

Cooperation in changing interaction networks



Ádám Kun^{1,2}, Gergely Boza^{1,2}
& István Scheuring^{2,3}


¹ Evolution and Ecology Program, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria

² Dpt. Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary

³ Research Group of Ecology and Theoretical Biology, The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

Prisoner's Dilemma

- Helper pays a cost (c)
- The helped gain a benefit (b)
- $b > c > 0$
- In a well-mixed population defection is the ESS
- Cooperation can be maintained in a **structured population** (regular graph)



Copyright 2005 - Investopedia.com

	C	D
C	$b-c$	$-c$
D	b	0

Animal social groups

- Association networks, which are not random
- The network is not a regular graph (small-world like)
- The network is seldom static
- Individuals can recognize each other






Research question

- Scale-free social network
- Dynamics network
- Preferential partner choice (no memory)


- In what conditions would cooperation spread in such a population?

Preferential partner choice – „Relinking”


- Random choice
- Get rid of defectors
- The friend of my friend is my friend




Higher intensity of preferential attachment is beneficial



More sophisticated relinking rule is better



Optimal group size



- In good agreement with data



Conclusions

- It is advantageous for cooperators to recognize each other and avoid defectors
- A behavioral change could be sufficient to achieve full cooperation
- There is an optimal (small) group size for cooperation

Thank you for your attention!



Kun Á. and Scheuring I. 2009. Evolution of cooperation on dynamical graphs. *BioSystems* **96**:65-68

Kun Á., Boza G. and Scheuring I. 2010. Cooperators Unite! Assortative linking promotes cooperation particularly for medium sized associations. *BMC Evolutionary Biology* **10**:173