ESF Forward Look

Central and Eastern Europe
Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe
European Science Foundation (ESF)

The European Science Foundation (ESF) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, the members of which are 72 national funding agencies, research performing agencies and academies from 30 countries. The strength of ESF lies in its influential membership and in its ability to bring together the different domains of European science in order to meet the challenges of the future.

Since its establishment in 1974, ESF, which has its headquarters in Strasbourg with offices in Brussels and Ostend, has assembled a host of organisations that span all disciplines of science, to create a common platform for cross-border cooperation in Europe.

ESF is dedicated to promoting collaboration in scientific research and in funding of research and science policy across Europe. Through its activities and instruments, ESF has made major contributions to science in a global context. ESF covers the following scientific domains:

- Humanities
- Life, Earth and Environmental Sciences
- Medical Sciences
- Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Social Sciences
- Marine Sciences
- Materials Science and Engineering
- Nuclear Physics
- Polar Sciences
- Radio Astronomy
- Space Sciences

www.esf.org

Forward Looks

ESF Forward Looks provide medium- to long-term authoritative visions on science perspectives in broad areas of research bringing together ESF Member Organisations, other research organisations and the scientific community in creative interaction.

Forward Look reports and other outputs such as ESF Science Policy Briefings assist policy makers and researchers in defining optimal research agendas and in setting priorities. Quality assurance mechanisms, based on peer review where appropriate, are applied at every stage of the development and delivery of a Forward Look to ensure its credibility and impact.

www.esf.org/llooks

Editors

Karen Henderson
Professor Vello Pettai
Dr Agnieszka Wenninger

This ESF Forward Look report has been prepared under the responsibility of the Standing Committee for the Social Sciences (SCSS):

Chair: Professor Sir Roderick Floud
Head of Social Sciences Unit and Forward Look Coordinator (until 2010): Dr Balázs Kiss
Head of the Humanities and Social Sciences Unit and Forward Look Coordinator:
Dr Nina Kancewicz-Hoffman
Editorial support: Mr Étienne Franchineau, Junior Science Officer

Cover picture:
Romanian Schengen zone border entrance
© Corbis
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Introducing the Forward Look

1. European research funding on Central and Eastern Europe: an empirical baseline for a thematic rethinking of the CEE research agenda  
   
   Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Olivier Ruchet  
   
   13

2. Post-communist capitalisms after crisis: scenarios for Central and Eastern Europe against the backdrop of economic recovery and European integration  
   
   Vello Pettai and Martin Brusis  
   
   23

## Forward Look Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

3. Economics  
   
   Vello Pettai  
   
   35

4. Sociology  
   
   Silvia Miháliková and Olga Gyárfášová  
   
   39

5. Political Science  
   
   Karen Henderson  
   
   45

6. Local Governance  
   
   Ilona Pálné Kovács  
   
   51

7. Conclusions and Recommendations  
   
   55

## Annexes

- Annex 1. Scientific and Management Committees  
  
  63
- Annex 2. List of Events  
  
  64
- Annex 3. List of organisations potentially interested in the recommendations  
  
  65
- References  
  
  66
In the last decade of the 20th century, social scientific research the world over paid special attention to the post-socialist transition, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). From the fall of communism until today, those countries have experienced profound changes; they have gone through democratic and economic transition and most of them are now full members of the European Union. Hence, beyond this transition, new societal challenges are currently on their horizon. It is therefore essential for the future of this region that we mobilise the full resources of all countries in the analysis and solution of problems which are of great importance to Central and Eastern European societies and economies and to that of Europe as a whole. Crucial aspects of this endeavour concern the study of social, economic and political developments in CEE and also the development of the potential which exists in Central and Eastern Europe. The social sciences have a great deal to offer, since few important problems can be solved by technological solutions alone; instead, they require knowledge of the histories, cultures, belief systems and constraints which apply, differentially, throughout Europe.

Previous initiatives by the European Science Foundation have looked at the research environment organisation and structure in CEE rather than the content of research agendas. The research community therefore suggested that, in the social sciences, a renewed research agenda would usefully complement other efforts to overcome the structural and resource challenges faced by researchers from CEE. In setting new frontiers in social science research in and on CEE and identifying the main research challenges for social scientists, the Forward Look ‘Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe’ brings this complement.

The report summarises the contributions of approximately 100 experts and scientists across Europe who participated in this project. The strong participation of numerous scholars from CEE countries shows that academics from Western and Eastern European countries need to collaborate in order to advance the frontiers of science. The ultimate goal of this Forward Look was to rethink social sciences research in and on Central and Eastern Europe and, to this end, this report provides an agenda with specific conclusions and recommendations including several sets of specific research themes.

While setting those new perspectives for CEE research in social sciences, the Forward Look also establishes a new cornerstone for European research and we thus encourage all stakeholders to work together toward the building of this “beyond transition” perennial research framework in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Sir Roderick Floud,  
Chair, Standing Committee for the Social Sciences

Mr Martin Hynes,  
ESF Chief Executive
Executive Summary

The last 25 years have witnessed some of the most profound political, social and economic changes in Europe’s history. The fall of communism at the end of the 1980s not only reshaped relationships within the continent against a background of rapidly increasing globalisation, but also provided fascinating insights into the potential for, and limitations of, the large-scale reshaping of society.

The Forward Look ‘Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe’ aims both to identify the developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) which would, could or should become hot research topics in the study of CEE as a part of European society and as such be promoted and endorsed by national and European grant institutions; and to outline ways in which foresight on CEE can contribute to the development of the social sciences in general and input important topics into transnational research.

To this end, the Forward Look ‘Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe’ provides a range of specific conclusions and recommendations contributing to the formation of targeted projects which meet the needs of policy makers struggling with the future challenges that are now facing Europe and the wider world.

1. Forward Look Findings

Convergence and divergence
For Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) research funding organisations on the one hand and Western European ones on the other, the themes of “Economic competition” and “Economic policies” were in the top three in both groups of funding agencies. An emphasis on “Regions, urban–rural issues” was more important in the East while “Methodology” carried more weight in the West. Thus, the general result of the Survey was that the research priorities of foundations in Western Europe and CEE do have some significant differences. Overall, however, similarities are more characteristic of the general picture and it seems reasonable to expect that this trend will continue.

Scenarios for the future
The dual dynamics of EU integration and economic development will matter most for CEE looking forward to 2020. The scenarios and their underlying assumptions do not suggest a major new research paradigm replacing the Europeanisation research of the 2000s. Rather than assuming unidirectional adaptation effects in CEE in the face of EU influences, this perspective highlights how domestic political actors might use and/or abuse the constraints and options offered by a Europeanised institutional, economic and social environment. If anything, the scenarios point to a need to see Central and Eastern Europe in a multi-level and multi-dimensional development setting.
2. Conclusions: Thematic Clusters

A number of forward-looking research topics have been suggested for each of the disciplines considered in the report. However, some interdisciplinary thematic clusters could be identified.

Populations in change
Out-migration, in-migration, regional population change, ethnic minorities and integration all affect the basic structure of our populations and alter social relations, governance challenges and economic opportunities. Many Western European countries have long faced similar challenges, particularly with regard to in-migration, which is a relatively new and as yet limited phenomenon in CEE, and more could be done to examine the possible divergences in priorities in different parts of Europe. In CEE, population shifts sometimes take place against the backdrop of still unresolved questions of indigenous ethnic minority integration, and while the danger of direct ethnic conflict has generally subsided, policy debate and political rhetoric about migration issues are particularly complex where they co-exist with older ethnic minority problems.

New Geographies of Europe
The ‘return to Europe’ – overcoming the West–East divide – has been a prevailing perspective on transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, and issues such as the economic division of labour between Western and Eastern Europe and how local governance and regional development are affected by EU cohesion funds will continue to need research. At the same time, geographic imaginaries are changing in Europe – a complex process in which the notion of Central and Eastern Europe will become more diffuse; and the recent financial and economic crisis has shown that the fates of many Western and Eastern European countries were much more interwoven than amongst the CEE countries themselves. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe also play a role in expanding Europe’s border further to the East, despite unease toward deepening cooperation with Russia, and the broader process of democratisation, including prospects for further EU enlargement, are crucial for Europe’s future.

Social cohesion
The degree of socio-economic transformation that post-communist Europe has undergone over the last 20 years has been astounding, including not only privatisation, but other forms of extensive capital and resource redistribution. Yet what has been the effect of this change on social cohesion and harmony? Beyond the past discussions of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from the transformation, scholars need to begin to study how these differences may (or may not) be now reproducing themselves across generations. What will be the transnational impact of these developments? In Western Europe there is also debate on decreased social mobility and changing party systems, and the international research agenda must effectively encompass and compare all such shifts. A second aspect of social cohesion concerns social trust. Old stresses in CEE – be they political from the era of communist repression or economic from the waning days of planned economy – have eased, and new relationships based on autonomous opportunity and choice have emerged. Yet, generalised social trust across the region remains low, which undermines society’s ability to stand for democracy. This issue is not confined to CEE and trust in institutions and in processes of all kinds is a useful topic for Europe-wide research.

3. Forward Look Recommendations

This Forward Look was designed to generate new thematic perspectives for social science research in and on Central and Eastern Europe and has thus formulated eight recommendations seen as the minimum pre-conditions for such research.

Recommendation 1
Ensure CEE issues are adequately addressed in European level funding opportunities
Given the particular focus of this Forward Look, the research themes that emerged have focused on issues specific to Central and Eastern Europe. However, in all cases it is important that not only research be conducted within the CEE states themselves, but also that the specifics of the region be incorporated into transnational research agendas. In this respect, European-level funding for social science research continues to be essential, since most national-level research funding agencies in CEE do not have the resources to initiate international projects.

Recommendation 2
Support multinational comparative projects
In this project, all of the research priorities that have been listed call out for a comparative, multi-country approach. Funders should clearly prioritise projects that apply such perspectives and do not limit themselves to purely national introspection.
Recommendation 3  
Invest in dedicated research infrastructures

For transnational research projects really to achieve comparative results, it is essential that scholars have access to cross-national data and that such data are comparable with the rest of Europe and globally. According to the Forward Look survey, ‘infrastructure, databases’ is the research topic where expenditure by West European foundations exceeds that of CEE foundations most conspicuously.

Access to high quality national data resources from CEE requires targeted financial support for CEE data archives along with specific actions directed at such issues as standardisation, tools and services provision as well as training opportunities for data providers and users.

Recommendation 4  
Encourage academic independence and research excellence

Research ethics and developing a new kind of standard research culture are of crucial importance for the quality of the general societal and political environment in which research takes place. It is therefore also of relevance, when assessing research conducted in CEE, to compare the influence and ‘political embeddedness’ of social scientists compared to Western Europe. How are academic freedom and independence guaranteed in CEE? What are the standards of research excellence, and how and where are they produced?

Recommendation 5  
Support CEE scholars in project leader positions

The survey conducted as part of the Forward Look showed particularly low participation of CEE scholars as coordinators in EC-funded framework projects. While this situation continues, governments and policy makers in CEE have only reduced possibilities of influencing transnational research agendas. Many social scientists in CEE have considerable experience and competence in research project management, and require skilled administrative back-up rather than leadership training in order to coordinate major international initiatives.

Recommendation 6  
Strengthen the interaction of social scientists and society

A stronger dialogue should be established with policy makers in order to present to them the potential contribution of social sciences to social developments. Many academic researchers in CEE have good contacts with politicians and policy makers, and high level meetings with, for example, MPs and MEPs at national and regional levels can assist in developing such a dialogue. Policy makers (the research recipients) should be involved in particular with regard to the potential impact of applied research.

Recommendation 7  
Develop good governance of science and resources

There should be regular meetings of researchers with research funders in CEE and the European Commission (ministries, research funding agencies, EC Directorates General). These should include briefings about potential research directions both in basic and applied research; mobilisation of national support for scholarly data facilities and the launching of specific programmes focusing on research infrastructures and data collection based on national data sharing policies; and action to ensure that peer reviewers from CEE are adequately represented in transnational actions.

Recommendation 8  
Strengthen human capital and capacities

Training opportunities should continue to be created for early career researchers. Care should be taken to ensure that young CEE scholars remain a priority and that tendencies for such career development opportunities increasingly to target Eastern European scholars from non-EU Member States should not jeopardise training provision for young scholars in other CEE states.
The last 25 years have witnessed some of the most profound political, social and economic changes in Europe’s history. The fall of communism at the end of the 1980s not only reshaped relationships within the continent against a background of rapidly increasing globalisation, but also provided fascinating insights into the potential for, and limitations of, the large-scale reshaping of society. This Final Report of the European Science Foundation’s Forward Look ‘Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe’ highlights some of the ways in which this experience can enrich social science research, and contribute to the formation of targeted projects which meet the needs of policy makers struggling with the future challenges that are now facing Europe and the wider world. To this end, the Report not only summarises the results of the Forward Look project, but also provides a range of specific conclusions and recommendations, including several sets of specific research themes identified as imperative for future social science research in and on the region.

This Forward Look builds on the ESF’s longstanding involvement with the social sciences in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In 2006, the ESF’s Standing Committee for the Social Sciences (SCSS) devoted its first major initiative focusing on this part of Europe – the MOCEE project (Member Organisations in Central and Eastern Europe). This project investigated the infrastructure for social science in CEE, looking at administrative structures, resource issues and national research policies as well as networking at an international level both within and beyond the region. The project produced a number of publications, most notably the book Internationalisation of Social Sciences in Central and Eastern Europe: The ‘Catching Up’ – A Myth or a Strategy?, edited by Ilona Pálné Kovács and Dagmar Kutsar. In addition, the project released a report on ‘Status and Developments of Social Science Research in Central and Eastern Europe’ and an ESF SCSS Science Position Paper ‘Promoting Internationalisation of the Social Sciences in Central and Eastern Europe’.

This Forward Look, however, has focused primarily on the subject matter of social science research on CEE rather than the infrastructure that facilitates it (although the latter is of crucial importance with regard to the implementation of this Report’s recommendations). The aim of the Forward Look was therefore to suggest a medium-term agenda for social science research on CEE. It draws from the work of the MOCEE project, while also recognising the extent of internationalisation that already exists in research. Most notably, we assumed while designing the project that social science research on CEE is conducted in a number of different forums, of which research institutions in the states themselves are but one. Researchers from CEE make a major contribution to research conducted by organisations based outside the area, including other ESF Member Organisations. Future agendas for social science research on CEE are therefore of interest to a very broad range of stakeholders.

Of equal importance is the fact that we launched the project with no pre-conceived ideas of the extent to which societal developments in CEE are sui generis and require a regional approach to research agendas. In looking at the issues likely to be of key significance to policy makers in the future, we paid attention both to specific developments in CEE that related to the communist legacy, and to the experiences of countries which have undergone rapid transition that highlight the importance of new
with the inclusion of CEE states often tacitly being based on a normative assumption that convergence with Western Europe was the goal of social development in the ‘post-communist world’. Yet by the end of the first decade of the new millennium, it was clear that research on CEE had passed through a number of phases:

- The ‘transition phase’ in the 1990s saw a major- ity of research focused on democratisation and economic transformation. Although the fall of communism per se initially attracted the most attention, much comparative work later in the decade was concerned with analysing the character of the changes that followed the fall of communism. In economics, discussion focused on whether rapid liberalisation and privatisation would themselves create the conditions for people to change their economic behaviour and reorient to a commercial and profit oriented outlook, or whether institutional change was a necessary prerequisite for capitalist development. In political science and sociology there was a debate on whether the revolutions were part of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation including Latin America and southern Europe (an approach labelled ‘transitology’), while some transnational studies attempted to compare CEE to Western European states. At an empirical level research focused on the development of the new institutional framework of democracy, the changing character of elites and their influence areas for Europe-wide or global research. It was also not assumed that the countries of CEE form a single ‘bloc’ where research imperatives are the same. We attempted, therefore, to create a multi-level agenda which reflects the diversity of CEE experience and the many ways in which it can contribute to understanding societal development as a whole. Since the field of social sciences is extremely broad, we concentrated primarily on three disciplines, Economics, Sociology and Political Science. In addition, we chose one sub-field, Local Governance, which raises some particularly interesting issues in CEE, and is to an extent interdisciplinary in its research focus.1

In terms of geographic focus, we chose to look particularly at the states of Central and Eastern Europe currently in the European Union (EU), where many research foundations are ESF Member Organisations. At the same time, we maintained an awareness that developments in these states could be particularly relevant for the future of the EU. It was noted that the EU currently embraces 27 states, of which ten formerly had some form of communist rule. Almost all candidates and potential candidates were post-communist states, and all the European states included in the European Neighbourhood Policy were post-communist. Consequently, it is possible that in the future, almost half of the EU’s member states will have had a protracted communist interlude in the past. Consequently, frameworks for European social science research which assume that the states of Central and Eastern Europe represent the ‘other’ compared to a western European ‘norm’ appear inappropriate.

Origins of the Project

The project’s starting point was the Strategic Workshop ‘Beyond Transition’ hosted by Dr Balázs Kiss, Head of the Social Sciences Unit at ESF, in Budapest in May 2008, and attended by many members of the ESF’s Standing Committee for the Social Sciences representing Member Organisations in CEE, as well as a number of other academics specialising in social science research on CEE.

The rationale behind the workshop was that, since the regime changes in CEE had taken place with rather unexpected speed, research agendas focusing on CEE had frequently been reactive, while research priorities of major transnational projects were usually determined by West European agendas, 1. The project’s survey of existing social science research projects (see Chapter 2) also showed that ‘regions, urban–rural issues and development’ are a prominent focus for political science research.
over economic and political change, the relative weakness of civil society development, the social welfare consequences of economic change, and changes in popular culture and attitudes towards the old and new regimes.

- The ‘consolidation phase’ started in the 2000s, when the European integration process began to dominate the research agenda on CEE. While EU enlargement had been a peripheral research topic at the point when detailed negotiations commenced in 1997–1999, within a few years it became the framework within which much social science research was conducted. Harmonisation and conditionality were viewed as leading forces driving political and economic transformation. Additional empirical concerns included questions of different types of capitalism, migration across Europe, problems of corruption and international crime, ethnic identities and their relation to political consolidation and the promotion of social justice according to EU norms, and social policy reforms and their meaning in terms of the character of social policy regimes in different countries in the region.

- The ‘beyond transition’ phase emerged around 2005–2007, when the period of rapid change in CEE ended, and many states in the region had achieved membership of the European Union. While research during this phase has continued to focus on Europeanisation issues, it was also soon engulfed by the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, although scholars have yet to draw any definitive conclusions from this particular challenge.

The Forward Look therefore aimed both to identify developments in CEE which would, could or should become hot research topics in the study of CEE as a part of European society and as such be promoted and endorsed by national and European grant institutions; and to outline ways in which foresight on CEE can contribute to the development of the social sciences in general and input important topics into transnational research. However, while the Forward Look began with a rather CEE-focused agenda, the foresight methods employed by the ESF in conducting the Forward Look placed these issues firmly within the context of the more general challenges facing the social sciences and policy makers.

Implementing the Forward Look

The work of the Forward Look took place over an 18-month period from the appointment of its Scientific Committee in September 2009 to the Consensus Conference held in Berlin in February 2011. Three workshops took place in the intervening period:

1. Bratislava, Slovakia, February 2010

The first workshop was based on ‘horizon scanning’, in which over 40 social scientists renowned for their research expertise on the CEE region were asked to identify major factors that would ‘drive’ social change in the next decade. The scanning method involved singling out drivers across six salient change categories: Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political and Values (also known as the STEEPV method). Thereafter the participants were asked to reformulate these drivers into the most important areas where cutting-edge social science research would be likely to prove essential for policy makers managing change processes. Both interdisciplinary and subject-specific sessions (looking at economics, sociology, political science and local governance) were held.

2. Leicester, UK, May 2010

The second workshop turned the focus toward specific disciplinary topics, starting with sociological and economic research. Keynote presentations (from Lazar Vlasceanu and Hans-Jürgen Wagener) were followed by discussions in disciplinary-specific groups. Prior to the workshop participants had been asked to elaborate on their own recent research as well as formulate their own predictions for future research agendas in CEE. During the workshop’s discussions, these perspectives were critically analysed and a synthesis of the most important research topics was generated.

3. Sofia, Bulgaria, June 2010

The third workshop continued the disciplinary format with a focus on political science and local governance. As with the Leicester workshop, keynote presentations (from Martin Brusis and Michal Illner) were followed by discussion in disciplinary-specific groups. In terms of methodological approaches used, participants undertook a SWOT analysis of the current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to research in Central and Eastern Europe.

Alongside these interactive methods, the Scientific Committee of the Forward Look also commissioned two written studies. The first was a ‘state-of-the-art’ survey aimed at compiling and analysing as large a database as possible of social science research projects on CEE that have been financed by ESF member organisations and the European Commission’s Framework Programmes for the last
several years. As will be detailed in the next chapter, the objective here was to gain an understanding of the thematic, geographic and cross-regional patterns of research on CEE in Europe. The survey was carried out under the direction of Hans-Dieter Klingemann from the Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung Berlin.

The second study involved generating a series of foresight-based ‘scenarios’, in which different combinations of drivers were played out in order to model possible future event trajectories in CEE. (See Chapter 2.) The aim here was to build an awareness of different research issues that might arise depending on how these societies broadly evolve over the next ten years. The study was coordinated by Vello Pettai and Martin Brusis.

The final Consensus Conference in Berlin encompassed a review and discussion of all the project elements listed above. In addition to synthesising the research perspectives generated at the earlier workshops, the conference also assessed both the ‘state-of-the-art’ study as well as the future scenarios. All of these discussions were then placed in the final context of formulating conclusions and recommendations from the project as a whole.

In total, more than 90 academics and stakeholders from 25 countries took part in the different workshops and the final Consensus Conference of the Forward Look. Many individuals attended more than one event, and we are profoundly grateful to them all for their participation in the project and all their comments – both critical and enthusiastic. We apologise if in this report we have included many ideas without acknowledging the contributors who introduced them into our discussions: the lively nature of the debate made it impossible to do more than to encapsulate some of the Forward Look’s major findings.

**Convergence and Divergence**

An important conceptual framework that came into view with the mapping out of CEE research over the last two decades concerned the twin phenomena of *convergence* and *divergence*. In the course of the project, this understanding deepened, helping to structure many of the discussions that would ensue. Seen as neither mutually exclusive nor pre-ordained, the two processes helped build an awareness of the multi-dimensional character of societal developments going on in CEE. They also cut across all of the main disciplines studied in this project.

For example, across many broadly systemic categories of analysis the imperative has been to highlight patterns of convergence. Namely, all the countries of the region have been encouraged to build democratic institutions, develop market economies and rebuild social cohesion. And indeed within a few short years a number of indicators across these domains showed signs of approximation with Western European levels. Free market exchange became well established, democracy was nearing consolidation, and social decline appeared at least arrested.

Yet divergence also seemed a compelling analytical framework, since the decades of not only communist rule but also delayed development vis-à-vis the West appeared to consign these countries to perhaps an equally long period of painful catching-up, if not stunted development. Politics would need years before relevant socio-economic cleavages could emerge that might undergird a stable party system. And although aggregate social welfare was perhaps no longer declining, social and regional inequalities were rapidly increasing, generating relative deprivation effects.

Moreover, the convergence/divergence question had two levels to it. Not only was it important to understand processes of approximating to Western Europe, it was equally a question of whether the Central and Eastern Europe countries weren’t themselves diverging from each other through qualitatively different policy choices, or at least showing strikingly different rates of change. Indeed, a paradox soon emerged that the countries in the region could well be *converging* with a number of important aggregate Western European indicators, while at the same time *diverging* in terms of the policy combinations or institutions they may have chosen to achieve these goals. The challenge for the Forward Look was therefore to keep these two perspectives in mind, i.e. charting societal developments for the region as a whole, while being mindful of divergent trajectories that have already begun to take hold.

In the chapters that follow this combination surfaces repeatedly. It is a prominent theme within the study of project funding presented by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Olivier Ruchet. It is also a basic pattern within the future scenarios drawn up by Vello Pettai and Martin Brusis. Lastly, it is a subtext within the disciplinary chapters that summarise the discussions held during the workshops on Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Local Governance. If anything, therefore, the Forward Look achieved an important conceptual breakthrough in terms of better framing the overall context of societal developments and research perspectives in Central and Eastern Europe.
1. Objectives and expectations

The essence of a Forward Look is to map out future research agendas and trends. Yet doing this can be difficult without adequate information about past research directions and results. In this ‘state-of-the-art’ survey we therefore examine the research topics of projects funded by European research funding agencies and foundations (hereafter ‘foundations’) for an earlier time period, and in so doing help to establish a baseline against which to anchor our rethink of the research agenda empirically. The study focuses on the thematic priorities of research projects funded in three disciplines – Economics, Political Science, and Sociology – by European foundations. What have the major research priorities been over recent years, and are the funding preferences of national foundations based in Western vs. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) similar or different? How do they compare to funding priorities developed by supranational foundations such as the European Union’s Framework Programmes, the European Research Council or the European Science Foundation? Can one single out research projects specific to a CEE agenda? These are the major questions the Forward Look survey aimed to address.

We are not aware of any reports that compare systematically the thematic priorities of research foundations in Europe. The two ESF reports on 'Status and Developments of Social Science Research in Central and Eastern Europe' (2006) and 'Vital Questions. The Contribution of European Social Science' (2009) are exceptions. Some indirect conclusions can be drawn from efforts to document the disciplinary development of the social sciences in Europe. Regarding CEE the most comprehensive sources are probably 'The Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology' edited by Kaase, Sparschuh and Wenninger (2002) and Klingemann’s ‘Capacities: Political Science in Europe’ (2008).

In these works the various authors have provided some preliminary thoughts as to how research agendas differ in Western and Eastern Europe as well as why this is the case. Three arguments are among the more prominent. The first is that the thematic prior-

---

1. The full survey report is available at [www.esf.org/cee](http://www.esf.org/cee) (Activities of the Forward Look)
ities of national foundations in Central and Eastern Europe differ systematically from those of Western Europe because social science research in CEE countries is still confronted with specific problems caused by the regime transformation. The second is that over time the thematic priorities of research foundations have started to converge, in particular thanks to over-arching imperatives such as European integration and adaptation. The third is that there has been a convergence of thematic priorities primarily because a common research agenda has been actively promoted by transnational European level foundations and their generous funding of large-scale comparative research projects (such as the European Union’s Framework Programmes).

All of these suggestions are interesting and useful when interpreting our data, yet the Survey as such was not designed to specifically test these expectations through rigorous statistical methods. Rather, our objective was to provide empirical data that might undergird the broader process of setting a future research agenda for the region. Specifically, we aimed to answer the following three empirical questions:

- What are the research topics of projects undertaken in the fields of Economics, Political Science and Sociology funded by national and transnational European foundations in the period of 2004 to 2008?
- Are there, in this period, systematic differences in the funding priorities of national foundations based in Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe?
- What is the impact on convergence or divergence of the European research agenda of the large scale comparative projects funded by the supranational European foundations?

2. Data

2.1 Foundations covered by the Survey

The "universe of foundations" covered by the Survey consisted of (i) the European Science Foundation and its national Member Organisations (plus the Latvian Academy of Sciences/Latvian Research Council [Latvia being one of two EU member states with no ESF Member Organisation]); (2) the European Research Council; and (3) the European Union’s Framework Programmes 6 and 7.

In 2009 ESF had 80 national members from 30 different countries. However, only half of these Member Organisations supported programmes in the social sciences and humanities.

The projects covered by the ESF Survey have been selected in two different ways. The foundations in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, the UK and Romania provided lists of projects in response to our request. The projects of the Framework Programmes 6 and 7 were well documented in publications of the European Commission available from their website. The Czech (two foundations), Finnish, German and Hungarian projects have been selected from the electronic documentation systems of the respective foundations as well as the projects funded by the European Research Council and the European Science Foundation.

Thus, of the foundations that should have been included in the Survey, the European Research Council (ERC) and the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 are, indeed, included. The same is true for the major ESF programmes (European Collaborative Research Projects (ECRP) scheme, EUROCORES HumVib, EUROCORES EuroHESC, Networks in the Social Sciences, Research Networking Programmes, Forward Looks). There was also a good response rate for ESF members in CEE, where all relevant organisations could be included except the foundations based in Bulgaria and Croatia. However, the Survey failed to receive data from a substantial number of its national members in other countries. These states were Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Table 1 summarises this outcome. It also provides the abbreviations for the foundations that are used in the text.

Thus, the completion rate for national ESF Member Organisations is a far cry from what was originally aspired to. This means that the Survey does not provide data that are representative for all ESF Member Organisations. It does, however, allow an exploration of the research questions formulated above. In this respect the Survey represents a first step into a territory yet unknown.

2.2 Selection of projects

As outlined in Table 2, the Survey covered 4,694 projects funded by 16 national foundations and three supranational European foundations. In our letter to the foundations, we asked them to take “starting date of the project” and “discipline” as the two selection criteria for the projects.

Projects were included whose starting dates fell within the five year period beginning 1 January 2004, and ending 31 December 31 2008. This
### Table 1. The ESF-Survey: Foundations initially targeted and finally included in the Survey

#### 1.0 European Science Foundation (ESF, major programmes)  

| 01 | Austrian Science Fund (FWF) | Included |
| 02 | Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS), Belgium, Walloon |
| 03 | Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Belgium | Included |
| 04 | Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) |
| 05 | Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HAZU) |
| 06 | Croatian Science Foundation (HRZZ) |
| 07 | Research Promotion Foundation (RPF), Cyprus |
| 08 | Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (ASCR) | Included |
| 09 | Czech Science Foundation (GAČR) | Included |
| 10 | Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation (FIST) |
| 11 | Estonian Academy of Sciences |
| 12 | Estonian Science Foundation (ETF) | Included |
| 13 | Academy of Finland (AF) | Included |
| 14 | National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), France |
| 15 | National Research Agency (ANR), France |
| 16 | German Research Foundation (DFG) | Included |
| 17 | National Hellenic Research Foundation (NHRF), Greece |
| 18 | Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) |
| 19 | Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) | Included |
| 20 | The Icelandic Centre for Research (RANNIS) |
| 21 | Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) |
| 22 | National Research Council (CNR), Italy |
| 23 | Research Council of Lithuania (LMT) | Included |
| 24 | National Research Fund (FNR), Luxembourg |
| 25 | Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) |
| 26 | Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) |
| 27 | Research Council of Norway (RCN) |
| 28 | Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNSW) | Included |
| 29 | Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), Portugal | Included |
| 30 | Romanian Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport/Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding (EUFISCSU) | Included |
| 31 | Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts/Research Grant Agency for Slovak Academy of Sciences and Universities (SAV/VEGA) | Included |
| 32 | Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) | Included |
| 33 | Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAZU) |
| 34 | Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), Spain |
| 35 | Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN), Spain |
| 36 | Swedish Research Council (VR) |
| 37 | Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS) |
| 38 | Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) |
| 39 | The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) |
| 40 | Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), UK | Included |

#### 2.0 Latvian Academy of Sciences/Latvian Research Council (LZA/LZP)  

| Included |

#### 3.0 European Research Council (ERC)  

| Included |

#### 4.0 EU Framework Programmes 6 & 7 (EU FP)  

| Included |
criterion did not encounter much difficulty, with one exception.4

The projects to be analysed were limited to the disciplines of Economics, Political Science and Sociology. Surprisingly, it turned out that most foundations did not document projects by discipline in a way that would be comparable across countries. In some cases the thematic scope was much broader, covering all of the humanities; in other cases the scope was much more specific, differentiating between a variety of smaller sub-fields in the social sciences. Consequently, the lists of projects sent by the foundations or taken from the electronic documentation systems had to be screened by the two principal investigators. In this screening process projects were classified by discipline and all projects were eliminated that could not be defined as belonging to the areas of Economics, Political Science or Sociology. Finally, projects dealing with methodology, social science infrastructure or research policy – topics that transcended the disciplinary boundaries of Economics, Political Science and Sociology – were classified as “General Research Issues”.

2.3 The modal research topics
The “modal research topic” is of key importance to describing the thematic research priorities of the funding agencies. It summarises the substantive theme of the project and is derived from its title and – if available – from the project’s synopsis. To cope with the wealth of information and to allow subsequent quantitative analysis a scheme was developed to classify modal research topics into a manageable

---

4. The starting date could not be determined properly for projects funded by the Slovak Academy of Sciences/Research Grant Agency for Slovak Academy of Sciences and Universities (SAV/VEGA). However, there is a fairly high probability that most of these projects were begun between 2004 and 2008 so it was decided to add them to the Survey.
number of categories. In its final version the scheme distinguishes 22 modal research topics. Four categories were used to sub-divide projects in Economics, seven in Political Science, and eight in Sociology. As mentioned above, in addition to themes that could easily be sorted by discipline, there were also projects dealing with methodological issues, problems of social science infrastructure and databases, as well as research policies. They have been added to the classification scheme in a separate section.

When coding the projects consistency was regarded as the main principle guiding the coding decision to ensure comparability. To maximise consistency, all projects were coded by only one principal investigator, although difficult decisions were discussed jointly before a code was assigned. Thus, if the Survey has a coding bias, it is the same for the whole data set. Nevertheless, the main quality criterion of this inductively derived classification scheme lies in its capacity to generate plausible groupings of modal research topics, and thereby make quantitative comparison possible.

2.4 Regional specification of research projects and patterns of cooperation

The information available for the large-scale comparative projects of the EU Framework Programmes invites additional analysis to locate research themes specific to Central and Eastern Europe. Two indicators have been created. The first one is derived from the projects’ synopses. It measures whether individual CEE countries or the region as a whole are mentioned in the abstract of the project. This indicator is called “Regional specification”. The second indicator makes use of the information about the regional location of researchers (coordinators and partners) that cooperate in a particular project. This indicator is labelled “Involvement of CEE scholars” (0: no, 1: yes).

It is expected that projects mentioning Central and Eastern Europe in the synopsis have a higher probability of being relevant to a research problem of that particular region. The same should be true when CEE scholars are involved in the project. However, in this case one could also assume that a more intense interaction of researchers from East and West would lead to a greater convergence of research interests and approaches.

2.5 Units of analysis

The main interest of this report is in the thematic funding priorities of foundations. Thus, the individual foundation is the unit of analysis. This means that characteristics of projects, such as the modal research topic, are aggregated at the foundation level. Frequencies are transformed into percentages based on the total number of projects funded by a particular foundation to ensure comparability. These decisions have important implications. First, the quantitative analysis is limited to 19 cases (foundations). Second, these cases have an equal weight in the analysis despite their great differences in size (number of projects funded and financial potential in particular).

The focus of the analysis is on similarities and differences in the distribution of modal research topics between foundations located in Western Europe (n=6), CEE (n=10) and those operating on a transnational European level (n=3). The East–West groupings are chosen because it is expected that research priorities are influenced by national/regional context. Most of the time, the characteristics of these three groups of foundations are reported as averages of standardised distributions.
3. Results

3.1 Disciplines
The profiles of the individual foundations differ by the proportion of projects belonging to one of the three disciplines under consideration. On average Sociology (31.7%) and Political Science (31.1%) had a greater weight than Economics (24.0%). A notable 13.4% of the projects dealt with General Research Issues that relate to all three disciplines. The variation between foundations is quite large. The proportion of projects funded in the area of Economics ranges from 45.5% (MNSW, Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education) to 4.0% (ESF, European Science Foundation). The range is lower in the areas of Sociology (37.1 percentage points) and Political Science (24.5 percentage points). East–West differences emerge when we compare foundations that give priority to Economics and Sociology. All four foundations that rank projects in Economics first are located in Central and Eastern Europe while five of the eight foundations that rank Sociology projects first are located in Western Europe. In all transnational European foundations Economics ranks last, with Political Science (ERC, EU FP) and Sociology (ESF) being ranked higher.

3.2 Modal research topics
Now we come to the heart of the study by addressing the two basic questions:

• What are the research topics of projects in Economics, Political Science and Sociology funded by national and transnational European foundations in the period of 2004 to 2008?
• Are there systematic differences in the funding priorities of national foundations in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and the supranational funding agencies?

The number one priority of each of the 19 foundations – measured as the modal research topic receiving the highest percentage of the overall distribution – is very different across the foundations. Of the six foundations located in Western Europe, only “Methodology” occupies first rank in more than one foundation (Finnish AF: 11.1%; Belgian FWO: 11.0%). The first priorities for all other foundations are different. Of the ten foundations located in Central and Eastern Europe, “Competition” is ranked first by the Polish MNSW (16.7%), the Slovenian ARRS (14.6%), and the Estonian ETF (14.3%); and “Education, socialisation” is placed on top by the Romanian EUFISCSU (15.7%) and the Hungarian OTKA (13.4%). The ERC (14.1%) and the ESF (13.7%) share “Knowledge, innovation” as their number one category. In other words, there is no clear pattern in these distributions. Priorities are rather different. However, the distance to each foundation’s second priority is usually small, ranging from 5.7 (Czech GAČR) to 0.4 (Finnish AF). The flat distribution of relative frequencies of modal research topics is also reflected in the low skewness values (0.96; lowest, Portuguese FCT: 0.04; highest, Czech GAČR: 1.87). The individual foundation level thus seems inadequate to offer a meaningful basis for comparison.

As a result we shift the analysis away from a comparison of individual foundations and turn to the aggregate level. At this level averages of distributions are discussed for the sets of foundations located in Western Europe, CEE, and the transnational European funding agencies. In general within-group variances are quite high; however, these are not reported in most of the tables so as to ease readability.

The major issue concerns possible similarities and differences between the national foundations located in the East and those in the West. Results for the transnational European foundations are shown in the respective tables and graphs, but they are not systematically included in the discussion.

Figure 1 shows the three most important modal research topics by type of foundation. The proportions can be interpreted as the average priority given to these modal research topics by the different groups of foundations.

We begin with the frequency of modal research topics. Recall that the first-priority research themes of individual foundations showed no distinct pattern. On average “Competition” (8.9%), “Methodology” (8.2%), and “Economic policies” (7.2%) ranked first. Looking at the regional distributions, “Methodology” (9.8%), “Economic policies” (7.9%) and “Competition” (7.4%) were the most important modal research topics in the West, while “Competition” (11.1%), “Regions, urban–rural issues, development” (8.7%) and “Economic policies” (7.8%) were the leading themes in CEE. Among the transnational European foundations, “Knowledge, innovation” (11.3%), “Rule of law, security issues” (8.2%) and “Infrastructure, databases” (7.8%) were the dominant research topics. Thus, this picture signals similarity for “Competition” and “Economic policies” as important modal research topics both in East and West. The three transnational European foundations displayed a very different agenda reflecting, on average, the general thematic orientation of the two EU Framework Programmes.

Modal research topics were not evenly distrib-
uted across disciplines. This led to a decision by the authors to compare the distributions of modal research topics between Western Europe and CEE within each discipline separately. In economics three of the four modal research topics differed significantly (using the F-test as a criteria, sign. level .10). “Economic growth” and “Competition” were themes that had more weight for the CEE foundations while the reverse was true for “Employment”. In Political Science “Civic society” was of significantly greater importance in the West, while projects on “Regions, urban–rural issues, development” found more attention in the East. Within sociology the “Education, socialisation” theme (for CEE) and the “Health” theme (for Western Europe) constituted the characteristic differences. So as far as the three disciplines are concerned, seven modal research topics indicated significant thematic differences while this was not the case for the remaining 12 modal research topics distinguished by the classification scheme. None of the three supplementary categories “Methodology”, “Infrastructure, data bases” and “Research policy” showed significant differences. Duncan’s index of dissimilarity offered another measure to describe the differences of distributions. The index values for the dissimilarities were modest. On that level it was found that the dissimilarities between the distributions of modal research topics were greatest in Economics, followed by Sociology, Political Science and General Research Issues.

With this initial overview in place, it is tempting to go further and add information about financial contributions in order to qualify and nuance this picture. The attempt is risky, however, because the relevant data are missing for three foundations, including the large German Research Foundation. Table 4 shows the average support for projects (in euros) for the 22 categories of modal research topics of the classification scheme. Indeed, the amount of funding awarded per research project changes the situation described above. The average priority in the West shifts to “Infrastructure, data bases” (€465,661), “Knowledge and innovation” (€294,417) and “Environment, energy, sustainability” (€265,881). In Central and Eastern Europe “Democratic institutions and processes” (€1,978,500), “Social cohesion, social inequality, exclusion” (€1,008), and “Economic growth” (€47,662) move to the top. The two transnational funding agencies now put their chips on “Governance” (€1,978,500), “Democratic institutions and processes” (€1,652,400), and “Knowledge, innovation” (€1,499,800). Thus, the possible pattern of convergence initially detected would need a more detailed analysis in light of these results. At the same time, because the primary focus of this Survey was on thematic priorities, a more detailed discussion of the impact of financial contribution on thematic priorities must be left to future research. It is, however, worth noting that for every modal research topic expenditure by West European foundations exceeds that of CEE foundations by several times, and that this is most conspicuous in the case of “Infrastructure, data bases”. Similarly, the expenditure of transnational European foundations far exceeds that of all the individual national foundations included in the Survey.
Table 4. Average financial contribution per modal research topic (in euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modal research topics</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Transnational European foundations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of foundations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>135,775</td>
<td>47,662</td>
<td>855,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>185,328</td>
<td>40,750</td>
<td>949,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>149,064</td>
<td>36,558</td>
<td>1,295,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policies</td>
<td>180,893</td>
<td>29,734</td>
<td>1,317,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>122,317</td>
<td>34,353</td>
<td>1,978,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law, security issues</td>
<td>156,208</td>
<td>38,319</td>
<td>1,193,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic institutions and processes</td>
<td>167,481</td>
<td>61,247</td>
<td>1,652,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and social identity</td>
<td>184,639</td>
<td>39,381</td>
<td>1,067,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic society</td>
<td>125,512</td>
<td>31,784</td>
<td>861,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions, urban-rural issues, development</td>
<td>133,290</td>
<td>42,874</td>
<td>715,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td>163,996</td>
<td>10,246</td>
<td>621,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography, ageing; family</td>
<td>181,491</td>
<td>46,256</td>
<td>1,097,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, socialisation</td>
<td>178,987</td>
<td>40,276</td>
<td>1,386,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge, innovation</td>
<td>294,417</td>
<td>40,021</td>
<td>1,499,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>178,744</td>
<td>26,752</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration; ethnic minorities</td>
<td>158,636</td>
<td>20,334</td>
<td>1,275,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion, social inequality, exclusion</td>
<td>126,654</td>
<td>51,008</td>
<td>831,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, energy, sustainability</td>
<td>265,881</td>
<td>22,602</td>
<td>678,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>114,651</td>
<td>38,381</td>
<td>799,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>194,593</td>
<td>33,659</td>
<td>997,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure, data bases</td>
<td>465,661</td>
<td>28,912</td>
<td>1,086,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research policies</td>
<td>202,006</td>
<td>42,031</td>
<td>1,239,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Specific aspects of the EU Framework Programmes

The analyses presented above were all based on the data available for all 19 foundations. The main emphasis was on the similarities and differences of research topics between East and West. In this concluding section the focus is on the large comparative research projects sponsored by the European Union’s Framework Programmes. These projects are particularly well documented. The available data allow a distinction between projects by regional specification of the research topic and by involvement of scholars located in CEE and/or Western research organisations. Thus, while the focus is on just one funding entity, the two indicators help to explore the two questions relevant to the discovery of topics that are of special interest to Central and Eastern Europe. When interpreting the results one has to keep in mind that the Framework Programmes 6 and 7 were targeted to promote themes relevant to growth, employment and competitiveness in a knowledge-based society. For this reason the distribution of modal research topics is likely to differ from those of the thematic priorities of the more demand-driven national foundations.

4.1 Regional specification

Mentioning Central and Eastern Europe in the synopses is a straightforward operational definition and easy to code. Conceptually the measure is supposed to indicate the importance of the region
for the research problem. It is expected that framing the research theme in these regional terms indicates a particular interest in a research topic with specific relevance for CEE. Empirically, there were many references to Europe in general. These references were not counted toward the "Regional specification CEE". Hence, in the final analysis 26% of the projects (n=70) mentioned Central and Eastern Europe in the synopsis. Half of them cited countries (or other sub-national units, for example cities), and half of them refer to CEE as a region. In total, 44% of the projects (n=117) said that "Europe in general" is their regional context. The remaining 30% (n=80) mentioned neither "Central and Eastern Europe" nor "Europe" in general. The subsequent analysis contrasts modal research topics of projects that mention CEE and those that do not.

4.2 Involvement of CEE scholars

The expectation linked to this indicator assumes that involvement of CEE scholars in a particular project has an effect on the selection of the modal research topic. If researchers located in Central and Eastern Europe participate in a specific project, there is a greater probability that the modal research topic reflects CEE problems. Operationalisation of this indicator is equally easy. From the project descriptions it is known who coordinates a project and who the project's cooperation partners are. This information includes organisational affiliation and regional location. Thus one can determine whether or not scholars institutionally located in CEE participate in a particular project.

Empirically, a total of 2,883 researchers were involved in the 267 projects either as coordinators or partners. Few scholars participated in more than one project. A total of 17% (n=505) of all researchers worked at an institution located in CEE. On average there are 1.9 researchers from CEE per project. Standardising the absolute number of Central and Eastern European researchers on the total number of researchers per project results in an average proportion of 17.4%. The variation around the mean was quite large; 28% of all projects (n=74) had no participating researcher from CEE, while only two from amongst all the projects lacked participation from Western Europe.

As is well known, every FP project is organised by a coordinator. In our Survey, only 12 of the 267 coordinators (4.5%) were from CEE, and these are located in just four countries: Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland.3

The "Regional specification" indicator and the "involvement" indicator were also interrelated; 92% of the projects that had no involvement of CEE researchers also did not mention the region in their synopses. On the other hand, 67% of the projects that had Central and Eastern European cooperation made no specific reference to Central and Eastern Europe as far as their regional context is concerned. The magnitude of the relationship between the two indicators is not very strong (r=.255).

4.3 Divergence or convergence?

Do the distributions of the modal research topics differ when Central and Eastern Europe is mentioned in the projects' synopses, or when CEE researchers are involved? To answer these questions we calculated again the coefficient of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Duncan, Cuzzort and Duncan 1961). This coefficient reaches 100 when the modal research topics contained in the classification scheme apply exclusively to one of the two groups. The coefficient is zero if the distribution between the two groups of projects is the same. The two coefficients that summarise the detailed information signal little dissimilarity. In the first group of projects that mention Central and Eastern Europe in their synopses the coefficient reached 26.5, meaning that similarity beats dissimilarity 73.5 to 26.5. In the case of the involvement of CEE researchers the respective coefficient was a bit lower (77.2 to 22.8).

Mentioning Central and Eastern Europe in the synopsis is the more narrow definition. It is also more closely related to the substance of the research project. Research projects that mentioned CEE in the synopsis dealt more with topics such as "Rule of law, security issues" while the group not mentioning the region in the synopsis focused more on "Methodology". Otherwise, only a few topics stood out as different. These were "Political and social identity" on the one hand and "Research infrastructure, data bases" on the other.

Similarities were also characteristic for research projects that were initiated and coordinated by research institutions located in CEE. In this group the chance of finding a project specifically related to Central and Eastern Europe was about fifty–fifty.

Why was there more convergence than divergence between the modal research topics of the EU Framework Programmes? A possible answer can be found in the patterns of cooperation. In total 79% of the research organisations where coordinators and partners worked were located in Western Europe. By sheer numbers, West European researchers dominated the discourse. In addition, 65% of all researchers worked in an academic set-

3. For further information on this, see Pálmé Kovács and Kutsar (2010).
ting (including the Academies of Sciences in CEE). For these researchers the quality of the individual research institution was probably more important than “country”. Where were these more important research institutions located? Measuring high “importance” of a research institution by requesting that at least 10 of its researchers must be involved in Framework projects one finds 46 institutions, nine of which are located in six CEE countries. If such institutions in turn cooperate one might well assume greater cross-fertilisation. Thus, future investigations of the causes for convergence and divergence of research agendas could profit from focusing on research institutions rather than countries.

5. Conclusions

This Survey explored the funding priorities of six foundations located in Western Europe, ten foundations located in CEE, and three transnational European funding agencies. A total of 4,694 projects in the fields of Economics, Political Science, and Sociology that were funded in the five-year period from 2004 to 2008 were classified according to 22 modal research topics. Focusing on the first three highest priorities and comparing average distributions of modal research topics for CEE foundations on the one hand and Western European foundations on the other, the themes of economic “Competition” and “Economic policies” were under the top three in both groups of funding agencies. An emphasis on “Regions, urban–rural issues” was more important in the East while “Methodology” carried more weight in the West. Comparing distributions of modal research topics within disciplines showed that the following themes were characteristic of projects funded by CEE foundations: “Economic growth”, “Competition”, “Regions, urban–rural issues, development”, and “Education, socialisation”. Distinctive sub-categories for West European foundations were: “Employment”, “Civic society”, and “Health”. No significant differences were found for the remaining 15 modal research topics.

These important results signal both similarities and differences. However, similarities were more characteristic of the situation than differences – a result that was underscored by the relatively low coefficients of dissimilarity between distributions of modal research topics. The analysis of the large-scale comparative research projects funded by the European Union’s Framework Programmes did not find distinct differences either. Examining the effects of involvement by CEE scholars showed that similarity beats dissimilarity by three to one.

Thus, the general result of the Survey was that the research priorities of foundations in Western Europe and CEE do have some significant differences. Overall, however, similarities are more characteristic of the general picture and it seems reasonable to expect that this trend will continue.
The challenge of generating a Forward Look for a particular research field involves (as we saw in the last chapter) having a knowledge of what scholarly themes have been examined so far and by whom. At the same time, Forward Looks also require casting a gaze directly into the future, if only to reflect on and assess the possible futures that might be out there. Foresight research and future studies provide a range of tools that can be used to put the future into perspective. In this Forward Look, our first application of foresight methods came during the opening workshop in Bratislava, where horizon scanning was used to lay out those topics and themes which scholars believed themselves would emerge over the next five years.

To bolster these perspectives, however, the Scientific Committee of the Forward Look decided to employ a second foresight technique: the construction of specific scenarios in relation to Central and Eastern Europe which could be used to spawn further reflection and brainstorming among scholars about where research in and on the region should be going. The scenarios were constructed from November 2010 to January 2011 and then presented to participants at the Berlin Consensus Conference for discussion.

Because the scenarios were developed as a means to an end – i.e. to use the scenarios to prompt new thinking about future research agendas – our aim was not to formulate them in such a way as to gain endorsement through some kind of deliberation at the Consensus Conference. Hence they should not be taken as any kind of collective outcome or result. Rather, the achievement of the scenarios needs to be seen within the disciplinary chapters to follow. It is these chapters that contain some of the topics and issues that were prompted once participants at the Consensus Conference began to put themselves into the mindset of one or another scenario and began to draw the implications for research that these trajectories entailed.

In sum, the scenarios presented here are first and foremost a testimony to the methods that were used in the Forward Look. They are also, however, a good test for new readers to see whether the scenarios elicit a similar sense of the future in CEE as they did at the Consensus Conference. Before outlining

---

6. The authors would like to thank Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits for sharing their thoughts and ideas on initial sketches of these scenarios.
the scenarios, however, it is worthwhile examining the assumptions and methods used in the exercise in order to fully grasp the potential.

1. Assumptions and scope conditions

The first essential point to be made about scenarios is that they are not predictions about the future. They are an elaboration of different permutations of the future given different combinations of input factors. They are meant to joggle the mind so that we can understand different issues that need to be reckoned with or researched in case one or another scenario emerges. They are therefore to be evaluated not in relation to the likelihood of their coming into being, but rather whether each scenario “hangs together” in its own terms. The question therefore becomes: if we take background conditions A and B as given, what will the consequence of these be in the areas of X, Y and Z? Do the effects we foresee for X, Y and Z logically fit together? Are we able to use what we know scientifically about how societal processes influence each other to trace a plausible chain of consequences and inter-relationships given a particular set of macro-conditions? What implications does one or the other scenario have for scholarly research and policy? And how do we recognize in a timely fashion which scenario is developing?

The second major dimension of any scenario exercise concerns the selection of drivers. Drawing from the Forward Look’s overall concept of convergence and divergence, we posited that the future of Central and Eastern Europe will be a factor of not only continuing integration with Western Europe, but also variation in the economic, political and social structures these societies have already developed. Both convergence and divergence in terms of developmental paths since 1989 came to serve as scope conditions influencing the possible patterns of change in the future.

For example, an important economic parameter characterising all of CEE is the notion of dependent development. For all the rhetoric of a united Europe and of a common socio-economic space, Central and Eastern Europe is fundamentally situated in a position of dependent development in relation to Western Europe and international capital more broadly, given the region’s considerable reliance on external investment for growth and the diminished degree of national sovereignty and policy choice that such a situation engenders. A number of recent studies have demonstrated convincingly that the CEE countries’ renewed integration with the European and world economic system since the early 1990s has certainly led to impressively high rates of economic growth, and in some cases levels of GDP have returned to the levels they were at in 1989 (Manning 2004). However, the mode of this growth has been one of reliance upon transnational capital investment, which has in turn served to structure a range of ensuing economic, social and political phenomena such that the overall model is one of dependent development (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). The countries of the region are striving to raise themselves out of the status of ‘semi-periphery’ into the ‘semi-core’ of the developed world (Greskovits 2008). Moreover, even strong inputs such as financial support from and policy integration with the European Union are not enough to offset the vulnerabilities and disadvantages of second-tier status in economic development.

Against the backdrop of this overarching condition, however, the countries of CEE have also witnessed divergence in terms of the varieties of capitalism that have emerged in the region. That is, while noting that development in all these countries has been dependent on interactions with transnational capital, scholars have also identified clear patterns in terms of how CEE policy makers have navigated these interactions as well as taken advantage (or not) of whatever industrial and other economic endowments they might have inherited from the communist era in order to undergird their new economies.

Drawing on indicators reflecting not only levels of international integration, but also the structure of exports and industrial production along with levels of social welfare spending, Bohle and Greskovits identify three varieties of post-communist capitalism, termed ‘neocorporatism’ in the case of Slovenia, ‘neoliberal’ in the case of the Baltic states and the Southern Balkans and ‘embedded neoliberal’ for the Visegrad countries. The models are compelling because they show, for example, how the existence of higher-scale industry in the Visegrad countries prompted the attraction of more sophisticated foreign investment, which allowed these countries to maintain an export and production profile of heavy and complex industry. By contrast, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria not only began their reform processes later, but they also had lower-scale industrial endowments, and those that they

---

7. See Bohle and Greskovits 2007a, 2007b, 2009, Greskovits 2008. Further extensions have been made to countries of the CIS, however, for our purposes these are not relevant.
did have from the communist era were either shut down or cut back in the head-long rush to dismantle the communist-era economy and integrate with the West. This pushed them more toward a neo-liberal economic model with ‘financialised’ growth (Drahokoupil and Myant 2010). Only Slovenia retained a neo-corporatist model in which strong institutions and practices of social bargaining have helped to retain a heavy and complex industrial profile together with social pacts.

Turning to the political conditions that are common across the region, most CEE countries have adopted the key elements of what Gerring and Thacker (2008) call a centripetal model of governance: a unitary state, a proportional electoral system with party lists and a parliamentary system of government. Of the CEE-10, six (soon to be seven) elect their president directly, but only the Romanian president is endowed with significant legislative powers. Proportional electoral systems with party lists exist in seven new EU member states; the remaining three states have mixed systems with a share of seats determined according to party-list proportional electoral rules (Harfst, 2008). All of the EU’s new CEE member states are unitary states, and only four of them have second chambers of parliament with weak veto powers. In sum, all of these institutions together encourage the centralised representation of societal interests through institutionalised parties and interest associations, inclusive decision-making through cabinets and parliaments, and single chains of delegation assigning clear political responsibilities (Blondel et al., 2007, Strom, 2000).

At the same time, other political trends have diverged considerably. For example, electoral volatility has been lower in countries such as the Czech Republic or Hungary, while high in Lithuania and Slovakia (Neff Powell and Tucker, 2009). Moreover, in many cases volatility has been caused by the constant emergence of new parties. According to Tavits (2007), in parliamentary elections since the regime change in post-communist democracies the average share of votes won by new parties was 19 percent. By contrast, “between 1945 and 1991, on average, only one new party emerged in an advanced Western democracy, winning only 2 percent of the votes in any given election.” (p. 114) These fluctuations have also manifested themselves in terms of government stability in the region. However, the overall message appears to be that while most governments in Central and Eastern Europe have developed strong political management structures, they remain exposed to unpredictable electorates and volatile party landscapes.

Among social parameters in the region, indicators such as low levels of interpersonal trust and organisational membership indicate that civil society continues to be weakly developed in CEE (Howard, 2003, Petrova and Tarrow, 2007). To be sure, popular protest movements contributed greatly to the political transitions of the early 1990s, but widespread disaffection with the outcomes since then has resulted in a demobilisation of civil society. Surveys have repeatedly documented low levels of trust in political institutions. For example, the Eurobarometer survey conducted in October/November 2009 found that, on average, 26 percent of the citizens in new EU member states from CEE tended to trust their national government, whereas the share of trusting citizens was 40 percent in the old EU member states.

CEE societies are also characterised by a distinctive inter-generational gap between elder cohorts, whose perceptions and behaviour were shaped by the experience of state socialism, and the younger cohorts raised during or after the political transitions (Evans, 2006). Moreover, this inter-generational divide corresponds to the urban–rural, educational and income dimensions of stratification and is also manifested in the distance between “modern” and “traditional” clusters of sociocultural and socioeconomic attitudes/practices (Jasiewicz, 2009, Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).

Clearly diverse across the countries of CEE are the types of ethnic minorities and ethnopolitical controversies present. Whereas some countries have few if any minorities (e.g. Poland), others have sizeable historical minorities (e.g. Hungarians in Slovakia or Romania, as well as Roma in a number of countries), while still others have minorities created largely by the communist era (e.g. Russians in the Baltic states). While all such minority issues have become subject to European and international human rights provisions as a set of equal benchmarks for the treatment of minorities, there are still different types of political rhetoric and dynamics that take place depending on the nature of the minority (Rechel, 2009). There are also notable differences in the levels of societal integration that different minorities exhibit in the region.

Lastly, economic and social factors in the region often combine to precipitate labour migration toward Western Europe. However, as research has shown (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010), only some CEE countries have major issues with out-migration (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania); others do not (Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic).
2. Change drivers

Turning now to the formal method of scenario building, this begins with the identification of two or three overarching processes which arguably will propel or underlie future events and/or decision-making. They should be processes which can go in opposite directions, thereby generating the kinds of permutations noted above as necessary for scenario building.

For these scenarios we adopted as our two main drivers (a) the prospects for overall economic growth in Europe and (b) the future institutional dynamism of the European Union. The choice in favour of these drivers is not surprising given the severity of the financial crisis of 2008–2009 as well as the challenges this has posed for policy coordination within the EU. At the same time, it is important to note that since our focus here is on Central and Eastern Europe, market economics and European integration are the two key settings into which these countries have embedded themselves since the early 1990s. While to some degree these countries have also now acquired a position to influence these external forces on their own, the main condition is one of being subject to these forces that are ultimately determined elsewhere.

For Central and Eastern Europe, economic growth and EU integration are inextricably linked in that renewed economic growth across the continent will be mutually dependent on the coordinated policy responses of the European Union. The EU’s moves already in 2008 to agree a European Economic Recovery Plan as well as create in 2009 institutions such as the European Financial Stability Facility have demonstrated the role the organisation has attempted to play in addressing the crisis. In addition, the EU has adopted more far-reaching action plans such as “Europe 2020” as well as the task of effectively implementing the new institutions created by the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. the office of EU President). Taken together, such moves have consequences for all of European integration to the extent that they establish new modes of coordination and may even prompt anew the EU’s oft-repeated pattern of deepening integration amidst crisis (Agh, 2010).

By the same token, it is important to acknowledge that the foregoing scenarios do not cover a number of international or global dimensions such as natural resource fluctuations, regional security issues, relations with Russia, trends within NATO, international terrorism, globalisation, etc. All of these issues naturally affect the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, since the scope of the Forward Look is on developments within the social sciences – defined mainly as economics, sociology, political science and local governance – the formal dimension of international relations is less trenchant.

In a logical fashion we can therefore posit four initial combinations of our drivers: renewed growth with deeper integration, renewed growth without integration, economic languishing despite integration, and economic languishing with integration collapse.8

Each of these contain important political ramifications as well, since resolving Europe’s economic crisis along with a strengthening of European integration will bolster European political cohesion and allow more room for Europe’s politicians to deal with remaining development challenges in Central and Eastern Europe. By contrast, continued EU pre-occupation with sluggish economic performance or, even worse, a renewed economic downturn will mean a setback for CEE’s efforts to realise the full aspirations of European Union membership. Governments will be less able to use EU structural funds to improve their economic competitiveness. Popular disenchantment with the EU and democratic politics may increase.

The matrix resulting from a combination of these two drivers is not difficult to imagine. Figure 2 outlines the four combinations which will be taken as the basis for the scenarios presented in this report.

All four scenarios outline political constellations at the end of the current decade that appear likely to emerge from the interplay of the different economic and EU integration dynamics. Each scenario suggests a causal sequence linking the assumed future constellation back to the situation today, and each also differentiates the two drivers’ effects for the Baltic and the Visegrad states with their different varieties of capitalism. The scenarios appear in the same order as they are presented in Figure 2, moving from most optimistic to most pessimistic.

8. We are aware that other logical combinations also exist, including deeper integration taking place through continued economic crisis and perhaps also disintegration amidst economic recovery. However, for the purposes of the Berlin Consensus Conference (for which these scenarios were created) we limited ourselves to these four combinations in order to keep the task simple and facilitate the goal of brain-storming on future research agenda, which was the real objective of the conference.
Scenario 1: The new social model

- After a period of crisis the EU establishes a credible system of fiscal and monetary oversight in 2014 in return for richer states continuing to help poorer ones.
- This Europeanisation of policy includes clamping down on flat tax regimes and other practices used by neo-liberal countries such as the Baltic states to establish competitiveness.
- Austerity measures in the Baltics lead to mass protests in 2013, forcing the countries to shift to more socially-oriented policy.
- Visegrad countries gain from new European approach.
- Euroscepticism and populism in CEE declines as new European model delivers renewed prosperity.

As Chancellor Claudia Lichtenegger delivered her final address before the European Parliament at the conclusion of Austria’s presidency of the European Union, she could not help but add a personal note looking back at how Europe had changed since her country’s last period at the EU’s helm some thirteen years ago in 2006. Lichtenegger recalled how as a mid-level Finance Ministry planner she had been involved at the time with helping to finalise the EU’s Financial Perspective for 2007–2013. The reference immediately drew some embarrassed looks from amongst the MEPs, as they all remembered the painful collapse of the Perspective in late 2012 and the distressing standstill that would result for more than a year as member states would squabble over new monetary and fiscal rules within the EU.

To relieve the parliamentarians’ unease, the Chancellor quickly followed up with memories of the EU’s Thessaloniki summit in May 2014, where Europe’s leaders had finally realised the sheer gravity of the situation. Taking a somewhat bizarre, yet effective, ‘shock-choreography’ approach to the meeting, the Greek government had intentionally chosen the country’s most downtrodden city to plead its case for a political breakthrough. As delegations were driven through streets piled high with uncollected garbage (a result of severe public service cuts), the summit itself was held across the street from an unemployment centre in full view of the throngs of jobless gathering daily to apply for minimal benefits. Against the backdrop of this misery, Chancellor Lichtenegger called to mind, a historic compromise had been reached, in which the EU finally established a credible system of fiscal and monetary oversight within the eurozone in exchange for a concerted effort by Germany,
of a 2013 state budget, the first major social protests erupted in Riga and Tallinn, causing the cabinets to retreat. Both leaders were forced into coalitions with centre-left parties (Harmony Centre in Latvia and the Centre Party in Estonia), which set the stage for a major shift in their economic policy orientations toward more social spending.

Two years later, the countries were further altered by the EU’s demand (following the Thessaloniki summit) that they abandon their special flat-rate personal income taxes as well as low corporate income taxes, widely seen as incommensurate with the EU’s new, more integrated economic model. Since this model aimed at aligning social protection spending across countries with their income levels (in order to limit countries trying to undercut), the Baltic states had to expand their welfare states, and, given the new tight EU control over fiscal policy, their only remaining source of financing became higher tax revenues. Still, this combination seemed to work, as social inequalities began to diminish and the countries settled into a more Nordic model of welfare statehood, which many thought only natural given their tight links to this region. Euro accession for Latvia and Lithuania became possible in 2015. Out-migration worsened during the years 2012–2014, as both skilled and unskilled workers sought better opportunities in the Nordic countries and the UK, where economic recovery was faster. However, this tapered off after the Baltic economies themselves stabilised during the second half of the decade.

The Visegrad countries and Slovenia generally took heart from the EU’s turn toward deeper economic policy integration. At a minimum, they found their embedded neo-liberal models strengthened by these trends, since the more reliable framework of economic policymaking provided incentives for companies to make long-term investments. Germany’s and the Netherland’s re-equilibration of foreign trade and investment activity meant that FDI flows to their industries would be slower than they had been in the 2000s. Higher EU transfers from the expanded equalisation scheme compensated for spending cuts that were necessitated by tougher EU oversight of budget deficits (particularly in Hungary). A “prosperity through integration” model took hold again, which by 2015 had reinforced the position of mainstream political parties. Eurosceptic or right-wing nationalist parties (such as Jobbik in Hungary) reared their head during 2011 and 2012, but were contained by the authorities as the latter were able to deliver on the prosperity gains they had promised as part of European integration, until they declined in the face of economic recovery.

Netherlands and Sweden to re-balance their invertebrate trade and current account surpluses that had widely been seen as a key aggravating condition for the economic crisis. Member states who were net contributors to the EU also agreed on a fiscal equalisation mechanism supporting poorer EU states and their citizens.

In concluding her address, the Chancellor noted that the Financial Perspective she had now had the honour as EU chair to prepare (for the years 2020–2026) would see the last of the EU’s Special Recovery Supports for Latvia and Hungary be phased out within a year, while the organisation’s Formal Monitoring Mechanism in relation to Ireland would also end within six months. In a remark that elicited final chuckles from her audience, the Austrian leader quipped that this time she felt her contribution to the EU’s financial planning would stack up better than her work in 2006. Europe, she said, had reached a new level of economic and political integration, one which had helped revive growth across the Union to an average rate of 3.4% by 2015–2016.

For the MEPs sitting in the chamber from Central and Eastern Europe, the Chancellor’s thoughts evoked mixed feelings. Countries such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that had followed a neo-liberal economic model before the 2008–2009 financial crisis continued to suffer years of painful internal devaluation until finally seeing living standards improve slightly in 2015. Initially governments in all three countries appeared to weather the political challenges well. Both the Latvian leader Valdis Dombrovskis and the Estonian prime minister Andrus Ansip were re-elected to office following elections in 2010 and 2011. Estonia’s accession to the eurozone in January 2011 also seemed to boost national confidence. However, when each leader attempted to impose a fifth year of fiscal retrenchment on their populations as part of the adoption

Austrian parliament
Chancellor Klaus Wellenberg tore his hair at the improvised late night press briefing. This European Council meeting had consumed his last reserves of patience and politeness. Together with other Northwestern EU states, Wellenberg’s German government had been trapped in an unpleasant standoff with the Madrid Alliance of Southern and East European member states. The Alliance had been formed in 2015, five years ago, in reaction to the first ordered sovereign insolvency proceedings that were imposed by the EU on Greece. The Alliance represented a majority of EU member states and was thus able to block all EU decisions. In the past, the balance of power between the Council, Commission and Parliament had been associated with fragmented policy arenas that prevented the emergence of stable coalitions of member states across policy areas. However, the economic crisis reinforced tendencies towards a more intergovernmental, Council-dominated EU system which weakened the Commission’s broker role and induced member states to form stable coalitions defending their key economic interests. Poorer and less competitive member states thus became able to negotiate huge financial compensation packages in exchange for their compliance with the fiscal rules of the Economic and Monetary Union. Despite hours of bargaining and verbal confrontation, this European Council had failed to achieve an agreement between the Madrid Alliance states and the Northwestern EU states on the pension reforms both sides had initially agreed in order to ensure the long-term financial stability of eurozone states. Although Wellenberg and other heads of government from solvent countries offered significant financial support, the beneficiary governments insisted on a far higher sum. To Wellenberg’s particular dismay, none of his colleagues honestly cared about the troubles his government would face explaining such a commitment to Germany’s increasingly EU-hostile mass media, voters and Constitutional Court.

For the Visegrad states, the failure of this European Council was also disappointing. To avoid exchange rate volatility and fulfil their accession commitments, they had all entered the eurozone by 2016, although real convergence was limited by successive years of sluggish economic growth. For them, eurozone membership meant accepting a much tougher Stability and Growth Pact than had existed before 2011. Their finance ministries had to send budget drafts for approval to the EU Commission, and deviations from the framework projections resulted in control visits of Commission officials that visibly demonstrated the loss of national sovereignty in this area. The most humiliating sanction was the public condemnation and grey-listing of governments that failed to comply with EU-approved rules.

Governments in the Baltic states fundamentally agreed with tightened fiscal controls, sweeping deregulation and severe cuts of redistributive policies in the EU. Their own taxation and enterprise policies were criticised as ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ practices by some richer EU member states, but persisting unanimity requirements and differences between the member states prevented any EU coordination in these areas. In the course of the years, the Baltic states had attracted larger shares of financial services and trade with Eurasia. But the growth in these sectors did not spill over to the non-tradable segments of their national economies. While small segments of bankers, brokers and IT specialists boosted their incomes, low-skilled workers became more decoupled and caught in structural unemployment. These marginalised groups either abstained from political participation or tended to support populist centrist parties. These politicians were either power-hungry business people or charismatic speakers supported by business groups. They conceived politics as a PR challenge and won electoral majorities through highly professionalised campaigns, but, once in office, regularly failed to deliver their promises of more inclusive economic and social policies due to pressures from the business community and financial markets.

The embedded neoliberal economies of the Visegrad states did not benefit from a less generous EU environment. In the past, these countries had been quite successful attracting green field investment of transnational industrial corporations. Eurozone integration had removed their foreign
exchange risks, but also undermined the competitiveness of the local industries that were envisaged as partners to the local plants of transnational industrial corporations these countries had attracted. As most of the industrial production moved to China and other emerging Asian countries, the medium-skill industries in the Visegrad countries stagnated or declined. Governments initially managed to stabilise middle-income groups which had suffered from the previous decade’s economic crisis. But they failed to consolidate domestic business as a broad social stratum. Mainstream political parties lost confidence among many voters since they did not manage to realise the prosperity gains expected from eurozone integration. Their economic policy strategies were increasingly contested by neoliberalists on the one hand, nationalist eurosceptic critics on the other.

**Scenario 3: Reviving the Sinatra doctrine**

- Prolonged difficulties among the non-euro countries of CEE to reach the EU’s monetary convergence requirements means the area languishes in economic lethargy.
- Many of the foreign banks who control the finance market in CEE become concerned about the effect of delayed accession on their loan portfolios.
- Populist politicians emerge demanding a relaxation of the convergence rules. Germany and other hawks resist, leading to a crisis in the EU, which remains unresolved.
- CEE countries threaten to renounce their obligation to join the euro and “do it their way.”

Standing amid the throngs of shoppers teeming Bucharest’s Piata Obor produce market, Stefania Petrescu gazed at the image of St. Andrew emblazoned on a promotional version of what eventually was supposed to come the symbol of Romania’s euro coins. Moreover, engraved next to the patron saint was the number ‘2017’, the year President Petru Munteanu had promised to take his country into the common European currency. Along with 63% of her fellow citizens, Stefania Petrescu had voted for Munteanu when he captured the presidency in 2014 through his upstart “Romania – Our Way” party. Though many outside observers feared Munteanu would soon follow Viktor Orban’s style of “hegemonic democracy” (for which Hungary had already undergone a period of sanctions from the rest of the EU during 2013), the 41-year-old Romanian leader retained a high degree of popularity in his country. Moreover, his ability to speak both English and French fluently (thanks to periods of study abroad in the mid-1990s as part of the EU’s Erasmus exchange programme) often meant he was able to break the image of most Western Europeans that Eastern Europeans were all maladroit and narrow-minded.

Indeed, Munteanu had been part of a broader wave of populist politicians rising to the surface in Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with Lithuania in 2012, Bulgaria in 2013 and the Czech Republic in 2014. All of these countries had agreed to undertake a series of tough austerity measures during 2010–2011 in order to stabilise their fiscal situation and maintain their prospects of entering the eurozone. Yet by 2012 these hopes were stymied when it became clear that none of these economies would actually meet the EU’s convergence criteria for some time to come. The chief culprits remained continually high inflation and sluggish growth rates, which prevented government revenues from rising and thus easing government deficits.

Slowly these non-euro countries of the region had begun to feel trapped in a twilight zone of continual belt-tightening without the prospects of a pay-off in terms of eurozone stability. Strike action by miners in Poland and auto workers in the Czech Republic dramatised the social costs of what was going on. Populist politicians began demanding the EU relax its euro-accession conditions or else the countries would renege on their obligation to adopt the common currency. “Loosen up or we’ll go the Hungarian Way”, they warned, referring to Viktor Orban’s formal repudiation of the euro in early 2013. The Hungarian leader had already become famous when he sought to re-interpret the late 1980s’ reference to the Sinatra doctrine, according to which Mikhail Gorbachev had agreed to let the countries of the Warsaw Pact “do it their way” and dissolve communism if they so wished. Orban felt the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should again “do it their way” if the EU proved intransigent.

Germany remained the most adamant in reject-
ing these new demands. But Angela Merkel suffered a blow when Axel Weber withdrew from the race to become head of the European Central Bank and a second-tier candidate was put forward. Eventually Berlin felt besieged from both East and West when other euro-states called for a multi-dimensional compromise to move the debate forward. Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, agreed to give up his proposal for the creation of eurobonds and other measures to move the EU toward a real fiscal union. In exchange, he insisted that Germany be more solidary with other eurozone countries as well as facilitate the entry of new members as a way to ‘revive’ (others said ‘salvage’) the monetary union.

Echoing these concerns were also a number of prominent Western banks, who lobbied eurozone governments to ease up on their accession criteria so that the risk involved with the banks’ loan exposure in the region would be relieved.

Romania’s Petru Munteanu thus took the lead in early 2015 to campaign for this new deal on behalf of those Central and Eastern European members still not members of the euro. Bolstered by the coincidence of Latvia holding the EU presidency, Munteanu cited the numerous problems the region had suffered because of languishing progress toward the euro, while also pointing to how Estonia had recovered from the 2008–2009 crisis partly thanks to the stability gained by euro accession.

Yet, even after a two-hour tête-à-tête with French President Francois Hollande, Munteanu was not able to achieve his ‘breakthrough’. The leaders of Poland, Czech Republic and especially the tempestuous Bulgarian Prime Minister Ognyanov demonstratively left Riga early. Although these countries never formally renounced their euro accession obligations, it was obvious that they had decided to enter into a period of non-compliance. Gradually they let their inflation rates rise and budget deficits slide in an attempt to secure some kind of renewed growth.

The populist leaders in these countries remained in power, since voters appreciated the new tough stance toward Brussels and the core eurozone countries. Yet social welfare and development did not improve so long as the core issue of euro accession remained unresolved.

**Scenario 4: Europe overwhelmed, Europe re-divided**

- Economic and financial failure strike Greece and Portugal. Together with the bailout for Ireland, the EU is overwhelmed with crisis spending and is paralysed politically.
- Investors forsake both Southern and Eastern European countries, preferring either high-rate Western European bonds or dynamic investments in Asia.
- Renewed recession in Eastern Europe puts severe strains on social welfare. Pressure among the unemployed to migrate to Western Europe becomes so great that Germany and many other countries re-impose border controls toward CEE member states, causing a major split within the EU.
- Populist politicians gain power across the region, and anti-EU sentiment becomes pronounced. Democracy as such does not collapse; however, governments become more manipulative and repressive in an uneasy struggle to maintain control.

“Restricting the free movement of persons is a severe breach of the Treaty”. Bitterness and anger exuded from the words of Prime Minister Stankiewicz as he declared Poland’s protest against the re-establishment of regular controls at the German–Polish border. A group of Northern and Western EU member states (led by Germany, but tacitly supported by the UK under its EU presidency in late 2017) had used the Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation to re-introduce a border control regime. These states claimed that the only way to limit the growing influx of immigrants was to means-test all East European travellers entering the core area of the Union. From 2020 onward, only visitors who would not have to rely on social assistance from their country of destination would be permitted entry.

This harsh and unprecedented measure had been triggered by an escalation of violence against East European labour migrants, but it also reflected the interest of right-wing populist governments which now dominated in core EU states. These political forces sought to replace what they perceived as overly communitarian EU institutions with more
inter-governmental agreements among sovereign nation states.

Indeed, no one had expected this development when several Central and Eastern European countries joined the eurozone and Schengen area in the previous decade. It was the economic crisis of 2008 that triggered persistent instability in financial markets and a steady decline of Eastern Europe’s economies. Foreign investors and banks became much more risk averse and directed most of their capital to the more dynamic Asian economies or to AAA-rated EU member states. The disengagement of private investors generated huge balance of payment deficits for East European states and jeopardised their financial stability.

To reduce their current account deficits and maintain their solvency, East European governments chose a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy that curbed economic activity. Output declines entailed higher unemployment and lower tax revenues, necessitating tighter austerity measures that in turn deepened the looming depression and brought several highly indebted countries to the verge of insolvency. The richer West European EU member states refused to channel more transfers to Eastern Europe, as they felt overburdened already with the costly Irish bailout of 2011 and later the actual withdrawal of Greece and Portugal from the eurozone and the commensurate challenges of debt restructuring.

Prime Minister Stankiewicz’s Law and Justice party had returned to power in 2015, after Poland’s initial economic recovery was reversed despite the austerity measures maintained by the second government of Donald Tusk. The country became a textbook case of how the lack of investment and the withdrawal of foreign capital made Polish enterprises unable to modernise their capital stock and sustain their competitiveness. Many companies in the manufacturing sector had to close down which entailed not only rising unemployment but also a loss of technical skills and professional experience required to fabricate more complex goods. The core industries that Poland and the other Visegrad countries had been able to modernise during the initial period of economic growth associated with EU accession had quickly whittled away. In effect, these countries became similar to the Baltic and Southeast European states as their industrial base became confined to light manufacturing and the processing of raw materials. Companies in these sectors remained competitive only by retaining low wages. Incomes narrowly above the poverty line and permanent structural unemployment caused many East Europeans to seek jobs in the wealthier core EU member states.

However, the opportunities for employment in Western Europe became increasingly limited, East European migrants were perceived as threatening the economic survival of poor people in the recipient countries, social conflicts erupted and the political environment worsened. The phrase “Polish plumber” now took on even more frenzied overtones. Economic decline, protracted impoverishment and widening income disparities also radicalised politics in Eastern Europe. Populist and hardline anti-EU parties largely replaced the moderate, pro-European political forces that had formed the mainstream of political parties in the first decade after EU membership. Given the visible stagnation and even decline of Eastern Europe, many disappointed citizens viewed the mainstream parties as deeply discredited. Their promise of achieving prosperity by opening towards Western markets and capital had utterly failed.

During the last Polish elections in 2011, Piotr Stankiewicz had been a complete unknown. But he soon became emblematic of the hard-edged yet savvy style of the new populism that was emerging. Stankiewicz had inherited Law and Justice’s leader-centred organisation, but he added to it a personal background in media relations, which professionalised the party’s message. Following in the line of Italy’s Berlusconi and Hungary’s Orban (and some even said Russia’s newly re-elected President Putin), Stankiewicz proceeded to slowly monopolise political power and use manipulative techniques to control the mass media, marginalise opposition parties and secure political influence over the courts, public administration and civil society.

While Eastern Europe’s new generation of political leaders claimed to be committed to democracy, their governing style tended to erode democratic institutions and run roughshod over constitutional checks and balances. One of their strategies of maintaining power was to cooperate with violent racist and nationalist movements that mobilised impoverished groups in society against ethnic and other minorities. Often these groups attacked persons belonging to minorities, prompting the latter to form their own protective organisations and sometimes take revenge. Stankiewicz in particular used these incidents to increase the size of the police and security forces, claiming to re-install law and order, but these measures did nothing to address the underlying problems.

In the aftermath of the EU decision to suspend certain Schengen provisions, Prime Minister Stankiewicz declared that a Rubicon in the EU’s history had been crossed. Although he promised to
lodge one final appeal before the European Court of Justice, Stankiewicz prepared his cabinet and other East European governments for a boycott of all EU institutions.

The upcoming 30th anniversary of the collapse of communism and the reunification of Europe threatened to become rather gloomy.

3. Conclusions

In this scenario exercise, we posited that the dual dynamics of EU integration and economic development will matter most for Central and Eastern Europe looking forward to 2020. These drivers will interact with more structural scope conditions such as the emerging varieties of capitalism or underlying electoral–political cleavages. Since the two chosen drivers are not equally central to all disciplines and research fields covered by this Forward Look, the scenarios may be misread as a suggestion to prioritise EU integration, models of capitalism or the impact of global/European economic processes at the expense of other research topics. This is not our intention.

On the contrary, one could also expand the scenarios to consider the effects of political and economic developments specifically for the fields of sociology and local governance. For example, deeper economic and political integration within the existing EU framework, as assumed in the first scenario, seems likely to strengthen multi-level governance by empowering local and regional actors through EU assistance. It would also probably decrease social stratification and inequalities. By contrast, economic recession and a breakdown of EU integration in the fourth scenario are likely to cause an erosion of the middle classes in CEE, higher out-migration and a downsizing of subnational public administration in the context of austerity policies.

The scenarios and their underlying assumptions do not suggest a major new research paradigm replacing the Europeanisation research of the 2000s. But they do echo some of the Europeanisation research that has encouraged a bottom-up perspective (Radaelli 2003). Rather than assuming unidirectional adaptation effects in CEE in the face of EU influences, this perspective highlights how domestic political actors might use and/or abuse the constraints and options offered by a Europeanised institutional, economic and social environment. If anything, the scenarios point to a need to see Central and Eastern Europe in a multi-level and multi-dimensional development setting.
3. Economics

Vello Pettai

The field of economics has played a central role in guiding the way in which the countries of post-communist Europe have been able to restructure their path of societal development and social welfare along the lines of a European and increasingly globalised capitalist system. This process began in the early 1990s with the task of creating markets as such and achieving macro-economic stability. It was followed by a transformation of property structures through privatisation and the establishment of financial systems with commercial banking. Thereafter it turned to the long-term reordering of the labour market as a consequence of these earlier changes as well as a re-examination of pension and other social welfare systems from the point of view of long-term sustainability.

The countries of post-communist Europe have in this respect been many things at once: both post-colonial (-Soviet) economies as well as emerging markets, semi-peripheral developing countries as well as partners in building European integration. They have been challenged by old legacies, yet equally exposed to ‘modern’ economic problems associated with an aging population and climate change.

Hence, scholars will often posit different research questions depending on the particular perspective they take. The economic transition from post-communism continues to constitute an important point of departure for many scholars, since this historical circumstance is so unique and arguably continues to show scars across Central and Eastern Europe. By contrast, seen from a ‘where are we going’ (and not ‘whence we came’) perspective, the issues become more dynamic, with international competitiveness and innovation coming to the fore.

These varying perspectives came through during the different discussions the Forward Look organised concerning the prospects for economics research in Central and Eastern Europe. The debates began during the project’s opening event in Bratislava, where a foresight exercise was carried out looking at possible drivers of change across the disciplines included in the Forward Look. For economics, three initial drivers emerged: (1) changing paradigms of economic development, (2) migration and labour mobility, and (3) education, innovation and research. During the special disciplinary seminar devoted to economics (and sociology) at Leicester, these themes became more precise, thanks partly to a background paper presented by Hans-Jürgen Wagener.

The key issues that tended to emerge were related to political economy writ large, and less in terms of formal economic theory or econometrics. This is not surprising, since as noted already above economics has contributed to social science in...
In sum, a number of Forward Look participants asked the question: ‘Is the “EU integration model of economic growth” still viable for CEE?’

2. Patterns of international integration

All of the countries in CEE have faced the challenge of re-integrating with international markets and global economic processes. However, there are noticeable differences across the states in terms of how they have both approached and achieved this goal. The differences begin with how countries devised their initial policies on foreign direct investment and privatisation, as well as how foreign investors assessed these options and evaluated investment opportunities. Over time, research in this field has spawned wide-ranging studies into the ‘varieties of capitalism’ emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. This research needs to be deepened and made more comparative.

Likewise, however, this research domain includes the issue of how such integration has impacted on attitudes, norms and ‘business cultures’ in the region. How did single entrepreneurs and key economic elites adapt under these changes? What have been the effects of international socialisation among economic elites? In which countries has a new ‘comprador’ class emerged and what are its sociological and/or attitudinal characteristics? Many of the economies of the region are now sufficiently developed and multi-dimensional to begin analysing also these dimensions of change.

3. Knowledge-based economy, education and innovation

It goes without saying that knowledge and innovation are key ingredients of any modern economy. The key challenge for many Central and Eastern European countries is to overcome many of the habits and norms of laissez-faire that prevailed when policies such as privatisation and emerging markets were the order of the day and to develop more concerted innovation policies that might entail more targeted government choices in terms of societal development. A second research theme in this domain involves examining the relationship between innovation policies and economies of scale: can many of the smaller CEE countries develop full-scale innovation policies, when their economies and populations are often too small to generate real technological breakthroughs? To what extent will it be possible to re-establish above-average rates of growth amidst these conditions in order to raise over time comparative living standards for the CEE countries? What will be the trade-offs CEE governments will face as they are pushed more and more toward fulfilling the Maastricht criteria even if having their own currencies would allow them faster growth?

Revising growth theory will further be complicated by the fact that part of the economic policy imperative includes preparing those CEE countries not yet in the eurozone for accession. However, this will mean that growth will be slowed, since within the eurozone growth opportunities will be more limited. To what extent will it be possible to re-establish above-average rates of growth amidst these conditions in order to raise over time comparative living standards for the CEE countries? What will be the trade-offs CEE governments will face as they are pushed more and more toward fulfilling the Maastricht criteria even if having their own currencies would allow them faster growth?

In the past, growth may now need to be revised – an issue that came out in Scenario 1.
extent should these policies be cross-national or at least ‘international’ in the sense that they should involve creating clusters of international researchers, and not simply relying on national talent? To what extent will systems of education need to be radically reformed in order to serve better the needs of new and innovative sectors of the economy? If small, financialised growth countries like Estonia are to shift their economies toward more innovation (as some workshop participants noted as part of Scenario 2), they will need to prepare the broader policy supports to achieve this.

4. Long-term economic setback and structural weakness

The financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 has exposed the weaknesses of many of the economies of CEE, especially those seen as too neo-liberal or excessively monetarised in their growth models. While some of these economies have now stabilised, they may well be in store for a prolonged period of stagnant growth and may actually fall back in their comparative standing to the rest of Europe. Particularly dramatised by Scenario 4, convergence with Western Europe will no longer be a question of “when?”, but rather “whether?”. Long-term or structural unemployment (akin to Spain or Greece) will become a new socio-economic problem that many of the CEE states have never faced. Governments will need to address these challenges on top of reviving innovation and rekindling comparative advantage in order to avoid long-term social malaise. Research should be aimed at examining not only these inter-relationships, but also regional and European consequences of such weakness. To what extent will neighbouring countries be affected by such chronically weak countries (e.g. Latvia and the Nordics; Hungary and Austria)? Will these countries also entail a drain on EU policy and budgetary resources?

5. Labour productivity, wage growth and competitiveness

One of the economic handicaps to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the current crisis has been an increasing loss in international competitiveness because of recent high wage growth and insufficient gains in labour productivity. For some countries these pressures have been eased by currency devaluation, while in others (most notably the Baltic states) policy makers have attempted to induce ‘internal devaluation’ by cutting wages and certain domestic prices. How successful have these divergent strategies been? How can the task of improving competitiveness be addressed where Maastricht convergence and other criteria narrow the scope for policy manoeuvre?

6. Out-migration

A factor that will either hinder or help revive the economies of CEE will be levels of out-migration within individual national populations. Some countries such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania or Romania have extremely high numbers of nationals who have left their countries for the UK, Ireland and other Western European states. While this phenomenon involves a wide range of social, political and cultural consequences (some of which are touched upon in the other disciplinary chapters of this report), it is possible to isolate a specific economic dimension to these trends in terms of how they will affect the structure of the national labour market and how this in turn will impact on the sources of economic growth that these states can expect. A corollary issue here is the effect of remittances on local families and economic communities.

At the same time, it is important to note that out-migration might also have an opposite effect – as witnessed in Ireland during the 1980s and 1990s. If sufficient amounts of experienced co-nationals return from abroad, these individuals may actually boost key economic sectors with new knowledge and skills. Can such migration patterns be better tracked and modelled in order to lay the groundwork for more targeted policy measures that might turn out-migration into a positive gain?

7. Conclusions

Economics as a discipline in Central and Eastern Europe has certainly gained in prominence over the last three years because of the global financial and economic crisis. At the same time, the field has not always proved itself capable of analysing the immediate consequences of the crisis or of devising ready solutions. To be sure, economics is often undermined by politics: it’s not the economic models that fail, but rather the politicians who do not take the proper policy steps. Yet, this only underscores the reason why political economy and economic governance in particular continue to be a predominant paradigm of the discipline in the region, rather than pure economic theory.
To tackle these issues, the discipline clearly needs more comparative data and analysis in order to flesh out more distinctly phenomena such as 'varieties of capitalism', innovation strategies or eurozone convergence issues. Researchers working in individual CEE countries should also expand their empirical horizons and engage in more cross-national comparisons in order to place their own countries into a broader perspective.
Sociology as a social science is expected to address the key social and political issues of the day without being driven by narrow disciplinary conventions and disputes. Unlike in the past when sociology generally used “hard data” to play an active role in discussions over the present and future shape of the social world, the discipline is nowadays becoming a more interpretative science. It is itself becoming the object of change, adapting to rapid and on-going social, economic, political and cultural transformation, while also being expected to interpret these changes for others.

Sociologists in Central and Eastern Europe played a major role as “actors” in the social processes that emerged after 1989, but over the last decade this function has gradually declined, just as the influence of sociologists in Western Europe disappeared with the decreasing role of intellectuals. Still, in CEE sociological interpretation of a changing reality is still perceived in public and political communication as being helpful in understanding present and future developments in individual states, in the region and in the world.

During the Forward Look project, discussions concerning future research directions in sociology focused (most particularly during the workshop in Leicester) on two basic research orientations in the discipline. On the one hand there continues to be a predisposition or preference among many scholars for single-country, -nation or -state focused projects. Not only do scholars from CEE prefer to study their own country, but Western European scholars also frequently study one of the new democracies in particular – e.g. Poland or Romania. At the same time there is a wide range of comparative projects that examine neighbouring countries, the Visegrad region, or “old” vs. “new” democracies.

An important outcome of the Forward Look discussions was that differing opinions remain on the necessity of distinguishing between Western societies and the new democracies of CEE. Many participants noted that the Forward Look’s survey of CEE-related social science research (see Chapter 1) offers arguments for both positions. On the one hand, there are systematic differences between projects funded by research foundations in CEE and in Western Europe, since in CEE scholars are still often concerned with the specific consequences of the regime transformation as well as with old cultural legacies. At the same time, the Forward Look survey showed that in other areas there were no differences, since society in Central and Eastern Europe has been transformed by the process of European integration and consequently researchers operate in a similar context.

These divergent opinions notwithstanding, most participants agreed that differences between Western Europe and CEE endure in at least two respects. First, the existing infrastructure for research funding is dissimilar; and second, for the next 5–10 years, the agenda for social research in CEE will (at least partially) be determined by societal developments that will still have some post-transition and post-integration specifics. These conclusions were reinforced during discussions of the scenarios, where participants from the discipline of sociology noted that no matter which scenario obtains, certain key sociological *problématisques* in CEE will remain.

The major societal challenges facing the CEE countries, most particularly those already in the EU, demand more systematic analysis of issues that require an interdisciplinary approach, such as outgoing migration and ageing; emerging virtual
Central and Eastern Europe Beyond Transition: Convergence and Divergence in Europe

identities. Each of the scenarios presented at the Berlin Consensus Conference also implied that migration and mobility will have important effects on attitudes and value orientations among citizens in Central and Eastern Europe. These will remain an important background process to whatever economic–political change takes place.

International/transnational migration is another emerging issue/topic. Return migrants and their economic activities could give new meaning to the concept of transnationalism, as well as the integration of old and new minorities. Regarding ‘old’ minorities, in CEE the situation of Roma minorities is likely to remain an important challenge for the foreseeable future. Central and Eastern Europe has to cope with a new diversity since multiculturalism and diversity are new phenomena often perceived either as a threat, leading to a rise in xenophobia and radical right attitudes hostile to migrants, or a challenge/opportunity for improving cultural capital via mobility. The extent to which anti-discrimination legislation introduced in the run-up to EU accession is actually enforced requires detailed monitoring and research.

2. Social structure, and sources of social inequalities

Even though indistinct concepts are not usually considered useful, the term ‘social structure’ actually represents the opposite. A major advantage of this term is that by looking at the relations between the main groups in society that occur at an institutional level, we can establish the reason for the existence of different life chances and social psychologies. Through its broadness, this definition manages to indicate the interdependency of social institutions and social consciousness.

This process could be explained in the following way: groups are not passive in their adaptation communities and social networking; increasing and diversifying internal and external inequalities, including new transnational and cultural inequalities; value changes and conflicts in the processes of de/nationalisation and re/nationalisation and Europeanisation of member states; individual and societal identity construction and their preservation; and the relationships between political democracy and economic performance.

While noting this multitude of possible research topics, the Forward Look in sociology coalesced around four overarching areas.

1. Mobility and (social) integration

Mobility is a broad social phenomenon, which includes and reflects other processes. It identifies emerging social processes and helps to discover gaps in theory and knowledge, and to determine what is needed in the future. Mobility is also closely related to various issues of identity, cultural diversity and citizenship.

The objective of further research should be to show the diversity of theoretical approaches on mobility and international migration. There is a range of theories used in different social sciences that investigate mobility and international migration. These contributions to researching the migration process need to be combined. Immigration is a major challenge for Europe and in general a priority on the agendas of governments and international organisations. The fact that the European mainland has rapidly come to the forefront as a destination for immigrants over the last three decades has made it hard for some countries to recognise that their status has changed and that they have become immigration countries. This phenomenon may affect CEE states in the medium term. Immigration policies need to become increasingly linked to the reality of a globalised world, which should be the foundation stone for integration at all levels, in combination with appropriate migration flow controls.

Sociological research on migration should include institutional and individual coping strategies, and also look at youth migration and the emergence of the first European generation profoundly affected by EU integration and its impact upon Europe. This includes the trend to circulation rather than brain-drain, even if at present the direction appears to be rather one-way in CEE. Young migrants from CEE states develop local identities and are engaged in local communities in their host countries, which leads to the alteration of national identities. Each of the scenarios presented at the Berlin Consensus Conference also implied that migration and mobility will have important effects on attitudes and value orientations among citizens in Central and Eastern Europe. These will remain an important background process to whatever economic–political change takes place.

International/transnational migration is another emerging issue/topic. Return migrants and their economic activities could give new meaning to the concept of transnationalism, as well as the integration of old and new minorities. Regarding ‘old’ minorities, in CEE the situation of Roma minorities is likely to remain an important challenge for the foreseeable future. Central and Eastern Europe has to cope with a new diversity since multiculturalism and diversity are new phenomena often perceived either as a threat, leading to a rise in xenophobia and radical right attitudes hostile to migrants, or a challenge/opportunity for improving cultural capital via mobility. The extent to which anti-discrimination legislation introduced in the run-up to EU accession is actually enforced requires detailed monitoring and research.
to institutional change, and therefore they indirectly affect the way institutions change. However, changes in institutions could also bring about the rise of new social groups who could put a halt to any changes or manipulate the pattern of change in their favour. (See, for example, the different socio-economic groups that have emerged as a result of the varying types of capitalism in CEE described in Chapter 2.) Consequently, if researchers in CEE states want to succeed in predicting the relationships between institutions, social consciousness and social structure they should try to research them as a whole. In addition there is a process of continuous restructuring of CEE society which introduces new actors, new elites and new power relations. This was underscored by the more negative Scenarios 3 and 4, where new, more self-assertive elites played an important role. The effects of globalisation and Europeanisation lead to the emergence of a new social order, which affects, for example, rural areas and the family. Researching who the actors of the new social order are is becoming a new theme for research. The unique possibility of examining the interactions which are currently evident in CEE, and which appear to be creating a newly shaped social order, could also lead to the re-definition of the concept of 'social structure', not only in the CEE states but also elsewhere. Social structure is no longer as clear-cut as it once was. In CEE, following the 'top-down' class levelling of the communist period, a new class structure is emerging from the bottom up.

While the survey showed that there is a considerable amount of research into social structure and social inequality, there is little specifically about the creation of the new 'middle class' in CEE. Where does it come from and how is it defined? The differentiation between structural and cultural explanations, as well as the definition that society is an interaction between divergent structural and social elements, is the traditionalist approach in constructing the idea of 'structure' usually offered in social sciences. Unlike these approaches, the ongoing processes in CEE point to the power of human agency as a merger of structure and culture. This can be further broken down into the following questions:

- Unlike in the West, the newly-born middle class which has emerged from the supposedly liberal ideology in CEE is still not clear about its position, and issues arise concerning the social sources of solidarity and stability.
- What is the nature of the intelligentsia/middle class/service class in CEE during the transition that has been taking place? What differentiates the new middle class/service class of CEE from its more established western counterparts?
- Will it have any effect on corruption and social marginalisation?
- What will be the consequences of increased consumerism and individualism in CEE, given that personal opportunities have increased, but without adequate resources to satisfy them?

Studying social structure also raises the question of whether there is a post-communist underclass in the making, and if not, why not? What processes have allowed the multitude of "losers" of the post-communist transformation to be incorporated passively into the rapidly developing market societies – citizenship, or EU integration?

Developing the idea of transnational communities, which demand the redefinition of basic concepts such as family, gender equality, age, ethnicity, reproduction patterns and intergenerational conflicts, is an area that social scientists should prioritise in the coming years. One of the solutions that should be examined concerns the social mechanisms that will prevent the intensification of social divisions and conflicts. Carrying out longitudinal research on the life chances of the post-2004 CEE generation, which is very mobile, could help to explore the generational divide. Is there any evidence that post-communist transitions revealed new elements of social structure that are a consequence of their particular trajectories?

Changes in social structure such as the phenomenon of an ageing population, changing family patterns, the lack of solidarity and social cohesion and increasing generational conflict also have effects on economic policy making. For example, a common field of research in Western Europe and CEE is pension reform, which is also a highly political issue. Faced with demographic changes, increases in global economic competition and fiscal constraints, many countries are trying to find the best solution for balancing pension schemes in the long term. However, the scope and extent of pension reform cannot be studied in isolation from other public policies and an analysis of the changes in social structure. In CEE in particular the heritage of state egalitarianism makes it difficult for governments to introduce more severe measures to deal with economic hardship since voters are much more sensitive to potential losses than potential gains. Even under the most positive scenarios considered in Chapter 2, these changes in social structure induced by population change will need to be considered.
3. Economic and social security

Developments in CEE not only profoundly influence populations in CEE but they are also critically important for the future of European society at large. Research focusing on economic security and the role of the welfare state is still marginal in CEE as étatism and the protective state are frequently dominant remnants of the previous regime.

Sociology needs to pay more attention to the influence of markets on political values, patterns of political behaviour and practices in society at large as well as in individual lives, together with measuring life satisfaction and subjective well-being across the EU. On a micro level, i.e. on the level of intimate social ties, CEE societies are characterised by increased individualisation. The discrepancy between growing individual expectations and the limited means to satisfy them are among the most important consequences of this process. Even if CEE societies become more affluent, it means that individuals will still feel frustrated and dissatisfied.

These individual perceptions are particularly problematic because economic development has long been confronted with the need to reduce budget deficits, and in the current economic crisis CEE governments expect that the budgetary situation will worsen as the improvement of the fiscal situation is now even more strongly associated with reducing mandatory expenditure and social welfare spending than in the recent past. Unfortunately, establishing firm foundations for fiscal rectitude is not helped by an often fragile political equilibrium where bold policy reforms are likely to lead to the fall of a government. The economic and political challenges faced by states in CEE are therefore directly linked to individual feelings of social and economic insecurity. The survey of existing research suggests that there is insufficient study of new mechanisms by which individuals survive and a sense of social security is created as well as of how policies and policy-makers can contribute to these processes.

4. Social capital, trust, social networking

Social capital is traditionally connected with the effects of interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary organisations. When exploring fast societal changes in old and new democracies, researchers have paid particular attention to the links between social capital and functioning institutions. The importance of social capital for efficient and accountable institutions is particularly acute in CEE due to the fact that the transition from post-totalitarianism to democracy and the shift from a planned to a market economy require additional resources at the community level. The ability to build and be a part of new social networks affects broader political participation and the mobilisation of various societal actors; it alters identities and lifestyles including the perception of security issues and risks in everyday life. Therefore it is necessary to study the phenomenon of trust – at both the interpersonal and generalised levels – since social networks are often a way of coping with transformation.

To date, however, much social science research has been focused on “financial” rather than “social/human” capital. While this may have been understandable during the economic imperatives of the first post-communist decade, in order to now make social development more sustainable new research is needed into how social and human capital has evolved (and will evolve) in CEE as institutions stabilise and economic relations become more regularised. A corollary topic here is that of social cohesion. The questions here are: how have attitudes and behaviours changed since the individualism (and sometimes egoism) that surged forth in the 1990s? Are the societies of Central and Eastern Europe settling down into some kind of pattern of mutual social understanding? The urgency of this topic of research was raised not only by project participants who evaluated the more pessimistic scenarios, but also by those who examined the prerequisites for generating new socio-economic development models in CEE.

5. Conclusions

It has often been remarked that sociology is one of the more interdisciplinary fields within social science. The phenomena of interest to it often link up quickly to phenomena in economics, political science or other fields – more frequently than in the opposite direction. The sociologists who participated in this Forward Look were no exception, citing the need in terms of methodology to continue multidisciplinary and trans-disciplinary approaches as well as to even add new perspectives such as anthropology. Such a broadening, it was argued, would contribute to a more fertile mixing of both hard and soft data as well as a move away from the predominance of structure-oriented approaches. Moreover, such models should help generate more mid-range theory, which would likewise fit well with the character of the region, i.e. one still undergoing change.
Indeed, participants in the Forward Look workshops stressed that the study of social phenomena in the CEE region will, on the one hand, continue to be preoccupied with the impact of radical social change such as the emergence of new social structures. This includes the rise of a new middle class as well as the patterns, dynamics and sources of inequality (for example, a new post-communist “underclass”). On the other hand, global and European challenges are likely to generate further interest into issues of mobility, the situation of migrants, their integration into their host societies or their impact on social ties in their home countries. The continued (and even exacerbated) pressures of economic development (especially since 2008) will also push sociological research in CEE towards studying different forms of social capital or the impact of social networks on growth and cohesion. Closely linked to this will be the topic of social institutions (including education and the family) and their sustainability in order to ensure that social capital and networks continue to develop and strengthen.
Political Science

Karen Henderson

While all social science disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe were profoundly changed by the fall of communism, the position of political science was unusual since it emerged after 1989 as a ‘new’ discipline. Newly founded departments and institutes of political science in many of the states did initially rely heavily on staff previously engaged in teaching ‘Marxism–Leninism’, ‘scientific communism’ or sociology, but there was no direct institutional continuity. Consequently, when analysing political processes the pluralist ideas introduced in the 1990s were planted into an ‘empty field’ that was open and highly receptive to western ideas and concepts. However, these were not always adequate for explaining the radical developments taking place in CEE, so that innovation by political scientists researching the region was key to understanding what was taking place. This is equally true more than 20 years on from the events of 1989. ‘Beyond transition’ there are still important differences in the way politics functions in CEE, and the need both to capture this in empirical research on CEE, and to frame pan-European projects which accommodate the greater diversity in political life throughout the EU, remains high.

Most social science research on Central and Eastern Europe examines issues that have political aspects, since in rapidly changing societies political decision-making has an impact on the trajectories of societal and economic development. The discussions of political scientists involved in the Forward Look therefore both looked specifically at, for example, political institutions and political communication in Central and Eastern Europe, and at broader societal changes that have political aspects. The aim was both to identify areas where new research agendas specific to all or some groups of CEE states should be pursued, and to identify European or global trends which present new challenges to political science research conducted in CEE.

The first project workshop began by identifying change drivers which will influence future social developments and therefore also the research agendas which will produce a scientific understanding of past, present and potential future structures and changes that can inform policy makers. Using the STEEPV method (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political and Values-based categories), the political change drivers identified were in the main not specific to CEE. Yet when all the major drivers identified by the STEEPV analysis were put in order by a plenary session, all ten most prominent issues selected had clear implications for political science research agendas, and many were particularly relevant to the transition process in CEE (e.g. ethnic diversity, migration, citizenship; changing paradigms of economic development; public sector role in development; eastern borders, including geopolitics and Russian power; political reactions to globalisation). The political driver considered most important was historical legacies in CEE, meaning predominantly the legacy of communist rule. This has been considered in a complex fashion in suggesting five major areas of political science research that need to be pursued.

Discussion of political science issues continued both at the third workshop in Sofia, and at the Consensus Conference in Berlin, and ideas from all stages of the Forward Look have been aggregated below.
1. Leadership and representation

The broad area of leadership and representation covers many issues that are of relevance Europe-wide, but these frequently have a particular salience in CEE because of the rapid changes in governance structures which took place 20 years ago, with the reintroduction of pluralist representation of interests and the re-emergence of civil society, and also the marked, but sometimes only partial, turnover in political elites. Needless to say, questions of leadership were underscored by participants when examining each of the scenarios considered during the Berlin Consensus Conference. Research into the issues involved is of crucial importance for understanding the processes of Europeanisation and globalisation which have been taking place simultaneously. However, as indicated by the Forward Look survey, much existing research has focused on the more obvious topics of immediate concern such as civil society and Europeanisation, and looked less at possible differences in the nature of political processes in CEE.

- ‘Populism’ has gained in salience as a focus of political science research over the past decade, most particularly because exclusionary and nationally-oriented discourses of populist parties are frequently euro-sceptic and hostile to European integration. In CEE, as in Western Europe, it is marked by the emergence of new political parties which juxtapose the ‘people’ with corrupt established elites, but which frequently fail when they gain power and themselves become the ruling elites. Although there is a growing body of research on populist parties in CEE, this issue should be researched more broadly by looking at the failure of representation, and at new forms of representation and new institutions. Underlying the phenomenon, however, is the question of political trust. While this appears to have been declining in Western Europe, in CEE political trust was arguably never firmly established after the fall of communism, as a consequence of which personal links and trust often prevail over trust in institutions and parties. The lack of political trust in CEE has therefore emerged through a different historical and institutional trajectory, and transnational and interdisciplinary research projects need to be designed to capture this phenomenon. Symptoms of anomic development need to be explained in terms that can be addressed by remedial policies.

- Attitudes to democracy in CEE are in some senses contradictory. There is strong support for democracy as a system, yet it is accompanied by widespread criticism of its practice in individuals’ own countries. Evidence-based voting patterns reflect disappointment with government performance. Yet, the issue also deserves reflection from an EU-wide perspective. Research must account for the great discrepancies in views both between social groups in individual countries and between states. In terms of Europeanisation, it is notable from Eurobarometer polls that CEE citizens tend to have greater trust in EU institutions than in their own parliaments and political parties. This is curious since citizen input into party activity and their democratically elected parliaments is more direct than in the case of EU institutions, so that research into this lack of domestic political efficacy appears necessary. The expression of trust in EU institutions may be a manifestation of a lack of trust in political processes at the local and national level rather than a sign of genuine Europeanisation.

- Understanding of sovereignty is a further issue relevant to CEE, since the region has a high number of smaller EU member states, and all have recent experience of highly restricted sovereignty, largely due to Soviet influence. In the post-communist period, relations with international organisations other than the EU – such as the OSCE and World Bank – also have some relevance. Since trust in domestic institutions is low, further research on perceptions of sovereignty, as well as the development of national interest articulation at the international level, is necessary. Processes of interest mediation at the European level have been under-researched, and in the CEE case it must be questioned – given the general perception of a lack of political efficacy – whether ‘organised interests’ have the ability to commit their members. These issues increase in relevance when one considers the different scenarios outlined in Chapter 2.

- Recruitment of political elites remains an under-researched topic in CEE that is key to understanding future developments since it affects public perception of the political process. Differing patterns of party system formation within CEE itself affect the recruitment of elites, but whereas there has been considerable research on the post-communist transformation process and the influence of ‘old’ elites on this process, issues of generational change which will be crucial for future development have received less attention. The discontinuity of political experience and life chances between generations in CEE is a notable phenomenon, which also plays a role in the lack of political trust. Europe-wide research may reveal markedly different patterns in the participation of
younger elites in the political process. Witness the example of 'Petru Munteanu' in Scenario 3.

2. Economics and politics

Interactions between economics and politics require further research throughout Europe, but distinct patterns may be present within the CEE region. The topic is often presented under the broad headings of 'corruption' and 'clientelism', but portrayal of the issue as a 'fight against corruption' ignores some of the crucial structural issues that affect the relationship of economics and politics in CEE and may be specific to post-communist societies. Many of the existing research projects listed in the full version of the survey commissioned by the Forward Look have looked rather narrowly at specifically economic questions, rather than focusing explicitly on the relationship between politics and economics, such as difficulties in establishing the rule of law in the emergent market economies, lack of state regulatory capacity, and the interlinking of economic interests and party politics that derived in part from the large-scale privatisation that followed the demise of the strong state since the aspiration of maintaining monolithic state control over manifold aspects of political, economic and social life was unattainable. The use of personal connections to circumvent dysfunctional formal procedures was therefore an everyday necessity rarely labelled as 'corruption'. After the fall of the old regimes, the already ineffective state apparatus coped badly with the need to transfer from controlling to regulatory functions, and while the economic sphere pluralised just as fundamentally as the political sphere, it proved more complex to regulate than processes such as holding free elections and reshaping the civil service and local government. The implementation of the 'rule of law' in economic matters therefore remains a major subject for research.

- **Weakness of the state** remains a problem in CEE. Although Soviet-style 'communist' states were often perceived to be 'strong states' with pervasive control over all aspects of their citizens' lives, even in the late communist period they were frequently rather weak states since the aspiration of maintaining monolithic state control over manifold aspects of political, economic and social life was unattainable. The use of personal connections to circumvent dysfunctional formal procedures was therefore an everyday necessity rarely labelled as 'corruption'. After the fall of the old regimes, the already ineffective state apparatus coped badly with the need to transfer from controlling to regulatory functions, and while the economic sphere pluralised just as fundamentally as the political sphere, it proved more complex to regulate than processes such as holding free elections and reshaping the civil service and local government. The implementation of the 'rule of law' in economic matters therefore remains a major subject for research.

- **State control of economic resources** remained politically crucial after the fall of the communist regimes since state ownership of the means of production inevitably led to political control of the privatisation process. The process of EU integration, and the channelling of EU funds through national ministries, has continued political control of economic resources after the privatisation process had largely been completed. EU funding therefore remains a key area for studies of corruption and clientelism, and implementation of the rule of law.

- **Party finance** also requires further research. Party systems in CEE have developed in an environment where both state funding and the substantial state resources administered by ruling parties have been a 'given'. This has contributed to the lack of trust in political parties and parliaments perceived by citizens, who regard them as a major source of corruption. Moreover, as different economic-business interests in society become more consolidated, the link between business and politics through party financing can become more ambiguous.

3. Foreign and security policy

The geographic location of the EU has been affected by its enlargement eastward to encompass nearly a dozen Central and Eastern European states. This shift has taken place at a time when foreign and security policy has been gaining an ever greater role in EU policy making, and when globalisation and the global and cross-border implications of security threats are becoming increasingly evident. EU enlargement is consequently an opportunity rather than a threat in terms of Europe's potential as an actor on the world stage. Research projects need to be framed to reflect this, and to enhance the EU's capacity to exploit the strengths that ensue from its greater diversity. Our survey indicated that relatively few political science projects supported by major funders have focused explicitly on research into the international relations of the CEE states, which is in part a reflection of the past, where most of the states concerned were not autonomous international actors. However, since EU enlargement this has changed for a number of reasons.

- **CEE states have greater expertise on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood** than ‘old’ EU member states. Their importance as foreign policy actors is therefore substantial, and their specific interests need to be fully researched and understood. Their stances in general affect security policy in Europe because of the strongly pro-NATO orientations of many of them, but this needs to be viewed in relation to their greater familiarity with states to the east. Here rather than CEE-specific projects, transnational projects have to be framed to encompass relations between CEE and the Eastern neighbourhood. Traditional security concerns are but one facet of the issue, since CEE states are also in general more affected by energy security concerns relating to the Eastern neighbourhood.
Relations with Russia play a key role both with regard to ‘hard security’, and to energy security, and to further enlargement agendas. The extent to which Russia will act as a change driver is open, and regional instability (e.g. in Belarus) has the potential to affect the EU in areas such as energy security. To what extent does Russia export an authoritarian model which competes with EU democratisation agendas in the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership area? Both the democratisation experiences of CEE states within the EU, and their expertise on the region, are key to successful future policy formation.

Further eastward enlargement of the EU is strongly supported by most ‘new’ member states in CEE. This is linked in part to the fact that ‘security through enlargement’ is of greater national interest to the states concerned. Further research needs to be conducted, however, on linked security issues. In ‘soft security’ issues, such as controlling migration and terrorist threats, the openness of CEE states towards further EU enlargement may run counter to the security concerns of states further west given that most of them are already in the Schengen zone.

4. Minorities, migration and ethnic diversity

Migration studies are already well developed within the EU, and have been assisted in CEE by external funding from the EU and other Europe-wide funders. However, much research has been led by a Western European agenda, focused on controlling migration flows through CEE transit countries, the need to ensure adequate procedures for dealing with asylum-seekers in the state where they initially enter the EU, and to prepare CEE states for possible future larger inward migration flows from third countries (a point made salient by Scenario 4). Furthermore, how EU member states deal with existing minorities within their own states is not within EU competencies, and was addressed during accession negotiations with CEE states largely in terms of the broad Copenhagen criteria on ensuring human and minority rights. The survey shows that this topic has been addressed in existing research, and more recent research focuses on CEE citizens as immigrants elsewhere in the EU, and also on the effects of out-migration on their home countries (see also Chapter 3 on Economics). However, a number of outstanding issues require further research.

Is ethnic conflict in CEE a thing of the past? The EU and OSCE helped the CEE states ‘solve’ minority problems prior to EU accession, and it was felt in the Forward Look that future agendas should look at rather different issues. Yet the possibility of ethnic conflict (e.g. in the Caucasus region or even further west) should not be ignored, and the experience of CEE states currently in the EU may assist with this.

Social inclusion of the Roma minorities is an obvious outstanding issue of particular import to CEE states, where most of the major Roma communities within the EU currently live. Although the survey did not show Roma issues to be a prominent topic, there is at present an increasing trend to highlight the issue (as in the 2012 FP call), yet care must be taken to ensure that research projects look at some of the broader underlying issues that affect Roma communities. The understanding of citizenship rights, and the internalisation of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the state in an advanced democracy, is an area which requires further research in CEE in relation to both national and EU citizenship. The securitisation of minority rights may also detract from Roma questions as right-based issues. The strengthening, particularly in implementation, of anti-discrimination legislation remains an outstanding issue. Discrimination is still common, and intolerance of racism has yet to develop firm roots.

Inward immigration into CEE will also be an emerging topic since current political debate in CEE relates to social integration of indigenous minorities or the economic effects of outward
migration. A background to this is asking what it takes to build a democratic political community. Defining the ‘demos’ – the political and social community (including both old and new groups) – is therefore a prerequisite for research on minority or migration topics.

5. Historical ‘turning points’

Debates throughout the Forward Look workshops always emphasised the issue of ‘historical legacies’ and the importance of the communist period for analysing contemporary political developments in CEE. The survey showed that much existing research conducted since 1990 focuses rather narrowly on the communist legacy, looking at the politics of memory and dealing with the burden of the past. Yet the issue of political trust has a longer history than the communist and post-communist period, and the issue of historical legacies needs to be seen in a broader context of long-term regime discontinuity. This could be particularly helpful in using the democratisation experiences of CEE states currently in the EU to assist developments not only in the eastern Neighbourhood, but also given recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East.

- Dealing with country-specific factors causes methodological research problems that require further investigation. In multinational comparative research, ‘outliers’ among CEE states can frequently only be explained by country-specific independent variables, and there are often remote and proximate causes. Yet ‘historical explanations’ of this kind are often not conducive to the formation of policy conclusions. Consequently, the methodology of explaining radical change needs to be developed further.

- Mapping of ‘traumatic events’ in Europe has been under-researched, and is key to understanding many developments, including the formation of party systems, and the way that historical memories constrain behaviour. While many west European states underwent gradual political change, in CEE radical change has tended to be the norm, with many countries undergoing sudden regime change and major border changes several times during the twentieth century. How far back in history should political science research go? While many transnational projects undertake detailed empirical research, there is also a need for exploratory research that does not a priori set boundaries for explaining change.

- Cross-regional research into democratisation is also necessary, since without explicit comparative research with countries outside the region – including countries outside Europe – we cannot fully understand the specificities of regions.

6. Conclusions

In presenting themes that could be a useful focus for political science research on Central and Eastern Europe, it is noticeable that in all cases the findings are likely to be of broader relevance to contemporary political analysis with a broader geographical scope. The interlinking of politics and economics is perhaps the only research field where the specifics of communist regimes – namely, the starting point at the beginning of the 1990s where the extent of state control of property and economic resources was quite exceptionally high – has led to developments that are (arguably) sui generis. In all other areas, a wider variety of historical and geographical factors and responses to contemporary processes of Europeanisation and globalisation more easily allow comparison with other regions in Europe and the world. Many of them can therefore be explored in transnational projects that are framed in an appropriate way that allows for the diversity of experience in the current European Union.

It should also be noted again that political science research on Central and Eastern Europe is concerned with identifying solutions as well as challenges. Over the last 20 years, both politicians, policy makers and political scientists in the region have gained unique experience in tackling a broad range of political, economic and social problems under considerable pressure from the urgent need to implement and manage rapid change. The research directions suggested here should both develop and utilise this expertise.
As an almost perpetual subject of empires, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have for centuries been extremely centralised, which has afforded them less of a chance to develop organic local government systems. When this condition changed in the wake of 1989, legislators generally preferred the Western self-governmental model that provided autonomy for local societies, laying emphasis on local democracy rather than the “local state” or its local agent for service provision. Yet, although the countries of CEE have been relatively successful in completing the formal and institutional requirements for local and regional governance autonomy and democracy, several problems remain concerning both structures and inefficiency.

The first question is whether ‘Europeanisation’ is the only future path or whether the region has specific characteristics linked to ‘path dependency’ that have to be considered in setting the research agenda. During the Soviet era the CEE countries were made to copy the Soviet type of local government system, which recognised neither the horizontal sharing nor the vertical division of power. This communist heritage and many elements stemming from the pre-communist past meant that both local governments and civil society lacked the knowledge and ability to self-govern. This duality, therefore, of very specific historical legacies alongside equally tangible European influences became an important background theme for assessing future research agendas in the sphere of local governance.

During the horizon-scanning exercise that was conducted during the Forward Look’s first workshop in Bratislava, this framework became more explicit as some of the drivers that were identified reflected historical legacies (e.g. structural disparities across regions), while others pointed to new, dynamic factors of change (such as e-government or evolving public–private service provision partnerships). During the third Forward Look workshop in Sofia (which was devoted to political science and local governance), an introductory paper by Michal Illner provided additional insights such as the need to distinguish formal models from actually functioning ones in the region. He also pointed to the heterogeneity of local governmental systems throughout Europe, and to the need to identify “Eastern pathologies” or specific negative features in CEE such as lack of trust, low participation and corruption.

At the Consensus Conference in Berlin, discussions concerning local governance sought specifically to address the EU dimension, as made prominent by the four scenarios. It was noted that since local government systems in CEE have been shaped or “Europeanised” under the regime of EU Structural Funds, the future of European integration and especially of the cohesion policy will be a significant determinant of progress in local governance in the region. On the European level, multilevel governance will remain a domain needing further investigation: how are regions and local governments in CEE able to emerge in the system of multilevel governance? To what extent will EU cohesion policy influence regional ‘catching up’ processes, and how could local governments become more involved in EU-wide policy learning? If scenarios such as those that predict continued sluggish economic growth in Europe obtain, how will local governments deal with chronic under-funding for public services or improving infrastructure to attract new investment?
1. Structural problems of local government systems

The structures which existed at the outset of transition and the inherited centralisation in CEE became one of the main obstacles to adapting to a regionalised/decentralised Europe and to managing public services efficiently. The existing literature as well as the experts participating in the Forward Look usually emphasised the fragmented structure of local governance mostly in rural areas. Many (but not all) Central and Eastern European countries are struggling with the fragmentation of local government which presents problems with capacity, finance, quality and accessibility. How to adapt the model which was the region’s starting point is a crucial question and depends on cultural, institutional, geographic, economic and infrastructural factors. The context dependency of local integrative policy needs a scientific foundation based on research because uniform solutions are not able to provide tailor-made models.

The other common structural problem in CEE, with a few exceptions, is the weakness or complete lack of meso- and regional-level governance, despite the fact that a number of reform programmes have aimed to reconstruct the regions, mostly within new boundaries. This may be one of the most fundamental differences from Western models in relation to the movement for a Europe of Regions, which flourished in particular in the 1990s, although it is currently less popular. The rescaling process in CEE was mostly determined by the regime of Structural Funds (SF). Territorial reforms implemented in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were only partially successful because centre–local tensions remained problematic, and central governments had a dominant position in using Structural Funds. Other countries, like Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria suffered from an unstable, floating “meso”, and established a jungle of institutions for absorbing the European funds, but the scale, boundaries, centres, competences, and the whole status of the new “meso” units were questionable and reforms seem to have come to a deadlock. The story of Central and Eastern European regionalism presents a situation where the rescaling process implemented in the last two decades in CEE has been motivated by European institutions that did not always take the special regional context and path dependency into consideration. It is not an accident that according to our survey (Chapter 1) urban and regional issues have been more frequent in the CEE research agenda. The urban and regional competitiveness of CEE depends heavily on the role of European regional policy, so the adaptation to the regime of Structural Funds was a “command” during the accession period. Likewise, as our scenarios revealed, EU integration and EU policies are very important change drivers for the future of CEE countries considering not just their economic but also political cohesion and governance.

Research is needed to determine how these structural problems could be solved in the future in a changing regime of Structural Funds and European governance in general. Research needs in particular to investigate:

- Reforms and mechanisms for consolidating the currently fragmented local governance structures;
- Changing boundaries and the roles of meso-levels;
- The history and evolution of central–local relations;
- CEE regions in the European multilevel governance system;
- The impact of European policies, especially of the cohesion policy on territorial governance in CEE.

2. Local and regional public service provision

The provision of local public services that was inherited mostly from the socialist “welfare state” system has many problems. First, smaller municipalities do not have the institutional and personnel capacity as well as the knowledge necessary for managing local affairs. They lack experts, information and professional assistance at the upper levels, and they are dependent on the very centralised redistribution of public resources.

Secondly, the institutions which provide public services are fighting with capacity problems: they are often too large in scale and have oversized capacity, while in other cases they are suffering from a lack of finance, personnel and infrastructures. These problems stem from the past since most branches of public service inherited their scale and scope from the communist era: the entire public service sector remained almost untouched, although both the demand and the real circumstances had changed dramatically. The New Public Management paradigm was unable to provide appropriate solutions
in countries where the business sector is weak and the public sector is not mature enough for establishing real partnerships, and where clients and civil society are too dependent on public services. All of these facts underline the recognition that CEE local governance is still in the middle of the public policy learning process and needs more evidence-based inputs to continue the modernisation of local public functions, which is also the question of leadership emphasised in the Chapter 5.

Participants at the Forward Look’s different workshops therefore identified a number of more specific research themes in this domain such as:

- Systematising modes and patterns of policy transfer;
- Examining the evolution of management structures and of e-governance;
- Evaluating the most appropriate modes of capacity building and learning;
- Assessing effective budgetary mechanisms for public service provision.

3. Local society and local democracy

As introduced already in Chapter 5, the issue of examining the structure of democratic attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe is as important for meso- and local-level government as it is for national administration. The political and administrative culture within CEE countries is related to deeply rooted values and norms of behaviour. In discussing cultural differences and attitudes we should not forget the fundamental gulf between the histories and culture of West and East. The organic, continuous development of the West and the continuous disruption in development in Eastern European countries has produced different bases for people’s identity and trust towards Europe, the nation (state) and local politics and public institutions. This fact has crucial consequences for the performance of local governments, not just because local and regional governments in CEE do not have stable civil and social backgrounds for governing, but also because local political and bureaucratic elites lack openness and the skills necessary for deliberative and participative democracy and consensus, as well as for innovation and the inclination to change. Weaker legitimacy causes a loss of trust and civic support and also of social capital in a broader sense, and we have to emphasise local tensions such as the presence of minority conflicts (as mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5). The question is whether the weaker legitimacy and the lower quality of democracy can be explained by historically postponed development alone, or whether it is embedded in deeper cultural roots? Another important question is whether the nation state frustration or identity conflicts which are common in CEE countries have any impact on central–local relationships and the strong tradition of centralisation?

If we agree that governance depends on the qualities of the governors, we have to investigate the local political and other elites (across parties, civil organisations, bureaucracies, entrepreneurs, etc.). The skills, knowledge and attitudes of these people determine the quality of local networks, the cohesiveness of local society. Research conducted in the region has found that the emerging networks are rather exclusive, and compared with public actors, civil and business stakeholders have very loose access to the centres of decision making. It is especially important to identify the new “project class” or development regimes emerging around the allocation and use of European Structural Funds. The experts involved in the Forward Look and contemporary literature also concur that local/regional politics is suffering from low civic participation and low turnout at local elections, from limited publicity, from a lack of trust and skills for “cognitive democracy”, and from the decreasing prestige of careers in local politics, all of which lead to an entrenched local elite. In general, local government regimes in CEE show many specific features, and it makes sense to investigate them comparatively and in as complex and interdisciplinary a way as possible.

Local society in CEE has remained weak: local elite networks are not transparent, and low turnout weakens legitimacy. Partnership mechanisms are not a solid basis for development coalitions and the relationship between business and politics is penetrated by corruption. Comparative research is needed to understand to what extent cultural differences determine the performance of local governments, which should include:

- The state of the art and processes in local democracy;
- Civic participation and trust and the political, economic and administrative elites;
- Cognitive aspects of local decision making.

4. The European context

Starting from the original aim of the Forward Look, the European dimension is one of the most important aspects of the transition since measuring the progress of transition entails comparison of ‘Eastern’ performance and structures
with ‘European’ ones. Europeanisation may be the main driving force of changes occurring in Central and Eastern European countries as it was assumed by our scenarios (Chapter 2). This is not just because Western democracy and the market model was the only pattern to be followed during systemic change, but also because during the pre-accession and post-accession periods the policy requirements shaped both the content and the institutionalisation of governance in CEE as a result of conditionality and the European administrative space.

European cohesion policy has not been particularly successful as an external driving force, especially with respect to the functioning of the new institutions and the utilisation of Structural Funds. Regional polarisation, the accelerated decline of rural, peripheral areas, and the segregation of Roma populations are all indications of the much larger scale of regional problems in CEE. As a consequence (and as Scenario 2 highlighted), how regional disparities should be handled, and how the future of European cohesion will affect the regions in CEE, are crucial topics for research. The recent debate on territorial cohesion and the location-based ("place-based") policy as well as the emergence of macro-regional co-operation as in the Baltic and Danube regions are big challenges facing local actors in CEE. European cohesion policy and its future are also relevant with regard to the institutional misfit of domestic development policy and public administration. The rescaling of territorial governance could also lead to a shift in power to the higher levels governance and away from the democratically elected sector. This is the case in most of the CEE countries, where centralisation has remained the main logic of governance and the horizontal logic of partnership is emerging only superficially.

The specificity of the geographical situation of CEE means that there are unique challenges for local governments. For example, do the long Eastern European borders of the CEE countries entail a special mission for neighbourhood policy, or do they simply mean a specific form of co-operation with countries and regions “beyond the EU” in the longer term? This borderland has many particularities that challenge not just the neighbouring local governments, but the European Union as well. We can refer here to Chapter 3 on Economics, which raises the question of structural weakness of CEE and its consequences for neighbouring countries, and also to migration problems mentioned in several parts in this report.

How the local and regional levels of multilevel governance may or may not be partners of European and national “partners” is a general problem, but local governments in CEE are in a worse position since they are only loosely embedded in Europe-wide local government networks and are more strongly dependent on central government. Urban governance matters are recognised in the West, but the question is how the leadership of the cities in the East can catch up. Only strong cities will be able to join to the European urban networks in reconstructing the European Space. The urban question is also important from several other aspects: gentrification and segregation, social aspects of urbanisation, institutionalisation of agglomerations, etc. Some specifically “Eastern” dimensions of the urban issue are postponed urban regeneration, the controversial relationship between urban centres and rural peripheries, the limited access of rural society to urban jobs and services and even the loose links between cities.

5. Conclusions

Although Central and Eastern European countries have already proceeded beyond transition in the sense that they have established institutions of local/regional governance compatible with European standards, ‘beyond transition' they are still suffering from many problems of capacity, function, structure and resources, which hinder genuine ‘catching up' and which, as suggested in the scenarios, have the potential to undermine European integration. One of the main messages of the Forward Look is that legal regulation and institution building are not enough, since it was frequently not the model that failed, but rather the context was not ‘mature’ enough to operate it effectively. Capacity building and learning are keys to handling this misfit. Yet on the other hand, cultural differences matter, and it should not be the aim to eliminate the deeply rooted differences, but rather to adjust national systems as flexibly as possible in order to enable them to cooperate with each other. Research focusing on CEE local governance is of vital importance not just for the countries and governments concerned; it can also make a valuable contribution through contextualisation – by testing the paradigms and assumptions underpinning the governance debate by means of comparative investigation of governance under different conditions of societal transformation.
This Forward Look was designed to generate new thematic perspectives for social science research in and on Central and Eastern Europe. In this concluding section, therefore, we would like not only to summarise the broad array of issues raised by the project, but also provide cross-disciplinary syntheses of these topics into what we will call thematic clusters. We believe that researchers, funders and policy makers should look at not only individual topics of interest within each discipline, but also reflect on constellations of issues that could represent more synergetic research programmes. Below we lay out three such thematic clusters as the main conclusions of our work. We follow this up with recommendations as to what we think are the minimum pre-conditions for such research.

This Forward Look was undertaken at a watershed moment for social science research on Central and Eastern Europe. The great financial and economic crisis of 2008–2010 arguably set the scene for the region’s fourth period of societal development and change since the fall of communism. The first phases were: establishing democracy in the first half of the 1990s; preparing for EU accession during the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s; and thereafter embarking on post-accession trajectories as of 2004. Now, the severe economic and political shocks that came after 2008 have placed the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in a wholly new and challenging development situation, where social science is needed to help understand problems and evaluate (and even propose) solutions.

However, Central and Eastern Europe is itself a source of solutions as well as problems. Over the last two decades, it has been a ‘laboratory for change’ where a number of reform-minded governments thinking ‘outside the box’ have undertaken the most radical reforms seen in post-war Europe. For longer established democracies, where governments approach change more cautiously, this provides valuable lessons – for example, lessons on the consequences of policy alternatives that other states have not dared to implement. It also sheds light on the extent to which states can adapt to external models and goals coming from Western Europe.

In carrying out its task, the Forward Look relied on a number of analytical and information gathering tools, including foresight methods, scenario-building, background research and traditional workshops and discussions. In summing up the application of these tools to the future-oriented task at hand, the Forward Look arrived at two kinds of conclusions and recommendations. Since this Forward Look was explicitly designed to examine the burgeoning agenda of social science research in Central and Eastern Europe, we will begin with the conclusions formed about this domain. At the same time, it will be no surprise that during the four workshops and conferences the Forward Look organised, with over 90 different participants, many issues were raised about the infrastructure for social science research in and on the region. As a result, this final chapter will also review the recommendations which address these points.

1. Thematic clusters

As noted in the Introduction, as well as across many of the preceding scenarios and disciplinary overviews, participants in the Forward Look came to coalesce around an important axiom of change in Central and Eastern Europe encapsulated by the dual notions of convergence and divergence. A range
of phenomena in the region have shown signs of convergence with similar indicators in Western Europe, though transnational research agendas must allow for the fact that the reunited Europe is structurally different from the former Western Europe. Indeed, a number of phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe have remained different, suggesting that the future development path in CEE states will not necessarily be an automatic and smooth transition toward the advanced industrial world. A number of disadvantages and inequalities in this region have prompted some analysts to apply the concept of ‘dependent development’ to these societies, thereby capturing not only the economic difficulties of competing with ‘core’ capitalist countries, but also the entrenched social and political consequences of such disparities – be they the emergence of a permanent social underclass or the rise of populism and chronically weak governance.

The disciplinary chapters of this final report have already laid out some of the main directions in which participants in the Forward Look argued that social science research on Central and Eastern Europe should go over the next years. This final section of the report will therefore highlight cross-cutting themes that appear across more than one discipline, and consider how these can be seen in terms of convergence or divergence.

1.1 Populations in change

Many aspects of social, political and economic change begin with the basic structure of our populations. Where the size, geographical distribution and composition of populations change, so too do the social relations, the governance challenges and the economic opportunities. This Forward Look brought these overarching connections into focus by highlighting issues such as out-migration, in-migration, regional population change, ethnic minorities and integration.

New synergetic research on the broader effects of population change should begin with mapping out the patterns of out-migration that Central and Eastern Europe has seen over the last 3–4 years. Such trends have precipitated not only profoundly transformed labour forces, but also social consequences for families and political challenges due to altered electorates and interests. By the same token, return migration has an equally important impact potential, including an influx of new skills, social networks and political awareness.

Another dimension of population change is in-migration, defined as arrivals (often illegal or refugee) from third countries. While in CEE this phenomenon has so far been generally small in scale compared to some Western European countries, it was notable how many participants across the different disciplines raised this research topic as important for the future. Many CEE governments have already commissioned studies in this area, examining the need for social integration policies as well as economic measures. There is also a clear convergence dimension to this issue, as many Western European countries have long faced these same challenges. But more could be done in terms of examining likely political consequences, with reference to the possible divergences in priorities in different parts of Europe.

Lastly, a number of these population shifts are taking place against the backdrop of still unresolved questions of ethnic minority integration. While the danger of direct ethnic conflict has in most areas subsided, the challenges of social and economic integration of minorities remain. Inevitably, policy debate and political rhetoric about migration issues becomes doubly problematic where ethnic minority problems exist on top.

1.2 New geographies of Europe

The prevailing perspective on transformation in Central and Eastern Europe has tended to examine the region’s success in ‘returning to Europe’, or in other words overcoming the West–East divide. In many respects this paradigm continues to be relevant, for example, as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe continue to develop their place within the European Union. The economic division of labour between Western and Eastern Europe will continue to evolve and need research. Likewise, local governance will profoundly be affected by how cohesion funds will be distributed and regional development promoted.

At the same time, geographic imaginaries are changing in Europe. In part, factors such as migration, but also value structures and historical linkages are changing the axes of social, political and economic relationships. Southern parts of Central and Eastern Europe sometimes evince more similarities with societies along the Mediterranean than with other erstwhile communist countries. The economic or political pressures they may be under may be similar in structural terms, and therefore merit more comparison along these geographical lines than within some kind of outdated post-communist paradigm. Likewise, regional integration around the Baltic sea area has begun to change the relevant context of social and economic development away from purely the ex-communist perspective. The recent financial and economic crisis has shown that the fates of many Western and Eastern European coun-
tries were much more inter-woven than amongst the CEE countries themselves. Lastly, labour migration trends mean that many families’ or communities’ social imaginaries may involve wholly separated relationships, where some members remain in the home country and others seek work in an entirely different area of Europe. The scattered nature of these rapport means that the notion of Central and Eastern Europe will become more diffuse.

Lastly, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have already and will continue to play a role in expanding Europe’s border further to the East and changing geographies in this manner. Both the broader process of democratisation as well as the more specific prospect of EU accession for some of the countries beyond CEE will affect the way in which future Europe integration will progress. The Balkans, for example, remain a European geography yet to be worked out. In this realm the interests of many CEE countries will at times be more united than across other issues. For example, there will be broad support for continuing the European Neighbourhood Policy, but unease toward deepening cooperation with Russia. Still, the overall pattern of European geography will change.

1.3 Social cohesion
The degree of socio-economic transformation that post-communist Europe has undergone over the last 20 years has been astounding. Profound economic reforms – including not only privatisation, but other forms of extensive capital and resource redistribution – have radically re-shaped the economic foundations of these societies. These changes have helped to spur considerable economic growth, causing aggregate welfare to rise often quite dramatically. Yet, the deeper question remains what the effect of this change has been on social cohesion and harmony. What kind of new societal division of labour is emerging and what are the social relationships stemming from that structure?

One prominent example involves new patterns of social stratification. Beyond the past discussions of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from the transformation, scholars need to begin to study how these differences may (or may not) be now reproducing themselves across generations. Hence, a combination of economics and social change. Are teenagers from ‘winner’ parents continuing to be as successful, while those from ‘loser’ families are stuck in lower social and educational strata? How will these hardening divisions play out politically in terms of electoral cleavages for parties? Will sharper stratification lead to tensions also in the economic realm? What will be the transnational impact of these developments? In Western Europe there is also debate on decreased social mobility and changing party systems, and the international research agenda must effectively encompass and compare all such shifts.

A second aspect of social cohesion concerns social trust. Clearly, the degree to which social relations have been transformed over the last two decades means that social trust has also been cast onto a new footing. Old stresses – be they political from the era of communist repression or economic from the waning days of planned economy – have eased, and new relationships based on autonomous opportunity and choice have emerged. Yet, generalised social trust across the region remains low, this despite the lapse of over two decades since change began. While low levels of social trust are often described as a generational issue, the fact that new generations are steadily maturing does not seem to have made much difference. Yet, as long as trust is low, civil society will be encumbered and society’s ability to stand for democracy will also be undermined. It should be noted, of course, that the issue of trust is not confined to CEE; yet it may take specific forms there given the backdrop of major societal change. Trust in institutions and in processes of all kinds is a useful topic for Europe-wide research; but projects must necessarily be framed with due consideration to the specifics of developments in CEE, as well as in more established democracies.

2. Recommendations

Recommendation 1
Ensure CEE issues are adequately addressed in European level funding opportunities

Given the particular focus of this Forward Look, the research themes that came forward have been focused on issues specific to Central and Eastern Europe. However, as this report has also sought to make clear, in all cases it is important that not only research be conducted within the CEE states themselves, but also that the specifics of the region be incorporated into transnational research agendas. In this respect, European-level funding for social science research continues to be essential, since most national-level research funding agencies in CEE do not have the resources to initiate international projects, and comparative international research is particularly important for a composite understanding of social change and of the policy implications that derive from it.
Recommendation 2
Support multinational comparative projects
In terms of methodological approaches, one of the most important outcomes to result from the Forward Look’s gathering of over 90 scholars and stakeholders interested in CEE research was a resounding reiteration of the need for continued comparative study of the region and of Europe as a whole. Successful and insightful research themes such as the ‘varieties of capitalism’ in CEE or post-communist party system development have amply demonstrated how joint efforts among scholars can yield important theoretical and empirical insights. In this Report, also, all of the research priorities that have been listed call out for a comparative, multi-country approach. Funders should clearly prioritise projects that apply such perspectives and do not limit themselves to purely national introspection.

Recommendation 3
Invest in dedicated research infrastructures
For transnational research projects really to achieve comparative results, it is essential that scholars have access to cross-national data and that such data are comparable with the rest of Europe and globally. According to the Forward Look survey, ‘infrastructure, data bases’ is the research topic where expenditure by West European foundations exceeds that of CEE foundations most conspicuously (see p. 19). However, there have also been some notable achievements. For example, most ESF members from Central and Eastern Europe contribute to important international survey programmes such as the ESS (European Social Survey), ISSP (International Social Survey Project), EVS (European Values Study). Indeed, most of the CEE countries have confirmed their participation in Round 5 of the ESS, and the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) is one of the six institutions represented in the coordinating team. However, on the other hand, there are several blind spots; for instance only Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia participate in SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe).

A corollary issue to data collection is data preservation. Social science data archives are important facilities for empirical social research, and are of crucial importance for comparative studies. Very limited investment in academic data infrastructures such as local data collections and data archives has led to under-representation of Central and Eastern European data within pan-European projects and initiatives. Access to high quality national data resources from CEE requires targeted financial support for CEE data archives along with specific actions directed at such issues as standardisation, tools and services provision as well as training opportunities for data providers and users.

Recommendation 4
Encourage academic independence and research excellence
Since a majority of participants in the Forward Look come from Central and Eastern Europe, discussions about research infrastructure often also touched on the local environment for scholarly research. Though not a uniform phenomenon across all disciplines or countries, some participants noted that in CEE research tends to be more dependent on political power. This can relate both to the partisan provision of financial resources and to researchers’ ambitions to convince political actors. Research ethics, tackling clientelism, and developing a new kind of standard research culture are of crucial importance for the quality of the general societal and political environment in which research takes place. The internal research environment and policy-driven projects require responsiveness to the funders’ needs which is linked to the needs of society. It is therefore also of relevance, when assessing research conducted in CEE, to compare the influence and ‘political embeddedness’ of social scientists compared to Western Europe. How are academic freedom and independence guaranteed in CEE? What are the standards of research excellence, and how and where are they produced? Why is natural and technical science research often privileged over the research into the social sciences, where unique CEE experiences have so much to offer?

Recommendation 5
Support CEE scholars in project leader positions
As highlighted in the MOCEE report, there is a particular need to strengthen participation of scholars from Central and Eastern Europe in comparative, international projects, specifically in leadership roles. The survey conducted as part of the Forward Look showed particularly low participation of CEE scholars as coordinators in EC-funded framework projects. It is likely that this is linked in part to underfunding and lack of infrastructure at their home institutions, which is an issue that has to be addressed primarily by individual states and higher education institutions, where administrative support could be strengthened. Some of the dearth of comparative data across CEE states as a whole reflects lack of investment in research and development in the region. While this situation continues, governments and policy makers in CEE have only
reduced possibilities of influencing transnational research agendas. There is also a need for clear funding policy for social sciences in CEE, preferably coordinated when it comes to topics specific for CEE.

**Recommendation 6**  
**Strengthen the interaction of social scientists and society**

The contribution of social science research is always enhanced by strengthening the interaction of social scientists and society. This can be facilitated by establishing a stronger dialogue with policy makers and presenting to them the potential contribution of social sciences to social developments. Many academic researchers in CEE have good contacts with politicians and policy makers, and high level meetings with, for example, MPs and MEPs at national and regional levels can assist in developing such a dialogue. This can lead to the proposing of specific research projects which would strengthen the involvement of policy makers in the research process (from design to implementation) in order to improve the effectiveness of research impact on policy and practice (including such methods as for example participatory action research), but also to monitor the social science-policy-society interface itself. Policy makers (the research recipients) should be involved in particular with regard to the potential impact of applied research.

**Recommendation 7**  
**Develop good governance of science and resources**

There should be regular meetings of researchers with research funders in CEE and the European Commission (ministries, research funding agencies, EC Directorates General). These should include briefings about potential research directions both in basic and applied research; mobilisation of national support for scholarly data facilities and the launching of specific programmes focusing on research infrastructures and data collection based on national data sharing policies; and action to ensure that peer reviewers from CEE are adequately represented in transnational actions.

**Recommendation 8**  
**Strengthen human capital and capacities**

Training opportunities should continue to be created for early career researchers. While many such initiatives have been implemented over the last 20 years, they remain particularly important for young scholars from CEE. Care should be taken to ensure that young CEE scholars remain a priority in such provision, and that tendencies for such career development opportunities increasingly to target Eastern European scholars from non-EU Member States should not jeopardise training provision for young scholars in other CEE states. A particular focus should be on comparative research analysis: methodologies, design and techniques, statistics, data analysis and access. It should be recognised, however, that competence in quantitative analysis is already fairly widespread in CEE, and training in qualitative methods and analysis is also important.

As social science in and on Central and Eastern Europe moves into a new phase of development, it faces both old and new challenges in its work. This Forward Look has sought first and foremost to formulate an innovative research agenda for the next ten years drawing on the analysis and reflections of social scientists themselves. Together with some additional infrastructural improvements (likewise identified in the course of the project as necessary), these conclusions and recommendations should allow funding agencies, policy makers, researchers and the public at large to understand better the stakes at hand for the next decade as well as to make sound decisions about how to continue societal development in the region.
Annex 1. **Scientific and Management Committees**

**Management Committee**

**Chair**
Professor Bogdan Mach
Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN),
former SCSS member

**Members**
Mr Berry J. Bonenkamp
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)

Dr Patricia Georgieva
National Science Fund of Bulgaria

Ms Petra Grabner
Austrian Science Fund (FWF)

Professor Everhard Holtmann
German Research Foundation (DFG)

Dr Balázs Kiss
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA)
and SCSS rapporteur

Professor Leo Mótus
Estonian Academy of Sciences

**Scientific Committee**

**Chair**
Karen Henderson
University of Leicester, United Kingdom

**Members**
Professor Dalina Dumitrescu
ASEBUSS – The Institute for Business and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania

Dr János Mátyás Kovács
Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Austria

Professor Silvia Mihálková
Comenius University, Slovak Republic

Professor Ilona Pálné Kovács
Regional Research Center, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary

Professor Vello Pettai
University of Tartu, Estonia

Dr Agnieszka Wenninger
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

**Foresight Methodology Consultant**
Professor Ian Miles
Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, University of Manchester, United Kingdom

**ESF Office**
Dr Balázs Kiss
Head of Social Sciences Unit, until 2010

Dr Nina Kancewicz-Hoffman
Head of Humanities and Social Sciences Unit

Mrs Rhona Heywood-Roos
Senior Administrator, Humanities and Social Sciences Unit
Annex 2. **List of Events**

**Survey**  
*October 2009 – September 2010*  
**Professor Hans-Dieter Klingemann**  
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung  
(WZB), Germany  
**Olivier Ruchet**  
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung  
(WZB), Germany / Sciences Po Paris, France

**Workshop 1**  
*Bratislava, Slovakia, 4-5 February 2010*

**Workshop 2: Economics, Regional Disparities, Social Structure**  
*Leicester, UK, 12-14 May 2010*  
**Keynote speakers:**  
**Professor Lazar Vlasceanu**  
Bucharest University, Romania  
**Professor Hans-Jürgen Wagener**  
Germany

**Workshop 3: Democratic Institutions, Local Governance, Political Culture**  
*Sofia, Bulgaria, 23-25 June 2010*  
**Keynote speakers:**  
**Dr Martin Brusis**  
University of Munich, Germany  
**Professor Michal Illner**  
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic

**Consensus Conference**  
*Berlin, Germany, 16-17 February 2011*  
**Keynote speakers:**  
**Professor Poul Holm**  
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland / Chair of EU METRIS report expert group  
**Professor George Kolankiewicz**  
University College London, United Kingdom  
**Dr Domenico Rossetti di Vidalbero**  
European Commission, Belgium
Annex 3. **List of organisations potentially interested in the recommendations**

- International Council for Central and East European Studies – ICCEES
- European Commission, DG Research & Innovation
- European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
- European Commission, DG Regional Policy
- Committee of the Regions
- European Research Council
- ALLEA – Federation of National Academies of Sciences and of Humanities
- European Confederation of Political Sciences Associations
- European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
- European Economic Association (EEA)
- European Sociological Association (ESA)
- European University Association (EUA)
- Science Europe
- The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPACee)
- Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA)
- ESF Member Organisations
- National professional associations (social sciences)
References


