HumVIB Final Conference
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Understanding European Diversity: Cross-National Analysis of Human Values, Attitudes and Behaviours

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS
Opening session: Keynote speeches

Between stable and unstable equilibria

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On most key dimensions, contemporary family life appears sub-optimal in terms of preferences: low fertility, postponement, marital instability. These are not, I argue, manifestations of advancing postmodernism but rather the by-products in a long transition from traditional to gender egalitarian norms of family life. The key question I address is what factors may promote and accelerate a transition to a new stable equilibrium?

Cultural values as constraints and facilitators of socio-economic change

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I will present three basic cultural value dimensions that capture basic cultural differences among countries: autonomy versus embeddedness, egalitarianism versus hierarchy, and harmony versus mastery. I will briefly describe these dimensions, their grounding in theory, and their measurement. Using these dimensions, I will map cultural differences between countries around the world and, more specifically, among 35 European countries. I will examine how national differences on these cultural dimensions relate to and may constrain or facilitate change on several socio-economic variables such as expenditures on the military and on health, and the levels of income inequality and of democracy.
**Session 1: Welfare Attitudes in Europe**

**Welfare attitudes in Europe: framework and key findings**

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This session introduces the forthcoming volume *Contested Welfare States. Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond* (Stanford University Press). In this book, we analyse and report results from a comprehensive research program on citizens’ attitudes toward welfare policies across European countries. We are mainly occupied with normative orientations toward the (re)distribution of resources and life chances, and toward public policies aimed at ameliorating adverse conditions. We summarize these under the heading “welfare attitudes.” Our research focuses on the interplay between individual welfare attitudes and behaviour, institutional contexts, and structural variables. We hope to provide essential input to the interdisciplinary field of comparative studies of welfare state attitudes and to offer critical insights into the public legitimacy of welfare state reform.

**Does popular support for welfare states depend on their outcomes?**

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Does support for the welfare state depend on the degree to which welfare state provisions result in adequate standards of living for citizens? Based on theoretical reflection, a positive as well as a negative relation between welfare outcomes and welfare legitimacy could be expected. It could be the case that good outcomes are ‘rewarded’ with high levels of welfare legitimacy, while bad outcomes are ‘punished’ with low support. However, it is equally plausible that weak outcomes increase support for the state’s responsibility in the provision of welfare, because government intervention is seen as a necessary condition to improve standards of living for vulnerable groups (improvement reaction). According to a similar argument, good outcomes could weaken support, because people feel ‘overburdened’ with taxes necessary to uphold the extensive programs that produce the good outcomes. Surprisingly enough, we know very little about the relationship between welfare performance and support. Nevertheless, these questions are impelling, especially in the light of the current economic crisis and the immanent welfare cuts.

This paper provides an empirical, cross-national study of how performance of the welfare state affect opinions on the role of government intervention. In contrast to previous research, this study does not only take actual performance of the welfare state into account, but also focuses on individual perceptions of performance. Furthermore, we argue that it is of crucial importance to make a distinction between different target groups of welfare programs, depending on their deservingness. Using European Social Survey (round 4, 2008/09) data makes it possible to carry out separate analyses regarding opinions toward pensioners (high deservingness) and the unemployed (lower deservingness). Multi-level analyses are performed on 22 European countries. Variables that might intervene in the relation between welfare outcomes and support – such as indicators of interest and ideological dispositions – are controlled for.
Welfare legitimacy in context: a normative approach to welfare attitudes

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This multilevel research studies the social psychological bases of support for government responsibility in citizen welfare across 28 European countries. The findings first demonstrate the strong impact of subordinate social positions (female gender, low level of education and high perceived vulnerability) on support for strong welfare states across all countries. Second, the study analysed the belief structure underlying welfare state support, based on a theoretical model of lay conceptions of social order. The findings show that beliefs of egalitarianism and authoritarianism and, importantly, social distrust led to support for strong welfare states, while beliefs of welfare dependency and ethnocentrism decreased welfare support. Mediation analyses revealed that low status positions predicted higher support for government responsibility through higher authoritarianism, lower social trust, and higher egalitarianism. Paradoxically, low status also increased perceived welfare dependency which decreased welfare support. Moreover, these relationships were qualified by the level of social expenditure of countries: authoritarianism was a stronger predictor of welfare state support in low rather than high social expenditure countries. Ethnocentrism, in turn, predicted opposition to welfare intervention in highly developed Western welfare states, while no relationship was found in less developed welfare states. These results demonstrate that political opinion construction is based on the subjective reality experienced by citizens and moderated by institutional and normative contexts.

Boundaries of solidarity: unraveling working-class welfare chauvinism

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Mass migration is one of the key phenomena of our time. Europe in particular has witnessed increasing levels of immigration during the past couple of decades. While immigration is often seen as an answer to the problem of demographic decline, it also challenges welfare systems and the way welfare states are run and legitimized. In our contribution, we discuss why members of the working class might be more prone to support ‘welfare chauvinism’, that is to grant entitlements to rights and access to welfare state benefits only to the members of one’s own ethnic community. Drawing comparative data from the European Social Survey 2008, we show that underlying to class-specific preferences there is an interplay of economic and cultural aspects which make working-class members more susceptible to welfare chauvinism. Moreover, it can be shown that the likelihood to adopt such exclusionist attitudes almost doubles under precarious conditions of the national economy. Yet, this effect seems to occur only regarding to the ‘high risk’ group of low skilled, poorly educated and authoritarian groups, whereas the ‘low risk’ group of the highly skilled, educated and libertarian individuals is hardly affected by poor economic conditions of a given country. Altogether, our empirical results support economic group conflict theories as well as socio-cultural explanations for the support of welfare chauvinism.
Session 2: Voter Turnout and Abstention in Context

A group-based model of voter turnout

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This paper presents a multi-level explanation of voter turnout that emphasises parties’ mobilization efforts and incentives. According to this view, some voters are more likely to be responsive to parties’ mobilization efforts than are others and parties value the support of some voters more than others. Starting from this point, we link recent work on social class and stratification, and on the importance of electoral geography, to voter turnout. Specifically, we suggest that, although individuals in higher social strata are more likely to turn out to vote than others, cross-national variation in the different rates of class voting can be attributed to electoral geography, or the geographic distribution of groups and seats across electoral districts. Thus, electoral geography determines the “electoral power” of different groups. We define “electoral power” as the frequency with which a social group is pivotal in the allocation of seats. Using Eurostat, European Social Survey, and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data, we examine this intuition by developing a multilevel model in which individual-level turnout is predicted by social class membership and the relative electoral power of different class groups.

The electoral system, personal votes, and party choice

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Using local elections in Denmark as an example the presentation shows that individual party choice is influenced both by individual level, municipality level, and national level characteristics. Some hypotheses about the effects of the electoral system on personal votes derived from a theory by Carey & Shugart (1995) are first tested using a fixed-effects model. The effect of the personal reputation of the candidates, measured by personal votes, on party choice is then tested using a multilevel multinomial logit model suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008). The paper shows that both the electoral system and the personal reputation of local candidates have theoretically expected effects on party choice at local elections in Denmark. The methodology can be used for cross-national studies of multilevel effects on multi-party choice.

Disproportionality and voter turnout in new and old democracies

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A long-standing puzzle in electoral research is why the disproportionality of electoral systems has a negative effect on voter participation in established democracies, but not in new democracies. We propose a learning theory of electoral system’s effects, and test it in a cross-national analysis and by using Spain as a case study. Electoral disproportionality is unrelated to voter participation in early elections after democratization, but the relationship is increasingly visible as democracies grow older. The case study uncovers two mechanisms: small parties optimize their
mobilization strategy only after the first democratic elections, and supporters of small parties increasingly fail to vote in small districts over time.

**The closer the merrier: political interest, turnout and diffusion of power**

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**Sergi Pardos-Prado**  
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**Carolina Galais**  
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Past aggregate research on the effect of proportionality on individual electoral participation is inconclusive. This paper builds upon the scarce examples of works focusing on micro-macro mechanisms trying to unveil when proportional features will foster or depress turnout among different types of individuals. While focusing on the effect of political interest across different levels and components of Lijphart’s notion of diffusion of power (1984, 1999), we show that the relationship between political disinterest and abstention is stronger in highly diffuse systems (with high levels of proportionality, effective number of parties, fractionalization, parliamentary powers and federalism). The results imply that adopting features of consensual democracies like higher levels of proportionality will apparently increase aggregate turnout in some cases. However, consensual features will systematically depress turnout among disinterested citizens due to lack of clear accountability.
Session 3: The Geography of Happiness in Europe: the role of environmental and policy differences

Data merging and generation

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This technical paper documents the work undertaken to link the European Social Survey – a biennial multi-country survey, which measures attitudes, beliefs and values of individuals living in more than 30 nations – to multi-level variables capturing the physical environment and context of the respondents (air pollution, climate, land use, local GDP per capita, population density, unemployment rate, etc.). The process of linking the data involved creating a series of spatial identifiers based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) geocodes. In addition, while the macroeconomic contextual variables are typically available at the regional level, pollution and climate data are recorded at monitoring stations, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) spatial interpolation techniques need to be applied prior to linking these to a particular respondent. GIS is increasingly used to process, analyse and display georeferenced data effectively due to its mapping capabilities. The resulting dataset provides a unique tool for quantitative investigation of interrelationships at the individual, regional and national levels in Europe.

Life satisfaction and the environment: the case of Europe

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Concerns for environmental quality and its impact on people’s welfare are a fundamental argument for the adoption of environmental legislation in most countries. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between environmental quality and subjective well-being in Europe. We merge three waves of the European Social Survey with a new dataset on environmental quality including air pollution and climate data at the regional level. We find a robust negative impact of sulphur dioxide concentrations on self-reported life satisfaction.
Sundays are blue, aren’t they? The day-of-the-week effect on subjective well-being and socio-economic status

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This paper analyses whether individuals are influenced by the day of the week when reporting subjective well-being. By using a large panel data set and controlling for observed and unobserved individual characteristics and self-selection we find a large day-of-the-week effect. Overall, we find a ‘blue’ Sunday effect with the lowest level of subjective well-being. The day-of-the-week effect differs with certain socio-economic and demographic factors such as employment, marital status and age. The paper concludes with recommendations for future analyses of subjective well-being data and design of data collections.

Perceptions of society and happiness: An analysis of material and subjective determinants of life satisfaction across European countries

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The topic of life satisfaction has been mainly studied from an economic and psychological perspective. As a result of this duopoly of the topic, happiness has been mainly related to two factors: a) the individual’s conditions of living, such as health, income and work situation and; b) the individual’s personality traits. In this paper we assess the impact of the social environment on individual well-being, focusing on the possible effect of social integration on life satisfaction. We include indicators of political participation, generalised trust, perceptions about social integration of the young and elderly, and two individual values: multiculturalism and traditionalism. We find that having a political opinion and voting have a positive effect on life satisfaction. At the country level, differences in life satisfaction cannot be explained by the fact that in some countries more people vote and/or are able to develop opinions about political topics. Generalised trust and perceptions about the social integration of the young and elderly have micro and macro level effects on life satisfaction. At the micro level, individuals with high levels of generalised trust and positive perceptions of the integration of the young and elderly tend to be more satisfied with life than their counterparts. At the macro level, to live in a country where generalised trust is extended increases the baseline level of life satisfaction of all individuals (independently of their beliefs and characteristics). Traditionalism decreases happiness and multiculturalism increases it. Contrary to our expectations, the effect of traditional and multicultural values on happiness is not dependent on whether they are held by the majority of the country’s population or are shared by only a minority.
Session 4: The Timing of the Life Course

Significant markers in the cultural segmentation of the life course

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Based on the assumption that modern European societies are characterised by an age system that divides the life course into major life phases, this research elaborates the role of markers in the cultural segmentation of the life course. The markers of the transition to adulthood (importance of financial independence, completion of education, full-time job, leaving the parental home, partnership, having a child) and to old age (physical frailty, dependency) are considered. European societies clearly differ according to what markers are decisively characterising the transitions from one stage to the other. Although there are some expected crystallizing country clusters (e.g. Nordic, East European), the statistical analyse reveals also unexpected associations of countries regarding cultural segmentation of the life course.

Age norms on leaving home: Multilevel evidence from the European Social Survey

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Young people leave the parental home at different ages, and such differences exist both between and within societies. International comparisons have emphasised the importance of institutions, in particular the welfare regime, the educational system and the labour market, as well as long-standing cultural differences. We here focus on age norms (“age deadlines”) for leaving home, a key determinant of actual behaviour within the life course approach. We analyse the data of a unique multi-country dataset, the third round of the European Social Survey (ESS), through a series of multi-level regression models where we allow simultaneously for country, regional, and individual-level factors. We find strong normative differences between countries, and significant, though lower, regional-level variation. Norms are significantly influenced by country-level “institutional” factors, as well as by regional-level “cultural” factors.

Double standards: A cross-European study on differences in norms against divorce, non-marital cohabitation and non-marital childbearing for men and women

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We examine double standards regarding divorce involving children, non-marital cohabitation, and childbearing within cohabitation. Whether men or women are more disapproved of when engaging in these behaviors is not a priori clear. We formulate arguments in both directions. Multilevel analyses were conducted including individual and societal-level variables. Our sample consists of 44,000 individuals nested in 25 countries (European Social Survey 2006). Findings indicate that men are generally more disapproved of than women when displaying such modern demographic behaviors. The double standard regarding divorce involving children is strongest. Overall, women endorse all three double standards, whereas men only endorse the double standard regarding divorce. Yet, clear cross-national differences in the double standard exist. The higher the national level of gender equality, the stronger the double standards.
How do conditions of security, either on the individual or societal level, affect the propensity of young adults to plan? We begin with two basic sets of hypotheses. In the positive direction, when young adults have greater security, planning becomes more possible and even more necessary in order to narrow the field of options; and when young adults have lower security, planning becomes less possible and even less necessary. In the negative direction, when young adults have lower security, planning becomes more necessary to optimize whatever prospects might exist; and when young adults have greater security, there is less need to plan because options are ample. The paper tests these hypotheses using two-level OLS regression models with individuals aged 18 to 35 in 23 European countries. Our results reveal opposing trends at the individual and country levels. Young adults with greater personal security are more likely to plan than those who have fewer personal resources. Yet young adults who live in countries with less favorable societal conditions are actually more likely to plan than those who live in countries with more favorable conditions. We conclude with explanations for, and the implications of, these opposing tendencies.
Session 5: Gender Inequality in a Comparative Perspective

Social support and the working hours of employed mothers in Europe: The relevance of the state, the workplace, and the family

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This paper studies the influence of state, workplace, and family support on the working hours of employed mothers and how these different support sources interact. Data taken from the European Social Survey 2004/05 as well as country-specific information were used to estimate several hierarchical models. We find evidence that the availability of supportive workplace arrangements and family support positively impact the working hours of employed mothers and that state policies facilitating the traditional family have a negative effect. There is weak support for a positive relationship between state policies facilitating the dual-earner family and working hours of employed mothers. In addition, most of the sources of support appear to be complementary. Supportive family role models and supportive workplace arrangements have a reinforcing relationship, as do partner’s household help and supportive workplace arrangements.

Gender inequality in household labour

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For women and men around the world, the balance of paid and unpaid work remains a key to sustainable gender equality. Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme, this subproject of the EQUALITY program highlights central findings from the study of couples’ domestic lives. Moving beyond research focused on individual and household characteristics, this cross-national and multi-level initiative shows how the household division of labor and its consequences are shaped by characteristics of the broader society. According to our research appearing in Social Forces, for example, homemakers have a small, but robust, advantage in happiness over full-time working wives. Nonetheless, country policies, such as social spending and public childcare, can and do narrow this gap in women’s subjective well-being. A paper from Social Science Research offers evidence that tight-knit kin networks deter women from turning to their husbands for help around the house—a relationship that holds even after controls for individual- and country-level mobility.

Persistence or decline? Gender gaps in voluntary association participation across countries and time

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Access to social networks and the potential to mobilize embedded resources, captured in the concept of social capital, are unequally distributed among individuals. This relational form of social inequality may generate and amplify social inequalities in other fields, such as occupational careers, income, power relations in public life and in the household, and in this way underline and enhance gender inequality. Voluntary associations are considered important arenas for getting useful information and meeting potentially important acquaintances. If men and women differ in their associational involvement, this brings them into different positions with regard to structural opportunities and unequal distribution of resources including time, money, knowledge, and skills.

In this paper, we focus on gender gap in different types of voluntary associations. Women have
traditionally concentrated in expressive voluntary associations and have had fewer memberships in instrumental groups than men. Since memberships in instrumental voluntary associations are considered particularly beneficial for generating access to valuable social resources, associational gender gap in instrumental groups may be particularly important for the persistence of gender inequalities in socioeconomic outcomes. Memberships in instrumental and expressive organizations in 28 societies are analyzed using data from a set of European Value and World Value surveys, contributing 85 country-years in the period 1981-2008. These cross-national repeated cross-sections are analyzed as a three-level multilevel model for change. In addition to individual-level predictors, the level of modernization in a country, operationalized through female labor force participation rate, is assumed to be associated with joining voluntary associations. The societal-level predictors are decomposed in between-country differences and within-country trends. Results show that only individual-level characteristics are associated with participation in expressive groups. In contrast, significant cross-country differences are found in instrumental voluntary associations, and the existing gender gap is closing over time, which indicates a decline in gender inequalities. However, the mechanism for this gender convergence is different than hypothesized. It is not that participation rates in instrumental voluntary associations are increasing faster for women than for men; rather, women disengage from instrumental groups at a significantly slower rate than men.

**What explains cross-country variations in gender inequality in poverty after socialism?**

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Using the 2008 cross-sectional wave of SILC and multi-level modeling techniques, this paper explores the macro-level determinants of the gender poverty gap in the ten post-communist European Union member states. In dialogue with the literature on the impact of economic development on gender inequality in Latin America, we find that fast-paced, foreign capital led economic growth is associated with a larger gender poverty gap, while generous welfare policies, specifically higher levels of spending on pensions and family policies are correlated with women’s lower relative vulnerability. Additionally, we find that countries where people claim to be more religious have smaller gender poverty gaps, but more women are in positions of power or the ubiquity of liberal gender roles do not explain the variation in gender inequality across these countries. We suggest that these findings describe the obstacles to social development faced by post-communist countries because of their specific geo-political location at the semi-peripheries of the European Union, as well as reflect the legacies of state socialism and the more general impact of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies.
Session 6a: Early-career researchers’ special session

Welfare regimes and normative feedback: a cross-country comparative study of public attitudes towards job flexibility

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Over the last decade, the idea of flexicurity as the combination of labour market flexibility and social security has become a popular though contested political issue within the EU, since its proponents call for more adaptive workforces in terms of readiness and willingness for change. This study explores the relevance of normative attitudes to job flexibility between and within welfare regime contexts. Drawing on the notion of “policy feedback”, we argue that welfare states with their particular principles of responsibility between state, market and family may create different normative expectations, value orientations and preferences with regard to the flexibility-security nexus. To this end, we a) investigate whether different types of welfare regimes vary systematically in the degree to which citizens hold similar normative attitudes to job flexibility and b) inspect the extent of attitudinal class differences between welfare contexts. The empirical analysis utilizes data from the cross-country comparative Eurobarometer survey 2005 and applies ordered logistic multilevel techniques. The results provide some support for regime-specific flexibility orientations which can partly be explained by differences between interest groups. Our findings give reason to assume that highly redistributive regimes based on universal solidarity norms have the capacity to accommodate the need for higher security among the more risk-exposed lower classes and hence to diminish attitudinal class differences in flexibility attitudes which are vital for the success of the flexicurity strategy.

Subjective social mobility and preferences for redistribution

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The study aims to explain the genesis of attitudes toward redistribution by applying the theory of causal attribution to the phenomenon of subjective social mobility. The paper asks two questions: (1.) Are attitudes toward income redistribution affected by the subjective experience of social mobility, and, (2.) how are these effects moderated by cultural contexts? These questions refer to a potential long-term feedback process between a welfare state's success in providing equal opportunities and individual attitudes toward welfare state actions.

Using the theories of causal attribution and distributive justice, the basic idea of the paper is that people who experienced upward mobility should attribute this success to internal dispositions and, consequently, be less supportive of redistribution. On the other hand, people who experienced downward mobility should attribute this to external factors and, consequently, show a higher level of support for redistribution. These hypotheses are tested with a multilevel design based on 21 countries and three time-points using international survey data from the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme). The robustness of these results is tested by a comparison of random and fixed effects approaches to multilevel analysis.

The results suggest that the experience of downward mobility leads to an increase in the support for redistribution, while the experience of upward mobility leads to a decrease in support for redistribution. These effects are independent of the indirect mobility effects that are due to changes in vertical positions. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the individual effect of being upwardly mobile is moderated by the cultural context. In particular, the analysis suggests that the effect of upward mobility is amplified in strongly individualistic countries, while it is weakened in collectivistic countries. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that individualistic (liberal) countries constitute more heterogeneous attitudes than non-individualistic countries do.
In light of the demographic change in industrialized countries, we investigate popular attitudes towards public pensions in thirteen welfare states. In all of these countries, an aging population threatens the balance between those who contribute to old age insurance and those who benefit. Eventually, the economically active will have difficulties to provide for the increasing costs of pension insurances and thus pensions might decrease. However, since in democracies welfare systems are assumed to match public preferences, it is doubtful to what extent voters’ will approve such decreases.

We investigate whether public expenditures for old-age pensions should be increased, decreased or remain the same from the point of view of the population, and of how people evaluate the current pension systems. In our study we combine micro- and macro-level perspectives: on the macro-level, we firstly examine to what extent attitudes between countries differ according to the different understandings of equality represented by different welfare state regimes. Secondly, we test the assumption that welfare arrangements in consolidated welfare states match public preferences more closely whereas popular attitudes towards pension expenditure still diverge from the institutional setting of recently developed pension systems.

On the micro-level, we compare the effects of cohorts with those of other socio-demographic variables, thus investigating whether potential conflicts concerning redistribution are age driven with regard to the uncertain future of public pensions or rather reflect different socio-economic differences as class or gender.

Our study includes three post-socialist countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) along with the US, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Western Germany, France, Spain, and Portugal.

Drawing on ISSP data, robust ordinal logistic regressions reveal little evidence that countries with all-encompassing pension schemes are evaluated as more successful than countries that provide less coverage. However, in line with loss aversion, we find the least satisfaction with and a particular strong demand for increased public expenditure on pensions in Mediterranean and post-socialist welfare states that only recently constructed or restructured their pension system. In contrast, people in consolidated welfare state regimes are more in favor of maintaining the status quo.

On the micro-level age-cohorts are the strongest predictor of attitudes towards pensions: the elderly clearly favor increased pension expenditure in order to maintain current pension standards. Among the younger cohorts, the call for increased pension expenditure is less pronounced. Nevertheless, even a majority of these cohorts is in favor of slightly increasing public pensions.

Acceptance of homosexuality varies widely across the world. A recent survey on that topic has shown that while 83% of Dutch respondents perceived their country as a good place for gays and lesbians to live, only 2% of Azerbaijanis had the same opinion about their country (Gallup Survey...
Similar discrepancies are found when looking at national legislation. Whereas in countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain equal marriage rights exist for same sex couples, homosexuality is considered a crime or even punished sometimes with death in other regions of the world. Although Europe seems to be a place where at least national laws prohibit the incitement to hatred and discrimination based on sexual orientation, also here the acceptance of gays and lesbians varies considerably. While the Netherlands and Sweden seem to be the most tolerable places for homosexuals, people in the new EU Member States (like Hungary and Poland) show a less tolerant attitude towards same sex relations (Gerhards 2010). So far most studies have focused on individual level explanations of sexual prejudices within a single country (dominantly the US). Results have shown that prejudice towards homosexuality is highly correlated with individual characteristics such as gender, education, race but primarily with religious and political attitudes (e.g. Hoover & Fishbein 1999; Herek 2000; Jenkins et al. 2007; Ford et al. 2009; Greenberg et al. 2010; Laythe et al. 2002; Rowat et al. 2006; O’Bryan et al. 2004). Recently, some research has started to examine this topic from a cross national perspective (Adamczyk & Pitt 2009; Gerhards 2010), focusing not only on individual attributes to explain differences in attitudes towards homosexuality across countries, but also on macro level factors, such as the role of the dominant religion and the economic welfare.

Against this background, using data from the European Social Survey for the year 2008, this paper contributes to the debate by examining the nature of the differences in the acceptance of homosexuals in European countries in more detail. Applying multi-level analysis seems appropriate in this context because this allows to clarify how cross national differences can be explained by determinants of the individual (e.g. education, gender, religion and political attitudes) as well as the institutional level (e.g. economic welfare, legalisation, egalitarian culture). Moreover, it can be examined to which extent cross national differences can be either attributed to individual characteristics or national context factors. Due to the integration of a macro level perspective and the consideration of additional macro level factors (such as policies allowing gay civil unions, adoptions for homosexual couples as well as measures related to a more gender egalitarian culture), the paper will shed light on the underlying causes of European diversity with respect to the acceptance of homosexuality. Furthermore, the limitations of previous research focusing on only one country or individual level explanations can be overcome.
Favorable conditions for workplace work-life policies in Europe

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With the steady rise of dual income families, European companies and governments have introduced work-life policies to facilitate the combination of work and family responsibilities. These policies will become even more relevant in the coming years as the labor supply of women will be needed in the labor market as a consequence of the ageing of societies. Governments differ in the number and kind of work-life policies they provide. When the state is not providing certain policies, companies can provide supplementary policies to their employees.

In this study we focus on favourable conditions for the provision of work-life policies by companies, taking company characteristics and the institutional context into account. Drawing upon a combination of economic theory and institutional theory, we first investigate how company characteristics, managerial attitudes and institutional conditions are related to the provision of work-life policies by companies. Second, we investigate how these favorable conditions reinforce each other leading to even more work-life policies being offered by the company.

The results of the multi-level analysis show that larger companies, organizations in the public sector, companies with a large proportion of women and companies with a HR manager with a positive attitude towards work-life policies tend to provide more work-life policies. Furthermore, a government providing extensive parental leave policies and a context with a high level of gender equality are associated with the provision of a wide range of work-life policies by companies. These favorable contextual characteristics for the provision of workplace work-life policies did not only have a direct association with the provision of workplace work-life policies, but also reinforced the positive association between favourable company characteristics and the provision of workplace work-life policies. The results imply that high national gender equality creates a normative climate in which it is beneficial for companies to provide work-life policies. Furthermore, the results suggest that the government and the market are supplementary in providing work-life policies.

Gender roles and fertility: a changing equilibrium

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The declining fertility rates in most western countries throughout the 20th century – that have been puzzling social scientists – have been accompanied by changing gender roles and family equilibria. The aim of this paper is to address the cross-country relation between changing gender roles and childbearing. In the European context, countries displaying higher fertility rates are also the ones where more gender equality is found, both at the individual and at the macro level. In developing countries, however, the relation is inverted: high fertility rates are associated with low gender equality. Following Esping Andersen’s reasoning of ‘Incomplete revolution’ we hypothesize – at the macro-level – a U-shaped relation between gender equality and fertility rates: fertility is high in developing, low equality countries and in developed, gender-equal countries. On the contrary, it is low in countries that are on their way towards high levels of
gender equality, but not quite there yet. At the micro-level, instead, we hypothesize a relation that takes the shape of an S-curve: individual level of gender equality has a negative effect on childbearing in countries that have low levels of gender equality, but the effect increases and becomes positive as gender equality increases.

**Timing preferences and age norms in the transition to adulthood among immigrants and majority groups in Europe**

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It is often suggested that migrant young adults enter adulthood at younger ages than majority populations in Europe. However, following assimilation theory, we may expect gradual adaptation of migrants to the norms and behavior in the host. The diversity in the timing of the transition to adulthood across European countries provides a unique comparative context to test immigrants’ adaptation to majority population timing preferences and norms regarding the transition to adulthood. We use data from the European Social Survey (Round 3, 2006/7) to assess age preferences and norms in 25 European countries. Among those of migrant and majority group origin we analyze ideal age of marriage and first birth as well as norms regarding the minimum age for experiencing first sexual intercourse, unmarried cohabitation, marriage and childbearing. We build individual-level models to explore how age preferences and norms vary across country/region of origin, migrant generation, socio-economic, gender and individual demographic characteristics. We conduct multilevel analyses to assess the effect of host country context on age preferences and norms among migrant groups in different European countries. Finally, we consider whether timing preferences and norms of migrant and majority populations living within the same country are more similar than those across countries.

**Why are religious people happy? A social norms explanation**

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Recent research in subjective well-being suggests that the same behavior can have a substantially different influence on subjective well-being depending on the extent to which this behavior is regulated by social norms in a respective society (Soons & Kalmijn, 2009; Stavrova, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). For example, unemployed people suffer more in countries with a strong norm to work for a living than in countries with more tolerant attitudes toward living off public funds.

The present research adds to this literature by considering the happiness effect of religiosity from the perspective of the theories of social norms and conformity research.

We suggest that the extent to which religiosity is normative within a society can increase the happiness of religious individuals, and decrease the happiness non-religious individuals.

In Study 1, we test this hypothesis using descriptive (national level of religiosity) and injunctive (the degree to which a society requires their members to be religious) social norms of religiosity measured at country level. The results of a multilevel regression analysis of the pooled data of the World (5th wave) and European (4th wave) Values Studies suggest that strong descriptive and injunctive norms increase the happiness of religious individuals, and decrease the happiness of non-religious individuals and thus provide support to the social norm hypothesis.

Study 2 was designed to examine the mechanisms through which normative conformity affects happiness. With the data from 22 European countries (European Social Survey, 3rd wave) we explore whether the effect of conformity to the norm of religiosity can be explained through differences in the degree of social integration of norm conformers and deviators. The results of a
multilevel moderated mediation analysis indicate that on average across countries, 50% of the total effect of religiosity on happiness is mediated by social integration. At the same time, the strength of the indirect effect does not depend on a country’s level of religiosity, whereas the direct effect of religiosity on happiness increases as the national level of religiosity increases. In other words, non-religious individuals in religious countries enjoy the same level of social support and integration as in secular countries but are still less happy than their religious counterparts. We explain this finding from the perspective of research in conformity and person-environment fit: in countries where religiosity is normative, holding atheistic or agnostic beliefs can be considered odd and make non-religious people feel less comfortable in multiple social situations. On the other hand, religious individuals living in countries where their beliefs and behaviors are shared with other people may benefit from the perceived fit with their environment.

In general, our results can be considered in a larger framework going beyond the study of religion. We show that the way personal religiosity – an ultimately private matter – affects happiness is shaped by social context. We believe that contextual effects and the person-environment interaction deserve more attention in subjective well-being research.
Session 6c: Early-career researchers’ special session

Unemployment and well-being in Europe. The effect of country unemployment rate, work ethics and family ties

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Subjective well-being literature shows that higher unemployment rate corresponds to lower psychological cost of own unemployment. The goal of the paper is to deepen the understanding of this regularity by investigating the role played by the two factors changing within the modernization process: work ethics and the strength of family ties. I analyze the European Values Study data (2008) for 36 countries using multilevel regression methodology.

First, starting from the “stigma hypothesis” I postulate that higher unemployment rate is associated with weaker work values, which correspond to less social pressure and feeling of guilt, in turn lowering the psychological cost of own unemployment. This is only partly supported by the data: whereas stronger individual work values lower the well-being of unemployed, the country work ethics has no effect.

According to the second hypothesis, stronger family ties raise the well-being of the unemployed. This prediction is confirmed: people living in countries with stronger family ties and those declaring stronger norms for family support suffer less from being unemployed. However, the strength of family ties does not mediate the link between unemployment rate and effect of own unemployment. Moreover, weaker family ties contribute to lower well-being of unemployed in Western Europe.

Concluding, the paper suggests existence of two modernization-related processes impacting the unemployed. First, typical feature of modern societies, strong work ethics, decreases well-being of the unemployed. However, adherence to own norms rather than social pressure seems to be the underlying mechanism. Second, weakening of family ties typically associated with postmodern striving for self-fulfillment is associated with lower well-being of unemployed. This suggests that individualization and broadening the sphere of personal freedom makes individuals more vulnerable to everyday risks.

The quality of the place of living, social participation and well-being in older age: exploring the cross-national variation in Europe

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Recent changes to life style observed in developed societies, including European countries, coupled with advances in medical sciences and increased availability and improved quality of health care, have resulted in people living longer and healthier lives than ever before. However, increased life expectancy and structural population ageing also potentially places more individuals at risk of social isolation and social exclusion.

One of the factors that may play a key role in shaping the risk of social exclusion in older age is the quality of the place of living. Indeed, its importance for outcomes in older age has been firmly recognized (Burridge and Ormandy, 1993; Stirling 1997; Ashmore, 1998; Marsh et al., 2000; Matte & Jacobs, 2000; Hood, 2005; Donald, 2009), although research has tended to focus on the effects on physical or mental health, rather than on social participation or subjective well-being.

This paper hypothesises that environmental conditions, captured in terms of housing and neighbourhood characteristics, can have independent and potentially cumulative effects on
older people's opportunities for playing their part in society and, ultimately, achieving personal well-being and independence. Crucially, the paper explores cross-national differences in the effects of the quality of the place of living, and attempts to explain them in terms of country-level (macro) variables.

The main independent variable is the quality of the place of living, covering two dimensions: local area (the quality of the neighbourhood) and individual housing (amenities, conditions of dwelling, overcrowding). The paper investigates the impact of these factors on the domains of social participation (social interactions, membership in clubs, community participation and volunteering) and subjective well-being (life satisfaction, happiness), while controlling for other key factors, such as health status, income, gender, family composition, rurality and tenure.

The research uses the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which is a large-scale panel survey with a sample of more than 45,000 people aged 50 and over. Fourteen countries are included in the analyses, representing various European regions (Scandinavia, Western and Northern Europe, the Mediterranean countries and the Central and Eastern Europe); the variety of countries covered ensures a good degree of variation in the macro-level characteristics used in statistical models. The main stage of analysis involves cross-national comparisons of associations between the quality of the place of living, social participation, and well-being of older people. Multilevel models are employed to substitute country and welfare regime labels with relevant macro-level variables to test direct effects of these on the processes operating at the micro level.

Are the baby-boomers still the ‘protest generation’ across Western Europe? Explaining cross-national differences in cohort effects on protest participation in Western Europe, 1981-2008

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The patterns of participation of Western European publics have undergone widespread changes in ‘the social movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) developing out of the student revolts of Mai 1968. Protest repertoires once perceived to be the sole remit of ‘anti-state rebels’ (Norris et al., 2005) are said to have become widespread and ‘normalized’ (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). In their classic study, Barnes and Kaase (1979: 524) argued for the “increase in potential for protest to be a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political involvement bound to fade away as time goes by.” However, Barnes and Kaase (1979) were examining a particularly special cohort of young people at the time of their study: the baby-boom generation coming of age in the tumultuous socio-historical period of the late 1960s and 1970s. The fact that the baby-boom generation was so large, and that the key works predicting an intergenerational shift to protest participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979, Inglehart 1977) emerged when this cohort was still young, might have lead scholars to confuse the distinctive participatory proclivities of ‘the protest generation’ with an emerging societal trend, one that would be extended and expanded by each successive younger cohort. In his classic study on the ageing of the American protest generation, Jennings (1987: 368) argued that: “the so-called protest generation provides an acid test of the [generational] thesis, for during its formative time it possessed strong political preferences, shared experiences, a common enemy, direct political action, and solidarity.” We might then expect that the baby-boom generation will exhibit a greater tendency for protest than generations coming of age in radically different historical phases, net of life-cycle and period effects. To what extent are the baby-boomers experiencing their formative years in the tumultuous late 1960s and 1970s distinctive in their patterns of political participation relative to previous and later generations? And what evidence is there for the resilience of ‘the protest generation’ across Western European countries?
Early studies of framing indicated that people did not have much knowledge about what was going on in politics. Scholars (e.g. Converse 1964, Zaller 1992) therefore raised certain doubts about how competent general audience was to participate in political affairs. These studies, however, also pointed out that people were in general very supportive towards democratic values such as free speech for instance, but only when words used were framed in specific, connotative ways. Hence, the new stream of researchers started to advocate the assumption that general public did not truly hold meaningful attitudes and that many answers on survey questionnaires have been chosen randomly (Converse 1964). The research on framing effects has further on examined the fluctuations in opinion making. Many researchers agree that opinions can be manipulated by how issues are framed which means that there can be no proper representation of public interest (Druckman and Chong 2007). This is a concerning point of view and it raises questions about the democratic process connecting political elite with media and voters.

Even though there exists a growing amount of research showing how framing affects public opinion, not so many studies have investigated the limits of framing effects. More specifically, only few studies tried to establish whether there exists a relationship between the sources of influence and framing effects (e.g. see Lecheler et al. 2009, Druckman 2001). Hence, my research adds to the existing literature by posing that public opinion might be affected differently depending on who the source of influence is and which framing strategies the source is using. This, opposite to the prevailing literature suggests, that there obviously exist limitations to the impact framing has on public opinion formation.

My doctoral dissertation addresses the issue of framing and its impacts on public opinion. More specifically, it is questioning whether framing effects vary depending on who the sources are and what kind of framing strategies they are using. Based on the data from 2009 elections to the European Parliament, this study investigates the extent to which framing effects differ in magnitude. My thesis consists of two parts: in the first part I analyze framing effects, framing strategies and frame building using the general dataset which consists of 27 EU member states, while in the second part I investigate a relationship between framing strategies and Euro scepticism using the data for four Euro sceptical countries in the EU (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Poland).
Linking ideological and subjective representation

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Typical studies of representation focus on the ideological dimension of representation and hence on policy congruence between elites and citizens. However, although it may be important how well citizens are represented, it may be even more important for the functioning of the democratic state how they feel represented. Those two dimensions do not need to be interlinked. In this article we explore the latter, so far widely overlooked dimension of representation and answer the questions: Which citizens feel their views are well represented by their preferred party? Does ideological congruence influence these feelings of being represented? We show that there is a link between subjective feelings of being represented and ideological representation, specifically the distance between the self-placement of voters and their preferred party on the left-right scale. Voters who are ideologically closer to a party also feel better represented by that party than voters with a greater distance.

Political representation of the poor and economic inequality: a comparative analysis

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This paper analyses the relation between economic inequality at the macro-level and the political representation of poor citizens in a comparative perspective. More specifically it addresses the research question: Does the level of economic inequality at the time of the election affect how well citizens belonging to the two lowest quintiles of the income distribution are represented by the party system and governments as compared to richer citizens? Using survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placement of political parties, we find that in economically more unequal societies the party system represents relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic inequality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

Rethinking the concept of representation

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This paper reviews some significant problems in the hitherto conceptualisations of ‘representation’, confronting those who depart from a consistent citizenry as a basis for the represented. These theories, we argue, do not work for recent developments of newly emerging migratory movements in a globalised world. This is because the democratic institutional arrangements described by the authors are built upon “old” notions of citizens as being parts of very homogeneous not very mobile groups staying foremost within their national borders. Such
notions cannot cope with recent demographic developments. The paper suggests three ways for overcoming the deficiencies. First, the notion of the citizenry must be extended to non-national long-term residents. Second, the established concepts on (US) minority representation must be extended to grasp also the European context. Third, we argue that, extra-parliamentary forms of representation, if applied seriously, could be a possible way out of the dilemma.

**Representation and agenda-setting in the EU**

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This paper builds on a new approach to the study of representation that addresses the importance of citizen and government agendas in assessing policy congruence. In the study of EU representation most scholarship has focused on positional congruence – for example how closely do the ideological policy positions between citizens and their political representatives correspond? Whilst important, this approach is incomplete because it neglects the issue of salience and whether citizens and governments prioritise policy areas similarly. Yet such ‘agenda’ congruence is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition of effective representation as one may question how representative legislative actors and governments are if they are congruent only with issues of low importance to voters. Therefore the central question of this paper is do the policy priorities of the public correspond with the priorities of the EU across time and across member states? Further, it is noted that institutions and citizens may differ in their capacity to prioritise various policy concerns whereby citizens can prioritise only a small number of policy issues at any one time but the EU is able to prioritise a larger number due to, for example, the presence of committees. Thus the overall structure of public and EU agenda spaces may vary. The present paper, therefore, considers an additional question; does the structure of the public policy agenda correspond with the structure of EU legislative agenda? To empirically explore these questions, the measure for the EU public agenda is derived from the European Election Studies 1994, 1999 and 2004. I make use of the Most Important Problem question, which asks respondents what they feel is the most important problem facing the country today. Responses to these questions are then coded into 18 policy categories as reflected by the Policy Agendas Project and adapted to include EU specific policy categories. The public agenda is then measured as the percentage of total responses for each policy area. For the EU legislative agenda, I rely on data retrieved from EUR-Lex to record the proportion of Commission proposals and EU directives issued in each policy category for each year under study. An examination of this research question has important implications for the study of EU representation as congruence between the policy priorities of citizens and governments is an important precondition of effective representation. Further, the present study may contribute to the debate on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ as sharp differences between public and EU agendas would suggest weak representation of member states interests.