into key positions or as equals. In contrast to the old *verzuiling* concept where the various pillars were kept largely separated but all held real power and compromised in parliament, the new minorities depend on the good will of the indigenous population. In addition, minorities in the Dutch concept are acknowledged only when they are below average (*achterstand*). Only such groups are getting help to improve their situation while on the other hand their otherness is demonstrated. Thus a well-intentioned and carefully constructed policy may have some counterproductive results in the economic and social field.[lxxii]

Foreigners in Germany had, up to 1999, rather low participation in the political field. Foreigners' councils *(Ausländerbeiräte)* that have been established in many cities and institutionalized in some *Länder* have not been very effective, and naturalization rates only began to rise substantially since 1994.[lxxiii] However, there is one outstanding institution that is only seldomly mentioned because it has old traditions only in Germany and Austria: the works councils (In the Netherlands, it is a new institution, and foreigners have full voting rights). In contrast to general elections, foreigners have full voting rights and eligibility at these factory and company institutions. After a period of adjustment - including local strike movements taken by foreign workers, the trade unions put foreign nationality candidates on the lists for the elections, and the numbers of foreigners elected rose up to 1990, with 558 foreigners being head of the *Betriebsrat.* in 1990. As this institution holds real power and the companies need the *Betriebsrat's* consent for working times, extra hours, the dismissal of workers and a wide range of other measures[lxxiv], participation makes sense for both foreign and indigenous workers, and co-operation strengthens the workers' position. This construction has resulted in a productive situation. Even in times of dramatic political conflict, the working place has remained peaceful and the works councils co-operative.[lxxv] Foreigners have thus been transformed into workers *(Arbeitnehmer),* but only at the workplace. A second institutional setting that is important for inclusionionary processes is the German apprentice system which in the last years is more and more extended to immigrant youths.

5.   Conclusions

Comparing the two countries, we can explain how diverging political styles brought about diverging results. Beginning in the 1970s, in both countries mindful people were aware that recruitment had led to permanent immigration, and both governments commissioned reports. The recommendations of the German *Kühn Memorandum* of 1979 were in many ways comparable to those of the Dutch scientific council. In both countries there also was a broad range of people and institutions discussing immigration, and an active and caring interest by students, Christian groups, leftist activists, and many other citizens. Whereas, however, the Dutch political system worked smoothly to formulate and implement a policy consensus, in Germany *Ausländer* were taken hostage in bitter strife between the political parties and ideological camps, quite similar to the conflicts in Britain and in France in the same decades.

Instead of *playing the race card*, the Dutch political élite concede voting rights and easy naturalization to immigrants, recruiting them as voters, and opening a *circulus virtuosus* in Hirschman´s sense.[lxxvi] Hirschman argues that the qualities of a liberal society do not rest in a given tradition or morality but that they are produced and transmitted through successful solutions of problems which then can be used as models and as an encouragement for the solution of further problems. Contrary to this, the Conservative parties in Germany (and in Britain and France) entered a *circulus vitiosus*, and were then repeating and varying the issue again and again[lxxvii] (although the phenomenon is less entrenched than the usual "playing the race card" in the U.S).

Whereas the Dutch solution proved to be harmonious in the field of politics, and an immigrant élite was created and coopted into the political and administrative system, the social and economic environment was not targeted successfully. The multicultural approach that was cultivated (sometimes not very coherently[lxxviii]) furthered the definition of the immigrants as being "the other" and different from the indigenous population, even when the groups were labelled Allochthones and Autochthones in a scientific language. As an object of welfare policy, the immigrants at the same time were stereotyped as needy and underachieving, along with other *achterstand* groups.[lxxix]

Germany was keeping and restructuring productive mechanisms for the integration of immigrants and particularly young immigrants into the economic system in the 1970s, in particular the apprentice system (which is especially important for the working classes and carries a certain public prestige), the inclusive works councils and trade unions, and integrative school policies in some *Länder*. In contrast, Dutch trade unions were less active or less successful in organizing immigrant workers. Moreover, early exclusionary decisions at the cost of post-colonial immigrants had far-reaching after-effects, as well as the post-colonial character of some migrations. In this context it is indicative that in spite of all elaborate efforts to "educate" the population (a standard term in official documents), a language of "black" and "white" is used informally to define groups, schools and other places (and then given in official documents in quotation marks).

Closer comparison between the general and the focussed programmes in the two countries also could enable us to evaluate how programme funding and policy implementation are related. To give one example: the "policy" document proclaims in a high tone that the Randstadt cities shall be given 2 million guilders each over a period of three years for integration - which would be less than a guilder per capita in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.[lxxx] On the other hand, the practice of doubling the teacher-per-student ratio for foreign born students in North Rhine Westphalia which is now going on for twenty years (largely unnoticed from the public) can be calculated to cost two billion DM per year in that land (see the positive results in *Länder* comparison, figure 1). This might also be an example of the difference between long term policies that can translate into built-in structures over time and short term programmes that always remain endangered and precarious just because of their limited time horizon - for clients as well as for the personnel.

Comparing the Netherlands and Germany, we can thus demonstrate that policy decisions make a difference and that they can start vicious or virtuous circles. At the same time, their outcomes can be traced to be specific and contingent, and not necessarily encompassing the whole system as such.

After comparing the two nations, and evaluating the respective developments, I would tentatively like to add some more general conclusions:

1. Contrary the ongoing discourse on necessary culture wars or culture clashes, policies can make a difference. In particular, they can pattern the perception of the population. For ten years the Dutch politicians were able to keep a code of conduct, deeply influencing the climate in the country, and even shaping a new pride of the Netherlands as a tolerant country, for consumption at home and abroad.

2. Much more as would be expected if we go into most of today's literature or discourse, the colonial heritage shapes intercommunal relations until today. This is particularly important in

cases where there a direct connection between the wars of independence and today's situation, as we can see in the Netherlands and in France. In particular, it is fascinating how much continuity we find in the handling of inter-communal affairs in the colonial era and today. Researcher should take more interest into these continuities in patterns.[lxxxi]

3. Early decisions matter, structuring later relations. In our comparison that is particularly important for the comparison of a post-colonial and a labour-importing policy, and for the decisions about the status of the immigrants.

4. Multiculturalism, under its nice and politically correct surface, can carry more and different messages. Defining groups with respect to census, workplace, representation, culture et cetera can imply that they are "the other". This sense of difference can then result in excluding effects, even against the intention of well-meaning constructeurs of a such policy of official tolerance.

Annotations

[i] Leiprecht/Lutz mention six German educationists who argue that Germans should learn from the Netherlands. They also comment that some Dutch "migration professionals" make minority policy "a sort of immaterial Dutch export product" (Rudolf Leiprecht/ Helma Lutz, The Dutch Way: Mythos und Realität der interkulturellen Pädagogik in den Niederlanden, in: Georg Auernheimer/ Peter Gsettner (eds.), Jahrbuch für Pädagogik, Frankfurt/ New York 1996, p. 239).
The Netherlands are also positively compared to Belgium and Britain. An early example is Christopher Bagley, The Dutch Plural Society: a Comprehensive Study in Race Relations, London: Oxford Univ. Press 1973. See also the review on this book by John Rex, Dutch example, in: New Society, 10 May 1973, who states that the Dutch have "the most racial attitudes" and have "managed the business of immigration of coloured colonial workers far more successfully than has Britain".

[ii] Cf. Josef Schmid, Wohlfahrtsverbände in modernen Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Soziale Dienste in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1996.

[iii] There have been racist incidents and murders in the Netherlands too - however much less registered by world opinion and the media in both countries.

[iv] See the overview in: Klaus Bade, Population, Labour and Migration in 19th and 20th century Germany, Oxford 1987.

[v] Günter Hinken, Die Rolle der Staatsangehörigkeit bei der Konzeption des Grundgesetzes, in: Dietrich Thränhardt (ed.), Einwanderung und Einbürgerung in Deutschland, Münster 1998: LIT, p. 179-264.

[vi] Consequently, high ranking members of the Communist nomenclatura were excluded from acceptance.

[vii] This organizational effort is an important difference in comparison to the situation in Switzerland where the unions took less interest in the foreign workers, leading to greater social distance in Switzerland. See Barbara Epple Schmitter, Immigration and Citizenship in West Germany and Switzerland, Ph. D. Thesis Chicago 1979, p. 235.

[viii] Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany. The Prospects for Pluralism, New York: Praeger 1978, p. 125 f.

[ix] Wolfgang Bodenbender, Zwischenbilanz der Ausländerpolitik, Paper, Conference on *Bildungsprobleme und Zukunftserwartungen der Kinder türkischer Gastarbeiter*, 1976, p. 1, cited in Rist, p. 111.

[x] Chancellor Schmidt at that time denounced "the cynicist exploitation of a certain latent xenophobia by the Ministerpräsident in Stuttgart and in München" (Wahlparteitag Essen, 9.-10. June 1980. Protocol, ed. by Vorstand der SPD, Bonn 1980, Vol. 2, Bonn 1980, p. 50). For Baden-Württemberg see Karl-

Heinz Meier-Braun, "Freiwillige Rotation". Ausländerpolitik am Beispiel der baden-württembergischen Landesregierung, München 1979. For the education debate see Rist 1978, p. 206-222, on Bavaria.

[xi] Frankfurter Rundschau 203, 3 September 1992.

[xii] Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, Zwischen Toleranz und Besorgtheit. Einstellungen der deutschen Bevölkerung zu aktuellen Problemen der Ausländerpolitik, Allensbach: Institut für Demoskopie 1985.

[xiii] See more details in Dietrich Thränhardt, The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany, in: Party Politics, Vol. 1, 1995, p. 321-343.

[xiv] See Simone Wolken, Das Grundrecht auf Asyl als Gegenstand der Innen- und Rechtspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt: Lang 1988.

[xv] Heribert Prantl, Deutschland - leicht entflammbar, München: Hanser 1994, p. 53.

[xvi] Paul Harris, Jewish Immigration to the New Germany. The Policy Making Process Leading to the Adoption of the 1991 Quota Refugee Law, in: Dietrich Thränhardt (ed.), Einwanderung und Einbürgerung in Deutschland, Münster: LIT 1998, p. 105-147.

[xvii] See his editorial in Karl A. Otto (ed.), Westwärts - heimwärts? Aussiedlerpolitik zwischen "Deutschtümelei" und "Verfassungsauftrag", Bielefeld 1990 (AJZ). A more recent evaluation is Klaus Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl. Eine Bestandsaufnahme, München: Beck 1994, p. 161 ff.

[xviii] See *CSU: Ausländerwahlrecht schafft Mehrheit für Rot-Grün*, in: FAZ 220, 22 September 1998; *Wahlrechtsreform ist Betrug an Deutschen*, in: SZ 219, 23 September 1998.

[xix] Jutta Witte, *Hessen wählt: Keine Wendestimmung*, in: Das Parlament 5, 29 January 1999, p. 15.

[xx] The original concept is from: S. Martin Lipset/ Stein Rokkan, Cleavages, Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in: Ibid (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives, New York: Free Press 1967.

[xxi] In that sense, two politicians leaving the Berlin CDU because of the campaign reported about the ongoing discourse in the CDU as: "The Turks don´t vote for us anyway." (*In der Partei sagen sie immer: Die Türken wählen uns sowieso nicht* (SZ, 20 January1999).

[xxii] For the categories see Dietrich Thränhardt, Europe - A New Immigration Continent. Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective, Münster 1996[2], p. 33-38.

[xxiii] Dirk Jacobs, Nieuwkomers in de Politiek. Het parlementair debat omtrent kiesrecht voor vreemdelingen in Nederland en Belgie (1970-1997). Gent: Academia Press 1998, 105f. He reports than one group was housed in a former concentration camp.

[xxiv] Private information by Kees Groenendijk.

[xxv] Eric Heijs, Van vreemdeling tot Nederlander. De verlening van het Nederlanderschap aan vreemdelingen 1813-1992, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis 1995, p. 144.

[xxvi] See Kees Groenendijk, Verboden voor Tukkers, Reacties op rellen tussen Italianen, Spanjaarden und Twentenaren in 1961, in: Frank Bovenkerk et al. (eds.), Wetenschap en Partijdigheid. Opstellen voor André J. F. Köbben, Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum 1990, p. 55-95. He describes the incidents, the different reactions of the mayors in the three cities and the resulting developments, gives an overview about other incidents and discusses what these early incidents can teach us.

[xxvii] Kind information by the head of the Research Department of the Social Services in Rotterdam, Gerard Oude Engbering.

[xxviii] Entzinger, p. 55.

[xxix] Quoted in Groenendijk 1990, p. 55.

xxx WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid), Ethnic Minorities, The Hague: State Publishers 1979.

xxxi Jacobs p. 133.

xxxii A. Donner, Nederlanders in het buitenland en het kiesrecht, in: Nederlands Juristen blad, Vol. 49, p. 726-727. For the development see C.A. Groenendijk, Vom Ausländer zum Mitbürger. Die symbolische und faktische Bedeutung des Wahlrechts für ausländische Immigranten, in: Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik, p. 23.

xxxiii Jacobs, Nieuwkomers, p. 103.

xxxiv Groenendijk 1987, p. 23.

xxxv Dirk Jacobs, Discourse, Politics and Policy: The Dutch Parliamentary Debate about Voting Rights for Foreign Residents, in: International Migration Review, Vol 32, Summer 1998, p. 363.

xxxvi Jacobs, Nieuwkomers, p. 136.

xxxvii Jacobs, Nieuwkomers, p. 132 ff.

xxxviii Heijs, p. 134 f.

xxxix Jacobs, Discourse, p. 366; Cf. Kees Groenendijk, Minderheitenpolitik in den Niederlanden, in: Dietrich Thränhardt (ed.), Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerintegration in Belgien, den Niederlanden und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Düsseldorf: Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung 1985, p. 38-52.

xl Groenendijk 1987, p. 25.

xli Kees Groenendijk, Einwanderung, Einwanderer und Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht in den Niederlanden 1945-1998, in: Ulrike Davy (ed.), Politische Integration der ausländischen Wohnbevölkerung, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999, p. 105-146.

xlii Groenendijk 1999, p. 2.

xliii For the text see Frits Bolkestein, Integratie van minderheden moet met lef worden angepakt, in: De Volkskrant, 12 September 1991. Jacobs, Discourse, argues that the change of public opinion began already in the late 1980s.

xliv See Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accomodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley 1968.

xlv WRR 1989: Immigrant Minorities. Dutch Scientific Coucil for Government Policy, The Hague 1990 (English Version). A summary of theses points can be found in the article of WRR president Han Entzinger, Shifting Paradigms: an Appraisal of Immigration in the Netherlands, in: Heinz Fassmann/ Rainer Münz (eds.), European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century, Aldershot: Edward Elgar 1994, p. 93-112, 109. The emphasis of this article is in stark contrast to Entzinger´s article of 1985.

xlvi Entzinger 1994, p. 108.

xlvii Kees Groenendijk, letter to the author.

xlviii Kees Groenendijk, letter to the author. See also the Dutch press in late February/ early March 1999, e.g. "Dijkstal bepleit terugsturen van 23.000 Bosniërs", in: NRC Handelsblad, 26 February 1999.

xlix Thomas F. Pettigrew, Reactions toward the New Minorities of Western Europe, University of California, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 28, 1998, p. 84 f. Based on the 1988 Eurobarometer survey.

l Pettigrew 1998, p. 84. See also Thomas F. Pettigrew/ R. W. Meertens, The Verzuiling Puzzle. Understanding Dutch Intergroup Relations, in: Current Psychology, Vol. 15, 1996, p. 3-13.

[li] Pettigrew 1998, p. 83. For American parallels see Pettigrew 1989; Sears 1988, for the usefulness of the concept for Europe see Barker 1982, Bergmann & Erb 1986; Essed 1990.

[lii] Pettigrew 1998, 84 f. See also Pettigrew 1998; Meertens/ Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew 1997.

[liii] Pettigrew 1998, p. 90 f.

[liv] Melanie Kiehl/ Heinz Werner, Die Arbeitsmarktsituation von EU-Bürgern und Angehörigen von Drittstaaten in der EU, IAB-Werkstattberichte No. 7, 30 July 1998, table 3.1.

[lv] Kiehl/ Werner 1998, graph 3.17.

[lvi] Werner 1997, p. 9.

[lvii] CBS, Dutch Statistical Office.

[lviii] CBS, p. 37 f.

[lix] Doomernijk 1998, p. 68.

[lx] Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Minderhedenbeleid 1999. Jaaroverzicht integratiebeleid Etnische Gropen 1999, The Hague, p. 23.

[lxi] Sjoerd Karsten, Concentratie en segregatie in het Nederlandse basisonderwijs, in: Pedagogisch Tijdschrift, Vol. 20, 1995, p. 41, cited after Leiprecht/Lutz 1996, p 250. See also Doomernijk 1998, p. 60.

[lxii] See for instance the first page of the social Democratic paper "De Volkskrant" of 17 April 1999, carrying the title *Kwaliteitsverschillen zwarte scholen groot* (Large quality differences in black schools).

[lxiii] Jeroen Doomernijk, The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and Their Descendents in France, Germany and The Netherlands, Geneva 1998, p. 65 (International Migration Papers 27).

[lxiv] The German situation is interpreted on these lines in detail in: Dietrich Thränhardt et al., Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Die Lebenslage der Menschen aus den ehemaligen Anwerbeländern und die Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Politik, Düsseldorf 1994 (Landessozialbericht Vol. 6). For more recent data see Ursula Mehrländer/ Carsten Ascheberg/ Jörg Ueltzhöffer, Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn 1996.

[lxv] Doomernijk 1998, p. 69.

[lxvi] F. Bovenkerk/ M. J. I. Gras/ D. Ramsoedh, Discrimination against Migrant Workers and Ethnic Minorities in Access to Employment in the Netherlands, Geneva 1995, p. 21, 52 (International Migration Papers 4).

[lxvii] Andreas Goldberg/ Dora Mourinho/ Ursula Kulke, Labour Market Discrimination against Foreign Workers in Germany, Geneva 1996, p. 47 (International Migration Papers 7).

[lxviii] Jan Rath, Minorisering: de sociale constructie van 'etnische minderheden', Amsterdam: Sua 1991

[lxix] See Robert Miles, Racism. The Evolution of the Debate about a Concept in Changing Times, in: Dietrich Thänhardt (ed.), Europe. A New Immigration Continent. Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective, Münster 1996[2], p. 88-116.

[lxx] Rath, p. 278.

[lxxi] Rath, p. 279

[lxxii] For the policy, see e.g. J. P.Abell/ A. E. Havelaar/ M. M. Dankoor, The Documentation and Evaluation of Anti-Discrimination Training Activies in the Netherlands, Geneva 1997 (International Migration Papers 16).

In this sense, Portes/Rumbaut agree with "students of ethnic mobilization...that receiving nation-states play a crucial role in the rise of ethnicity through their defining and treating various groups differently" (Alejandro Portes/ Rubén G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America. A Portrait, Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press 1996, p. 136.)

[lxxiii] Heike Hagedorn, Wer darf Mitglied werden?. Einbürgerung in Deutschland und Frankreich, in: Dietrich Thränhardt (ed.), Einwanderung und Einbürgung in Deutschland. Yearbook Migration 1997/98, Münster 1998, p. 15-63; Ibid., Falling Borders, Liberal Trends in German Naturalization Policy, Paper, Conference "Magnet Societies. Immigration in Postwar Germany and the United States", SMU Dallas, 1-2 March 1999, http://www,smu.edu/-tower/twrann.html

[lxxiv] The large majority of German entrepreneurs see the Betriebsrat as a very important institution. Cf.Horst-Udo Niedenhoff, Die Praxis der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung: Zusammenarbeit von Betriebsrat und Arbeitgeber, Kosten des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes, Betriebsrat und Sprecherausschußwahlen, Köln : Deutscher Instituts-Verlag 1999.

[lxxv] See Manfred Budzinski, Gewerkschaftliche und betriebliche Erfahrungen ausländischer Arbeiter, Frankfurt: Campus 1979; Peter Kühne, Beteiligungschancen und Repräsentanz von Migranten in der Arbeitswelt, in. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(Hrsg.), Partizipationschancen ethnischer Minderheiten. Ein Vergleich zwsichen Großbritannien, den Niederlanden und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn 1993, 19-32.

[lxxvi] Albert O. Hirschman, Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society, in: Political Theory, Vol. 22, 1994, p. 203-218.

[lxxvii] See Dietrich Thränhardt, The Political Uses of Xenophobia in England, France and Germany, in: Party Politics, Vol. 1, 1995, p. 323-345.

[lxxviii] This can be particularly observed in the official policy document "Policy on the Integration of Ethnic Minorities" of 1993. Again and again, it speaks of a "multicultural society" and the need for more cohesion and "integration" without ever defining the borders of the concept. At the end there is talk of a need for "redistribution of the vital social resources of employment and income, education and housing", but there are not concrete commitments.for any particular steps in that direction.

[lxxix] Sometimes this extends into scientific interpretation. In his comparative study on discrimination, Doomernijk applauds critical German literature on discrimination in that country. However, he explains the - much larger - deficits in the Netherlands with a lack of "cultural capital" at the side of the immigrants (Doomernijk 1998, p. 65)

[lxxx] Policy 1994. p. 34

[lxxxi] For a comparison of the English, Spanish and French policies towards indigenous populations, see Anthony Pagden's analysis in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Oxford University Press 1999, quoted after Connor Cruise O'Brien, Buried Lives, in: The New York Review of Books, December 16, 1999.

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Comments and Perspectives

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Four future research questions were raised by Han Entzinger:

1. I**mmigration and the (welfare) state**. "Markets need migrants, but citizens do not always want them". How will this contradiction develop, given the expected economic and demographic trends in the western world, particularly in Europe? How to reconcile the openness of an immigration society with the closedness of a nation-state, its entitlements and provisions?

2. **Integration and Diversity**. How can increasingly diverse societies be kept together? How to generate a sufficient degree of solidarity and a sense of belonging in order to guarantee the functioning of economic, social, political and cultural systems in a society?

3. **Identity and Xenophobia.** How do identity, development among individuals and communities interact with the rise of xenophobia in societies? This includes research into shifting attitudes and perceptions among communities in a society as well as into new political movements that focus on integration.

4. **World development and migration**. More insight is required into the very complex relationship between (under)development, migration, pressure and actual migration.

SESSION 2 **IDENTITY**

Introduction

Amélie Mummendey

Recently, the problem of a growing number of right-wing extremist opinions has been recognised in both public and political opinion. Their spread in newly established and especially for young people attractive organisations, an increasing amount of violent acts against "foreign looking" and homeless people are discussed and interventions are demanded. Related to this, the danger of intimidation of non-involved people, their passive toleration or even their silent approval and support of the actions are increasingly taken into account.

The problem of discrimination and degradation, intimidation and violence against those who are different is not restricted to a right-wing extremist environment. Conflicts between social groups are also taking place in other contexts, for instance between members of different ethnic minorities and native groups. In addition, highly cohesive groups of shared religion, which develop a strong feeling of superiority towards other religious groups, have been established. Apart from the high damage caused by crimes in this context, this situation also carries with it high economic costs. Moreover, there is the danger of destabilisation of the democratic society, which was founded on constitutional consensus.

In the immediate and longer term society will face a broad spectrum of problems and critical situations, which are caused by conflicts between social groups. As a consequence of migration within and into Europe, and also due to the expansion of the European Union, social constellations will arise, in which new social identities will develop or membership of already existing social groups will gain a new meaning. Societies will become less based on a single unifying cultural tradition.

Social Identities and the subjective representation of social reality
Central parts of human life are determined by an individual's membership in different social groups. Thoughts and behaviour are influenced by structures and processes within one's own social groups as well as between those groups and other groups. Both individual views and the will to act individually or collectively have their roots in this fact.

Social identity is that part of the self concept which is defined by the membership in different social groups and the appraisals connected to that. It can be based on national, ethnic or religious affiliation, but may also be derived from the membership in a company in which a person is employed or an institution to which somebody belongs. The social self-esteem, collective values and norms are connected to social identities. Besides that, social identities determine the attachment and the solidarity to other members of the own group. At the same time they also determine the separation from others, who are not members of the own group and therefore do not share that social identity. In other words, social identities help to locate an individual's place in the community.

Social and societal change caused by processes like the German unification, by migration, but also by changes in structures of public organisations and business enterprises, which influence the status quo of our social identity: Doubts are raised about the previously secure aspects of and the validity of one's values and beliefs which may be connected to group membership. They have to be defined in a new way. Threats to social identity and its positively valued position have to be rejected and coped with.

In this way a situation characterised by changes in the relation between social groups and the corresponding social identities can be the roots of conflicts. They can manifest themselves in negative evaluations, derogation, detraction and discrimination and even violent attacks against people who are different. All these phenomena are socially and economically costly. Costs for police actions and for non-cooperative and destructive relations in shared

organisations, districts, schools etc. cause immediate economic and societal damage. The long-term consequence is the development of a dangerous climate, which might have devastating effects on national but also supra national economies.

Identity and the perception of intergroup difference

It is now timely and necessary to integrate existing knowledge and try to resolve questions which can help to understand the causes and mechanisms underlying intergroup attitudes and behaviours. In this respect, how is the difference between one's own and the 'other' group evaluated ? Either negatively, as a challenge to the attitudes and characteristics of the own group and therefore threatening, or positively, as an enrichment or even as a basis of support for the own group's opinions? It is central for the understanding of the quality of intergroup relations to understand the processes underlying the evaluation of intergroup difference (or similarity).

Dealing with intergroup differences is mainly influenced by ideas about justice and - correspondingly – by perceptions of injustice, e.g. with regards to the situation of the own group in relation to others. Resentment, feelings of relative deprivation and perceived threat of the own position are strong preconditions for discrimination, hostility or even open violence against those who are different. The question arises, which factors influence the perception of the own situation? Interestingly it is not necessarily personal circumstances which foster feelings of social disadvantage, resentment and the will to engage in collective protest. Paradoxically, much research shows that there is a discrepancy between the evaluation of the personal and the group situation: Individuals who describe their current situation as positive and satisfying can simultaneously be very unhappy about their situation as a group member. This can lead to anger, feelings of being disadvantaged, collective actions like protest or support for hostility towards people who are seen as different. Considering all these facts, it is not surprising that the most powerful right-wing extremists and violent offenders are usually not unemployed young people or persons with few future prospects, but rather socially established people, who are integrated in a working environment. Mechanisms and styles of social information processing and social judgement (e.g. social categorisation, social comparison), motivational processes (e.g. development of different action goals and the perception of a discrepancy between the actual and the aspired situation) are all of great importance for this issue. At the same time, the question of how an individual deals with perceived unjustified disadvantage and the respective identity threat is of considerable interest. It is also necessary to take a closer look at forms and strategies to cope with uncertainty arising from changes in intergroup relations.

The self-perception as a single individual or a group member can lead to very different appraisals and evaluations of the own situation. It is also of central importance whether an individual is alone or together with other group members in a given situation. The group situation influences perception and behaviour of each group member. Conformity to group goals and norms, views and opinions are strongly influenced by group membership. Homogenous and often extreme attitudes and decisions also frequently occur in an intergroup context. Taking into consideration that group processes and social identities are important factors for people's attitudes and behaviours, research is urgently needed which addresses the question of which conditions help to immunise group members against socially problematic effects of group processes.

Identities and behaviours towards those who are different
One main focus of interest will be on the development and on changes in conflict and cooperation and their characteristics and consequences. Conflict and cooperation can be seen as specific forms of intra- and/or intergroup relations. Special features in this context are the way individuals mutually perceive, evaluate and influence each other. Especially relevant for the way these mechanisms work are aspects of the self-definition of the involved individuals, their salient self-categorisation and their social identity. Basically there are three levels of categorisation for the perception of the self within a given social situation: First, the self ("I") in contrast to other persons; second, the own group ("we") in contrast to another

group; and third, the perception of a shared group, which includes the self and the others ("all of us"). The levels of self-categorisation differ in the number of people or groups that are included apart from the self. Aspects of action goals and motives for behaviour regulation are connected to this process of self-categorisation. They are also central for preferences in decision-making: As a single individual differing from other individuals, a person will pursue other interests than in the role of a group member sharing important goals and characteristics with other group members. Therefore it is of central importance for the evaluation of an identity threat and of conflicts of interest how the social situation is cognitively represented.

Parallel to the different forms of relationships and interactions during conflict and cooperation, certain perceptions of the intergroup situation, attitudes towards it and behaviours have to be distinguished, which can generally be labelled as discrimination and tolerance. They can also be referred to as hostility and aggression vs. acceptance and social support. The relationship between these different classes of phenomena is currently under-researched. For example, how are negative stereotypes or tolerance linked to corresponding *behaviours* like discrimination and cooperation? Is there a qualitative difference between biased attitudes and outright hostility towards the outgroup? The analysis of the antecedent conditions and processes that have an impact on the way we deal with intergroup difference provides the basis for the identification of mechanisms for improving the relations between groups, for reducing conflict and for increasing mutual tolerance and acceptance. In this context it is also important to find out under what circumstances contact between groups takes place and what interventions can optimise the quality of that contact. There is clear evidence that favourable intergroup contact can improve relations between groups; what is less clear is how to implement that contact.

Social Identity and Social Institutions: A Case of Co-evolution

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Abstract: The concept of "social identity" has been invoked throughout the human sciences whenever there is need for a conceptual bridge between individual and group levels of analysis. Social identity provides a link between the psychology of the individual --the representation of self--and the structure and process of social groups and institutions within which the self is embedded. The reciprocal relationship between social identities and social institutions becomes particularly evident under conditions of institutional change.

One important consequence of social identification is it implications for interpersonal trust and cooperation. Experimental research in social psychology demonstrates that individuals are willing to risk trusting another, unknown person simply on the basis of category membership. Ingroup members are trusted more than outgroup members, as long as shared group membership is salient and mutually recognized. This spontaneous trust is an important underpinning of social exchange and cooperation, but it is limited to those who share ingroup identity. The boundaries of the ingroup are also boundaries of exclusion from trust.

One important question for future research is the role of political, economic, and social institutions in expanding the inclusiveness of social identities and, by derivation, the community of trust. Institutions can undermine interpersonal trust or reinforce it, depending upon whether the institution is perceived as an external regulatory agent or an embodiment of a shared identity. Institutions may play a role in building superordinate identities within which subgroup identities are nested, or in creating cross-cutting identities that reduce the salience of other social cleavages.

In a complex, pluralistic social system, there are a number of theoretical reasons why multiple cross-cutting social identities might reduce discrimination along any one dimension. First, cross-cutting distinctions make social categorization more complex and reduce the magnitude of ingroup-outgroup differentiations. Second, multiple group memberships reduce the importance of any one social identity for satisfying an individual's need for belonging and self-definition, and self-esteem, reducing the motivational base for integroup discrimination. Finally, when another person is an ingroup member on one category dimension but belongs to an outgroup in another categorization, cognitive inconsistency is introduced if that individual is evaluated positively as an ingroup member but is also associated with others who are evaluated negatively as outgroup members. In an effort to resolve such inconsistencies, interpersonal balance processes should lead to greater positivity toward the outgroup based on overlapping memberships. The nature of multiculturalism policies and institutions may be particularly important in determining whether pluralistic societies are experienced as segmented or cross-cutting identities.

Historical Dimensions of Collective Identities in Central Europe

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Abstract:

1. History is the constitutive part of several, first of all national identities: appealing to the past was and is a basic element in the process of the formation of collective identity. The way we attempt to reconstruct the content and formal connections of the individual and collective conciousness is significantly directed by the criteria, which originated in the context of the national thinking of the 19th century. The inquiry about constructions of identities has formed the focus of interdisciplinary research interest in cultural sciences since the 1980´s. Historians and cultural anthropologists started to analysed nations and nation states as "social constructs" and "imagined communities".

2. Collective Identities in the Central European region were not formed by a homogeneous national tradition, but by ethno-cultural plurality and heterogeneity. New approaches to the national and ethnical self-image and outside-image open up the concept of "hybridity" and the "post colonial" perspective.

3. A case study about the Roma in Slovakia represents their "situational" identities and public policy problems with heterogenity and unstable ethnic boundaries.

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Collective identity and memory are phenomena, which are experiencing a boom in historiography at present. The construction and control of the past was one of the specialized themes of the Nineteenth International Congress of the Historical Sciences in Oslo in 2000. The results of historical research from almost all continents show that even in the period of globalization, we cannot expect the disappearance of different historical identities, only their transformation and rearrangement. In many cases national identities were shaped in contrast to a majority nationalism. In other conditions, they formed with the help of a unifying "great narrative" about victorious wars or tragic defeats. Collective identities undergo changes. The influences on them include differences between the historical memories of the winners and the victims of historical processes.

The research of Jörn Rüsen on the role of the holocaust in the German identity is an example of the present approach of historians[1]. He analysed the forms of memory of three generations. 1/ For the fellow travellers of National Socialism, defeat in the war meant a break in identity and cast doubt on their existing national consciousness. Their solutions included appeals to older historical traditions, for example, to the Goethe cult. Consciousness of defeat, struggle with material deprivation and attribution of blame from the outside shaped an environment, lacking the internal freedom for recognition of their own guilt. The holocaust was put aside and not considered in public discussion. The Nazis were demonized, excluded or ex-territorialized from German history. Both the Nazis and the victorious allies were placed in the role of the "others", who are important for defining collective identity. 2/ The next generation took up a critical position to the collective silence of their parents concerning the Holocaust. In their eyes, National Socialism and the Holocaust became a negative constituting event - a counter-narrative. They integrated the Shoah into German history. They replaced tradition with universalist values and norms. This generation identified with the victims, the offenders and onlookers became the "others". 3/ Only the third generation gradually matured to the recognition that the offenders and those who profited from the Holocaust or witnessed it were integral parts of historical experience: the offenders were the others - the others were also Germans. Moral distancing from the offenders, characteristic of the preceding generation, changed into appropriation of these tragic events and a specific historic distance.

From the historical perspective, states and nations are temporally defined phenomena, which cannot be regarded as the "end of history". In the past, the state "expropriated" the power of free towns, local communities, estates and other social formations, today supra-national corporations are doing this to the state. States will continue to exist, just as formerly independent cities still exist, but many of their responsibilities are passing into other hands. The modern nation is a political construction of 19th century intellectuals. It corresponded to the needs of the time to secure a feeling of protection in the period of modernization, which cast doubt on all the old certainties: the patriarchal family, religion, the estate division of society. State-citizenship and national/ethnic identity represent only one level of group identities: in some situations regional, local, gender (male, female), confessional, professional etc.).

History as a constitutive part of collective identities

The French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs pointed to the connection between "identities" and "memory" long ago, and more recently the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann clarified it [2]. Historians emphasize the connection of the concept of "identity" to the specific historical constellations and they study the production of identities 1/ as part of social and political practices, and 2/ as a cultural text, which is historically differently coded, it brings and activates different images.

New impulses for the study of collective identities came from a change of perspective in research on nationalism in the 1980s. Until then the emphasis was placed on the real, "natural" and allegedly ahistorical factors such as language, nation or the geographical environment, with the help of which individuals were integrated into political systems. Theories of modernization (Karl Deutsch) and social anthropological models (Ernest Gellner) interpreted nationalism as a functional ideology for the integration of modern societies. The new theories of nationalism explain the political integration of individuals into anonymous wholes on the basis of historically produced and changeable ideas about the features that are allegedly common and which substantially distinguish them from the members of other groups. Nations and states are interpreted as "*social constructions"* or "*imagined communities".*[4] The "*invention of tradition"* is used in the processes of formation of nations. This means the construction of a jointly imagined history, shared historical experiences, values and models, which become part of the communication of wide groups in the population, with the help of political symbols and rituals.[5] This is how the modern nation is formed: its members are characterized by *historical signs*, which mediate to them outward distinction and internal identity, and lend legitimization on the basis of history to the new order.

From the end of the 18th century, figures in the national movements were concerned with "invented history" in various ways. These constructs usually continue traditional concepts of earlier political systems and political culture. The nation state was usually depicted as a continuation of its own history. For example, the Swiss civil nation constituted itself by the principle of the "sovereignty of the people" as the only legitimate source of power. This was presented as the regeneration of the historical "Eidgenossenschaft" (Oath-fellowship, Confederation). In France, the origin of the nation state was conceived as a break in history. The French Revolution was presented as a "new beginning". The conception of non-tradition dominated, with the idea that French citizens had to be re-educated. The integration of non-elite groups - peasant farmers, craftsmen and workers - into the homogeneous political culture, that is the process of internal nation building was completed in France only at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. In general, we can say that wars and revolutions acted as founding events for the invention of traditions, and that national movements defined themselves through external and internal enemies.[6]

In historical perspective, a nation differed from the hierarchical estates system by their political character and the equality of their members. According to the criteria of equality - whether by language, a certain historical tradition, allegiance to a state or religion - types of nation - ethnic, cultural, class or civil - are distinguished. Historicness was both a motor and a result of nation building. On the other hand, nationalism itself rewrote history, to prove continuity with the past and present the nation as something natural and certain.[7]

Recent research is seeking an explanation of the long survival of some collective identities and their resistance to modernization. It pays attention to the relationship between national identity and other collective identities - ethnic, gender or religious. The complex process of merging of ethnicity and nationality in the second half of the 19th century was closely connected with the new social "thematization" of cultural and social differentiation (in social and cultural reform movements, feminism, and in the new sciences - sociology, ethnology, anthropology). Ethnicization of the nation was a process of the production and reproduction of differentiation, which serve nationalism more effectively than the opposite process of their suppression.[8] The evolutionary teaching of Charles Darwin on the continual changes to species was one of the most important ideological components. A new feature - merging of historical changes with "timeless" heredity - was added to the construct of the national community based on common origin. Discontinuities or breaks in the development of a nation were interpreted in an evolutionary sense as heroic moments of struggle for the survival of the nation. With the reshaping of the nation into a community, which sees its survival as the "survival of the fittest", which undergoes crises as a process of self-perfection, nationalism acquired an inherent changeability. Constant new production of ethnic, racial, cultural, political or linguistic, but always "natural" definitions of the nations had the result that the short term was presented as the "age-old" and accident as "destiny". The chameleon ability of nationalism is, therefore, not only a socio-spatial, but above all a historico-temporal phenomenon, which guaranteed long-term "progressiveness".[9]

Scholars originally thought that nationalism disturbed traditional cultural identities in the 19th century, that national identity replaced older religious, social or regional identities. More recent research has shown that nationalism mixes with previous identities and overlaps with them, but in different ways in different periods.[10]

The secret of the success of nationalism lies in its ability to adapt pre-political value ideas, to reshape them into political forms, which contain the image of people's own community and of an enemy. National discourse in the 19th and 20th centuries enables a politics, which acts as if national identity was united, fixed and permanent. Plurality of identities was suppressed; individuals are regarded as part of a political unit - the nation.[11]

Codification of collective identity starts from the basic paradigm that a socially constructed division between external and internal appears to be justified and authentic. Bernhard Giesen proposes a typology of the codification of collective identities:[12]
1/ primordial codes (so-called natural, concerning gender, generations, kinship, ethnicity, race);
2/ traditionalist codes (the traditions, routines and memories of the community are regarded as the core of identity);
3/ universalist codes (attempting to transform the secular into the transcendental).

Giesen suggests *historical scenarios* of collective identities, according to which German and French intellectuals and their public in the 19th and early 20th centuries projected and constructed social identities. He assigns to the *universalist scenario* the public and private spheres in the German and French enlightenment, Jacobinism and Romanticism: from French cosmopolitanism, through German patriotism, the public space of the Jacobins to the "aesthetic" identity of German Romanticism. He illustrated *traditionalist codes* using the examples of historicism and modernism in Imperial Germany (forgetting of the past, establishment and emphasizing of museums, cultural pessimism). Anti-Semitism and racism in Germany and France are examples of the *primordial scenario*. All the scenarios involve an illusion of a common history, common threat or common destiny, which were mediated by narratives (about heroes, victories and defeats, decline and rebirth) and staged in rituals. The authors of these great narratives and rituals were often intellectuals.

Giesen thinks that present-day intellectuals have given up their classical roles as prophets of new and better tomorrows. After the fall of the great utopias, they are limiting themselves to mediation between different cultures or to preserving monuments. In the present world, oriented towards consumerism and the market, their message is only one of many. Precisely in a situation, in which social groups are losing their stable contours and cannot be defined either by education, profession, origin or style, ideas about belonging together and collective

identity are becoming extraordinarily attractive, as compensations for the rapid oscillations of the market.[13]

Many layered identity in Central Europe
The cultures of Central Europe clearly offer themselves as "modern" illustrative material, since both plurality and unity can be clearly demonstrated in this region.[14] As a result of the varied and fragmented character of this ethno- culturally heterogeneous region, it was not simple to use "great stories" to gain a generally valid and binding construction, which could delegitimize old value models. Moritz Csáky points to the special socio-cultural relevance of modernization in the Habsburg Monarchy and its results for the constituting of identities.[15] The people flowing into the cities were more heterogeneous than elsewhere and their proportion in the urban population was higher. For example, around 1900 6% of the population of Paris was born elsewhere, but in Vienna the proportion was 60%. Accelerated social differentiation and perception of social otherness influenced individual and collective consciousness.

In this environment, reference systems were more complex, and the search more multifarious. The "*hybrid character"* of culture resulted from *exogenous plurality* (European and extra-European influences in language, music, theatre, architecture, dress, diet and so on) and from *endogenous plurality* (variety of ethnic groups, languages, religions, customs and so on). The collective and individual reference systems were very varied, with individual elements meeting and interpenetrating, but they retained their independence, that is their foreignness.[16]

Intensive interaction of the various ethnic and cultural traditions in the urban environment resulted in processes of cultural diffusion and acculturation. They acted as an important stimulus to cultural creativity, but they also provoked feelings of being threatened, which led to forcible linguistic and cultural assimilation. Thus, in Central Europe, nations defined themselves through language and the nationalist ideologies promoted the view that each person could have only one national identity, not several. The fact that national and folk cultures are enriched by contrasting elements from neighbouring cultures was "forgotten" in public discourse. In a pluralist environment of many ethnic groups, religions, political and administrative traditions, polyglosy and mixed marriages, national homogenization did not proceed simply, but was accompanied by many conflicts.

The models for settling disputes in the Habsburg Monarchy were connected with the specific course of modernization - initiated and implemented mainly by the state - and the problematic formation of civil society - strong Catholic traditions, the influence of enlightened absolutism, ethnic emancipation processes. In the second half of the 19th century, the ethnic groups developed into units, which determined real political life. The question of their co- existence became a central internal political problem, because ethnic heterogeneity led to competing national conceptions within the state. After the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867, the principle of equality of ethnic groups ("Volksstämme") was applied in the Austrian part of the Monarchy - but the real power-political situation did not correspond to this liberal constitutional structure. Dominance of the ethnic Hungarian or Magyars was applied in the legal and political life of the Kingdom of Hungary. In both parts of the Monarchy, mental disintegration increased and parallel civil societies were formed. The "public" was always only a particular ethnic group, which was not prepared to compromise, but was gained for a national interest policy. Ethnic organizations lost the character of civil society, and became imitations of the state and instruments for the ideologization of national disputes.[17]

These processes also continued after the break up of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the cultural level it was still true that the creative potential of the region was not bound to national-cultural characteristics, but to the cultural code of the whole region, for example the specific tradition of thought from Bolzano to Wittgenstein. On the political level, the successor states were confronted with the same problems as the original common state. The attempts at ethno-cultural homogenization culminated in deportation and resettlement of inhabitants.

Memories of the "heritage" of the Habsburg Monarchy were excluded from the cultural memory of the inhabitants of the region for a long time. In the 1960s, the Italian Germanist

Claudio Magris presented the "Habsburg myth" as a utopia of a "happy and harmonious period", a "settled, fairy-tale Central Europe". However, the positive thematizing of Central Europe came only in the 1980s, especially thanks to writers and intellectuals from behind the Iron Curtain. Their "discovery" of the Central European space, which crossed national frontiers and the frontiers of the Cold War, had the aim of creating a new imaginary frontier - distancing them from the "East".[18]

From this period, academic interest began to concentrate on the multi-ethnic plurality of the Danubian Monarchy in connection with modernization crises. The inter-disciplinary research programme "Modernism - Vienna and Central Europe around 1900" led by Moritz Csáky (Graz University) is still continuing. In cooperation with scholars mainly from the neighbouring countries, they are developing the idea of Central Europe as a laboratory, in which we can trace the continuity of processes, which are also important in the epoch of globalization and cultural networks. In contrast to the stereotype of multi-culturalism as a natural, "friendly", harmonious crossing of many cultural codes, these historic researches point to permanent cultural crises and conflicts. The utopia of multi-culturalism is replaced by the concept of polyphonic and hybrid cultures in a pluri- cultural society or supra-national state.[19]

The new projects are concerned with the relationship between power and cultural symbolism, with the question of dealing with "another" culture or the perspectives of national identities.[20] Under the influence of so-called *Postcolonial Studies*, a cultural-historical current has arisen, starting from the idea of "internal colonization". It asks whether the internal imperial policy of the Habsburg Monarchy towards the non-German ethnic groups can be regarded as internal colonialism.[21] It provides the possibility of a more global view of the influence of a (foreign) power on the symbolic world of cultures, images and everyday myths, auto- and hetero-stereotypes, on the constituting of collective identities.

Fluidity of collective identities. The example of the Romany in Slovakia
Delegations from the West often ask: "Why don't you let them travel?" However, they have not taken the time to read background information about the historical context of Central Europe. More than 90% of the Romany in Slovakia live a settled way of life and have done for centuries. From the 15th century, Romany travellers in Western Europe were cruelly persecuted - killing of a Gypsy was not considered a crime, but in Central and South-Eastern Europe the situation was different. During the Turkish expansion of the 16th and 17th centuries, when the frontier of the Ottoman Empire extended into southern Slovakia, both sides in the conflict used the services of the local population, including the Romany. Apart from working on fortification and other building projects, Romany smiths were employed. From the 16th century, some towns and feudal families allowed Romany smiths and musicians to settle on their property. This laid the foundations for a permanently settled way of life for the Romany inhabitants of Slovakia.

The decrees of the 18th century Empress Maria Theresa represented an important shift in policy towards the Romany. Although they aimed at the consistent assimilation of this ethnic group (bans on travelling use of their own language, conclusion of mutual marriages), they were regarded as a really existing component of the population of the country. The decrees of Joseph II were directed towards the education and Christianization of the Romany. In this way, the Habsburg monarch was the forerunner of various "solvers of the Romany problem" in the 20th century. The decrees of Maria Theresa and Joseph II became the model for the legislation of other European countries.[22]

During the Second World War, the Romany of the Slovak Republic of the time were not transported to concentration camps, but they were subjected to discrimination: they could not use public transport, they could enter villages only on defined days and hours, and special labour camps were established for the men. After the occupation of Slovakia by the German army in September 1944, there were mass executions of Romany in various places.

After the Second World War, state policy on the Romany was directed towards hidden or open assimilation. An act from 1958 forcible limited the movement of the part of the Romany population (Wallachian Roma), which had travelled until then. Pseudo-scientific

argumentation pointed out that the Romany probably did not form a single ethnic group in their original Indian homeland, their language was only on the level of slang and they do not have their own culture. The conclusion was that they do not have a claim to their own ethnic existence: they could not establish Roman folklore ensembles, sports clubs or magazines. State policy treated them as a socially backward group in the population - state measures were directed towards liquidation of Romany settlements and towards various forms of social support.[23]

Much changed in the life of Romany in Slovakia after 1989. They gained the status of an ethnic minority with state support for the development of culture. Romany magazine and original works by Romany writers began to be published. At Košice the professional Romany theatre Romathan was established, and at the Nitra a university Department of Romany culture. They have founded numerous political parties. However, the transformation of post-communist society mainly brought the Romany high unemployment, marginalization, loss of social certainties and poverty in their settlements. With the feelings of hopelessness and inability to solve their own basic problems, alcoholism and criminality have grown, and relations with the majority population are getting worse.[24]

The different cultural backgrounds and ways of life of the Romany and non-Romany are creating tension between these groups. The differentness of the Romany is perceived negatively by others. A social distance is being created between the Romany and the rest of the population. This is promoting the growth of stereotypes and prejudices on both sides. The view that a large proportion of Romany cannot or do not want to adapt to the social norms norms of the majority, prevails among the majority population. This set of factors is leading to the social exclusion and social isolation of the Romany.[25]

Abroad, discrimination resulting from latent or open racism is perceived as the cause of the unsatisfactory status of the Romany in Slovakia, but in Slovakia the Romany problem is seen mainly as a social problem, and without acceptance of information about the causes and results of marginalization, real segregation and the problems of latent racism.[26]

The Romany represent the second most numerous minority in Slovakia. In the 2001 census, 90,000 people, that is 1.7% of the population of Slovakia, declared Romany nationality. Demographers estimate their number at 380,000. In comparison with the total population, Slovakia, together with Bulgaria and Macedonia, has the largest Romany community in the world with about 8%.[27] The unwillingness of the Romany to declare their ethnicity is attributed to fear of persecution and to the process of social integration of many Romany into the majority community.

The formation of the ethnic identity of the Romany was in the past and is today a complex process, determined by various factors: long-term pressure from the majority community, isolation within the whole society, mutual isolation, mutual prejudices and distance between Romany and non-Romany and between settled and former travelling Romany, lack of consciousness of a common origin, anthropological differences and others. Ethnological research points to the many-layered character of ethno-identification processes. With some simplification, the members of the Romany ethnic group in Slovakia can be classified according to their relationship to their own ethnic origin: 1/ The first group see the possibility of a satisfactory life for themselves and their descendants in maximal appropriation of the way of life of the majority population, and they prefer the route of *assimilation.* Professional, interest, confessional and regional identities are becoming dominant for them. 2/ The second group see the solution to the unsatisfactory position of the Romany in a self-awareness process. They prefer the route of *ethnic identification - romipen.* 3/ The majority of Romany do not see a solution to their social problems in either of the preceding possibilities and have a *passive indifferent* attitude to their ethnicity. 4/ Many descendants of mixed marriages and Romany living for a long time in a Slovak or Hungarian ethnic environment have a *dual ethnic identity.*[28]

Types of ethnicity can be classified on the basis of the social complexity of the actors. *Local level ethnicity* is closely connected with everyday categorization. Its concept building mechanism is based on matching similarities or dissimilarities to examples or prototypes. But similarity matching is always and strongly affected by context, and in this way it is highly situational and temporal, that means, it may easily change across spatial, temporal or political constellations. *Institutional categories,* on the other hand, are used for administrative purposes. Because they do not use prototypes or examples for deciding whether an actual person or group belongs to a given ethnic category or not, it is free of context effects. A person or a group either matches the features listed in the definition, or not. This is one of the reasons why public policy does not deal well with heterogeneity and unstable ethnic boundaries.[29]

For example, Slovakia bound itself to fulfil the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, which also requires official communication and education in the Romany language. Since the majority is not prepared for this situation, it will be necessary to deal with this question very differently with regard for the various levels of ethnic identification of the Romany. At present, large proportion of Romany parents do not want teaching of their children in the Romany language, because they see it as a sign of segregation. In an attempt to free themselves from their backward position, they deliberately do not teach their children the Romany language. In spite of certain generally valid socio-psychological mechanisms, the approach to collective identities must be differentiated and requires thorough knowledge of the historic and cultural context.

Notes

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[4] Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities. London 1983.

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[7] Siegfried Weichlein: Nationalismus als Theorie sozialer Ordnung. In: Thomas Mergel - Thomas Welskopp (Eds.): Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte. München, Beck 1997, p. 171-200.

[8] Christian Geulen: Die Metamorphose der Identität. Zur "Langlebigkeit" des Nationalismus. In: Assmann - Friese: Identitäten (as in note 3), p. 346- 373.

[9] Ibid., p. 373.

[10] Using the example of Masonic lodges, the following clarifies the transition from universal humanist values to an emphasis on national values: - Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann: Die Politik der Geselligkeit. Freimaurerlogen in der deutschen Bürgergesellschaft 1840-1918. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 2000.

[11] Ibid., p. 286.

[12] Bernhard Giesen: Kollektive Identität. Die Intellektuellen und die Nation 2. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1999.

[13] Ibid., p. 331-333.

[14] Richard Reichensperger: The Art of Memory between Paris and Vienna. Maurice Halbwachs, Walter Benjamin, Alfred Schütz and the Vienna Ringstraße. In: Moritz Csáky - Elena Mannová (Eds.): Collective Identities in Central Europe in Modern Times. Bratislava, Academic Electronic Press 1999, p. 23-44, here p. 23.

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[22] Arne B. Mann: Gypsies in Slovakia. In: Tibor Huszár: Cigáni. Gypsies. Bratislava, Gemini 1993, p. 151-153.

[23] Ibid., p. 151.

[24] For more details see Arne B. Mann: Sozialer Wandel bei den Roma in der Slowakei seit 1989. In: Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsforschung (München) 45, 1996, 3, p. 267-281.

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The concept of social identity in social psychology: implications for social exclusion and integration

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Abstract: This paper will provide a brief introduction to Social Identity Theory (SIT), a social psychological theory of intergroup relations that has acquired some prominence over the past two decades. This perspective is seen as complementary to those functionalist accounts in social science which emphasise the importance of group interests as determinants of intergroup behaviour, but as antagonistic to some traditional individualistic models which overemphasise purely cognitive or arousal factors and which tend to ignore contextual factors like group memberships and intergroup relationships. At the heart of SIT is the idea that people derive part of their identity from their membership in key social groups. This means that the fortunes of those groups have the capacity to reflect on individual self evaluations and that, consequently, group members will often be motivated to perceive their groups in a positive light and act in ways that will result in some positive ingroup distinctiveness. The implications of this approach for social exclusion and integration will be sketched out.

Since SIT implies a fundamental motivation to achieve group distinctiveness, it predicts, ceteris paribus, that group members will tend to be biased and discriminatory in their group's favour. Much evidence supports this proposition. Further, effects of real conflicts of interests or of relative deprivation may be stronger for those identifying more strongly with their ingroup. Finally, it is possible to hypothesise that the effects of national identification will be particularly deleterious when that identity is defined in a social comparative rather than a temporal context. Evidence relevant to these ideas will be presented.

SIT also has implications for how social integration between groups can be furthered. Current models of intergroup contact which aim to improve intergroup attitudes and to reduce prejudice are derived in different ways from the SIT account. In essence, these are all concerned with varying category salience in intergroup encounters, particularly for achieving some generalised positive attitude change. Furthermore, models of acculturation, which emphasise the goals of cultural maintenance and intergroup contact in the pursuit of integration, also draw on identity concepts. Evidence from studies of intergroup contact and acculturation of ethnic minorities will be briefly outlined.

*

Slides of PowerPoint presentation:

Some theoretical perspectives in intergroup relations
- Psychological: e.g. 'personality', socio-cognitive models. Prejudice explained via individual personality dynamics or information processing capacities/limitations of cognitive system.
- Functionalist: e.g. 'realistic conflict' perspective. Intergroup behaviour is a functional response to actual or perceived group interests.
- Relative deprivation: animosity (or tolerance) between groups determined by discrepancies between what ingroup has and what it believes it deserves.
- Social identity: intergroup behaviour motivated by desire to see ingroup in a positive light in relation to others.

Social Identity Theory
- Groups provide a source of social identity
- Individuals strive to achieve/maintain a positive identity
- Positive identity is based mainly on favourable intergroup comparisons (the ingroup should be positively distinct from outgroups)
- When social identity is unsatisfactory, people will try either to leave their group or to make it more positively distinct
- Factors which may influence differentiation: identification (internalization of group membership); outgroup comparability (e.g. similarity, proximity); structural instability and illegitimacy

Tajfel & Turner (1986)

Real conflict and national identification affecting attitudes towards foreigners
Brown et al (2001) GPIR, 4, 81-97

Identification moderates relative deprivation
Tropp & Wright (1999) and Zagefka & Brown (2001)

National identification and xenophobia
Mummendey, Klink & Brown (2001) BJSP, 40, 159-172

- Three conditions:
1. *Social frame* ("think how your country is better than others" = Nationalism?);
2. *Temporal frame* ("think how your country is better now than it used to be" = **Patriotism**?);
3. *Control* ("think how your country is good")

- Correlations with national identification:

	Social	Temporal	Control
Ingroup evaluation	+ .58***	+ .50***	+ .42***
Outgroup derogation	+ .44***	+ .05	+ .11

Three developments of Allport's Contact Hypothesis
- Decategorization: reduce salience of available categories to avoid arousal of ingroup favouring biases (Brewer & Miller, 1984)
- Recategorization: subsume available categories into new superordinate category so that former outgroup members come to be seen as ingroup members in the new larger group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000)
- Category salience: retain some level of category salience to allow generalization from individuals to outgroup as a whole (Hewstone & Brown, 1986)

Identity salience moderates effects of contact
Brown, Vivian & Hewstone (1999) EJSP, 29, 741-764

			Generalised Evaluative Ratings Outgroup Targets				
Outgroup Country	Salience in Contact	Eva. Rat. Person	Germans	Spanish	Belgians	Greeks	Z
Germany	Low Salience (n = 196)	Eval. Ratings German person	.38***				Z = 3.89 P < .001
	High Salience (n = 174)	Eval. Ratings German person	.66***				
Spain	Low Salience (n = 170)	Eval. Ratings Spanish person		.64***			Z = .077 (n.s)
	High Salience (n = 138)	Eval. Ratings Spanish person		.69***			
Belgium	Low Salience (n = 101)	Eval. Ratings Belgian person			.46***		Z = 3.41 P < .001
	High Salience (n = 84)	Eval. Ratings Belgian person			.76***		
Greece	Low Salience (n = 109)	Eval. Ratings Greek person				.53***	Z = 2.06 P < .01
	High Salience (n = 96)	Eval. Ratings Greek person				.70***	

Correlation between evaluative rating of the outgroup contact person and generalised evaluative rating of the outgroup as a whole within high and low levels of group membership salience
[Gonzalez & Brown, 2001]

Contact

Is it considered to be of value to have contact with host society members?

'Yes'

'No'

Culture maintenance

Is it considered to be of value to maintain one's cultural identity?

'Yes' ←——————→ 'No'

| Integration | Assimilation |
| Separation | Marginalisation |

Relative Fit: The Interactive Acculturation Model

Host community attitude	Immigrant attitude			
	Integration	**Assimilation**	**Separation**	**Marginalisation**
Integration	consensual	problematic	conflictual	problematic
Assimilation	problematic	consensual	conflictual	problematic
Separation	conflictual	conflictual	conflictual	conflictual
Marginalisation	conflictual	conflictual	conflictual	conflictual

Relative 'fit' between own and perceived other orientations and ingroup bias– host society sample (Germany)
From: Zagefka & Brown (2002) EJSP, 32, 171-188

101

Relative 'fit' between own and perceived other orientations and anti-immigrant attitudes: host society sample in Belgium
Zagefka & Brown, Broquard & Leventoglu-Martin (2002)

Future perspectives for social integration

- Are national/ethnic identities compatible with superordinate identities?
- Are national/ethnic identifications compatible with tolerance?
- Antecedents of acculturation orientations/'fit'?

The pervasiveness of ingroup bias

- A meta-analysis of 42 studies (1960-1990) revealed that, in 103/137 hypothesis tests, ingroup bias was observed; Fisher z = .36, p < 6.9 E-77 (Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992)
- Discrimination can be observed in the most 'minimal' of group settings (Brewer, 1979)
- Linguistic and attributional biases in explanations of social events (Maass, 1999)

Acculturation preferences amongst minority group respondents in Germany
Zagefka & Brown (2002) EJSP, 32, 171-188

	(N = 112)
Integration	73
Assimilation	20
Separation	4
Marginalisation	3

Relative 'fit' between own and perceived other acculturation orientations and ingroup bias – immigrant sample (Germany)
From: Zagefka & Brown (2002) <u>EJSP</u>, 32,171-188

Comments and Perspectives 1

Summary of the main results and identification of research questions

Bart Maddens

Katolieke Universiteit Leuven, BE

The comments and the discussion focused primarily on the distinction between "patriotism" and "nationalism", touched upon by Rupert Brown. This distinction more or less matches the distinction in the theoretical literature between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism. The former defines the nation in terms of a basic contract, accessible to anybody willing to accept the rights and duties involved, and based on humanist and democratic values. The latter defines the nation in terms of descent, race or cultural affiliation, emphasising the notion of cultural homogeneity. Contrary to civic nationalism or patriotism, the own nation is considered as superior. While increasing efforts are being made - as in Rupert Brown's research - to disentangle these two attitudes, the distinction is more and more being questioned in the theoretical literature. Michael Billig, for instance, argues (in *Banal Nationalism*, London, Sage, 1995) that "patriotism" is also a form nationalism, albeit a nationalism that is socially more accepted. Both forms of nationalism involve a similar identity politics of boundary drawing, based on a discursive mechanism of othering, i.e. making a distinction between an out-group and an in-group. This othering mechanism, which is inherent to the nationalist ideology, involves both the drawing of boundaries between the nationals and the non-nationals or foreigners, as the drawing of boundaries within the nation, i.e. between 'good' citizens, who live up to the core values of the nation, and the 'bad' citizens, who do not.

In Elena Mannová's paper it is shown that the construction of the Roma identity was to a large extent a reaction against anti-Roma discrimination. Indeed, in most cases, the construction of a (national) identity appears to involve the contra-identification with an outgroup. It is an interesting and highly relevant matter of dispute in social psychology to what extent ingroup loyalty and out-group aggression are two sides of the same coin, i.e. whether outgroup-hostility is a prerequisite for in-group solidarity. During the discussion it was argued that in-group loyalty does not really require out-group aggression, even though it is significantly enhanced in the presence of an outgroup.

In their research on the relationship between national identity and the attitude towards foreigners, on the basis of the Belgian case, Maddens, Billiet and Beerten (National Identity and the Attitude Towards Foreigners in Multi-National States : the case of Belgium, in : *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol.26, nr.1, 2000) have shown that a more intense identification with the nation does not necessarily imply a more negative attitude attitude towards foreigners. Instead, the relationship appears to be partly dependent upon the context. In Flanders, an intense identification with the region coincides with a negative attitude towards foreigners, while an intense identification with Belgium coincides with a more positive attitude. In Wallonia, a reverse though smaller correlation was found. The relationship in Flanders is probably due to the fact that the Flemish nationalist discourse is predominantly of an ethnic nature, while the Belgian nationalist discourse is more civic and multicultural. Thus, apparently, an intense identification with the Belgian nation does not imply a contra-identification with the non-nationals or foreigners. Yet it can also be argued that the foreigners or immigrants simply do not constitute a relevant outgroup in this case, given that the concept of a Belgian nation is constructed along multicultural lines. Instead, the othering process involves a distinction between the Belgians that support the multicultural ideal and those who do not, and hence constitute the relevant outgroup for the construction of the Belgian national identity.

During the discussion some methodological issues regarding the measurement of (national) identity were raised. It was argued that empirical research should attempt to capture both the ambivalent and multifaceted nature of identities and the way in which social identities are dependent upon the context. Some participants pointed to the limits of traditional survey research in this respect and argued in favour of more experimental and/or qualitative research designs.

Summary of the main results and identification of research questions

Margarita Gomez-Reino
Universidad de Salamanca, ES

Identification of Research Questions

In this session we had the opportunity to read two very different papers about collective identities. They serve to illustrate the range of fields, approaches and perspectives available today within the Social Sciences to study collective identity. Marilynn Brewer developed the concept of social identity from the perspective of cutting-edge work in Social Psychology (SIT). She offered an articulation of crosscutting membership in groups that, in my view, allows us to draw some implications for the potential space for multiple identities in contemporary politics. Elena Mannova, in turn, presented a fascinating research on the Rom minority in Slovakia. Her paper is particularly relevant for those interested in integration and policies to fight discrimination. Her focus is on one 'old' minority--one who is also discriminated in other West European countries. However, most of current research is devoted to new migrant (minorities), and leave aside the older minorities in Europe. Her paper is a good reminder about some neglected questions on collective identities and minority groups in our research area.

My task is to identify research questions in the papers presented to build a common agenda. An over-arching research question emerging from both papers is, I believe, focused on the why (why these minorities and why now). A paralleled question is embedded here: which collective identities? At stake are the definition of collective identity, the identification of multi-layered identities, and the 'content' of identity as the starting point to provide a common ground for basic research.

One of the first issues to be addressed concerns the very minorities under study. Most of the discussion evolves implicitly about new migrant minorities in Europe. However, old minorities and new minorities have to be inserted in our analysis, and they are often times inextricably linked. To illustrate this, an excellent example for contemporary European politics can serve the purpose. Last year the Report of the Wise Men—a Committee appointed by the European Commission—to look into the Austrian FPÖ's policies, established the party complied with Austrian legislation and international norms on minorities. More important, most of the report was not dedicated to look at how the party was dealing with the new (migrant) minorities in Austria, but rather, how the 'old' minorities were protected under the constitutional system. The question of old and new minorities is also relevant because both papers identified areas of flexibility, novelty and change. Mannova's paper developed the framework of constructed or invented categories, now familiar to all of us. The content of identity from this perspective must be integrated with the history of the old minorities. Brewers' paper introduced the European identity as a new layer in our reconstruction. Thus, it involves theoretical, empirical and normative aspects. A common research agenda has to take into consideration the existing surveys and data bases that can and will allows us in the future to address the question of collective identity (in the format of the old and new minorities) and multiple identities (e.g. the so-called Moreno question) that allows us to compare the strength of different multiple identities.

Conceptually, the problem of old and new minorities can be also illustrated with the classical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms in Europe. The predictions that we can make along these two trajectories are very marginal and also, wrong. To illustrate this, the example of current nationalist parties in the Basque country and Catalonia can serve as a guide. Traditionally, Basque nationalism was labelled 'ethnic', while Catalan nationalism was associated with 'civicness'. However, over the past two years and in relation with the presence of new migrants in the region, Catalan politicians have appeared in the media as exponents of xenophobic sentiments against migrants. To my knowledge, this is not the case for Basque politicians. In Europe comparative research should pay attention and explore comparisons between Northern and Southern Europe and West and Eastern Europe. There is much to do if we want to expand our knowledge of collective identities as this workshop aims to do.

Finally, although Mannova and Brewer dealt with the question of institutions and policies, I did not have the time here to comment on this crucial aspect. The role of institutions in identity formation and the ways in which institutional actors and arenas shape collective identities deserves to be one of the central research questions for us in the future.

SESSION 3: COLLECTIVE ACTION

Introduction

Hanspeter Kriesi

Let me start by reminding us of the central goal of our Workshop: we are here to formulate research questions. We should try "to think the unthinkable" and to formulate a perspective for future research, which is not restricted by traditional disciplinary boundaries. We have this morning a political scientist and a social psychologist who will give their perspectives on the role of collective action in the contemporary European society. In introducing the theme of "collective action" in a world of opening national boundaries, let me – as a political sociologist – make a few suggestions and pose a number of questions for our discussion of this morning – suggestions and questions which may not be directly related to the presentations of our two speakers, but which may serve as an additional input for the subsequent debate.

The general question to start out with: How is the theme of "collective action" related to the opening up of national borders?

First of all, I would like to suggest that the opening up of national borders creates new *structural and cultural potentials for collective action at the national and the supranational level*. In the tradition of Stein Rokkan, we can view the opening up of national boundaries as a critical juncture in the modern history, which creates a new fundamental cleavage in the national political systems – between new groups of *winners* (those who benefit from the opening up of the boundaries) and *losers* (those who were protected by the boundaries in the past). As far as I can see, there are at least three distinct processes contributing to the creation of the new cleavage:
- the global economic deregulation process, which increases both the opportunities for competitive social groups, and the competitive pressure on social groups which had so far been protected by national boundaries;
- the immigration process, which increases the cultural and ethnic competition in West European societies and not only decreases what Russell Hardin has called the "epistemological comforts of home", but also increases the competition for scarce resources between culturally different groups – especially for the less privileged groups in Western Europe.
- The political process of European integration, which restricts the political leverage at the national level and is felt as a loss for all those who strongly identify with the national political community and have been protected by it in the past.

While these processes create opportunities for cosmopolitan, highly educated, resource-rich social groups, they pose a series of threats for all those who have traditionally been protected by the nation-state and who hold little resources to participate in the more competitive world that results from these processes.
Second: How important are these potentials for contemporary and future collective action in Europe? I would like to suggest that these structural potentials are already structuring collective action at the national level in Western Europe in a decisive way and that they provide the *crucial battleground for collective action* at that level for years to come. We already have some ideas about the way these potentials will be articulated: While the established political parties and interest groups tend to defend the causes of the winners of the opening up of new borders, the mobilization of the losers has so far mainly been taken up by peripheral (but growing) political actors – parties, interest groups and social movements, with the *national-populist new right* so far having had the greatest success in mobilizing the losers in a number of countries: Le Pen, Haider, Berlusconi, Bossi, Blocher, Vlaamse Blok, Pim Fortuyn, Ms. Kjaersgaard, to name but a few of these figures. As a result, I would submit to you that we witness an ethnicisation of national politics, which implies that, as they are about to wither away, the national boundaries become once again crucial issues in European politics.

Third, I would like to suggest that this process is *heavily conditioned by national characteristics* such as the remaining degree of salience of the traditional national cleavage structure, the national level of economic development, the national cultural heritage, the national political institutions. Just to take up the example of citizenship: the opening up of borders posits a general challenge for the traditional models of citizenship – it implies a decoupling of its basic components – rights and obligations. Different models of citizenship – the ethnic model, the models of civic republicanism and of civic pluralism – have crucial implications for how each country will deal with the problem of cultural diversity and immigration. The question is how they are able to cope with the common problem and to what extent they will condition collective political action in the different countries.

Fourth, I would like to suggest that the national-level consequences are still the most important ones for our theme of collective action, because such action still is and will remain mainly structured by national-level politics for some time to come. But I would hasten to add that this is by no means the only level to take into consideration for the future study of collective action. The emerging supra- and transnational political space increasingly gives rise to supra- or transnational political mobilization. The battles of Seattle, Goetheborg or Genova, and the by now yearly conferences at Porto Alegre remind us that a global protest movement is underway, which is no longer defending losers on the basis of exclusionary norms (as is the case of the national-populist movements), but on the basis of an appeal to universalistic norms. This global movement mobilizes in the name of supranational institutions and norms, i.e. in the name of "positive integration" on a supranational level. What is also striking and should be taken into account by future studies of collective action is that these supranational and universal norms, in turn, provide leverage for collective action on the national level – as is, for example, illustrated by the mobilization for equal rights of the women's movement all over the world.

Fifth, I would like to suggest that the Europeanization process in particular poses a particular challenge to the way we ought to think about collective action. The emerging multi-level system of European governance provides an entirely new context of opportunities and constraints for collective action. The larger question raised by this process is to what extent it merely leads to political fragmentation and a loss of control over our collective destinies, or whether we are witnessing a reconstitution of collective identities, solidarities and capacities to act on other territorial and social levels than the nation-states.

Sixth and finally, this question is linked to the still larger question of the preconditions for the democratization of the supra-national level? How can the hollowing out of democracy be prevented, which is currently taking place by the transfer of political competencies from the (democratic) national level to the (undemocratic) supra-national level? Many German commentators (Fritz Scharpf, Manfred Schmidt, Claus Offe) argue that in order to create a democratic European state, we first need a European demos, i.e. a collective European identity. The dissenting argument (Klaus Armingeon, Dieter Fuchs, Jürgen Gerhards) maintains that the existence of common democratic political institutions and of a shared European public space constitute a precondition for the creation of a collective European identity.

The End of Politics? Political Engagement in a depoliticising World

Professor Jan van Deth
Universität Mannheim, DE

Abstract: Politics appears to be an industry in decline in many countries. Even if we do not accept the myth of widespread political activism in the 1960s, it is clear that political engagement lost much of its specific appeal. Apparently, citizens are less willing to be involved in public and political affairs on a formal basis. Political institutions and authorities experience a rapid shrinkage of their dominant positions in the last few decades. These processes are intensified by the disappearance of national borders in Europe – and this waning of the national state deprives politics from its traditional and 'natural' object, base, and arena. Politics, then, seems to have lost much of its relevance and saliency.

Available explanations and interpretations for these developments can be broadly distinguished into two categories: (i) changes in political institutions and processes, and (ii) societal changes in the positions and attitudes of citizens. The first category mainly consists of refences to divergent historical developments like the end of the Cold War and the accompanying termination of ideological conflicts, the institutionalization and broad acceptance of welfare-state provisions and representative democracy, the personalization of political campaigns, the move of political competences to Brussels, or the rise of global challenges like pollution or bio-medical technologies. Politics – that is, particularly national politics – seems to have lost its ideological roots and is gradually transformed from ideologically based social conflicts into disputes among experts. Besides, growing international interdependencies imply decreasing national capabilities. Depoliticisation characterizes the development of political institutions and processes, and politics has become 'background noise' or 'elevator music' in which citizens "are not much interested [...] as long as it stays as unobtrusive as possible" (Glassman).

At the heart of the discussions about changes in the positions and attitudes of citizens is the idea that societal processes (especially 'modernization') have made citizens less dependent of collective regulations and the defence of shared interests. More autonomous and resourceful citizens will be more inclined to lean on their own capacities and resources to deal with the problems and opportunities of everyday life. Politics – as basically a collective affair with public outcomes – becomes less salient for shaping one's own life and lost its role as the continuation of the class struggle with other means. That is not to say, however, that politics becomes less important in absolute terms; what it means is that *in comparison* with other activities and opportunities available, political engagement becomes less significant for citizens. Consequently, political debates and conflicts are characterized by high fluctuations in term of issues and participants.

[No written paper was submitte.]

Identity and Collective Action

Bernd Simon
University of Kiel, DE

Abstract: In the first part of my presentation, I will discuss the role of collective identity as a social psychological mediator in collective action. The main argument is as follows: While collective identity itself is reflective of cleavages and opportunities in the (macro-level) social structure, it facilitates consensus mobilization so that (macro-level) frictions and contradictions are translated into (micro-level) psychological experiences of common undesirable fate involving shared grievances, injustices and common enemies. Similarly, (macro-level) opportunities are translated into (micro-level) psychological experiences of collective strength and hope. Strengthened by this awareness of common fate and collective strength, collective identity then facilitates action mobilization so that, by way of participation in collective action, people can act on the (macro-level) social structure and may eventually change it. In turn, the underlying collective identity is likely to be strengthened in the process of participation due to an increase in the cognitive salience of this identity and/or increased feelings of agency and empowerment. The strengthened collective identity then again promotes subsequent participation in collective action. This role of collective identity, especially with regard to action mobilization, will be illustrated with evidence from a research project conducted within the context of several new social movements, such as the older people's movement, the gay movement and the fat acceptance movement. I will further argue that and discuss how, in addition to being anchored in the (macro-level) social structure of intergroup relations, collective identity is also critically shaped in the immediate (meso-level) interaction situation.

Looking forward, I will then explore possible relationships between the collective identity of members of minority groups and their participation in collective action, on the one hand, and their integration into (i.e., identification with and participation in) the wider community (e.g. the nation-state), on the other hand. More specifically, I will examine the role of respect in integration processes and also develop the argument that a politicization of the collective identity of members of groups that feel disrespected in the wider community may actually promote their integration into this community.

Slides of PowerPoint presentation:

Macro Level of Analysis

Frictions and contradictions in society
(e.g., asymmetries in wealth, status, power)

Opportunity structures for collective action
(e.g., mass communication, alliances, transportation)

Meso Level of Analysis

Collective identity

action mobilization

Micro Level of Analysis

consensus mobilization

psychological experiences of common fate (shared grievances, injustices and common enemies) and collective strength (hope)

Collective Identity and Social Movement Participation

Social Movement Research
Klandermans, 1997

self as rational egoist

What are the costs, what are the benefits of participation?

Social Identity / Self-Categorization Theory
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987

self as group member

"If I identify with the group/movement, I engage in group-serving collective action."

116

Calculation Processes
(Klandermans, 1997)

➡ Collective incentives
   value of collective goals
   x expectation that goals will be reached

➡ Normative incentives
   reaction of significant others (normative beliefs)
   x personal importance of significant others (motivation to comply)

➡ Reward incentives
   value of possible gains and losses
   x likelihood of gains and losses

Identification Processes
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987)

➡ Identification with Recruitment Category

➡ Identification with Social Movement (Organization)

Regression analysis with willingness to participate as criterion (Grey Panthers)

	Identification with old people	Identification with Grey Panthers	Reward incentives	Normative incentives	Collective incentives
beta	.02	.24	.47	.14	.20
t	0.23	2.44*	5.30***	1.73(*)	3.05**

$^{(*)} p \leq .10$ $*p \leq .05$ $**p \leq .01$

$R^2 = .70$, $F(5,81) = 37.29$, $p < .001$

Multiple regression analysis with participation in collective protest reported one year after measurement of predictors

	Identification with gay men	Identification with SVD	Reward incentives	Normative incentives	Collective incentives
beta	.02	.18	.01	.23	.04
t	0.27	2.33*	0.10	2.87**	0.49

$*p \leq .05$ $**p \leq .01$

$R^2 = .13$, $F(5,193) = 5.87$, $p < .001$

a Standardized regression coefficients from multiple regression analysis

* p ≤ .05   *** p < .001

Collective identification

Collective identification

| | disrespectful | respectful |
| 2.59 | 3.54 |

Intragroup Treatment

Willingness to engage in group-serving behaviour

| disrespectful | respectful |
| 2.88 | 4.07 |

Intragroup Treatment

collective identification

.23**

.47 ***

perceived respectful intragroup treatment

.11

willingness to engage in group-serving behaviour

** p ≤ .01   *** p < .001

[a] standardized regression coefficients from multiple regression analysis controlling for the collective, normative and reward incentives, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

civic participation

volunteerism

organizational participation

collective protest

Integration through participation

organizational identity

Integration through participation

actors with PCI

opponents

Third Party
e.g., General Public

PCI*

Ingroup — Outgroup

Involvement of Society
by Triangulation

Adversarial Attribution

Awareness of Shared Grievances

*Politicized
Collective
Identity

123

<p style="text-align:center">Comments and Perspectives:</p>

Summary of the main results and identification of research questions

Dieter Rucht

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As discussants, we are expected to deliver a „Summary of the main results and identification of research questions" in the context of a scientific forward look. I will try to stick closely to this task, skipping in these written comments my oral reactions to the very stimulating oral presentations by my colleagues Jan van Deth (The End of Politics? Political engagement in a depoliticising world) and Bernd Simon (Identity and Collective Action).

Any meaningful attempt to suggest directions for future research in a given area should be preceded by a discussion of the weaknesses (and strengths!) in the past and present. Let me concentrate on the weaknesses by laying out some of the basic problems in the field of collective action. For each of these, I will offer some hints on how these problems could be reduced by re-orienting our concepts, foci of attention, and/or research designs.

1. The fuzziness of the subject of research

Unlike governments, firms, political parties, and the like, collective action is a fuzzy phenomenon with unclear boundaries. Nevertheless, some characteristics of collective action can be discerned so that at least some of its general contours may become visible. Let me start by pointing to an even broader phenomenon, namely collective *behaviour*. Collective behaviour is a relatively old and still widely used term which includes more specific subjects such as panics, fads, and social movements. Collective behaviour may occur without co-ordination – and sometimes even without intention - among the individuals or groups under consideration. Consider the example of a crowd waiting at the bus stop and staring into the same direction. Consider also a great number of people who follow a vague consumer trend.

Contrary to "behaviour", the term "action" implies purposive and conscious activity. In the case of *collective* action, the people involved have, or at least believe to have, a common goal which they try to reach by co-ordinating their efforts. Therefore, I suggest to reserve the notion of collective action only for self-regulated, co-ordinated and voluntary action of a number of individuals or groups. Hence, group action that rests exclusively on coercion would be excluded.

Today's social scientists, even when sticking to the term collective behaviour (consider also the sections on "Collective Behaviour and Social Movements" within both the American and the International Sociological Associations), usually focus on collective *action* and, more specifically, on phenomena such as revolutions, social movements, contentious gatherings, and the like. This is mainly the result of a paradigmatic shift. Whereas in the past, and most clearly in mass psychology around the turn to the 20th century, collective action was perceived to be basically unstructured and irrational, most forms that are subsumed under the label of "collective behaviour" are now seen as fairly structured, or even organized, and guided (at least partly) by rational calculus. Although this perspective was to be found in the 19th century already, only by the 1960s and 1970s it became condensed in a specific approach called "resource mobilisation theory". Because this approach tended to overemphasise the "organised" nature of many forms of collective action and, more particularly, social movements, more recently there was a move from the actions' "hardware" to their "software", i.e. from organisations, resources, leaders, etc. to culture, symbols, frames, and discourse. Moreover, one could observe another shift of attention. While the resource mobilisation approach tended to focus on collective actors and their internal conditions, more recent approaches stress the external conditions, including other social groups, that heavily

influence the aims, strategies, and impacts of the collective actor under consideration. This shift can be seen as an extension of the symbolic interactionism which now tends to be applied also to levels beyond the social micro cosmos.

While these recent developments can be seen as healthy reactions to the limitations of earlier concepts and theories, the field of collective action is still ridden by a number of disagreements and gaps of knowledge. Let me briefly discuss a few of these:

2. Choosing adequate units of analyses

Probably related to the fuzziness of the subject of study is the danger to reify the units of analysis. So, for the sake of convenience, researchers often tend to treat single events of collective action, or particular sets of actors, as distinct subjects that can be seen, and understood, in isolation from each other and detached from their historical context. Yet, can we assume that there exists, for example, a social unit called "French feminist movement" once we acknowledge, first, complex horizontal overlaps with other groups and movements, and even state administrations, and, second, vertical overlaps with what could be called a transnational women's movement? In a similar vein, can we study in a meaningful way a single collective act, say an incident of creative protest, without considering that it may be part of a broader campaign, an adoption from another kind of struggle, and/or a reaction to previous positive or negative experiences of the same group of actors?

What follows from this is to select the units of analysis in a more careful, more tentative, and probably more flexible way. These units always should be seen as part of a wider social, spatial and temporal environment. The risk, of course, is that we enlarge our field under investigation more and more because, as a saying goes, "everything is related to everything". The limiting criterion, however, would be a clear-cut research question (see below) and a corresponding research design. Only those aspects come under scrutiny that can be linked to the research question. Other aspects, however interesting they may appear, have to be ignored.

To provide an example: When it comes to study the dynamics of protest and, more specifically, the interactions between opponents, we can choose a single and short-lived event, a protest campaign as a sequence of interrelated events lasting weeks, months or years, or a protest movement as an interrelated and enduring set of campaigns that may span over decades. Each of these units is worth to be studied. However, if obliged to select, I would opt for the campaign as the most promising unit of analysis because it can be connected to both its smaller components and its wider context.

3. The clash of basic theoretical paradigms

As an expression of a deeper divide within the social sciences, also the field of collective behaviour is marked by an ongoing confrontation between incompatible paradigms, i.e. methodological individualism on the one hand and, on the other, theories considering social phenomena as emergent entities. Contrary to the latter, the methodological individualism contends that collective action is nothing else than an aggregate of individual action.

In my view, it is pointless to juxtapose these paradigms as if these were matters of confession. Rather, we should engage in a search for common ground - without ignoring differences and incompatibilities.

Again an example: Rational choice theorists who typically adhere to the tradition of methodological individualism gradually take into account that cost-benefit considerations often occur in situations of incomplete or even wrong information ("bounded rationality"). Also, they learn that (individual?) choices may be discussed and evaluated in a group context. Further, these theorists tend to broaden their notion of benefits by including, for example, social incentives (the attraction of group solidarity) and moral incentives (acting in accordance with moral convictions). On the other side, collective action students rooted in the genuine sociological tradition tend to acknowledge that in many situations, even those of apparently spontaneous nature, elements of (individual) rationality come into play, particularly when it

becomes obvious that almost all groups are based on hierarchies, be they formal or informal. The extent to which individuals and groups make rational choices then is a matter of empirical investigation instead of a prior assumption. Similarly, the existence and relevance of individual versus collective action becomes a matter of empirical research which has to take seriously both levels of action – the individual and the group.

4. Structure versus Agency?

As in many other fields of social sciences, some scholars studying collective action focus on structural aspects while others emphasize agency. Though it is fully legitimate to concentrate on one or the other aspect, it is problematic to ground such preferences in pre-existing basic beliefs about the "freedom of the individual" or, to the contrary, the "determining power of structure".

Again, the degree of agency or structural determination is a matter of empirical variation and therefore has to be studied in empirical research that should link aspects of structure and agency. Fortunately, there are attempts to bridge this divide, as exemplified by a programmatic book title "From structure to action" (Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1988), or, on the level of general theorizing, by Anthony Giddens' concept of the "duality of structure". The latter not only discusses how sequences of action gradually crystallise in structure but also how existing structures both limit and enable action. It is along these lines of thinking and theorizing that future research in the field of collective action should build upon.

5. The need for interpretative and explanatory approaches

Regrettably, the field of collective action is still dominated by descriptive accounts which offer a wealth of information but tend to neglect the – more difficult - tasks of providing explanation and interpretation. The challenge in this field is not to produce rich and thick description, though this may be sometimes a necessary step to reach more ambitious goals. The real challenge, in my view, is to provide adequate interpretation and, at least in retrospect, sound explanation of collective behaviour. It would be wrong to assume that even modest empirical description could be done without an underlying question and – however naïve – underlying theories, let alone without concepts that allow us to identify and delineate certain aspects of reality.

From that it follows that theoretical reflection and empirical investigation have to be closely linked. As C. Wright Mills rightly stated, theory without empirical investigation is empty, while empirical investigation without theory is blind. Regarding the field of collective action, this would imply to work in a more continuous and cumulative way on theoretical questions that guide empirical investigation. In my view, still many of the classics in this field can teach us a lot. Therefore, they are far from being outdated - contrary to what is suggested by the flourishing of fancy concepts such as political opportunity structure, resource mobilisation, and frame analysis.

Again, let me provide an example: In the study of social movements, still a tendency prevails to view social movements engaged in a bi-lateral conflict (with the state, a counter-movement, etc.). Instead, we should recognise that always (!) third parties (bystander publics, mass media, mediators, police forces, etc.) are involved in such conflicts. If so, we should take into account that multi-lateral conflicts follow a different logic than bi-lateral conflicts, as Georg Simmel, in his essay on the role of third parties, has emphasised already the early 20th century

6. Overcoming segmentation

The field of collective action is characterised by a long and ongoing trend towards segmentation and over-specialisation. Many scholars concentrate on phenomena such as terrorism, revolution, feminist movements, etc. without becoming aware that, in spite of all differences, these subjects may have something in common – as the very concept of collective action suggests. They ignore that they might draw on the same basic concepts, and

they miss the chance to learn from each other. Moreover, scholars tend to specialize on particular methods, such as survey research, protest event analyses, in depth interviews or organizations studies without fully realizing that different methods may well complement each other, or triangulation could help to test the validity of research findings.

What would be needed, then, is a closer co-operation among scholars studying the same or closely related subjects, coming from different disciplinary backgrounds, and/or preferring different methods. This is not to be misunderstood as a voluntaristic call to talking to each other in workshops and conferences. Such meetings can be nothing more than a starting point. Ultimately, we need *institutionalized* co-operation within the framework of common projects, and even networks of projects. In my view, these endeavours should not depart from the demarcation of a field of study (similar to a geographical territory to be explored by a group of tourists). Rather, it should commence with a clear research question which then can be pursued by different disciplines, from different angles and by different methods. Moreover, the same question may well be investigated vastly different empirical settings.

Let me provide just one example of a scientifically and politically relevant research question: Under which conditions do conflicts among social groups tend to escalate? I imagine that answering such a seemingly simple question (which, of course, requires further specification), we would need a co-ordinated effort of a group of scholars from different background and with different competencies. Therefore, I suggest not to discuss general preferences in terms of theory, methods, and the like. Rather, one should single out a limited number of questions that deem important to a heterogeneous group of scholars such as they are represented here. Once the research question is fixed, the rest does not follow automatically. But what follows should be guided by the respect for experience, competence and, above all, the power of the better argument.

SESSION 4: INTEGRATION

Introduction

Jaak Billiet

This morning session is on "integration". Over the past days, "integration" has already been mentioned several times as an important issue in the context of diversity, collective identities, and collective action. Without claiming to be exhaustive, I will draw your attention to aspects that were already touched upon.

1. During Charles Westins short summary, a distinction was made between integration as a *theoretical* concept and integration as a *policy* concept. At several occasions, the theoretical concept came into the discussion when reference was made to *system* or *systemic* integration, and to *cultural,* or *normative* integration or social cohesion. However, most of the time integration was discussed in *policy* terms. Charles Westin directly linked "integration" to "unemployment rates and other indicators". This is integration in the sense of social, economic, and political *'participation'* of individual members of social groups. As a policy concept 'integration' has often been understood in that sense. The central idea is that integration is realised when a *'certain'* (how many?) proportion of the members of the minority groups to which the policy is oriented, participate/take part in political elections, schooling, economic activities, etc… Bernd Simon also mentioned this aspect where he related it to *group identification:* are groups with a firm in-group identification more ready to integrate into society as a whole? This is certainly one of the questions that needs further consideration.

2. The idea of integration, understood as individual participation, directly leads to some other distinctions that are made during discussions in previous sessions.
a) Integration at the *individual* level (of individual) versus integration at the *society level*. Several aspects can be discussed under this heading (individuals versus society level). The opportunities for 'individual participation' can be established at the society level (in the legal and political system), but this is no an automatic guarantee for factual participation and social equality. There may be 'hidden' opportunities that are more effective than the formal institutionalised rules.
b) Thinking about the society level, and at the same time somewhat more theoretically, the problem of *internal* versus *external* pluralism was mentioned; or in other terms *horizontal* versus *vertical* (or *segmented*) pluralism. External pluralism refers to the classical Dutch and Belgian systems of pillars (or compartments), as was mentioned by Han Entzinger in his statement about the institutionalisation of multiculturalism. In pillarised societies, social (and political activities) are organised around the relevant cleavages; each group has its own schools, hospitals, sport clubs…, and a political party, there are no contacts between the members, there is a strong groups identity, but … cooperation at the level of the political and societal leaders. This was a stable integrated system with stable and exclusive relations between the electoral channel (political parties) and the organisational channel (civil society). In the discussions, it was not always taken for granted that *internal* (horizontal) pluralism, were people of difference ethnic religion groups participate in common 'neutral' organisations without collective identity, is always the most effective base for individual social, cultural, political, and economic participation. Recent research of Fennena & Tilly (Amsterdam, IMES) that was inspired by the Putnam thesis, suggests that the more ethic minority groups are characterised by participation in their own organisations, the more they participate in politics. But others who do not find this relationship in another context have rejected this thesis. Therefore, we must ask "*under what conditions does vertical or external pluralism lead to more integration for the individuals or to more cohesion of society*". We know for example that the Belgian Pillarised system was functional for solving political conflicts because of the *crosscutting* character of the cleavages. The individuals always were attached to different crosscutting identities.

3. Finally 'integration' came into our discussions in the context of a typology of complete *assimilation* versus *exclusion* or separation. This is a hot political issue in many countries, and it has lead to heavy and cruel conflicts in several places, even in Europe in recent history. In Rinus Penninx' paper a more elaborated typology is based on three dimensions.

Rinus Penninx is professor at the University of Amsterdam and director of the well know *Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies* (IMES). He is an anthropologist but he considers himself actually more a 'social scientist' because of the multi disciplinary character of his institute. IMES carried out numerous interesting studies on several aspects of migration. Apart from the theoretical and more fundamental studies, Rinus Penninx is often asked to act as advisor for problems of integration at both the state and the communal level.

Our second speaker is *Miles Hewstone*, professor at the *Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford* (New College). Miles Hewstone is a social psychologist and he is also an immigrant of the last type of Rinus Penninx, since he lived for years in Belgium, near Brussels. The presentation of Miles "*Facing the challenges of integration*" deals with inter-group contacts. It consists of two parts. The first part tells us what we know from past research about the effects of inter-group contacts; the second part deals with the kind of research we have to do in order to solve a number of open questions.

Andreas Wimmer is our discussant. He is professor at the *Centre for development Research* in Bonn, and he is a social anthropologist. As director of an interdisciplinary research centre, he is familiar with several disciplines that are relevant for the problems we have discussed. In a few months Andreas Winner will move to the USA since is appointed as a professor in UCLA. We are eager   to   hear   his   reflections   on   the   two   papers.

States, Cities and Immigrants: Principles and Practice of Integration Policies in Europe

Rinus Penninx
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL[i]

Abstract

I.   In the first part the paper some observations are made on processes of globalisation, on big cities as focus points of this phenomenon. Paradoxically, these metropoles are at the same time global and local. Having become globalised these cities share similar experiences and a certain convergence may be supposed; at the same time each of them continues to be specific, and each of them deals with the new phenomena of globalisation in ways that are shaped by the heritage of the local and national past.

International migration and the strong presence of immigrant newcomers have evoked policies from local, national and European governments. Over the last four decades there have been considerable shifts between these levels. In general, the national level has lost prominence and influence both to the local level of large cities and to the EU-level. Furthermore there is a growing tension between (im)migration policies on the one hand and integration policies on the other.

II.   In order to compare more specifically the integration policies and approaches in Europe it is proposed to start from a simple analytical framework that centers around the concept of 'citizenship'. Three basic dimensions are distinguished in this concept:
   a)   the juridical/political dimension;
   b)   the socio-economic dimension;
   c)   the cultural/religious dimension.

III.   These dimensions of citizenship can be reformulated for the purpose of analysis of policies of national and local governments as `spheres of integration' and used as yardsticks to typologise the kind and partiality of integration policies.

The most commonly acknowledged forms of policies pertain to the socio-economic dimension: legally residing immigrants; policies relating the juridical/political dimension diverge substantially and are related to basic ideas about membership of a political community. The cultural/religious dimension is the most contested: multicultural policies are rather uncommon in Europe, and the policies that go under this banner is often based on traditions of diversity that existed already before the present immigrants came.

IV.   In the last part of the paper a number of principles are formulated for integration policies in cities. Here the typology of II comes back, but the recommendations are normative rather than analytical. Observations are added relating to the level on which the integration process can be analysed and influenced.

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[i]. International Metropolis is global network of research, governmental and NGO-partners that acts as a forum for discussion on ways of improving policies and programmes for effectively magaging the impact of immigration and diversity in large cities. Rinus Penninx is the European co-chair of Metropolis. He is also one of the co-ordinators of a UNESCO-sponsored international research programme called `*Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC)'*. This contribution draws and builds on work done in these contexts. Penninx is also director of the Research Programme of the IMES at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. For further information consult the website of Metropolis (http://www.international.metropolis.net), UNESCO (http:\\www.unesco.org) and IMES ((http://www.pscw.uva.nl/imes/).

1. Introduction: stating the problem
Globalisation and internationalisation have manifested strongly in the postwar era in a number of areas. The financial world was one of the first to emancipate from national borders and authorities and to go worldwide. Following the free movement of capital, economic activities and products are now also much less restricted by national boundaries than they used to be. The development of technology in information, communication and transport has evidently contributed to this new economic and financial world order. And in its wake it has assisted internationalisation in cultural and political matters. The coming into existence of the European Union is a manifestation of the latter.

This globalisation in all those domains has had two specific consequences. The first was the movement of human beings: a growing number of people linked to the internationalisation have moved and still move across borders. There is a substantial migration *directly linked* to globalisation through multinational companies and international organisations. In general one might say that the labour market of the highly skilled has become increasingly international. This specific kind of migration - which often is temporary - is generally not seen as problematic, although it contributes clearly to growing diversity.

However, these are not the only people who move. A far greater number of people move as an *indirect* consequence of globalisation: the uneven distribution of wealth and work globally, political instability in certain regions, uneven demographic growth and environmental degradation are the root causes that make for increased migration pressure. The increased reach of communication and transport, the higher density of networks globally and thus the increase of intermediary structures that facilitate migration, are then conditioning factors that have significantly contributed to the growth of immigration of workers and refugees and their family members. Until 1974 their arrival was welcomed and even stimulated by recruitment because of the demand for their labour, but after the restructuring of European economy in the 1970s and 1980s they kept coming unasked for. Migration to Europe became increasingly supply-driven. It is particularly this category of newcomers that is perceived as problematic in the eyes of the societies of settlement.

All these newcomers tend – more than this used to be in the past - to concentrate heavily in a few, but large urban areas during recent decades. This is the case, both in the classical immigration countries, like the USA, Canada and Australia, and in Europe. In the Netherlands e.g. more than 60 % of all immigrants live in the Western conurbation. They have become the directly visible face of globalisation and have rapidly changed the composition of the population of these cities. In Amsterdam for example, immigrants and their descendants form more than 42 % of the total population; in primary schools in Amsterdam more than half of the pupils are of non-Dutch origin. And such changes took place within a relatively short period of time.

To complicate things we note that not only the intensity of migration and its dominant direction to big cities changed, but also the form that migration often takes differs from the ones that we are used to. Scientists talk about transnational communities and transnational migrants, indicating those forms of migration in which migrants are not only embedded in the national or local society of settlement, but retain strong and intensive bonds across borders. This may lead to new forms of incorporation of immigrants. It surely has consequences for the kind of integration policies that national and local authorities implement[iii].

A second consequence of globalisation that is relevant for our discussion is the shift in political structures and responsibilities. On the one hand the national states have lost much of their former

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[iii]. For a recent overview of this literature see the special issue of *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 22 (1999) 2, particularly the introduction and conclusion by Portes et al. See also Van Amersfoort 2001.

autonomy to external forces. Their influence on financial markets, on economic processes and especially on developments in employment opportunities clearly diminished. The gradual emergence of larger political units, such as the European Union, further restricts autonomous policies of nations. On the other hand large cities, where internationalisation manifests itself most clearly, have to devise and implement policies that are geared to these new circumstances, and thus confront these same national states with claims to decentralise policies to lower levels. The new distribution of tasks and responsibilities between these layers of government is increasingly complex and give rise to tensions. In our field for example, migration and admission policies are mainly national and European Union policies, but the concrete consequences have to be dealt with by local governments, particularly large cities that are attraction poles of immigrants (see: Doomernik et al. 1997).

What does all this mean in practice for large cities? First of all, these cities are confronted with great and fast changes. General changes as a consequence of globalisation that create new diversity within the settled, native population; and at the same time specific changes embodied in the arrival of large numbers of newcomers that contribute to more diversity. Let me be clear about the message I want to convey: I do not suggest that there was homogeneity and uniformity before: most larger cities always had diversity of all kinds that they had to cope with, such as class divisions and religious, cultural and language minorities. Particularly in larger cities heterogeneity has in general been the rule and thus the often-made distinction between the 'native culture' and that of newcomers is illusionary, and false. The difference is that what I would call 'the old diversity' has been accommodated more or less and is reflected in political structures and processes of decision making: 'we are used to it'. The crucial question for cities seems to be whether they are able to accommodate the new diversity, both the general and the specific one. How to create and enhance unity, loyalty and social cohesion? How to rearrange structures and institutions within these cities in such a way that they are able to reflect the new composition of the population and its diversity. How to enable and stimulate newcomers to find a fair and accepted place and participate in the new social and political environment and thereby develop their loyalty to it and contribute to it. How to find a new balance of a political community that shares basic values and rules that are necessary for any political unity to survive, while at the same time taking into account and respecting diversity and reap the potential fruits of this diversity.

Cities and municipalities do have a special responsibility here, apart from that of national authorities. I remind here that the word citizen is derived from 'city'; the local political community of the city is from the point of view of the individual the place where the important things happen that affect his life, his position and his future.

The basic paradox of the present situation seems to be that we try to handle the migration phenomenon that is rooted in global developments in a framework that is still essentially based on the nation-state premises that has divided the world into separate political communities and territories, in which migration is an anomaly, as Zolberg stated once.

In this contribution I will demonstrate that paradox particularly for the European case. First I will briefly look back at European migration policies as a general context. Secondly I will turn to integration policies of European countries. And thirdly, I will address the need for changes in these policies and the principles upon which these could be based.

2. European immigration policies in comparative perspective

When it comes to immigration in Europe we observe first of all that immigration takes place in all European countries nowadays, notwithstanding the fact that most of these countries deliberately do not call themselves immigration countries. Some of the West European countries even have higher immigration figures than classical immigration countries, measured simply by the percentage of foreign born within the total population. For example, Switzerland and the FRG have higher percentages than the United States of America.

So the *facts* of immigration are to a greater or lesser extent the same in these countries, but *perception* is *not*. Classical immigration countries like the US and Canada have a history in which immigration is a crucial element and they are aware of that. There is a basic acceptance of immigration and an elaborate institutional setting to handle it. Of course, immigration is discussed continuously there too, and it changes over time, but still... The common feature of Europe, on the contrary, is one of a basic non-acceptance of immigration. Admittedly, there are variations in non-acceptance: the Netherlands could be an example of 'accepting immigration grudgingly'; Austria and Switzerland are more clearly non-acceptant. Notwithstanding these variations the basic transatlantic difference remains.

Developments within the new context of the European Union has changed things, but in the domain of immigration not yet for the better. *Migration policies* of the EU are essentially ambivalent. On the one hand the EU created a sort of fundamental right to migrate within the EU-area for citizens of member states, and furthermore a lenient policy is practiced in all states for highly skilled and company linked migrants from outside the EU. On the other hand the EU has developed a common, restrictive and defensive immigration policy to keep out all other unasked for migrants. I am not talking now about the effectiveness of these policies, but about their aims. Fortress Europe is indeed a designation that is not far off the mark. The fresh ideas on new European immigration policies published (by the commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs, Vitorino, of the European Commission) did not change these policies and practices yet (`Communication on a Community Immigration Policy', EC, November 2000).

3. European Integration policies: diversity of policies instead of policies of diversity
European immigration policies are thus communitarian policies - competence of the European Commission- but integration policies are not. Integration policies have remained in the so-called `Third Pillar', which means essentially that these are national policies. Any common initiative can only be implemented by a unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers.

The combination of non-acceptance of immigration and very restrictive and defensive admission policies has severe consequences for integration policies. It is a Janus-face: you cannot easily put off the severe side of restrictive admission to change it for the benevolent and seducing face of integration policies. The negative effects of the first are furthermore anchored within all European countries in political movements of varying size and face: large and visible in some countries like France (Le Pen), Austria (Haider) and Belgium (Flemish Blok), more disguised under mostly conservative labels in other countries like the UK, Germany etc.

In order to describe and analyse systematically the present European integration policies and their differences, I will first develop a basic typology as a tool.

3.1. Citizenship, integration and a typology of policies
I propose to start from a simple analytical framework that centers on the concept of `citizenship'. Recently political theorists have contributed significantly to our thinking on citizenship, particularly when they have tried to answer the question how basic democratic values can and should be combined with cultural and religious diversity on the one hand and socio-economic equality on the other (Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Soysal 1994; Young 1990).

I propose to bring in the most important elements of these discussions in a rather practical way: let us distinguish three different aspects or dimensions of citizenship.

The first is the *juridical/political dimension*: it refers to the basic question whether immigrants are regarded as fully fledged members of the political community. In practice the question is in how far immigrants and ethnic minorities do have formal rights and duties that differ from those of

natives in relation to opportunities for political participation. This also includes the question whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; it evidently also includes the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals.

The second is the *socio-economic dimension* of citizenship: this pertains to social and economic rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do they have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work related benefits, like unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the state-provided social security facilities, like social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities, et cetera?

The third dimension pertains to the domain of *cultural and religious rights* of immigrants and minorities: do they have equal rights to organize and manifest themselves as ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

These dimensions of citizenship can be reformulated for the purpose of analysis of policies of national and local governments as `spheres of integration' and used as yardsticks to typologise the kind and partiality of integration policies.

If we attribute for the sake of simplicity only two qualities to each of the dimensions defined above, one positive quality meaning the explicit support in policy for the dimension concerned, and one negative meaning that that same dimension is denied support in policies, we have created a typology space of possible forms of policies:

Typology space of integration policies:

		INCLUSION			EXCLUSION		
	Type	1	2	3	4	5	6
Juridical/political dimension		+	+	+	-	-	-
Socio-economic dimension		+	+	-	+	-	-
Cultural-religious dimension		+	-	-	+	+	-

3.2. Policies of diversity or diversity of policies?
From this simple typology a number of things become clear. The first and most important divide between policies is based on the juridical-political dimension: if migrants or immigrants are not regarded as (potentially) part of the political community of the country or city of settlement and if the juridical position is defined as essentially different, I will call these exclusionist policies.

On this point we observe significant historical differences between Northwest European countries: a number of countries have started so called `guest worker policies' after the Second World War. By definition such migration was temporary, and thus exclusionist: types 4, 5 and 6. Dutch policies until 1980, for example, fitted perfectly type 4, since it combined political exclusion and a special juridical position of these alien guests with in principle equal rights in the socio-economic

sphere and a policy of `retaining cultural and religious identity' in view of their anticipated return. Austrian and Swiss policies have fitted, and still do to a great extent, to types 5 or 6 in the sense that they combine political exclusion with unequal industrial and social rights of foreign workers.

In the beginning of the 1980s, however, a number of these European countries, such as The Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden[iv], have explicitly acknowledged that most of the (former) labour migrants would be settling for good and that more inclusionist policies were necessary (Vermeulen 1997, Lindo 1997). These countries have changed their naturalisation laws and/or practices in order to facilitate access to formal citizenship, most prominently for the children of immigrants. Sometimes they have added opportunities for formal political participation of legally residing aliens at the local level or have devised group-specific forms of consultation and participation.

Not all European countries, however, have made such a change in definitions and policies, or at least not to the same extent. Austrian and Swiss national policies, for example, still reflect to a large extent the premises of guest worker policies. Germany made a first step towards a more inclusionist policy in 1991 with a relative easing of the tough naturalization regulations. A major second step was prepared by the report of the Expert Committee led by Rita Suessmuth in July 2001, containing a set of policy proposals for immigration and integration policies. The report, however, did not lead yet to political decisions.

Against this background of continental Europe, the United Kingdom represents a different case: there is no such tradition as a 'guest worker scheme' and the great majority of those who immigrated to the UK was entitled to or possessed already a British passport on their arrival. Alienness and nationality are not significant characteristics: it was and is the racial or ethnic origin or descent that is the relevant paradigm. The British case, being one that is inclusionist in the formal sense from the beginning, makes us aware of the distinction between formal inclusion and inclusion in practice. Inclusion in the political-juridical domain turns out to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to attain equality.

Although there is thus some convergence in national migrant policies in Europe pertaining to the juridical/political dimension, quite substantial differences remain[v]. Such differences are related to basic ideas about membership of the political community in different countries: Germany, for example, defines its national community in ethnic terms, in terms of ancestry, and thus welcomes resettlers (Aussiedler) as Germans returning to the fatherland, but regards settled foreigners as Ausländer, as 'alien elements'. The French republican conception, in contradistinction, is based on a political contract between individual citizens and the state, a contract that anyone who subscribes the principles of that political system may enter into. The fact that such principles in the French case are strongly embedded in culturally defined institutions, however, makes things complicated for those immigrants that have different cultural and religious backgrounds. Also here the political-juridical inclusion seems to be a necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient condition.

And of course a different terminology goes with such different conceptions: more exclusionist policies talk about `aliens', 'Ausländer', 'guest workers' and other designations that accentuate the (supposed) temporal stay or the belonging of a person to another political unity. Terminology and content of such policies reflect basically the non-acceptance of immigration as a phenomenon and of newcomers as permanent immigrants. In inclusionist policies on the contrary, 'immigrant' is

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[iv].Sweden was in fact the first country to change its policies already in the 1970s.

[v]. Policies of cities are to a great extent dependent on positions that have been taken and policies that have been adopted at the national level. Nevertheless, local policies within national contexts may vary significantly: cities may on the one hand circumvent or compensate restrictions of national policies, for example by creating special structures for political participation such as Advisory Councils; on the other hand cities may neglect or refuse to implement inclusionist national policies in other cases.

an accepted term like in France, or the term ethnic minorities is adopted as in the case of the UK and the Netherlands, the term reflecting on the one hand the fact that a group (of immigrants) is part of the political community, but has on the other hand a vulnerable place in that community.

Let us now turn to the second and third dimension and look particularly at inclusionist policies[vi]. The first remark is that type 3 does not exist in theory in Western Europe at this moment: liberal democracies principally do not allow for inequality and unequal rights for those who are regarded as members of the political community. Type 3 may, however, exist in practice, as far as racism and discrimination is given space to overthrow such high principles.

In terms of official policies, however, we find the second important divide within inclusionist policies in Europe: between type 1 that stands for multiculturalist policies on the one hand and type 2, that pertains to those forms of `integration' policies that are mainly based on assimilationist premises.

Multicultural policies of type 1 presuppose not only political inclusion and equality in the socio-economic domain, but also aim at cultural and religious equity. The basic premise of multiculturalism, defined as a set of normative notions on how to shape a multicultural society politically, is that immigrants cannot become equal citizens unless state and society accept that both individuals and groups have the right to cultural difference. According to multiculturalists, the prevailing institutions and rules in society are historical and cultural products that are not neutral for newcomers and thus may need revision in order to accommodate newcomers.

Integration policies of type 2, in contradistinction, take the state and society of settlement as 'given', also in the cultural and normative sense. Newcomers are supposed to adapt at least to the public institutions of that society. This may lead to strong assimilation pressure.

3.3. Convergence of policies?
The definitions of the different types of policy described above are ideal types. As I said earlier, I have given only two extreme qualities on each dimension: positive or negative. In practice the divides between them are much fuzzier. Let us then pose the question whether positions have been moving and whether there is convergence in European integration policies.

Taking back again the distinction between the three domains, we have to conclude that the extent of convergence that has occurred is not equally strong in each of these domains. There has been some convergence in the political-juridical domain: for example, in all member states, EU rules will apply to large groups of `third-country nationals'. Also the wide disparities between French and German naturalisation legislation have narrowed somewhat. In recent years there have been increasing appeals in Germany to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily. The *ius sanguinis* principle is thus being relaxed and the *ius soli* principle is being considered, while in France the opposite is happening.

The clearest pressure for convergence, however, is in certain parts of the socio-economic domain. Uniform rules of the EU from above, assisted by trade union pressure within national contexts, have contributed to much more uniformity than before. But also here convergence has limitations as is shown for example in the comparative study of trade unions in Europe and their reactions to immigration and immigrants (Penninx and Roosblad 2000).

The largest disparities still exist in the cultural-religious domain. Policies related to the two most important elements in this domain, those of language and religion, show little evidence of

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[vi]. Variations in the right part of the scheme reflect differences in soft and harder kinds of `temporary migration': the types of column 5 and 6 represent policies that contest essential notions of equality and equal rights in liberal democracies in relation to these migrants, such as equal wages, provisions, right to benefits.

convergence. Awareness of the need to have such policies varies significantly and pressure of European institutions is not strong here. One of the basic problems here is that language and religion are often tightly bound up with notions of national identity. More diverse policies are then easily perceived as threatening that national identity. Nevertheless some signs of convergence can be seen, often at the local level, for example in the recognition of Muslims as negotiating partners and rudimentary institutionalization of so called 'new' religions. But at the same time there are still wide disparities with regard to religious instruction in state schools and opportunities for religiously based schools.

4. Principles for integration policies of cities

If the foregoing brief assessment of present immigration and integration policies in European countries is essentially correct, what can be expected under conditions of unchanged policies? First of all we will see (and we see it already) a spiral movement of negative consequences of defensive immigration policies: admission policies, and particularly asylum procedures, will be increasingly jammed; the present legal instruments, starting only when candidates have already reached the territory, will turn out to be unable to steer migration processes in any significant way. Such defensive policies and its failure to control migration will have negative consequences for legally residing immigrants and integration policies. They are also not able to solve or regulate the migration pressure from outside on the one hand and the increasing demand for (often specific categories of) migrants within European countries on the other hand. I will not dwell here on the basic principles of a badly needed comprehensive and pro-active migration policy: I have formulated these principles already some years ago (Doomernik/Penninx/Van Amersfoort 1997) and they have been reiterated recently in similar form by others[vii].

For cities, and particularly for the larger metropoles in Europe, unchanged policies will lead to growing tensions between national governments and these large cities. These cities are confronted with fast and thorough changes in their population. Admission of these newcomers, however, is 'steered' by national en European policies; the consequences are for these cities. Furthermore these newcomers are migrants of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is luring. There is a danger of loss of the social cohesion in these cities, a threat that may be enhanced by the new phenomenon of transnational 'foot loose' individuals or groups.

There is thus a special problematic and a specific responsibility for these cities, different from that of the national authorities. And there is a need for intensive and pro-active integration policies on this local level, where the citizen should regain its original meaning: an active and accepted participant in the daily life of these cities and thus both profiting from and contributing to the health of that city. How to organize such a local integration policy? What should be the basic principles of such policy?

I will formulate three basic points for the development of such a pro-active local integration policy. The first is that such a integration should be based on a broad and *comprehensive concept of integration*. In the above analysis of present European integration policies I have distinguished three basic dimensions of the concept: the political/juridical, the socio-economic, and the cultural/religious dimension. Integration policies then should actively challenge the participation of immigrants by including and balancing these three dimensions.

[vii]. See Patrick Weil's contribution to the conference `Migrations. Scenario's for the 21st Century', Rome, Italy, July 12-14, 2000. Also the contribution of the European Commissioner of Justice and Home Affairs reflect these new principles. See also the recent publication of the Bertelsmann Foundation et al. (Guetersloh, 2000). See also Ghosh 2000.

In realising an inclusive policy on the *political/juridical dimension,* cities will often be confronted with barriers and limitations that come from national legislation: access to national citizenship, access to the formal political system on different levels. Apart from trying to change such national barriers, cities may be quite creative by establishing alternative local participation systems, whether that pertains to advisory functions for immigrants and their organisations or their participation in implementing policies.

In promoting equality and participation in the *socio-economic domain* local authorities are much less dependent on, or hindered by, limitations on other levels. In this domain city authorities can formulate and implement policies to combat socio-economic arrears of immigrants in fields like the labour market, housing en education within the city, and introduce soft or hard instruments for implementation: from stimulating migrants to strong forms of (temporary) positive action. They may also promote active anti-discrimination policies and effective instruments to implement these.

Equity in the *cultural and religious domain* is often the most problematic, although large cities - that always had the combination of greater anonymity and greater diversity in their population - do have more practical experience and possibilities here. Here the lesson from cities that did experiment with 'multicultural policies' of some sort is that new forms of diversity are most easily introduced in areas where there have been historically forms of diversity. Dutch policies, including the ones of big cities, for example show that the tradition of recognizing different religious denominations - that was politically anchored in the past in the religious pillari'ation of the political system - may be used to recognize institutionally `new immigrant religions' such as Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism on an equal level, using existing legislation and old traditions (Rath et al. 1999, 2001; Lucassen/Penninx 1997). In the same vain, it is easier for countries that recognise a multilingual system of old to institutionalise to a certain extent 'new immigrant languages' (Vermeulen 1997, Lindo 1998).

Whatever the difficulties of introducing such multicultural policies and have these accepted, it is important to realize that in large globalised cities the recognition of different cultures, religions and life styles, and the ensuing multiple identities and loyalties do exist. And at the same time one should try to solicit allegiance of all these different inhabitants to the local social order to build new forms of cohesion. Recognition often turns out to be a necessary start for such a process that can be stimulated further by engaging these groups somehow in common decision making.

This brings me to the second principle of new comprehensive local integration policies: these should be conceptualised and implemented on three levels at the same time. The first is the level of *institutions.* For our purpose here we should distinguish between two kinds of institutions. The first are general public institutions of a society or city, such as the educational system or the political system. These general institutions should reflect the new composition of the population, simply because they are supposed to serve all inhabitants, and equally. Since such institutions have developed certain - culturally determined - ways of operating that in practice hinder access and/or equal outcome for newcomers, there is a need to adjust their practices. The second kind is specific institutions of immigrant groups themselves, such as religious or cultural institutions. They have an important function for these groups. It is important that such specific institutions should be recognised on the same level as comparable institutions of native groups.

The second level is that of *organisations.* These organisations are in fact the concrete (but partial) manifestation of institutions: mosks associations, for example, are one of the manifestations of the institutionalisation of Islam. That means also that these organizations can be the concrete vehicle for promoting integration. Recognition of and mobilisation of social and cultural resources of these organizations in the framework of integration policies facilitates and legitimates these policies. They may also become important partners in decision making and even in implementing integration policies.

Finally, the third level is that of *individual* migrants. Actually, in most cases integration is defined and narrowed down to this level only. However, if the above mentioned levels are not included

and the reciprocal nature of integration is not explicitly recognized, such a narrow conceptualisation approaches in practice a kind of `forced assimilation'. On the other hand, if it is combined with integration on the institutional and organisational level, it demands from individual immigrants a readiness to live up to a limited number of basic rules that are necessary to ensure cohesion: rules of democracy, of equity and equality of all individuals, and of tolerance. Rules that give newcomers at the same time the liberty, within such basic rules, to organise their lives according to their preferences and liking. In such a conception of integration policy at the individual level it is of great importance that newcomers get the practical means and instruments to participate and in doing so develop allegiance to the local society: language courses and informative courses that give an insight in the structures and possibilities of the society and city of settlement and in the basic rules of it, are necessary building stones of any integration policy.

The third point for a new integration policy is a *strategic principle*. Starting from the concept of citizenship as defined above, policies should look analytically at citizenship and participation from two different perspectives and try to combine them in practice. These two perspectives are simply based on the assumption that you need two partners to tango: the immigrants and the receiving society or city.

The first perspective then is the `*top-down-approach'*. Here the institutional framework of the society of settlement is taken as a starting point and the question is put in how far that institutional framework is open for participation by immigrants and ethnic minorities, or is opened and activated in the course of time. In this approach the terms of inclusion/exclusion and `opportunity structure' are key-concepts pertaining to openness of the existing system. As far as measures are taken to stimulate participation, among others by adapting that existing system, *activation* seems to be the appropriate term in two senses: activation of the existing system and of immigrants.

The second is the `*bottom-up-approach'*. Here the central focus is on the initiatives taken by immigrants, ethnic minorities and their organizations to stand up for their (political, social and cultural) interests irrespective of institutional structures, alone or in coalition with other actors. The basic concept here is *mobilization*. The analytical distinction between top-down and bottom-up, and activation and mobilisation makes it possible to look at the possible mismatch and at the interaction between the two.

Focusing on local situations and the role of immigrants and local authorities in such situations one can thus identify on the one hand *channels of mobilisation* for immigrants and ethnic minorities for each of the domains of citizenship mentioned above. In the cultural sphere one can think for example of mobilisation through religious or cultural organizations of immigrants and their efforts to establish places of worship, religious courses or courses in immigrant languages, through parents' participation in the educational system of their children to introduce such elements in the school system, et cetera. In the socio-economic domain immigrants may mobilize themselves also in many ways: as interest organizations defending or trying to gain social rights; by taking initiatives as entrepreneurs or self help groups. In the political-juridical domain immigrants may mobilize themselves, depending on the opportunity structure, as pressure groups outside or within existing political parties, by establishing 'immigrant parties' or action groups, or to call for consultative bodies.

On the other hand one can identify the opportunity structure for such action, or the *channels of activation*. Parallel institutions and policies can be created to function as liaisons between local authorities and immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as Contact and Co-ordination Groups, created for the inclusion of all majority and minority groups with a broad remit to improve relations; Working and Co-ordination Groups, comprised of government departments dealing with immigrants and ethnic minorities for the purpose of sharing information and coordinating programmes and activities; Parliaments or Forums of Migrant Workers or Ethnic Minorities which have the function of articulating their interests and pressing for the implementation of policies; or Advisory Councils with broad scope for sharing information, expressing concerns, distributing resources, and lobbying for interests.

5. Conclusion

As stated earlier, the world is confronted with the basic paradox that states try to handle the migration phenomenon that is rooted in global developments, in a framework that is still essentially based on the nation-state premise. This premise divides the world into separate political communities and territories, in which migration is an anomaly. States have and use their sovereignty to develop immigration policies in which they decide on admission or refusal of migrants. In recent times, however, such policies have lost much of their regulatory power and have more and more become 'symbolic' policies.

Large metropoles in Western Europe and elsewhere have become the concrete locus where consequences are visible. These cities have changed considerably and swiftly. I have argued that there is a need for new concepts of integration policies and new strategies for its implementation in order to retain, and sometimes regain viability and social cohesion in these cities. In my view large cities are in principle in a better position than national governments to develop and implement such new policies. Out of the rich and divers laboratory of these cities new remedies for viable and cohesive local communities may emerge, if local authorities have the courage to coin integration policies based on a comprehensive and reciprocal concept of integration and use strategies that enable them to use the social and cultural resources that newcomers bring with them, and thus acquiring allegiance of newcomers to the local community.

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Rinus Penninx

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Facing the Challenge of Integration: The Contributions of 'Contact' and 'Categorization'

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Abstract: In this talk I approach the topic of 'integration' by studying intergroup contact. The 'contact hypothesis' refers to the classic idea that, under appropriate conditions, contacts between members of different groups can help to improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice.

'Looking backwards', I explore the assumptions underlying the contact hypothesis, and review the evidence for it based on the most recent meta-analysis and a comprehensive narrative review of the literature. I conclude that contact does work, under appropriate conditions (e.g., cooperation), and that it works mainly by generating affective ties. In this respect friendships between members of different groups are especially influential, and they can reduce prejudice by reducing anxiety about interaction with the other group, and also by helping group members to take the perspective of members of the other group. I also argued that the effects of contact can, and do generalize across members of the out-group, especially where social categories remain salient during contact (e.g., members are aware of respective group memberships and/or refer to them).

'Looking forwards' I consider two main issues, (1) future research; and (2) designing interventions to improve intergroup relations in Europe. I propose 4 research questions for future research: a) exploration of when 'opportunities for contact' (e.g. mixed neighbourhoods) are, and are not, taken up; b) exploration of contact in the contexts of individual and social competition (i.e., when are greater numbers of out-group members seen as increasing opportunities vs increasing threat and competition?); c) the need for longitudinal research in an area dominated almost exclusively by cross-sectional research; d) the need to develop new measures of attitude (including implicit vs explicit measures and contact (including assessment of social networks). Regarding social interventions, I argue that we must pool our special knowledge of how contact operates in the European context, and what we know of the background to this contact (history, immigration etc) to design interventions that are most likely to improve intergroup relations in this specific context.

Based on slides of PowerPoint presentation:

Outline
- I. Introduction:
  - The 'contact hypothesis'
  - Integration
- II. Looking backwards:
  - *Does* contact work?
  - *How* does contact work?
  - *Do* the effects of contact generalize?
- III. Looking forwards I: Future research
  - Taking up opportunities for contact
  - Contact in the contexts of individual and social competition
  - Longitudinal research
  - New measures of contact and attitudes
- IV. Looking forwards II: Designing Interventions for Europe
- V   Conclusions

Part I: Introduction

"It has sometimes been held that merely by assembling people without regard for race, color, religion, or national origin, we can thereby destroy stereotypes and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not so simple." *(Allport, 1954)*

'The Contact Hypothesis' Favourable Conditions for Contact: "Independent Variables"
(Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1982)
- Equal status
- Stereotypes are disconfirmed
- Cooperation
- Situation allows participants to get to know each other properly
- Norms support equality

Should be seen as <u>facilitating</u> rather than <u>essential</u> conditions (Pettigrew, 1998)

'What Can Contact Change?: "Dependent Variables"
- Out-group attitudes
  - More positive or, at least, less negative
- Perceived variability of the out-group
  - Increased complexity of out-group perceptions
- Trust
  - Increased out-group trust
- More subtle processes:
  - Reduction in "almost automatic fear" with which members of one group respond to members of the other (Sagar & Schofield, 1984)
  - Contact can provide access to informal social networks

'Integration' vs. 'Desegregation'
(Pettigrew, 1969; Schofield, 1989)
Integration = mixing under the circumstances that Allport argued are conducive to positive outcomes
Desegregation = 'mere mixing'

The Cantle Report
- Bradford, Burnley & Oldham showed a "depth of polarisation"
- Segregated communities living "a series of parallel lives"
- The segregation of our young in single-faith schools was a major factor contributing to the riots

'Community Pride Not Prejudice'
Ouseley Report, CRC
"If left to their own devices it seems people will retreat into their own separate 'comfort zones' surrounding themselves only by people like themselves".

The Guardian
"Plans are being laid to twin Asian and white schools in the city [of Bradford], to encourage pupils from the two communities to meet and mix" (January 15, 2002)

Interview with Gurbux Singh, Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (March 18, 2002):

"[The only answer is] to bring communities together [by developing] public policies which actively encourage integration [through housing and education]"

Part II: Looking Backwards

Does Contact Help to Reduce Prejudice? A Meta-analytic Answer
(Pettigrew, Tropp, & Wright, in prep.)
- Data base:
  - 504 studies (227,000 participants)
  - Direct contact as IV, prejudice as DV
  - Individual-level data
- Finding: highly significant inverse relationship between contact and prejudice
  - Mean effect size (r = -.20)
  - Heterogeneous results => moderators
    - Larger effects in more rigorous and experimental research; with better measurement; with adequate control groups; with attitudinal measures (rs = -.30)
    - And for samples including 'favourable conditions' (r = -.29)

How Does Contact Work? 4 Major Processes of Change
(Pettigrew, 1998)
- Learning about the out-group
- Changing attitudes via behaviour
- In-group reappraisal
- Generating affective ties

Generating Affective Ties
- Forming close friendships
- Reducing (intergroup) anxiety
  - Approximately 29% of the effect of contact reducing prejudice is mediated by contact also reducing anxiety
  - Tension in intergroup settings (Devine et al., 1996) may take many forms (sometimes different for members of majority and minority groups) including:
    - Prejudice and hostility
    - Fear of victimization
    - Negative evaluation
    - Social anxiety
- Direct and indirect contact effects

Direct vs Indirect (extended) Contact
- Knowledge that a fellow in-group member has a close relationship with an out-group member can be used as a catalyst to promote more positive intergroup attitudes (Wright et al., 1997)
- This 'extended contact' is second-hand, rather than involving the participants in direct intergroup contact themselves.
- 4 key advantages:
  - Large-scale optimal contact
  - Use of cross-group friendships
  - Increased salience of group memberships for <u>observer</u> vs participants
  - Less likely to induce 'intergroup anxiety'

More Subtle Effects of Cross-group Friendships
- Access gained to friendship networks may affect minority students' academic achievement
- Access to desegregated networks can help them to obtain better employment (Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Pettigrew, 1967; Schofield, 1991)
  - The 'strength of weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973, 1982)

Extending the 'extended contact' Effect

- Reading/learning about in-group members who have positive contact with out-group members can 'model' positive intergroup attitudes and tolerant in-group norms (Liebkind, & McAlister, 1998)
- Contact can also work indirectly via prominent out-group members (e.g. politicians) who are merely encountered indirectly, via the media and their policy outcomes (Hajnal, 2002)
  - In U.S.A., Whites' experience of black mayors led to decreased racial tension, greater racial sympathy, and increased support for black representation
    - But not among white Republicans

Do Effects of Contact Generalize? In what ways?

- Across situations? (Harding & Hogrefe, 1952; Minard, 1952)
- From specific members of the out-group to the out-group as a whole? (Hewstone & Brown, 1986)
- From the immediate out-group to other out-groups? (Pettigrew, 1997)

The 'Intergroup Contact' Moderation Hypothesis

- 'Intergroup' contact (e.g., awareness of group memberships during contact, typicality of the out-group member) moderates the effect of 'interpersonal' contact on out-group attitudes
- The association between contact and outcomes is greater:
  - (a) for participants with <u>high</u> vs <u>low</u> awareness of group memberships during contact
  - (b) when contact takes place with other(s) who are <u>typical</u> vs <u>atypical</u> of the out-group

Part III: Looking Forwards I: Future research

Mixed Neighborhood Determines Contact ('Intergroup friends')
(Pettigrew, 1997)

- How to calibrate degree of ethnic mix in neighborhood? (demographic indices)
- What determines whether 'opportunities for contact' are, in fact, taken up?
  - One person's 'opportunity' is another's 'competition'! . . .

Perceived Competition: 'Individual' and 'Contextual' Conditions
(Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002)

- 'Individual' competitive conditions: ethnic exclusionism stronger (via threat) among social categories of the dominant group in similar positions as social categories of ethnic out-groups:
  - (a) low level of education
  - (b) manual workers
  - (c) unemployed
  - (d) low income
  - (e) urban

Perceived Competition: 'Individual' and 'Contextual' Conditions
(Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002)
- 'Contextual' competitive conditions: ethnic <u>exclusionism stronger</u> in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high:
    - (a) <u>relatively high proportion of non-EU citizens</u> [opportunity OR competitive condition?]
    - (b) relatively high number of asylum seekers
    - (c) strong increase in the relative number of asylum seekers
    - (d) high rate of unemployment
    - (e) large increase in the level of unemployment

The Need for Longitudinal Research
- Ca. 4 out of 500+ studies in meta-analysis are longitudinal
- In many cases it is to be expected that the longitudinal relationship between contact and attitudes is reciprocal
- But as long as contact <u>does</u> affect attitudes, then it can be effective as an intervention
- Longitudinal surveys can be complemented by diary studies: daily records of cross-group contacts

Explicit and Implicit Measures of Bias

Explicit measures

- Responses are made consciously
- Typically assessed by traditional self-report measures
    - Group evaluations (prejudice) (affective)
    - Attribution of group traits (stereotypes) (cognitive)

Implicit measures
- Evaluations and beliefs that are <u>automatically</u> activated by the mere presence of the target group
- Can tap biases despite norm of political correctness and social desirability response set
- Tap <u>unintentional</u> bias, of which well-intentioned and would-be unprejudiced people are largely unaware

- Response-time procedures following priming
    - 'Prime' with black vs white category labels
    - Compare speed of response to differently valenced words (e.g., Dovidio et al 1997, Fazio et al 1995)
    - Prejudice implies:
        - Faster responses by white respondents to negative traits after black vs. white primes
        - And to positive traits after white vs. black primes
- Are implicit measures reliable?
    - Meta-analysis yielded a significant, but modest, relationship between different implicit measures of prejudice (Dovidio et al., 2001)
    - Appear to have substantial reliability and convergent validity (e.g., Blair 2001; Devine et al 2001)

Traditional and Novel Measures of Contact
Traditional measures
- Self-report measures of quantity and quality of cross-group contact
Novel measures
- Peer ratings of target person's social contacts (parallel: personality theory)

- More 'dyadic' approach to contact: how do individuals from majority and minority groups think about and approach dynamic, interpersonal cross-group contacts? (Devine et al., 1996)
  – Goals, motives, expectations?
- From extended contact to social networks: extend with more 'sociological' measures of contact

Part IV: Looking Forwards II: Designing Interventions for Europe

The Need to Promote Intergroup Contact
- Because:
  – Many people <u>do not have</u> opportunities for contact due to high levels of segregation
  – Many people <u>decline to take up</u> opportunities
  – Many people actively <u>avoid</u> out-group contact
  – Contact is often <u>proscribed</u> and violations sanctioned
- These factors undermine conflict resolution, because they:
  – <u>Reduce</u> the likelihood of future out-group contact
  – <u>Strengthen</u> assumed dissimilarity between groups
  – <u>Maintain</u> intergroup anxiety
  – <u>Reinforce</u> the intergroup boundary
- Drawback:
  – Because contact improves intergroup relations by changing the degree of intergroup differentiation, it may reduce collective action by members of disadvantaged groups

Contact is a Key Part of Many Proposed interventions
- Increased empathy (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000)
- Cooperative learning paradigms (e.g., Aronson & Patnoe, 1997)
- Multi-cultural education programs (e.g., Banks, 1997)
- Crossed categorization (e.g., Crisp et al., in press)
- 'Common in-group identity' (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000)
- All these approaches involve, to a greater or lesser extent, intergroup contact

Part V: Conclusions

What we have learned: looking backwards and forwards
- Looking backwards:
  – Contact does work
  – Primarily via its impact on affective variables
  – Most likely to generalize when social categories are acknowledged, not ignored or suppressed
- Looking forwards:
  – More research is still needed:
    • Translating opportunities for contact into contact
    • Contact in the contexts of individual and social competition
    • Longitudinal surveys and diary studies
    • New measures of contact and outcomes
  – We also need specially-designed, theoretically-based interventions aimed at European

- Not 'How to design a really stupid immigration policy'
- But 'How to design really intelligent interventions to implement integration'

Italian Students' Contact with African Immigrants: The Role of Anxiety
(Voci & Hewstone, 2002)

$c^2(44) = 61.047, p > .04$
RMSEA = .0352
SRMR = .0339
CFI = .986

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; N = 314

147

Effects of Direct and Indirect Cross-Group Friendships between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (N = 316)
(Paolini, Hewstone & Cairns, 2002)

Summary of the main results and identification of research questions

Andreas Wimmer
University of Bonn, DE

Some worries with regard to the state of the art in research on migration and integration
A comment to Rinus Penninx' paper

Rinus Penninx' paper may be regarded as an excellent representation of the state of the art in this field of research. I take the opportunity to share with you four major points where I think that we should go beyond this state of the art or, in other words, where I think we should revise our research strategy. More precisely, I perceive that our perspective is biased in several regards and that we should try to overcome these limitations.

1) A policy bias: After having neglected in social science research, for decades, the state as a central actor and shaper of social reality, the state has been forcefully "brought back in", to use Skopcol's famous expression, in the eighties and nineties. Perhaps to forcefully, at least in the field of migration research. My feeling is that we overstate nowadays the importance of state institutions for the process of immigrant integration. We nowadays focus on rights and state policies as the major determinants, trying to overcome in this way the older assimilation paradigm where the sole and exclusive focus was on immigrant capacities to successfully integrate.

A good example for the empirical drawbacks of this is the ILO study on discrimination on the labour market, where effective discrimination rates were measured across Europe in a very standardised and sophisticated methodology. The result was that the discrimination laws and policies (including the enforcement mechanisms) had no visible impact on effective rates of discrimination. Massey' seminal paper of this morning has also shown that policies do not have the effects we think they have and that migration mechanisms develop largely independent of even the most hard-handed policies of immigration control. Thränhardt has shown in his comparison of Holland and Germany, that more effective integration is achieved by policies that are not at all perceived or designed as integration policies.

We thus have to go beyond the current state and policy bias and to have a look at the mechanisms of immigrant incorporation in a broader perspective, perhaps using the scheme that Rinus has presented this morning, where opportunity structures and different strategies of immigrants themselves are related to each other. It means, in other words, to take of the kind of issues that the classic theory of immigrant assimilation had focussed upon and combine it with an analysis of the effects of state institutions. This is done in the "new assimilation" theory such as developed by Min Zhou at UCLA or Leo Lucassen in Amsterdam.

2) A continuity bias. This is typical of the typological reasoning that has become standard in comparative studies of immigrant integration. Rinus' paper is a very good example of this genre. Usually, countries are contrasted with each other and the main differences related to different political cultures, legal systems, established institutions of dealing with ethnic minorities and immigrants. The bias is also the result, I assume, of the prominence of neo-institutionalist thinking in the social science.

Again, there are striking counter examples. Consider the enormous shift in Canada from a policy of immigration favouring white European immigrants to its current policy of favouring everybody as long as the human capital record is excellent. Or consider the recent shift in Germany to a naturalisation law that included important elements of ius sanguinis, thought to

be impossible by neo-institutionalist that emphasise the ethnic nationalism tradition of Germany and its immigrant and integration policies.

We thus have to ask what exactly the political conditions are under which a country shifts from one box in our typology to another, we have to have, in other words, processual models of major policy shifts that go beyond the endless play of typologies. We have to move from classification to explanation.

3) The nationalist bias. It is interesting to observe, especially in multi-national conferences where you have German, French and roughly North European (meaning Dutch, Scandinavian, British) participation, how every researcher implicitely favours his or her own national model of immigrant integration over all the others. Canadians are notorious for measuring success and failure of immigrant integration in terms of relative closeness to their own policies. French scholars, such as Dominique Schnapper, present argument after argument for the republican, ethnicity-blind modus of integration. Dutch scholars, such as Rinus in his paper, implicitely favour multiculturalism and a rights based approach. Tränhardt defended the German model of Sozialpartnerschaft as the golden road to successful integration.
I personally do not know of one single rigidly designed empirical comparison (with the possible exception of the EFNATIS programme) where the state of integration of comparable immigrant groups would be compared, let alone a rigid evaluation of the possible effects that different policies might have on these divergent states.

Another effect of the nationalist bias is that we tend to take it for granted that groups by national origin are meaningful points of departure for studying integration. Why not take all immigrants with a certain educational background as a unit of observation? Why not take immigration cohorts, thus focussing on the social age of immigrants—a view much closer, by the way, to how residents of immigrant neighborhoods view the social reality, as we recently have shown in a comparison of three Swiss cities?

We are all bound, in other words, by methodological nationalism (as I have termed it in a forthcoming article written together with Nina Glick Schiller) that represents a serious obstacle in advancing our knowledge on issues of immigrant integration — perhaps more so than in other fields, given that it represents a highly controversial topic where nationalist sentiments play a very pronounced role.

4) The liberal bias. We know that all researchers, with very few notable exceptions, defend left wing positions in the debate on immigration and integration. My feeling is that this produces certain blind spots that are dangerous to in the longterm. To give an example that has puzzled me for some time now: Most researchers share the liberal conviction that all good things may go together in social life. An open immigration policy and a very inclusive integration policy with a maximum of rights given to a maximum number of immigrants in the shortest time possible do not seem to contradict each other in this standard view that is also nicely expressed in Rinus' paper.

My fear is that we tend to forget the very basic Weberian insight that strong membership rights in any social group (and be it one defined by citizenship and nationality) produce strong mechanisms of social closure (or, in current terminology, of exclusion). This is a point already made by Shmuel Eisenstadt this morning in one of his lucid comments.

The Swiss example, on which I have a chapter in my forthcoming book, illustrates this very well. The most republican, non-ethnic, multi-lingual history of nation building in the Western world is combined with perhaps one of the most rigid and legally sophisticated forms of excluding immigrants from full participation while at the same time putting almost no restrictions on their immigration.

In any case, I believe that we should pay much more attention to the dialectical relationship between integration (through welfare state mechanisms, through citizenship regimes with very strong membership rights etc.) and processes of closure on the other hand and ask what is

systematic about this relationship and what is historically arbitrary and can therefore be changed.

I am convinced that these biases can be overcome by a good design of future research programmes. Here are some thought with that regard, taking again point after point:

1) The policy bias could be overcome by designing in a rigorous way a cross-national comparative project on immigrant integration. Choosen comparable groups (same origin, same social and educational background, similar sector of economy activity in receiving country) would be a must, advanced methods (cohort studies, life history event methods etc.) should be applied. It is clear that the data problems are enormous, and I am convinced that the ESF could play an enormously stimulating role here in helping us to produce something of the style of Massey's great datasets for a number of European countries too.

2) Going beyond typological reasoning would mean to focus on processes of institutional change (which in general is the most promising line of research of instiututionalism) bringing in new methods (veto point analysis) and much more historical data. Studies where the formation of immigrant groups (with the variations that Hartmut Esser has described many years ago) are the dependent variable and different institutional settings the independent variable would also be helpful in going beyond the state of the art where more integrative policies (in one corner of the typology) are automatically assumed to lead to more integration.

3) In order to overcome the nationalist bias, I think that long term cross-national cooperation is necessary. According to my experience (e.g. within Efnatis), overcoming nationalist biasis in research designs is a very painful and conflictive process, it needs time. Research teams should nevertheless try to maximise national differences (i.e. always include a French and a German component in a field heavily dominated by North European perspectives) in order to become more aware of their biases. Again, ESF is in a privileged position to help researchers travel on this path.

4) The liberal bias may be overcome by systematically looking at boundary creating mechanisms that are implied in different types of integration policies and in different modes of immigrant incorporation (including those that we consider to be the most beneficial). A systematic study of the non-intended, exclusionary consequences of multi-culturalism, of republicanism, of Sozialpartnerschaft etc. would certainly help to overcome this blindspot. Reflecting systematically and on the basis of empirical (not least: historical) research on the linkages between integration within and closure against the outside might be another, more theory driven way to overcome the liberal bias - without evidently having to cease being liberal.

FINAL SESSION

Summary of the discussion

Introduction
Hartmut Esser

General Remarks

The most important result of the conference was the meeting of representatives from very different fields and disciplines, including the contact between scientists and people from the public, administrative and political sphere. That was the more important as usually the scientific, administrative, practical and political activities are more or less separated. The conference was the first opportunity to create an absolutely necessary form for an exchange between "camps" which have mainly no contact to each other. Of special importance was also the "confrontation" of scientist from very different fields and backgrounds (like political scientists, sociologists, ethnologists and social-psychologists). Also in this respect the conference could be an important first step to initiate a fruitful (and necessary) kind of interdisciplinarity that is urgently needed in the extremely multidimensional field of cultural diversity, political action, social movements and integration.

The conference clearly reconfirmed the extreme – scientific as well as public - importance of the field(s) discussed in the meeting.

On the other hand, the conference showed also certain stagnation in the scientific developments to deal with the problem(s). That is an old problem especially in the field of migration research and "cultural" theory. It has to do with the fact, that the typical analytical-explanative perspective, that is a prerequisite for cumulative research, is somehow underdeveloped in those fields. For a lot of extremely important concepts the theoretical foundations are not very strong, long discussed concepts are not very well defined (like "integration" or "identity"), explicit theoretical explanations and (i.a. formal) models of the central processes are mainly lacking, as well as proper designs for the necessary systematic empirical studies. There are, however, remarkable exceptions, presented by some of the participants, and these should serve for a starting point of the next steps in "forward looking" research in the field(s). The main problem seems to be a (not uncommon) kind of over-specialization of the researchers in the special fields: for most of the problems, like e.g. the mobilization of movements, conditions of structural integration and "inclusion", the emergence of ethnic conflicts, some "general" concepts are available in other fields and disciplines (e.g. also economics), but in the special fields these developments at least sometimes are not (adequately) adopted or even known. One of the main activities in the future should be an exchange about these "general" theoretical instruments in social sciences.

Common Themes of Research

The discussions showed clearly, that there are, besides the plurality in many details, some general, overlapping themes, which could serve as starting points for the development of common project perspectives in the future. These themes are the following:

- Concepts and processes of (international) migration and its consequences, especially concerning the integration of migrants;

- Cultural pluralization and societal integration in modern societies

- The interplay of identities, structured interest and institutions and the emergence of collective actions and social movements

Two further topics were also possible subjects of main common activities in the future:

- Ethnic segregation, ethnic segmentation and ethnic stratification (and their implications for the emergence of cultural conflicts)

- Neo-Feudalism in modern societies (emergence of quasi-castes and enclaves, new forms of ascriptions, religious and cultural fundamentalism)

Besides these broader themes some special topics emerged also as possible subjects for common research:

- Processes and conditions of intergenerational integration of migrants
- Education and labour-market integration of migrants
- Language acquisition and multi-lingualism
- The effects of integration courses
- Families, networks and ethnic communities
- Ethnic organizations
- Mass media, mass transportation and the emergence of "transnationalism"
- Social distances, discrimination and hostility

Methodological Requirements

The discussions proved a high consensus on certain methodological requirements for the planned research. These requirements can be summarized in the following points: The research (ideally) should be problem oriented, cumulative and theory driven, comparative and longitudinal.

Additionally, a high demand for evaluation studies, especially in connection with new measures of integration policies, was felt. And last not least an improvement in designs and the quality of instruments in the (complicated) empirical studies in the field of cultural (and other) differences was seen as necessary.

Comments from politicians and policy practitioners

- *Local-national-global:* Can we construct a city without being national? Or local groups only? Children with an immigrant background surveyed do not necessarily see 'national' in the same light as the common understanding in a country of residence. (**Kent Andersson**)

- *Minority questions:* There is a debate on issues designated by the policy as problematic and not, for the time being, solved, namely, Roma people, Islam and ingroup-outgroup relations, trust and co-operativeness linked to symbols. Politicians are interested in and open to the theoretical explanations of such issues. (**Johan Leman**)

- *Theory and practice of national policies about immigrants -- inward and outward orientations:* Within currently dominating legislations there are frequent changes, which harbour many contradictions, making reactions and actions difficult. A positive tone has recently been incorporated into the discussion of immigration issues, stressing the cultural richness and diversity within an integration approach. However, 70% of funds are allocated to programmes concerned with the return of migrants to their countries, compared with only 30% being used to integrate immigrants in the society. (**Campbell Snoddy**)

- *Cross-level debate and cross-country comparisons:* The importance of methodology and the framework needed for defining the appropriate focus and the level of authority – national and supranational government – for discussion of the relevant policy issues. For this, it is crucially important to learn more about the policies implemented in different countries. (**Dagmar Simon**)

- *Migration and social welfare - the pathways through services:* There are inconsistencies between academic 'theory' and political 'practice' concerning social welfare provision for migrant population, in particular in the areas of health care system. This may be studied through exploring the pathways of refugees through social and health-care system as well as education and training of professionals working in social care (for instance, in mental care). There is a need to involve professionals in academic research to respond to the real situation and needs engendered through combining top-down and bottom-up approaches. [For instance, a tracking report on the experiences of migrant group brings out necessary areas of development within health, social and mental care.] A model implicitly focused on is the pathways through services. (**Charles Watters**)

Additional questions and issues raised

o What are the points of convergence and divergence in clarifying the four concepts: diversity-identity-collective action-integration?

o Which questions should be studied in a cross-disciplinary way and at cross-national level - and how should they be studied?

It was emphasised that the workshop was not aimed at identifying fields to examine, but the specific questions within the areas already defined. However, it was felt that there was not enough opportunity to see how concepts are understood by different persons and group. An aspect worth investigating would be under which conditions inter-group conflicts spiral into negative violence or, alternatively, give a positive result (**Dieter Rucht**).

Lack of an underlying theory to explain why people in sending population are sedentary (majority of the population), not only why do they migrate. Such problems would require a longitudinal analysis. However, policy-funded research obviously is typically in search of quick (and convenient) answers, operating on a short-term, rather than the long-term evidence. Also, there is a need to move from national analysis to country comparisons and, indeed, it is the currently observed tendency that should be followed (**Charles Westin**).

In spite of this workshop's concern with current problems, also the past time should be analysed effectively, focusing on an assimilation into a different culture within three generations (**Russell Hardin**).

Analysis of legal (or legalised) immigrants presents the 'tip of an iceberg' and that unsuccessful as well as successful immigrations should be investigated. In meetings like this participants from migrating countries (or indigenous populations) ought to be presented and provide their stories. There seems to have been a tendency to categorize different types of immigrants too seriously; policies often create these categories (**Douglas Massey**).

Session Report: Diversity

Rainer Bauböck
Austrian Academy of Sciences

1. Research design

1.1. Stimulating multidisciplinary research
Multidisciplinary research is often desired but rarely practiced. It is much easier to organize multidisciplinary meetings, as ours was, than to bring academics from different disciplines together in well-integrated research projects. We all have intellectual incentives to "talk across disciplines" at conferences because it gives us quick access to state of the art debates in neighbouring disciplines (often presented in a popularized and more accessible form than at disciplinary conferences). But designing joint research requires a stronger effort not only to make ourselves understood to each other, but also to translate our concepts and modify our methods so that research result can be related to each other – or maybe even tested against each other – across disciplines. This is cumbersome and there are few academic rewards within the established disciplinary fields for such efforts. The best academic research is always *theory-driven* and attempts to widen, disprove, modify or replace a consensus within our disciplines.

I want to suggest that in order to engage in multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary research we ought to stimulate *problem-driven* research. We need to start with identifying problems that are perceived as problems within a wider public and non-academic discourse, rather than merely problems that represent gaps within our theories. There must be a certain sense of urgency in the wider society about these problems, not only to encourage politicians to invest money into research but also to generate also a pressure for academics to cooperate across disciplines. With regard to the theme of "diversity" this means focussing less on the benefits of diversity (as did the celebratory multiculturalism literature of the early 1980s or much of the globalization literature of the early 1990s) and more on the (perceived) conflicts.

1.2. The dialogue between academic research and policy-makers
This is also essential for the other dialogue that is more often desired than practiced: that between academic researchers and policy-makers. Policy-makers want to be seen as problem-solvers in their societies and they have little patience with the internal problems of academic theory. Academics, on the other hand, are understandably wary to let politicians and civil servants dictate their agenda. In the perception of academics, politicians often exploit theoretical discourses by trivializing concepts generated within these discourses to shore up their own image as intellectuals, and high level civil servants exploit empirical research by using it selectively for legitimizing policies whose basic goals remain beyond scrutiny.

As social system theorists have argued, politics and science are rather autonomous systems with their own internal logics and modes of communication. In contrast with the attempt to integrate multidisciplinary research it is neither desirable nor possible to integrate academic research and policy-making. However, it is important to have an ongoing dialogue across these "system boundaries" on those social problems that are relevant for both academic research and public policy. "Managing diversity" in contemporary western democracies is a problem of this sort. The dialogue is important precisely because there is not only the danger that academic research will be used for purposes beyond its control (this is also the case with nuclear physics or biogenetics) but also of a feedback loop mentioned by Charles Westin through which the politicians' perception of the problem feeds into academic approaches.

I see two important tasks in this regard: First, empirical research on problems of diversity should focus on a critical evaluation of policy outcomes by measuring them through hard empirical indicators. Douglas Massey's paper in session 1 was a perfect example of this kind of research. Instead of providing policy-makers with facts they can select for their own purposes, this research develops its own standards for a comprehensive evaluation of policy successes and failures. The benefit for policy-makers is that they get a much better idea of

where they may have to correct either their goals or their policy instruments for achieving their stated goals. ESF is excellently placed for stimulating such research in a European context.

Second, the results of academic research on diversity should be disseminated more widely and should feed directly into the general public discourses on diversity. There is a demand for "popularizing" the result of serious research on issues that rank already high on the agenda of the mass media. A multidisciplinary research focus initiated by an organization such as ESF should include channels of dissemination beyond academic journals and publishers that would allow researchers to exercise some control over how their results are presented to a wider audience in civil society.

1.3. Comparative research

In research on immigration and cultural diversity Europe has one big competitive advantage over the US: European research is almost naturally comparative, whereas most American research focuses exclusively on the US experience. The lack of a comparative perspective in the US explains why there is often a tendency to ignore, or to take for granted, some very peculiar features of the American experience. Thus, American debates on multiculturalism have been strongly shaped by the contrasting experiences of African American descendants of slaves and immigrants of mostly European origin. In many European countries, as well as in Canada, there is a further layer of diversity related to the existence of native national and linguistic minorities that have pursued rival nation-building projects against a dominant core nation. While both Massey's paper on US immigration policy and Dietrich Thränhardt's comparison between German and Dutch integration policies showed a strong contrast between policy inputs and unintended outcomes, the comparison between the two European countries gives rise to further research questions how to explain the contrast between national discourses on diversity.

Comparative research is, however, not per se a remedy against what Andreas Wimmer has called "methodological nationalism". I suggest that three research strategies might help to avoid or minimize such bias.

(1) many edited volumes on European immigration and integration policies consist of country chapters each of which develops its own set of definitions of concepts and problems that are basically derived from a national public discourse in that country. While for many purposes the nation-state will remain the relevant unit of analysis, it is important to develop typologies of state-based regimes of diversity that allow to cluster various countries with common characteristics. Comparative political scientists do this when they examine, for example, electoral or party systems, types of parliamentary or presidential democracies, federal or unitary constitutions, etc. There is still much less agreement on basic comparative typologies when it comes to ethnic, linguistic, religious or national diversity and political regimes that respond to this diversity. So my first suggestion is that a requirement for funding comparative research projects on diversity in Europe should be that they develop typological descriptions of the phenomena they study that are not derived from single country cases but can be applied across a wide range of states.

(2) Second, in order to avoid the danger of replicating in their premises normative presuppositions of national policy frameworks, there is a need for developing comprehensive and hard indicators for policy evaluation across countries. Just as economic policies need indices of price inflation or unemployment rates, so immigration and diversity policies need to be assessed by indicators that allow to measure and compare diversity as well as policies that try to manage it. This is not merely a task of collecting and standardizing large data sets from all European countries. There is an additional academic challenge of condensing these data into comprehensive indicators that allow us to compare and rank countries with regard to issues such as access of immigrants to citizenship status and rights, discrimination or upward mobility of minorities in labour and housing markets, cultural assimilation or segregation of ethnic groups over time, etc.

(3) Third, with regard to issues of migration and integration it is often inadequate to use receiving states as the only (or even as the basic) unit for comparison. There are at least three alternative possibilities that ought to be systematically explored: a) choosing *lower-level jurisdictions* such as cities (or provinces) as basic units. We know that cities rather than nation-states are the destination of most migrants and that city and provincial governments have often extensive powers in policy areas that are vital for social and cultural integration. Comparing cities across national borders is therefore an important exercise;

b) choosing *sending countries* as basic units and comparing migrant flows and integration patterns of groups of similar origins in various destination countries. A well-known survey by Michele Tribalat in France in the early 1990s showed that Turks were less integrated than migrants from the Maghreb, whereas recent studies about political integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands show almost the opposite result. It is not difficult to guess that this discrepancy is partly due to very different conceptions and indicators of "integration" used in both countries. That kind of bias can be made explicit by comparing similar origin groups across destination countries;

c) choosing the *European Union* as unit of analysis. Not merely in terms of size it makes more sense to compare the US with the EU that with any of its member states; the EU is also increasingly becoming a meaningful unit of analysis as its laws and policies address policy issues of migration and diversity. Open borders within Schengen-Europe are accompanied by a common European regime for asylum and border control. There is a more ambitious EU agenda of harmonizing broad areas of immigration and integration policies. While there are of course many analyses of these policy developments, it is still not common to aggregate data on migration, integration and diversity on a European level and to examine the properties of the emerging multilevel regime.

2. Research questions

2.1. Explaining migration and diversity policies and their outcomes

Massey's findings on the "really stupid immigration policy" of the US from 1986-96 could easily be transferred to the present European context. In contrast with the US, most European societies are experiencing demographic decline through population ageing and stagnation (or even shrinking). At the same time the traditional sending countries of migrants to the EU, especially Turkey and the Maghreb states, still have strongly expanding populations. Although the migration systems that link the shores of the Mediterranean have been operating for a long time, there is a European-wide policy of cutting down these flows, while some countries attempt to attract highly skilled technicians from South East Asia. Most attention is currently given to the impact of Eastern enlargement of the EU although the accession socieites have less developed migration chains with Western Europe and are themselves experiencing steep demographic decline.

Massey's analysis raises not only the question what a more rational immigration policy would look like under these conditions, but also how one can explain the apparent irrationality of current policies. Thränhardt's paper has thrown up similar questions about integration and diversity policies. To answer them it will be important to distinguish between four different levels of analysis:

a) *political discourse:* Public discourses on immigration are shaped by national myths and histories of nation-building. The common distinction between (Eastern) ethnic and (Western) civic nationalism is too simplistic in this respect. One has to look at how countries have interpreted their own internal ethnocultural diversity during the period of nation-building; whether during that time they had been a country of emigration or already conceived of themselves as a nation of immigrants; and whether a country regards the immigration of co-ethnics as a national raison d'être (Israel), gives co-ethnic immigrants privileged admission (Germany; Japan, Italy, Greece and others), or selectively excludes groups of immigrants on racial and religious grounds (as the US, Australia and Canada have done in their past).

b) *politics:* as other policies, those on immigration and integration are shaped by competition between political candidates and parties. The need to catch voters from other parties or to form coalitions with them in order to achieve parliamentary majorities has a strong impact on policy platforms and determines the scope of deviation from ideological core commitments. In countries where the majority of immigrants are foreign citizens who cannot vote, there are fewer counterweights to incentives for centre parties to chase the anti-immigrant vote.

c) *policies*: policy-formation is shaped more strongly by organized interest groups and internal logics of public administrations than by ideological preferences of average voters and party programmes. As Gary Freeman has suggested this may explain why liberal democracies usually accept more immigration than would correspond to the aggregated preferences of their voters. Legislative decisions often do also not strictly determine policy implementation by the branches of public administration. Increasingly, NGOs are involved in implementing integration policies. In highly decentralized, and especially in federal political systems, the interests of regional or local authorities may conflict with those of national governments.

d) *policy outcomes:* as Rinus Penninx has pointed out during our discussions, policy outcomes depend not merely on political decisions and their implementation, but also on the actual steering capacities of public authorities in a given policy field. For example, in the absence of a large state owned industries, government actions to reduce a high rate of unemployment among immigrants, will be quite constrained. If there is, however, a large sector of public housing, public policies may have a much stronger impact on housing standards and residential segregation among immigrants. From a perspective of policy reform it is important to consider models of "good governance" that regard policy outcomes as a joint product of public and private agency.

Comparative research on immigration and integration policies should explicitly address the discrepancies but also the interdependence between these four levels of political action.

2.2. Distinguishing types of diversity

Research on cultural diversity and the integration of ethnic minorities should distinguish between types of groups who are differently positioned within the wider society and political system. There is not one single concept of integration that fits all sizes and types. This was made clear by Charles Westin's comparison of the situation of the aboriginal Sami population of Sweden, Norway and Finland with cultural diversity resulting from recent immigration. Main factors that distinguish immigrant communities from other ethnic minorities are obviously the time of first settlement and present territorial concentration. However, minorities must be also distinguished by their political aspirations and by their relation to national identities prevalent within their society of residence and external "homelands".

(1) *National and indigenous minorities:* The Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka has distinguished the claims of national minorities who strive for political autonomy from those of immigrants who want to negotiate and modify the terms of their integration. There are further important differences between indigenous (aboriginal) groups, such as the Sami, who want to preserve a distinct way of life, the problems of European Roma as ethnic outcasts living in pockets of the mainstream society, and "modern" linguistic and national minorities such as the Catalans and Basques, Welsh and Scots, or Hungarians in Rumania and Slovakia. For the latter the main difference is whether the state in which they live formally recognizes their autonomy through devolution or federalism.

(2) *Immigrant groups*: Migrant groups, too, need to be further differentiated. Generally, immigrant communities in western societies can be characterized as minorities in transition. While across three generations most immigrant cohorts will assimilate into the cultural mainstream, a continuous influx of new migrants from the same origins can perpetuate a structure of cultural diversity that is characteristic for the first generation. Immigrant groups differ with regard to the strength of their transnational activities and affiliations. The study of economic, cultural, religious and political migrant transnationalism has become an important

focus in recent research (see the Oxford University Transnational Communities Project at: http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/). Most of the empirical research in this area is still focused on immigrant groups in the US, while European migration research has tended to follow implicitly the older American assumptions of unidirectional integration. Taking seriously the transnational dimension would also be important for understanding the impact of changes in the sending countries on the orientation of immigrant groups in European receiving societies, such as the recent upsurge in naturalization rates among immigrant groups of Turkish origin.

Often 'diaspora' is used broadly as a synonym for transnationally oriented communites of migrant origin. However, diasporas are characterized by an intergenerational continuity of an identity related to an external homeland that is absent among most migrant groups. Diasporic orientations can be maintained over time only if there is a strong religious backing or an unfinished external nation-building project with which a minority identifies. As the reaction of the Albanian diaspora during the Kosovo war shows, diasporic orientations may also be revived after having been dormant over a long period. Studying the conditions under which migrants develop diasporic identities will also be important for understanding the influence of Islamicist movements among some immigrant groups in the West.

(3) *configurations of diversity*: S.N. Eisenstadt's distinction between totalistic and multifaceted group identities can be used as a starting point for analysing different configurations how "identity groups" relate to each other. We can distinguish nested, overlapping and cross-cutting group identities as three basic configurations. The former corresponds to a federal form of diversity and is characteristic for multinational democracies such as Spain, Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom. In this configuration the wider society is seen as composed of self-governing constitutive subunits so that every member of the subgroup is also a member of the larger polity. Transnational migration creates horizontally overlapping multiple affiliations between societies politically organized as independent states. Dual nationality is a legally codified expression of this much broader phenomenon. Finally, in democratic societies identities relating to gender, sexual orientation, religion, racial discrimination or ethnic background are structured in such a way that every individual can be simultaneously a member of different cross-cutting groups. A problem alluded to by Eisenstadt is that only cross-cutting configurations of identity in civil society can become multifaceted all the way down, whereas nested and overlapping structures require a certain extent of homogeneity at the level of subgroups or superordinate groups. As our debates have shown, there is a common interest among social psychologist and social and political theorists in studying such configurations so that similar typologies might form a starting point for interdisciplinary research.

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Session report: Identity

Emanuele Castano
The University of Kent at Canterbury

Issues discussed:

- Methods
- Ingroup love vs. outgroup hate
- Institutions and Identities
- Ethnic vs. Supra-ordinate identities
- The paradox of the EU

Methods
- Experiments
  - high control
  - tap causality
  - reductionism
  - low generalizability (?)
- Surveys
  - low control
  - correlational/descriptive
  - representative samples

Ingroup love/Outgroup hate
- Ingroup love - there's something special about us
- Outgroup hate - there's something special about them
- Distribution of resources; intergroup settings.
- Evidence (little and preliminary) exists showing that group norms may promote fairness towards other groups *(Jetten et al.);* Importance of "Procedural justice" in intergroup settings regulated by common institutions *(Tyler) – rule of law.*

Institutions and Identities

Supra-ordinate entity needs to be high in entitativity, that is, needs to be perceived as a real entity.
- common fate
- boundedness
- salience
- similarity (within)

  - *Are national/ethnic identities compatible with supraordinate identities?*
  - *What's so special about ethnic identities?*
  - *Are they inescapable in the organization of common living*?
  - *What's so special about ethnic identities?*

- collusion between processes of identity construction and human beings' tendency to essentialize social categories.
  - essential properties
  - vagueness in the definition
  - circular and unfalsifiable

Are they inescapable in the organization of common living?

- *Communitarianists* - common good; demos and ethnos bounded together.
- *Liberals* – politics of rights; contractually defined, institutional identity

- do principles of the political life of individuals vary significantly and systematically across the ethno-cultural, national groups?
  - the exixtence of the single european electorate

New question…

- *Are national/ethnic identities compatible with supraordinate identities?* becomes:
- *Are national leaders able to foster the formation of supra-national identities?*

Leaders
- prototypicality is a key factor to be perceived/elected as group leader
- people tend to behave prototypically when acting in a group, as members of such groups
- and they expect others to behave as group members (e.g., Brewer's results on trust)

The paradox
  - prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, presidents, are to be prototypes of the nation state, embody its norms, and represent its interests; this is what we ask them to be
  - they ALSO are the actors in charge of implementing the transfer sovereignty to the supra-national
    - (John Llyod)
  - same for constitutional courts: gate-keepers of the national essence (Montero) and actors in the intergration process!

- *Europeanization* of european elections
  - currently, there's no European agenda
- European constitution
- Clarification of competencies *(danger, especially in early phases, for spill-over to be depicted/perceived as a threat to pre-existing identities)*
- *otherwise*, "si je ne le fais pas, qui va le faire?"

Collective Identity
- What is (this) collective identity about?
  - historiography and social sciences approach
  - focus on content
  - characteristics of a specific collective identity; its genesis
- How people come to embrace collective identities?
- What are the consequences?
  - socio-psychological approach
  - focus on processes, considered general (at least in western culture)
  - a dose of positivism is needed

Why Social Identification
- Social psychological research:
  - positive identity *(Tajfel, Turner, Brown)*
  - assimilation vs differentiation needs *(Brewer)*
  - reduction of uncertainty *(Hogg, Abrams)*
  - extending the self into broader social entitities for existential concerns *(Castano,*

Paladino, et al.)

- Should be taken into account when designing policy, be it for integration of immigrants into a nation state, or of nation states into a supraordinate entity
  - e.g., neo-functional approach to EU integration

Issues emerged
- methodological
- ingroup love/outgroup hate

Are national ethnic identities compatible with tolerance
- (configurations of) institutions and identities
- are national/ethnic identities compatible with supraordinate identities?

Session report: Collective Action

Bert Klandermans
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Two methodological remarks

Let me begin my report with two methodological remarks. The first remark concerns the need for standardization. Listening to the various presentations in this session but also in the other sessions I was struck by the lack of a common terminology and standardized measurements. What do we mean by such concepts as identity, participation, integration and how do we measure it? The problem is that we are lacking good indicators of participation or integration, or for that matter identity, that allow us to compare over time or between countries or populations and therefore, we lack the data to draw firm conclusions. If the ESF were to stimulate and support research on the subject, workshops or projects that aim at conceptual clarification and the development of measures that can be used in different contexts would be extremely useful. The second remark regards the need for comparative and longitudinal studies. The kind of processes that interests us in this workshop are so much context dependent, that it is a necessity to investigate how they differ in various context and how they change over time.

Politics with other means

Collective action can be conceived of as politics with *other* means (Tilly, 1984). It is a mean in the interaction between *citizens* and the *state*. Traditionally political parties, pressure groups, etc. have taken the role of intermediary between citizens and the state. In Western democracies they established an institutionalised mediation structure at the local, regional and the national level. However, over the last few decades (since the fifties) the social movement industry[1] has become an increasingly effective alternative of the party system and pressure groups (Klandermans 1989; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). At the same time, institutionalised forms of participation have declined as Jan van Deth has argued so convincingly in his presentation.

I want to argue that we witness not so much a decline but rather a shift in participation. I maintain that citizens will continue to feel the need to influence the state, while on the other hand, state structures will continue to need actors that inform them about citizens and their desires and with whom they can negotiate. Of course, states can be more or less repressive and leave more or less space for actors to stage collective action. But the literature suggests that moderately repressive states generate more rather than less protest (cf. Olivier 1993). In any event, my argument implies that the average state has an interest in keeping the intermediary structures--be it parties or movements--going.

Indeed, over the last decades repertoires of collective action broadened. More people are using more different forms of collective action (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Klandermans 2001). Moreover, people have learned to employ collective action to promote their interests. Whether authorities interfere or fail to interfere in people's circumstances, citizens react by organizing and staging collective action. Imagine a waste incinerator planned near to a neighborhood, a trajectory of a highway or a railway track planned near to a town, or people affected by a flooding or industrial accidents (chemical waste, or an explosion of a fireworks company), little is needed for them to organize and to stage collective action if needed. This is all the more likely because such incidents come with a collective identity, namely that of the people affected.

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[1] Social movement literature distinguishes between social movement organizations, that is, organizations that are part of a social movement; social movement sectors, that is, all the organizations that belong to a specific social movement, for example, the peace movement; and social movement industries, that is all the social movements in a polity.

States structures have changed
The means citizens are using have changed, but so have states and state structures. It has been mentioned time and again processes such as globalization of the economy, the creation of supranational structures have made the nation state less relevant. Yet, it is not clear at all what that means in terms of collective action. It certainly does not mean that collective action automatically globalises as well. There is a very simple reason for that: for collective action to be staged you need a target and eventually some authority to negotiate with. You cannot protest globalization, because it has no residence. You can protest at meetings of the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, or the WTO and, of course, you can protest against your national government. In fact, residence is not enough, an institution must also have the authority to take binding decisions. Labour unions in Europe only negotiate at the national level, because there is no institution or organization at the European level that has the authority to take decisions that bind employers all over Europe. Agricultural policy on the other hand is to a large extent decided upon at the European level, nevertheless, even in this situation farmers tend to protest against their national government more frequently than against European authorities (Imig and Tarrow 2001).

Crucial questions to be answered in this regard to be answered in future research are such questions as What are exactly the statal and suprastatal structures involved in political decision making? What are their abilities and how does that influence citizen participation? Where does the authority reside?

Strategic opportunities and constraints
However, the transformation of the political system creates strategic opportunities and constraints for collective actors as well. In the first place, multi-layered governance raises for citizens the question of *where to protest?*[2] As a rule decisions are taken at the higher level and implemented at the lower level. At the national level authorities argue that they are not in charge of the implementation, at the local level authorities argue that they are not the ones who have taken the decision. In our own research among Dutch and Spanish farmers we found that many farmers held national government rather than European Union responsible for the situation of agricultural in their country. Yet, even if the held the European Union responsible those who were angry about agricultural policy were angry with their national government. Apparently, citizens expect lower level government to represent their interest and they are angry with lower level authorities if they fail to do so.

There is some evidence that collective actors can and do make strategic use of these different levels. For example, collective actors may forge coalitions with lower level government to put pressure on higher level government. Huberts (1989) demonstrates that local protests against highway trajectories are more effective if the actors manage to forge a coalition with the local authorities in opposition to national government. Tarrow (1995) shows that Spanish fishermen managed to put effectively pressure on the European Union with the help of their national government. On the other hand, actors sometimes appeal successfully to a higher authority to put pressure on a lower authority, as did the Dutch women's movement when it appealed to the European Court to enforce Dutch government to implement equal rule for women in the social security system.

Secondly, the existence of supranational political structures makes that citizens are confronted by the question of *how to mobilize across borders?* Thus far, we have witnessed very few successful transnational mobilizations (Tarrow 1995). Note, that transnational mobilization is different than the transnational diffusion of protest. By transnational mobilization I mean strategic and coordinated planning of protest in different countries by a transnational coalition of movement organizations. One of the rare examples of such mobilization has been the anti-cruise missile protests in Western Europe in the eighties and the more recent anti-globalization protests throughout the world shows some international planning and organizing. But these are exceptions. Indeed, more protest aims at a defence of national interests against outsiders, than at the promotion or protection of some common

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[2] Multi-layered governance is not a new phenomenon. Within countries there have always been several layers of government—for instance, local, provincial and national governance. Supranational structures have simply added a layer. The dynamics described here has always been immanent to layered polities.

interest across borders. For example, most farmers' protest in Europe aims at a defence of national interest against that of farmers in other parts of Europe (Bush and Simi 2001). In a similar vein, European labor unions have been unsuccessful in defending the workers' interest against the policy of multinational companies. Part of the problem originates from the lack of a collective identity. If social movement literature is right in assuming that some collective identity is needed for citizens to mobilize than the lack of such identity should be a serious constraint. In our own research among farmers in the Netherlands and Spain we found that farmers identified with other farmers in their community or their country but much less with farmers in Europe (Klandermans et al 2002).

Social movement scholars are only beginning to look into these dynamics and much more researched is needed to be able to give answers to the question related to the transnationalization of protest.

Citizenship has changed
Not only political repertoires and state structures have changed, the citizenship has changed too. Over the last decades the citizenship of every industrialized Western society has become much more heterogeneous and this has had far reaching consequences for conventional and contentious politics. To be sure, the citizenship has never been homogeneous in these countries. The second half of the 20th century we have witnessed such movements as the civil rights movement, the women's movement, new social movements that were typically rooted in the new middle class, and movements of the extreme right typically rooted in the old middle class. Nonetheless, migration has turned every industrialized country into a multicultural society. The process of social and cultural diversification resulted in a differentiation of societal and political participation and action repertoires, differential claims making ranging from access to the political arena to recognition of social, cultural and religious identity, and differential multiorganizational fields of actual and potential allies and opponents, of movement and countermovement organizations (women's organizations, migrant organizations, neighborhood or community organizations, civil society organizations).

With regard to collective action all this has meant a proliferation of groups acting on behalf of some group of citizens with a common identity and common interests. We are only beginning to explore this multidimensional space. Important questions concern the indigenous organizational fields among the citizenship or differential political participation (conventional and contentious), esp. among ethnic minorities and migrant populations.

The dynamics of collective action
I have discussed the new political structures that came into being, the diversification of Western societies, and the differentiation of collective action repertoires as a consequence. But little has been said, so far, about the processes that generate collective action. In an attempt to bring process in I propose three concepts—demand, supply, and mobilization—to analyze the dynamics of collective action.

Demand refers to characteristics of citizens that are the potential participants of collective action. What are their grievances, do they experience relative deprivation,[3] what kind of resources do they command, which groups do they identify with (collective identity), what do they expect from collective action, and so on.

Supply concerns the actors/organizations that stage collective action. There is no immaculate conception of collective action. They are always people, organizations, media, etc. involved. Such actors can be characterized in terms of their effectiveness, organizational strength, the resources they command, their record of past successes, the appeal of their action repertoire, and so on.

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[3] Relative deprivation refers to the conclusion that outcomes are less than what one feels one deserves. Comparison processes—be it comparison to other people or with the past—play an important role in the development of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Tyler and Smith 1998).

Mobilization is the marketing mechanism of the collective action domain. It is the process that brings demand and supply together. It encompasses such processes as framing,[4] communicating the message of the organizer to the public, and motivating people. Convincing and activating is what it is all about.

The key question in this regard is, of course, why does this particular group of citizens mobilize, while others in the same or comparable situation don't? The answer to this question can and must be sought in the interplay of the generation of demand in a society, the development of an appealing supply, and mobilization techniques that bring supply and demand together.

What motivates people to participate?

Eventually it is an individual that must decide to participate or not to participate. Why would people be motivated to participate in collective action? [5]

Thus far, in the social movement literature the answer to this question has been sought in three different directions which relate to three fundamental motives to participate in collective action: instrumentality, identity, and ideology. People participate because they want to change some state of affairs (instrumentality), because they identify with the group that is engage in collective action (identity), and because they want to express their view on, their anger about a state of affairs (ideology). In my view, each of these motives can be sufficient reason to participate, but I presume that they also accumulate and interact. That is to say, that the combination of instrumentality, identity and ideology is more powerful than each motive independently (Simon et al. 1998; and in this report). Moreover, I assume that a strong identification with the group of protestors or a strong ideological passion affects the instrumental component, identity and ideology conceivably reinforce each other.

Instrumentality refers to the expectation that the situation can be changed at affordable costs. Instrumentality as a motive is related to the strength of the grievances and the likelihood that these grievances can be successfully redressed by collective action. As these are public goods the dilemma of collective action must be solved. Expectations about the behaviour of others play an important role in this regard (Klandermans 1984). In addition, selective incentives[6] may add to the attractiveness of participation. However, there is reason to believe that the two other motives, namely identity and ideology are much more important to overcome the dilemma.

Identity refers to the strength of the identification with the group that is involved in collective action. Simon et al. (1998, see also Stürmer 2001) have convincingly demonstrated that identification with the group involved in collective action is an important motivator of participation. Compared to instrumentality identity is underinvestigated as a motive to participate in collective action. Important questions such as what makes a collective identity salient and what makes it politicise, are still waiting for an answer (see Simon and Klandermans 2001). Not to speak of such issues as the impact of multiple identity and super-

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[4] In order to mobilize people some degree of consensus is needed among potential participants to become actively involved in collective action. Klandermans (1984) distinguished between consensus mobilization and action mobilization to separate these two aspects of mobilization. Snow et al. (1986) further elaborated the process of consensus mobilization in their frame alignment approach. A social movement organization defines a state of affairs. The resulting frame is specified by Snow and his colleagues into a diagnosis (what is the problem and who is responsible for it?) and a prognosis (What to do?). Frame alignment describes the process of dissemination and persuasion that social movement organizations engage in to convince and activate people.

[5] Since the publication of Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1968) this question only became more pressing. After all, Olson argued that rational actors would chose to not participate. Collective action produces public goods and public goods have the characteristic that they are made available to everybody in the community, irrespective of whether they have participated in their production. Hence, from the perspective of the rational actor there is no need to participate to reap the benefits.

[6] Selective incentives are costs and benefits that are directly related to participation or non-participation. Olson (1968) maintains that only selective incentives make rational actors chose to take part in collective action (but see Oliver 1980, Klandermans 1988).

and subordinate identity on collective action participation. As for the first, participants in collective action face the problem of how to reconcile the different collective identities they belong to (for example, worker, female, ethnic minority). As for the second, participants in collective action on behalf of a subgroup are often accused of forsaking or undermining some superordinate identity (for example, ethnic identity vs. national identity).

Ideology refers to participation in collective action for no other reason than that people want to express their disagreement with a policy or show their anger about it. Strange enough such passion as a motive for participation has been the least studied. Only recently such scholars as Jasper, Goodwin and Poletta (Jasper 1998; Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2001) are beginning to explore the terrain.

Conclusion

To conclude, a whole host of questions regarding collective action is still waiting for an answer, especially, if we focus our questions on collective action participation by the migrant populations in Western European societies. To be sure, we have learned a lot during the last thirty years but there remains a lot to be studied. In this respect, it would be of extreme relevance to conduct a comparative study of collective action participation among ethnic minorities in European countries.

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Session report: Integration

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As a device to place the discussion of this workshop in a broader theoretical context, may I suggest that the manner in which it is conceptualized is influenced by whether one starts from the perspective of Emile Durkheim or Adam Smith. The set of slides presented show how these differences unfold as on one moves through a series of stages running though:

- Basic assumption on the role of values in society.
- Fundamental assumption about the distribution of resources.
- Mechanisms through which integration is achieved
- Implications for the regulatory role of the state.
- Negative consequences of mode of state regulation.
- Responses to unintended negative consequences.

Summary slide from PowerPoint presentation:

Two paradigms of social integration (SI)

	Durkheim	Smith
Hypothesis	Value consensus → SI	Value dissensus → SI
Assumption	SI = zero-sum game	SI = positive-sum game
Mechanism	Consensus → common concepts and goals →cooperation	Dissensus → exchange → greater welfare → cooperation
Policy implication	State regulation to increase cultural homogeneity	*Laissez-faire* state multiculturalism
Downside of policy	Labor shortage → immigration	Business cycle → political instability
Remedy	Attempt to assimilate	Rise of welfare state
New problem	Failure to asssimilate; right-wing backlash	Demographic challenges to welfare state

Towards an Action Plan [.]

Christopher Whelan

Chair of the Standing Committee of the Social Sciences

Introduction

The Forward Look (FL) on *Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity and Integration* has followed closely the overall model for such ventures in the establishment of a specialist preparatory group, the commissioning of high level overview papers, the use of designated discussants and the bringing together of outstanding academics and policy makers in a conference that promotes interaction and an assessment not only of the current state of knowledge but also an exploration of new directions in research and policy formulation. The Menaggio *Workshop Report* provides an account of the outcomes to date of this process. This report will provide a reference point for the future and it is intended that its diffusion through the use of web sites and other means will lead to a substantial engagement of the research community. For this we must offer our sincere gratitude to all who have participated to this point.

It was always intended, however, that the FL process should extend beyond the holding of a conference and indeed the output of such a conference. Extending the process requires that attention is focused on the development of an *Action Plan* in order to develop research goals and means of implementation. In relation to the present FL it is anticipated that using this report as a reference point this process should be initiated by a small ESF Task Force (TF) composed of outstanding contributors to the Menaggio Workshop. The procedural objective of such TF would be to pave the way for the establishment of a Forward Look *Project Advisory Board* (PAB) with its own infrastructure. The PAB would provide overall intellectual leadership within a governance structure appropriate to the project formula adopted. Both the choice of project structure and the research policy objectives are outcomes that must emerge from this process and cannot be anticipated or dictated by us at this point. However, what we can perhaps usefully do, drawing on the outcomes of the Menaggio Workshop, is draw attention to some of the crucial issues with which the TF and PAB will have to grapple

Project-design approach

Acknowledging the existence of a substantial body of research on migration-related issues, the Menaggio Workshop expressed a strongly felt-need for the development of a further and more ambitious research agenda focusing on both significant theoretical gaps and on the required links between research and policy. Ideally, it was felt that efforts towards strengthening theoretical foundations and methodological instruments should be accompanied by studies that contribute to the evaluation of the impact of policy. A major objective is to transcend the current disciplinary fragmentation of intrinsically inter-related issues and move research questions pertaining to international migration, ethnic relations, diversity and multiculturalism to the forefront of the academic debate. Accordingly, basic research, policy analysis and the development of bridging mechanisms were suggested as the building blocks of a project needed to address such issues in a comprehensive fashion.

[.] in preparing this section, I have benefited substantially from the availability of the earlier overview of the Forward Look (A Follow-up Report) prepared by Wlodzimierz Okrasa

There was a strongly held view that the ESF could provide a suitable umbrella for this ambitious task. The nature of the topic does not, however, lend itself easily to the standard formula for a scientific project, such as those offered within the ESF's 'traditional instruments' packet. This task faced therefore is to move this process forward within the FL formula while drawing on ideas generated during the Menaggio Workshop. To the extent that policy relevance remains to the fore, the scale of the challenge is magnified since what is involved is not just a research project but an attempt to use relevant knowledge and learning fo 'best practices' purposes

Possible Project components

1. Core project: *Organizing research activities*

The Menaggio Workshop strongly recommended that a long-running scientific programme be organized, which would take into account the dynamic and complex nature of the central topic through being:

- o   longitudinal in terms of both empirical evidence and of theoretical and policy outlook;
- o   multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary
- o   comparative
- o   evaluative
- o   participatory
- o   sensitive to cultural differences
- o   policy relevant.

It was felt that the development of such a long-term project would benefit from the involvement of a wide range of academics policy makers and disseminators in its governance structure. It was also felt that a suitable framework for such action could involve using ESF possibilities - such as those provided by EUROCORES - in a combination with other institutional possibilities, such as those available within the EU's 6th Framework Programme

2. Linking research and policy: *establishing a science-policy community*

There now appears to exist 'critical mass' of demand from both social science and policy representative to provide a framework to improve interaction between researchers and policymakers concerned with problems connected to international migration. Creating a mechanism to facilitate collaboration between researchers and politicians and policy-practitioners at each stage of jointly designed research would contribute substantially to the development of evidence-based policy. The success of such efforts would be crucially influenced by the degree of effectiveness of communication channels. To this end consideration of issues involved in developing effective means of knowledge dissemination and transfer and knowledge utilization and feedback become crucial

Infrastructure

There was clear agreement at the Menaggio Workshop that all of the major activities of such an ambitious programme – research, training and research-policy cooperation – would require adequate infrastructure: Among the elements which could contribute to success of such a venture would be:

- A database on international migration for comparative research purposes and for policy evaluation
- Research and policy interaction facilities: creating sustainable mechanisms for communication and consultation, either on an institutional or virtual basis.
- Training facilities: IT-based distance learning facilities ('learning platform'), and other required means.

- Knowledge web site – an advanced web for regular news on the project progress, for printing a newsletter and for e-debate among researchers and policy makers.

Project management and monitoring

The fully developed Forward Look Project in the social sciences should be a relatively autonomous project, remaining under the scientific auspices of the ESF but moving toward a broader funding basis. In its initial phases such a project would most likely be dependent on ESF-organized resources (the most likely combination being Exploratory Workshops and EUROCORES). In its later stages it should benefit from wide-scale interest in the key policy-related issues among a range of other funding organizations.. Such additional support would be especially needed to ensure the sustainability of the science-policy linkages, of benefit to policy and research alike.

Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity and Collective Action Consequences of the opening up of national borders

Hotel Grand Victoria, Lago di Como, Italy
3 - 7 April 2002

PROGRAMME

WEDNESDAY 3 APRIL

Morning / early afternoon	Registration **Hotel Grand Victoria** Lungolago G. Castelli 7 22017 Menaggio

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Website: http://www.palacehotel.it

16.00   **Welcome and Opening**
            Enric Banda, *ESF Secretary General*
            Christopher Whelan*, Chair of the Standing Committee for
            the Social Sciences*

GENERAL SESSION

Chair: **Robert Erikson**

16.15   **Robert Erikson**
            (Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research, SE)
            Introduction

16.30   **Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt** (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, IL)
            *Collective Identity, Public Spheres, Civil Societies and
            Citizenship in the Contemporary World - beyond the Model of
            the Nation-State*

17.00	Coffee break
17.30	**Charles Westin** (Stockholm University, SE) *Rethinking Multiculturalism and the Swedish Nation State.* *Striking a Balance between Diversity and Social Cohesion*
18.00	**Russel Hardin** (New York University, US) *Discussant's Comments and Perspectives*
18.15 - 19.00	General Discussion
20.00	Dinner

THURSDAY 4 APRIL

SESSION 1: DIVERSITY

Chair: **Jadwiga Koralewicz**

09.00	**Jadwiga Koralewicz** (Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, PL) *Introduction*
09.15	**Douglas Massey** (University of Pennsylvania, US) *How to Design a Really Stupid Immigration Policy:* *U.S. Actions and their Consequences 1986-1996*
09.45	**Dietrich Thränhardt** (Universität Münster, D) *The Politics of Diversity and Integration in Germany and the* *Netherlands: A Comparison*
10.15	Coffee break
10.45	**Han Entzinger** (Rotterdam University, NL) *Discussant's comments: Summary of the main results and* *identification of research questions*
11.15 - 12.00	**General Discussion** *Questions from Politicians* *Perspectives for the workshop arising from Session 1*
12.30	Lunch

SESSION 2: IDENTITY

Chair: **Amélie Mummendey**

14.00   **Amélie Mummendey** (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, D)
Introduction

14.15   **Marilynn Brewer** (Ohio State University, US)
Social Identity and Social Institutions: A Case of Co-evolution

14.45   **Elena Mannová** (Bratislava, SK)
Historical Dimensions of Collective Identities in Central Europe

15.15   **Rupert Brown** (University of Kent, UK)
The Concept of Social Identity in Social Psychology: Implications for Social Exclusion and Integration

15.45   Coffee Break

16.15   **Bart Maddens** (K. U. Leuven, B)
Discussant's comments: Summary of the main results

16.30   **Marga Gomez-Reino** (Universidad de Salamanca, E)
Discussant's comments: Identification of research questions

16.45 - 17.30   **General Discussion**
Questions from Politicians
Perspectives for the workshop arising from Session 2

20.00   Dinner

FRIDAY 5 APRIL

SESSION 3: COLLECTIVE ACTION

Chair: **Hanspeter Kriesi**

09.00   **Hanspeter Kriesi** (Université de Genève, CH)
Introduction

09.15   **Jan van Deth** (Universität Mannheim, D)
The End of Politics? Political Engagement in a depoliticising World

09.45   **Bernd Simon** (Universität Kiel, D)
Identity and Collective Action

10.15   Coffee break

10.45	**Dieter Rucht** (WZ-Berlin, D)
	Discussant's comments: Summary of the main results and identification of research questions
11.15 - 12.00	**General Discussion**
	Questions from Politicians
	Perspectives for the workshop arising from Session 3
12.30	Lunch

Free Afternoon.

Concert at Villa Vigoni and Dinner

SATURDAY 6 APRIL

SESSION 4: INTEGRATION

Chair: **Jaak Billiet**

09.00	**Jaak Billiet** (K-U Leuven, B)
	Introduction
09.15	**Rinus Penninx** (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)
	States, Cities and Immigrants: Principles and Practice of Integration Policies in Europe
09.45	**Miles Hewstone** (University of Oxford, UK)
	Facing the Challenge of Integration: The Contributions of 'Contact' and 'Categorization'
10.15	Coffee break
10.45	**Andreas Wimmer** (Universität Bonn, D)
	Discussant's comments: Summary of the main results and Identification of research questions
11.15 - 12.00	**General Discussion**
	Questions from Politicians
	Perspectives for the workshop arising from Session 4
12.30	Lunch

FINAL GENERAL SESSION: PERSPECTIVES FOR A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH PROGRAMME

Chair: **Hartmut Esser** (Universität Mannheim, D)

	Identification of Research Problems from the Perspectives of Social Science and Politics *Reports from Sessions 1 - 4, including 10 mins discussion*
14.00	Rapporteur Session 1: **Rainer Bauböck** (Institut für Politikwissenschaft, A)
14.30	Rapporteur Session 2: **Emanuele Castano** (University of Kent, UK)
15.00	Rapporteur Session 3: **Bert Klandermans** (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, NL)
15.30	Rapporteur Session 4: **Michael Hechter** (University of Washington, US)
16.00	Coffee
16.30 - 18.30	**Final Discussion: Conclusions and Future Actions** *Summary of research problems identified by rapporteurs* *First Outline of a long-run Research Programme discussed from the Perspective of Social Scientists and Politicians/Practioners*
20.00	Dinner

SUNDAY 7 APRIL

Breakfast and Departure

EUROPEAN SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Standing Committee for the Social Sciences: Forward Look Workshop
Cultural Diversity, Collective Identity and Collective Action
Menaggio, Lago di Como, Italy, 3-7 April 2002

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