




# The Evolution of Cooperation & Trading



from microbes to man



**Ronald Noë**

Centre d'Ecologie, Physiologie et Ethologie, CNRS  
&  
Psychology, Université Louis-Pasteur

Strasbourg, France



Cooperation is  
omnipresent in  
nature

... and presents  
itself in many  
different forms



New Scientist  
7 Oct. 2000 p. 25

**Cooperative  
hunting**

Bruce Davidson  
Encycl. of Mammals p. 63




## Inter-specific cooperation



trading nectar  
against transport  
of pollen



## Symbiosis



- trading nutrients
- protection against dehydration


F. Grehan/Cosmos



## Cooperation among humans shows similarities ..



trading transport for  
money in Calcutta



cooperative hunting  
by !San men



## .. but can also take a very different dimension: **collective action**



Amish barn raising




**Warfare:** collective action with and against conspecifics



Waterloo




**Trading and cooperation** have much in common



local market Ivory Coast



**Common characteristics of cooperation and trading**



- investment in other agents
- risk of no returns



**Considerable effort has been put in the study of control mechanisms**



game theoretical models based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and related paradigms





## The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

|          |           | player B  |        |
|----------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|          |           | cooperate | defect |
| player A | cooperate | 3, 3      | 1, 4   |
|          | defect    | 4, 1      | 2, 2   |



More interaction between theoreticians and empiricists would be desirable, not only to study **partner control**, but also ...

- partner choice
- division of payoffs
- indirect reciprocity
- reputation
- power asymmetries
- punishment & harassment
- and more ....



## Collective action and the management of public goods




Participation in cooperation among large numbers of unrelated individuals could be used to define *'being human'*



Large scale cooperation among unrelated individuals became stable only after **control mechanisms** evolved




policing



religion



**Bacteria** are capable of collective action too, but only when closely related



formation of fruiting bodies




swarming



Many disciplines and even more overlaps




Interdisciplinary research 1



**neuro-economics**


neuronal basis of:

- preference for certain items
- choice of certain partners
- detection of cheating
- altruistic punishment
- moral behaviour



**Economic decisions and the brain**


fMRI research in reward anticipation ('wanting') and reward outcome ('liking')



Knutson et al. (2001). NeuroReport 12 (17): 3683-3687 (Fig. 1)



## Interdisciplinary research 2




### biological markets

- influence of supply & demand ratio on exchange rates
- partner choice as mechanism of selection
- exchanges without contracts





## Mycorrhiza markets



Kummel & Salant  
(*Ecology in press*)

plant – fungus cooperation



Carbon – nitrogen trade: when to trade with which fungus?




## Mycorrhiza markets




2 plants under different light conditions in interaction with 2 fungus species

Kummel & Salant (*Ecology in press*)



## Interdisciplinary research 3



the role of power asymmetries



## Paying for cuddling


S. P. Henzi



Female baboons have to groom the mother before getting access to the infant



## The baboon baby market




- higher ranking mother ► higher price
- fewer infants ► higher price

Barrett & Henzi 2005 (in Kappeler & van Schaik ed)




## Interdisciplinary research 4



bounded rationality

fast & frugal heuristics in decision making




## Eörs Szathmáry

Collegium Budapest (Institute for Advanced Study)  
&  
Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Eötvös University

Budapest, Hungary



## Interdisciplinary research 5



**molecular cooperation**

**The origin of life is understood as complex molecular cooperation**



## The major transitions

**Table 1.** The major transitions in evolution

| Before                          | After   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Replicating molecules           | Populations of molecules in protocells          |
| Independently replicating genes | Chromosomes                                     |
| RNA as gene and enzyme          | * DNA genes, protein enzymes                    |
| Bacterial cells (prokaryotes)   | * Cells with nuclei and organelles (eukaryotes) |
| Asexual clones                  | * Sexual populations                            |
| Single-celled organisms         | Animals, plants and fungi                       |
| Solitary individuals            | Colonies with non-reproductive castes           |
| Prelinguistic societies         | * Human societies with language                 |

Reproduced from Maynard Smith J and Szathmáry E (1999) *The Origins of Life. From the Birth of Life to the Origin of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

\* These transitions are regarded as 'difficult'



## Egalitarian and fraternal major transitions


**Table 2.** Egalitarian and fraternal major transitions

|                                 | Egalitarian   | Fraternal  |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Examples                        | Different molecules in compartments, chromosomes, nucleus and organelles, sex | Same molecules in compartments, organelles in the same cell, cells in individuals, individuals in colonies |
| Units                           | Unlike, nonfungible   | Like, fungible   |
| Reproductive division of labor  | No  | Yes  |
| Control of conflicts            | Fairness in reproduction, mutual dependence                                   | Kinship  |
| Initial advantage               | Combination of functions  | Economies of scale   |
| Means of increase in complexity | Symbiosis   | Epigenesis   |
| Greatest hurdle                 | Control of conflicts  | Initial advantage  |

Reproduced from Queller DC (1997) Cooperators since life began. *Quarterly Review of Biology* 72: 184-188.




## Termites: fraternal transition



- Kinship is the most important factor
- Reproductive (and other division of labour) readily arises
- Niche construction: „the wisdom of the hive”




## Eukaryotic cells: egalitarian transition




- Reproductive division of labour is impossible
- Compartments with different genetic origin must be centrally regulated for reproduction


Different bacterial lineages have contributed to the origin of eukaryotic cells



## Simple ideas about molecular cooperation break down




## Cooperation on the surface allows the increase in complexity



- Molecules interact with their neighbours
- Have limited diffusion on the surface




## Life is the "symbiosis" of genes, metabolism and membrane



systems chemistry aims at synthesizing systems of molecular cooperation




## Group selection of early replicators



- A bag of genes: genes sitting in the same boat
- How fast can complexity increase?
- When did chromosomes arise?



## Interdisciplinary research 6




the role of communication

co-evolution of language and complex forms of cooperation?



## Understanding language evolution is difficult



## The explanatory power of theories for the origin of language

- (1) selective advantage (2) honesty (3) grounded in reality  
(4) power of generalisations (5) cognitive abilities (6) uniqueness



| Theories/Questions                                       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Language as a mental tool (Jerison, 1991; Burling, 1993) | + | + | - | + | - | - |
| Grooming hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998)                       | - | + | - | - | - | - |
| Gossip (Power, 1998)                                     | + | - | - | + | - | - |
| Tool making (Greenfield, 1991)                           | + | + | + | + | + | - |
| Mating contract (Deacon, 1997)                           | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Sexual selection (Miller, 2000)                          | + | - | - | - | - | - |
| Status for information (Dessalles, 2000)                 | + | - | - | + | - | - |
| Song hypothesis (Vanechoutte & Skoyles, 1998)            | - | - | - | - | - | + |
| Group bonding/ ritual (Knight, 1998)                     | - | + | - | - | - | - |
| Gestural theory (Hewes, 1973)                            | + | - | + | + | - | - |
| Hunting theories (Washburn & Lanchester, 1968)           | + | + | + | + | - | - |



## An educated guess

The evolution of human language had something to do with the following activities

- Mental representations/ mental models
- Tool making
- Gesturing
- Co-operative hunting (planning)
- Individual recognition
- Population structure (fission/fusion society)



The ultimate goal is to re-enact this transition in simulated and embodied agents



## Samuel Bowles

Economics, University of Siena

Siena, Italy

&


Behavioral Sciences Program, Santa Fe Institute

Santa Fe, USA



## Are humans a special case?

- Vast behavioral differences among groups
- Kinds and scope of cooperation
- Trade among millions of anonymous individuals
- Other- regarding preferences



Akbar and his court



What distinctively human characteristics explain the differences in the extent and types of cooperation and trade? Possibilities include:




- Long lives, large cognitive capacity and language
- Can formulate, communicate and enforce moral rules
- Evolved meat-intensive diet
- Docility/socialization: internalization of norms
- Heightened in-group out-group distinctions
- Projectile weapons: lethal warfare, low cost punishment of defectors
- Social institutions as a form of niche construction



### Puzzles

Is human cooperation and trading supported entirely by self-regarding motives, **or are other-regarding motives (social preferences) involved?**




Donald Trump      Mother Theresa



### Puzzles

If self-regarding motives are the main support for cooperation did they evolve by reciprocal altruism? Indirect reciprocity? **Can these models explain the adherence to norms of cooperation in large groups with noisy or private information?**




Degas, La Bourse



### Puzzles

Is kin altruism the template for more extensive forms of cooperation, and how important is it in explaining cooperation?




26 December 2004



### Puzzles

If other-regarding motives are involved, are they best described by *inequality aversion*, *resistance to domination*, *altruistic punishment*, *strong reciprocity*?




fMRI scan of an Ultimatum Game subject  
*Greene et al.*



## Puzzles

How could altruistic behaviours emerge and proliferate among humans? Kin selection, group selection, other forms of positive assortment?

Is it empirically plausible that a genetic predisposition to cooperate could have evolved by group selection?




Warfare in PNG



## Puzzles

Social institutions are an example of human niche construction that support cooperation: **what is the role of suppression of within-group competition and phenotypic variance reduction (ie reproductive and other forms of levelling)?**




Meat sharing in the Kalahari



## Puzzles


Conflicts over the division of the gains to cooperation may preclude cooperative solutions: **when does this occur and how can it be avoided?**



El Salvador, 1991



**Example:** What can econs and other social sci.s learn from biologists?



a point mutation (Drosophila)



fall of the Berlin Wall

- Variance reduction as a force propelling evolution
- Speciation as a model of the emergence of new social institutions
- Quorum sensing (e.g. in bacteria) and neutral mutations as a prototype for political action against the status quo (applications to the fall of Communism etc)
- Multilevel selection as a model of interactions of firms, firms, regions, and nations




Joseph Henrich,  
Robert Boyd,  
Samuel Bowles,  
Colin Camerer,  
Ernst Fehr,  
Herbert Gintis,  
Richard McElreath,  
Michael Alvard,  
Abigail Barr,  
Jean Ensminger,  
Kim Hill,  
Francisco Gil-White,  
Michael Gurven,  
Frank Marlow,  
John Patton,  
Natalie Smith, and  
David Tracer

**The question:** in an experimentally controlled interaction with real material stakes and identical incentives, how do 15 small-scale societies with differing cultures cooperate (or fail to do so) and police defectors?


**The research team:** decision scientists, game theorists, ethnographers, evolutionary modelers

**Funding:** The MacArthur Foundation



**Results:** cultural diversity, purely self interested subjects a small minority, strong impact of economic structure

**Self interested subjects who believe others to be self interested would offer the least possible amount. Few did.**



Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, et al, BBS, 2005



**Payoffs to trans-disciplinary research in the cross cultural experiments project**


- Many peer reviewed and other papers (*American Economic Review*, *Behavior and Brain Science*, etc etc) and books
- An active learning process among the 17 participants; many of the anthropologists have since taken up both game theory and experimental methods; some economists have become serious students of anthropology.
- Imitations, spin offs in other disciplines, and a well funded second round



**Lamalera whale hunters**




**Dividing the gains to cooperation**





Cooperation is  
omnipresent,



.. but not that easy



**Ruth Mace**

Evolutionary Anthropology, University College London  
London, UK

**Peter Hammerstein**

Institute for Theoretical Biology, Humboldt University  
Berlin, Germany

**Eric van Damme**

CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University  
Tilburg, The Netherlands