

The allocation of tenders using a distance-based extension of Majority Judgment

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Allocation of tenders with a Social Choice background

T.H. Chen: “An economic approach to public procurement”

Journal of Public Procurement 8 (2009), pp. 407-430

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- **Our proposal: Extension of Majority Judgment based on distances**

Ranking paradox: example

- Tenders: A, B y C
- Criteria: Quality and Price
- The grading of the Price criterion is within a mathematical formula

$$SCORE = 50 \cdot L/P$$

L: the lowest price

P: the price of the tender being evaluated

Ranking paradox: example

| | Quality score | Price | Price score | Total |
|---|---------------|-------|-------------|-------|
| A | 25 | 40€ | 50 | 75 |
| B | 32 | 50€ | 40 | 72 |
| C | 50 | 80€ | 25 | 75 |

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C-tender claims to be the winner because A-tender does not fulfill the requirements

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If we use the same scores, C-tender will be indeed the winner

| | Quality score | Price | Price score | Total |
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But if we assess the scores again

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But if we assess the scores again

| | Quality score | Price | Price score | Total |
|---|---------------|-------|-------------|-------|
| B | 32 | 50€ | 50 | 82 |
| C | 50 | 80€ | 31,25 | 81,25 |

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The new winner would be B-tender who was the loser before

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Relative scoring → Failure of the independence of irrelevant alternatives

Michel BALINSKI, Rida LARAKI: MAJORITY JUDGEMENT

- The Majority Judgement (2007)
<http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/>
- A theory of measuring, electing and ranking
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, pp. 8720-8725 (2007)
- Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental evidence
Ecole Polytechnique - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Cahier 2007 - 28 (2007)
- *Majority Judgment. Measuring, Ranking, and Electing*
The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2011

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Political election proposal based on linguistic terms

Median + tie-break

Majority Judgment criticisms

- **W. D. Smith** (2007): On Balinski & Laraki's "Majority Judgement" median-based range-like voting scheme
<http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html>
- **D. S. Felsenthal, M. Machover** (2008): The Majority Judgment voting procedure: A critical evaluation
Homo Oeconomicus 25 (3), pp. 319-334
- **J. L. García-Lapresta, M. Martínez-Panero** (2008): Sorting alternatives into linguistic classes and their aggregation
Computational Intelligence in Decision and Control, World Scientific, Singapore, pp. 531-536
- **J. L. García-Lapresta, M. Martínez-Panero** (2009): Linguistic-based voting through centered OWA operators
Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making 8, pp. 381-393
- **H. Nurmi** (2009): Voting Theory

Notation

- $V = \{1, \dots, m\}$ set of criteria ($m \geq 2$)
- $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ set of tenders ($n \geq 2$)
- $L = \{l_1, \dots, l_g\}$ ordered set of linguistic terms ($g \geq 2$)
 $l_1 < \dots < l_g$

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Example

| | | | | | |
|-----------|-------|------------|-------|-----------|-----------|
| l_1 | l_2 | l_3 | l_4 | l_5 | l_6 |
| to reject | poor | acceptable | good | very good | excellent |

Assignment of the global assessment $l(x_j)$

- A **profile** P is a matrix $m \times n$ with coefficients in L

$$\begin{pmatrix} v_1^1 & \cdots & v_j^1 & \cdots & v_n^1 \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ v_1^i & \cdots & v_j^i & \cdots & v_n^i \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ v_1^m & \cdots & v_j^m & \cdots & v_n^m \end{pmatrix}$$

where $v_j^i \in L$ is the assessment obtained by tender x_j in criterion i

Assignment of the global assessment $l(x_j)$

$$\begin{pmatrix} v_1^1 & \cdots & v_j^1 & \cdots & v_n^1 \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ v_1^i & \cdots & v_j^i & \cdots & v_n^i \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ v_1^m & \cdots & v_j^m & \cdots & v_n^m \end{pmatrix} \mapsto (l(x_1), \dots, l(x_j), \dots, l(x_n))$$

$$l(x_j) = f(v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m) \quad j = 1, \dots, n$$

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$$l(x_j) = f(v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m) \quad j = 1, \dots, n$$

Our proposal

For each tender x_j , choose $l(x_j)$ such that the vector $(l(x_j), \dots, l(x_j))$ minimizes the distance between it and the assessments vector (v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m)

Minkowski distances ($p \geq 1$)

$d_p : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined as

$$d_p(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^m |a_i - b_i|^p \right)^{\frac{1}{p}}$$

for all $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_m)$, $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \dots, b_m)$

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Induced Minkowski distances


$\bar{d}_p : L^m \times L^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined as

$$\bar{d}_p((l_{a_1}, \dots, l_{a_m}), (l_{b_1}, \dots, l_{b_m})) = d_p(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^m |a_i - b_i|^p \right)^{\frac{1}{p}}$$

Assignment of the global assessment $l(x_j)$

- Select $l_k \in L$ that fulfill

$$\bar{d}_p((v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m), (l_k, \dots, l_k)) \leq \bar{d}_p((v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m), (l_h, \dots, l_h)) \quad \forall l_h \in L$$




Tie-breaking method

To rank the tenders we need to break the ties among the tenders with the same global assessment


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


$$D^+(x_j) = \bar{d}_p(\mathbf{v}_j^+, (l(x_j), \dots, l(x_j)))$$

$$D^-(x_j) = \bar{d}_p(\mathbf{v}_j^-, (l(x_j), \dots, l(x_j)))$$

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$$D(x_j) = D^+(x_j) - D^-(x_j)$$

Ranking tenders

Consider the triplet $T(\cdot) = (l(\cdot), D(\cdot), E(\cdot))$ for each tender and then proceed lexicographically:

$x_j \succ x_k$ if and only if one of the following conditions hold

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- 2 $l(x_j) = l(x_k)$ and $D(x_j) > D(x_k)$
- 3 $l(x_j) = l(x_k)$, $D(x_j) = D(x_k)$ and $E(x_j) \leq E(x_k)$

where

$$E(x_j) = \bar{d}_p((v_j^1, \dots, v_j^m), (l(x_j), \dots, l(x_j)))$$

$$E(x_k) = \bar{d}_p((v_k^1, \dots, v_k^m), (l(x_k), \dots, l(x_k)))$$

Allocation of tenders with the same weight for each criteria

Tenders' grades

| | Price | Quality | Warranty | Security |
|-------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| x_1 | l_1 | l_2 | l_5 | l_5 |
| x_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_2 | l_1 |
| x_3 | l_5 | l_4 | l_1 | l_1 |

Results for each tender ($p = 1.5$)

| | $l(x_j)$ | $D^+(x_j)$ | $D^-(x_j)$ | $D(x_j)$ |
|-------|----------|------------|------------|----------|
| x_1 | l_3 | 3.17 | 2.45 | 0.73 |
| x_2 | l_2 | 1.59 | 1 | 0.59 |
| x_3 | l_3 | 2.45 | 3.17 | -0.73 |

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| x_3 | l_3 | 2.45 | 3.17 | -0.73 |

Final result: $x_1 \succ x_3 \succ x_2$

Allocation of tenders with different weights

Different weights

Criteria have different weights in the global assessment

How can we show the weights in a qualitative scale?

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How can we show the weights in a qualitative scale?

We should find the connection within them and replicate each assessment in accordance

| | Price | Quality | Warranty | Security |
|------------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| Percentage | 40% | 30% | 20% | 10% |
| Weight | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

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Arranged and replicated profile

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| x_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_2 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |
| x_2 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

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| x_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_2 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |
| x_2 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

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| x_2 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

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| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

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|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| x_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_2 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |
| x_2 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

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Arranged and replicated profile

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| x_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_2 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |
| x_2 | l_1 | l_2 | l_2 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_1 | l_1 | l_1 | l_4 | l_4 | l_4 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 | l_5 |

Results for the arranged and replicated profile

| | $l(x_j)$ |
|-------|----------|
| x_1 | l_2 |
| x_2 | l_3 |
| x_3 | l_4 |

Final result: $x_3 \succ x_2 \succ x_1$

Concluding remarks

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 - $p = 2 \rightsquigarrow$ the “mean”
- Work in progress
 - The possibility to assess more than one label when the experts hesitate
 - Different scales depending on the criteria

The allocation of tenders using a distance-based extension of Majority Judgment

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