ESF Exploratory Workshop on

The Resilience of Neo-liberalism in Europe

Paris (France), 24-26 June 2012

Convened by:

Vivien Schmidt ⁉ and Mark Thatcher ⁉

SCIENTIFIC REPORT
1. Executive summary

The purpose of the meeting was to examine a central research question: why have neo-liberal ideas been so resilient despite powerful challenges, major economic crises, apparent failure and political turmoil? This is of great importance both academically and also in understanding policy developments in Europe. Since making the application, our proposal has been formally accepted by Cambridge University Press, and hence the workshop was also preparation for the final papers for the volume. The workshop followed an earlier one held at Boston. Thus we have engaged in two workshops to ensure appropriate depth of discussion and preparation for the volume.

The meeting was held at the Centre d’Etudes Européennes, Sciences Po Paris, on 25-26 June, although several participants arrived on Sunday 24th and met informally then. Participants came from nine different countries - Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Germany, the US, which allowed us a wide coverage of views. A few participants were unable to attend, some due to very last minute personal and family factors - eg one person’s mother had a stroke while another became unwell on the day of travel. The meeting was welcomed by Professor Renaud Dehousse and the event was very well supported administratively by the Centre d’Etudes Européennes.

The environment allowed a great deal of informal interaction - coffee and lunch were provided in the seminar room, so we did not spend time getting to and from there. In addition, we had a conference dinner on the Monday evening and several people also attended an informal dinner on the Sunday evening.

The meeting was organized with written papers that had been circulated in advance, which were briefly presented orally. Thereafter, assigned discussants offered their comments, before a general discussion of each paper. The atmosphere was extremely constructive, with a very high level of discussion and intellectual exchange. The central question was agreed to be important and interesting. Different viewpoints and suggestions for changing papers were made and discussed very cordially.

The scientific objective was to analyse the central puzzle of the continued resilience of neo-liberal economic ideas by reference to five structuring hypotheses:

- that neo-liberal ideas are vague and far from being resilient, they have been so flexible and varied that they have been radically reshaped whilst still being labelled as neo-liberal;
- that despite the rhetoric, neo-liberal ideas have not been implemented in practice, but this has allowed them to remain dominant in terms of discourse, public policy objectives or analyses of problems;
- that existing neo-liberal ideas and discourse mean that despite the problems of neo-liberal ideas, critiques have been limited and alternatives are even weaker;
- that debates about economic policy have been captured by powerful interests which are able to prevent alternatives to neo-liberalism from gaining ground in policy debates;
- that through endogenous or path-dependent processes neo-liberalism has in fact reduced the capacity of the state to choose other alternative policies.
Although comments on each paper varied, at least six general conclusions developed in the discussions:

1. The need for a clear definition of neo-liberalism. The workshop underlined that we are focusing on a core set of ideas about the markets and the state’s role in (or as part of) such markets. Neo-liberalism centres on the belief that markets should be as free as possible, meaning governed by competition and open across borders. However it is not non-interventionist- it seeks a strong state but which plays a limited political economic role in creating and preserving the institutional framework that secures property rights, guarantees free markets, and promotes free trade.

2. The meaning of ‘resilient’. We are focusing on resilience of neo-liberal policy ideas. The term refers to neo-liberal ideas remaining the dominant norm—that is, considered the ‘usual’ or ‘conventional’ analytic framework, values/guiding principles, aims and/or discourse—and also to their adaptation to new circumstances. Hence it combines two features—dominance and survival in the face of challenges.

3. A key factor in neo-liberalism’s resilience is its plasticity- it can operate at different levels and also can take multiple forms. Hence we need to separate different levels of neo-liberal ideas- from very general principles to more specific ideas. It often seems the case that the more general principles are more resilient than particular policy ideas, but since neo-liberalism is so adaptable, it can continue with new and diverse specific policies.

4. A further key explanation lies in neo-liberalism’s appeal to ‘commonsense’. Its values and policy directions often chime with expectations about the correct approach to policy issues, frequently based on analogies with problems at the individual level. Equally, it appeals to deep normative values about how policy issues should be resolved.

5. Neo-liberal resilience is a highly political process. Neo-liberal ideas aid and allow the mobilisation of political support behind their policies- through political parties, coalitions and popular opinion. Its resilience is seen in the fact that in the 1990s and 2000s, many social democratic parties were in government, yet neo-liberal ideas continued.

6. The crisis of the 2000s, especially that after 2007/8, offers the strongest test for neo-liberalism. It has shown the depth of support for neo-liberalism and the difficulties in setting out and mobilising support for alternative policies.

2. Scientific Content

The papers were divided into four groups: first, the Introduction, which sets out the question and also main lines of analysis; the international level, the comparative level and then paired comparisons of countries that are considered to share the same ‘variety of capitalism’.

The Introduction paper laid out the key questions, definitions and hypotheses for the workshop and subsequent book. It sought to define the contours of liberal economic ideas that are being analysed in terms of about markets and especially the state’s role in (or as part
of) such markets. Neo-liberalism, as it has applied to the market and the state since the late 1970s, represents a somewhat amorphous body of thought with many different philosophical strands, normative interpretations, and policy applications. It is united nevertheless by a common view that markets should be as free as possible, while the state should play a limited political economic role—to create and preserve the institutional framework that secures property rights, guarantees free markets, and promotes free trade. Just how limited the state and how free the market depends upon the strand of neo-liberalism involved. Neo-liberalism has been ‘resilient’ in combining two features—dominance and survival in the face of challenges. Resilience is a process not a fixed state—it occurs and must be assessed over time. Equally, it does not mean that neo-liberal ideas are unchallenged—on the contrary, it includes the capacity to fend off actual or potential ideational competitors. It can also be a highly political process, marked by struggles to set agendas, set goals and select policies.

The Introduction then set out five different hypotheses to explain resilient liberal economic ideas. That neo-liberalism is not in fact resilient except in the rhetoric; that ideas may be neo-liberal but not the policy in practice; that neo-liberal ideas and discourse have been more powerful relative to alternative competitors; that powerful interests have promoted neo-liberalism; that neo-liberalism is so institutionally embedded that it precludes alternatives.

The chapter then enjoyed comments by two discussants (Professor Brigid Laffan and Professor Patrick le Galès), followed by a lengthy debate among participants. A key point was: what are the core elements of neo-liberalism? This is important as we need to know what its boundaries are. The discussion identified two sets of central elements. One is the organisation of markets, which are to be based on the belief in the efficiency of market allocation through competition across services and capital as well as goods; this includes a strong normative element about the superiority of market allocation compared with state and collective provisions. However the second element concerns the state. Contrary to much popular and sometimes academic opinion, neo-liberalism does not seek a non-interventionist state—on contrary, the state is highly interventionist, but its role is to protect markets via regulation. It seeks to extend competition to the public sector as well as the private sector. Neo-liberalism seeks a ‘small state’ in the sense of attacking the public and indeed collective provision of goods and services, and also in protecting negative not positive freedoms.

Neo-liberalism needs to be analysed as a political project, as it has the political aim of extending and enforcing the discipline of market. It is a form of attack on particular views of the provision of welfare because it supports welfare provision only insofar as it plays a role in the economy rather than being based on rights and form of democracy. As a political project neo-liberalism seeks to destroy resistance to market and impose its dominant views of markets. Our analysis needs to be more political, notably by looking at the ways in which political coalitions mobilise around neo-liberal ideas and support them. The political attractiveness of such ideas needs to be underlined—especially how they seems to be ‘commonsense’ and can be seen as progressive – they do not just sit in left-right categories. Equally, their flexibility allows them to be adapted— in particular, they can be adapted to diverse national circumstances.

Andrew Gamble’s paper, ‘Genealogies of Neo-Liberalism’, traced the ideological roots of neo-liberalism by looking at earlier forms of liberalism. It argues that part of its resilience is that it draws upon perennial themes of classical liberal political economy, particularly concerning the nature of commercial society and the role of the state in a market economy.
Moreover, neo-liberalism is not a unified doctrine, but has several distinct strands, which can be contradictory. The paper looked especially at neo-liberal attitudes to fiscal conservatism, and more specifically at their approach to the state budget, which is often treated as if it were a household budget.

The discussion, initiated by Professor Yves Surel, invited Professor Gamble to break down his categories further - in particular, to separate different forms of neo-liberalism and also different levels of neo-liberal ideas - eg discourses, policy paradigms, specific policy ideas. It suggested that one of the key reasons for resilience about state budgets is the ‘commonsense’ argument that states cannot continue to spend more than they earn. More generally, treating state budgets as if they are household ones resonates with deep values and individual experience. Hence even if academic or scientific views show that state budgets cannot be treated in this way, political debates can differ and continue to do so, not withstanding powerful academic critiques of the approach that date back to at least the 1920s.

Erik Jones’s paper, ‘The Collapse of the Brussels Frankfurt consensus and the future of the Euro’ was presented and then also critiqued by Professor Loukas Tsoukalis. The chapter sets out four elements of the Brussels Frankfurt consensus - ‘sound money’, stable state finances via rules not discretion, ‘efficient’ financial markets and market structure reforms, especially of labour markets, to achieve competitive economies. It then outlines how that consensus broke down. Its central argument is that to the extent that it existed, the ideational consensus underpinning Europe’s single currency was always more rhetoric than reality. The main economic actors couched their policies in the language of sound money and stable finances (or free markets and neutral states), but they actually behaved more pragmatically than ideologically and they showed a remarkable willingness to break their own rules. Repeated crises have revealed the nature of the consensus, but no alternative consensus has been developed.

The discussion suggested that the paper be more clearly linked to hypotheses 2, 4 and 5 of the volume - ie that the ‘Brussels Frankfurt consensus’ was based on non-implementation, but also ‘what was politically feasible’ - the interests of key actors and the institutional framework of monetary union. The paper also shows that the Brussels Frankfurt consensus developed even though very different national traditions existed, including ordo-liberalism, so it shows that liberalism’s resilience also derives from its plasticity and diverse forms. The argument that no coherent ideational alternative is produced should be further explored - eg whether this is due to interests, institutions or the ideational legacy of liberalism that has portrayed the crisis as one of states rather than the private sector and private financial markets. In particular, is one reason for the lack of ideational alternatives that the crisis is framed in neo-liberal terms, stifling alternatives, and/or the ECB is political actor using ideas to justify its own power and autonomy?

Mark Thatcher’s paper ‘EU Regulation of Economic Markets: Interests and Neo-liberal Ideas’ argued that since the 1980s, EU economic regulation has taken a strong neo-liberal turn across many markets - both specific sectors such as the network industries and financial services - and horizontally, in terms of general competition regulation such as mergers and acquisitions, anti-competitive practices and state aid. The EU has developed a dominant set of ideas centred around ‘fair competition’ to achieve a single European market, which is sufficiently integrated and coherent to be called a ‘model’. That neo-liberal model has become dominant in debates and decisions about EU regulation of economic markets and remained so despite its many
limitations. The paper offers an explanation based on the interests and constraints of key actors. It thus follows the fourth hypothesis of the project, namely the role of powerful interests in promoting neo-liberalism. It develops the hypothesis by analysing how the EU regulatory model allows diverse actors to pursue their differing interests. A powerful coalition of the Commission (and units within it), the European Court of Justice, national governments and large firms has formed to support the EU regulatory model, from which it draws benefits.

Dr Charlotte Halpern was the discussant, and led a lengthy discussion which suggested that the explanation needed to show how this heterogeneous coalition was kept together, notably by offering more on the interests of the different actors. It also questioned whether the coalition has been stable throughout or whether actors and their interests have evolved over time, perhaps following ‘critical junctures’. Hence discussants suggested differentiating different periods of resilience, and also the development of actors’ interests and relationships that have allowed the development of the coalition. Particular attention was paid to the European Court of Justice, which at times has allowed other aims such as pan-European solidarity, suggesting that neo-liberal resilience may vary by type of regulation.

Sigurt Vitol’s paper, ‘European Corporate Governance: Is There an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism?’ was presented and critiqued by Daniel Kinderman. It looked at the emergence and persistence of a neo-liberal approach to corporate governance at the European level, the so-called “shareholder value” model. It argues that an important political coalition including minority investors, investment banks and law firms profiting from the “marketization” of ownership, and academics, have been a key driver of changes in policy and philosophy at the European level. The minority investors, investment banks and law firms have provided the “material interests” and the academics the “ideational resources” of the coalition.

The discussion began by suggesting that the historical and political roots of the coalition needed greater attention. In particular, it would be useful to look at how the coalition was formed and when- whether in the 1970s or later. Moreover, the ‘shareholder’ model has deep historical roots that are worth exploring. It was also argued that one reason for the success of the coalition is that the shareholder model is highly flexible and hence can be adapted to diverse national circumstances. Thus again, the debate centred on both neo-liberalism’s adaptability and the importance of history.

Daniel Mügge’s paper on ‘Neo-liberalism in EU Financial regulation: whence it came, why it stuck’ was presented and critiqued by Ana Maria Evans. The paper argues that pro-market thought in financial regulation is a broad church, stretching from laissez-faire and doctrinaire non-intervention to a market-enhancing liberalism, under which public agencies seek to fine-tune markets to boost efficiency. For this reason, actual policy failures can rarely be pinned on neo-liberalism as a whole. Laissez-faire adherents can claim that excessive government distortions had spawned market failure; market-enhancers respond that their project of rooting out these failures through regulation has not been finished yet. Both positions can be framed as “pro-market” ideas. The vagueness of neoliberal ideas – apparently a sign of weakness – is ultimately a source of strength. Whatever arguments are made against pro-market thinking, there always is a strain that emerges unscathed. In spite of widespread criticism of neoliberal ideas, no coherent contending paradigm has emerged. Critics have exposed the intellectual weaknesses of market-enhancing financial regulation. They have failed, however, to table an alternative that could take neo-liberalism’s place.
The discussion began by seeking closer links between the paper and the general hypotheses. The paper implicitly mainly addresses hypotheses 3 and 5 - ie that due to the power of neo-liberal ideas and discourse no stronger alternatives to neo-liberalism have been proposed and/or that institutions prevented the development of alternatives. The paper needed to develop the political processes that lie behind the argument looking at which actors blocked alternatives and how and why they did so, and which could have proposed alternatives and even may be tried to but were blocked. Thus the importance of political processes and coalitions was underlined. Equally, the kind of case this is for the resilience of neo-liberal ideas was debated. On the one hand, is this a ‘most likely case due to the nature of financial markets (eg the power of large firms, the development of liberal theories etc)? Or on the other hand, is it a least likely/hard case in which neo-liberal ideas seem to have spectacularly failed with disastrous results, and are now widely accepted to be inadequate, and hence we would expect new ideas to challenge and replace them? Finally, the group suggested that a key element in the explanation for neo-liberal ideas about financial regulation was the development and spread of the ‘efficient market hypothesis and the ‘rational man’ assumption.

Professor Vivien Schmidt presented her paper (written with Cornelia Woll) entitled ‘The State: Bête Noire of Neo-Liberalism or its Greatest Conquest?’. The paper argues that the state has been neo-liberalism’s main focus of attack, because neo-liberals, whatever their differences, have viewed the (non neo-liberal) state as consistently doing too much in the wrong ways with the worst consequences not only for the markets but also for democracy, by endangering individual freedom through its interventions. But the state has also been neo-liberalism’s greatest conquest, since it has been primarily through the state that neo-liberals have been able to realize their vision(s). The paper argues that different forms of discourse have been important in spreading neo-liberalism across European states and the EU, but its forms and especially the balance between the two elements of a highly limited state but also a strong state able to impose neo-liberal reform.

The discussion was begun by Professor Patrick Le Galès. It was suggested that a key element in the diversity of neo-liberalism’s penetration and alteration of states has been historical legacies, notably state traditions. Equally, political resistance and struggles vary from one country to another. These mediate neo-liberalism which for its part is highly flexible and hence can adapt to particular national circumstances. Hence context matters greatly for the spread of neo-liberal ideas across states. Moreover, it is important to underline the central role that the state plays in sustaining key elements of competitive markets - from the legal system and upholding property rights to preventing undesirable groups from gaining certain forms of power. Far from being opposed to the state, neo-liberalism needs a strong interventionist state - but it is the form and purpose of its activities that matter.

On the Tuesday, Professor Cathy Martin presented her paper entitled ‘A Working Class Hero is something to be: From Organized to Flexible Labor Markets’. She examines the development of ‘active labour market policies’, and argues that the flexible, multi-faceted nature of liberal political ideology contributes to its resilience. Such policies shifted the policy goal from one of improving and protecting the well-being of a class of workers to one of realizing individual potential, even in unpropitious countries such as Scandinavia and despite economic crisis. The shifting realization of liberal ideals across time and place reflects the essential malleability of the liberal political philosophy. Since the crisis, a very different set of economic conditions have contributed to the enduring utility of the
neoliberal reforms, as active labor market policies have become a strategic tool in national economic patriotism. Active labour market policies allow policymakers simultaneously to combat unemployment, to provide macroeconomic stimulus and to retrain human capital; consequently, these investments have a more targeted economic impact than automatic stabilizers. Active labor market policies offer to advance goals of economic patriotism, by promising to augment national productive activity while combating unemployment.

The discussant, Professor Bruno Palier, began with the question was whether active labour market policies are really neo-liberal, especially since the paper shows that they have been used in different ways in different countries. Hence neo-liberal and non-liberal policies need to be distinguished—e.g. by conceptions of the role of the state or the aims of the policies. Indeed, the discussion emphasized the political nature of active labour market policies, which have political aims and are not just driven by function needs of the labour market, and also the role of political parties in developing such policies. Moreover, the nature of coalitions behind such policies is important. Equally, the role of the EU was brought up— the Commission could use the Lisbon Treaty to establish a safety net but is not doing so.

Maurizio Ferrera’s paper ‘Welfare State Transformations: From Anti-Welfare Neoliberalism to Liberal Welfarism?’ argued that in discourse about the welfare state, neo-liberalism has followed a parabola of expansion (1980-early 1990s), flattening (1990s) and then gradual decline (2000s), leaving room for the emergence of a new post-neoliberal ideological synthesis, which seeks to bridge the (readapted) social-democratic and liberal-democratic traditions. It set out how neo-liberalism offered a critique of traditional social democratic approaches, largely inspired by an economistic critique of the Keynesian welfare state which was accused of too much egalitarianism and taxation and thus less efficiency and entrepreneurship, less risk-taking ad innovation as well as distorted incentives, and then too much bureaucratization and social control and thus less freedom and choice, less dynamism, increasing predation by special interest groups, a culture of passive dependence and weakened personal responsibility on the side of beneficiaries and the citizenry more generally. Combined with moral conservatism this anti-welfare ideology triumphed throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. But its policy solutions such as cutting back the welfare state, failed and faced strong attacks. In response, neo-liberalism has adapted, absorbing new theories of rights, in order to reduce criticisms. It views negative freedom as inextricably linked to positive freedoms and opportunities that allow for self-development, and hence it builds (also) on negative freedom to strengthen the principle of non discrimination and thus generate new types of civil rights (e.g. gay marriage; gender quotas; minority rights). Equally, it has broadened the notion of equality to include opportunities, ‘life chances’, capabilities and ‘functioning’. The result is a new synthesis that combines key ne-liberal elements based on individual responsibility with rights-based theories.

The discussion was initiated by Dr Jonathan Hopkin and then Professor Palier, centred around explanatory factors for the parabola identified in welfare. Links between the welfare state and supporting financial capitalism and firms were pointed out—the welfare state actually aids firms by taking many costs from their shoulders. Equally, neo-liberalism has faced competing ideas and ideals and hence neo-liberalism has been less resilient in ideas (and policy terms) than in other domains. Equally, variations across countries were pointed out—the inroads of neo-liberalism and the development of the new synthesis have varied from one country to another, depending on factors such as national traditions, the force of socialist ideas and economic conditions.
Gerhard Schynder presented a paper on ‘After Corporatism? The Reorganisation of Coordinated Capitalism in Germany and Sweden’ (with Gregory Jackson) which argued that the economic crisis of 2007/8 did not lead to radical break with many neo-liberal pre-crisis policies. No marked return to ‘coordinated’ forms of socio-economic arrangements took place and instead the crisis largely saw a continuation of liberalization strategies adopted since the 1980s and 1990s in order to overcome problems of the growth model of the 1970s. The main reason is that neo-liberal ideas had been strongly institutionalized in the 1980s onwards and characterised by reforms that mix typically neo-liberal measures with measures that follow more closely the traditional ‘logic’ of the systems in the two countries, i.e. that corporatist arrangements and/or state intervention, and formulated and/or implemented using traditional corporatist channels, notably being compromises born of negotiations among the social partners and in many cases supported by both right- and left-wing parties.

Ana Maria Evans began the discussion of the paper. A key question was the nature of the cases- these two countries are usually taken as archetypes of ‘coordinated market economies’ and hence least likely or hard cases for neo-liberal ideas. This leads to the central question of differences in the form of neo-liberalism between the two countries. In Germany, it calls for a discussion of ordo-liberalism for macroeconomic policy, and social democracy for coordination between business and labor, leading to the social market economy. This has been important in the form of neo-liberal in the 2000s, notably the move towards a secondary low-cost labour market. In contrast, Sweden has traditions of adherence to egalitarian policies plus a strong state. These are important in the Swedish strategy of pursuing high-value and technological growth.

The final paper was presented by Elisabetta Gualmini and Vivien Schmidt, entitled ‘Global Crisis and EU Constraints: The Challenges to the State-Influenced Market Economies of Italy and France’. It argues that Italy and France are state-influenced market economies in which the state intervenes more, for better or for worse, and differently, than in liberal market economies such as the UK and coordinated market economies like Germany. Although neo-liberal ideas have taken hold in these state-influenced market economies, too, replacing the non-liberal policy paradigms embodied in postwar state-assisted capitalism in Italy and postwar state-led capitalism in France, state actors have interpreted and applied such neo-liberal ideas differently from their counterparts in other varieties of capitalism. Italy’s trajectory since the postwar years has taken it back and forth between non-liberal political and neo-liberal technocratic leadership, whereas France began with non-liberal technocratic leadership in the postwar years and then moved to neo-liberal political leadership since the 1980s. Moreover, while the non-liberal political elites in Italy have mostly been ‘opportunistic’ and the neo-liberal technocratic elites ‘pragmatic’, in France the postwar non-liberal technocratic elites tended to be ‘ideological’ and the post-1980s neo-liberal political elites pragmatic.

The discussion was begun by Dr Jonathan Hopkin. It underlined that as ‘statist’ polities, the two countries are ‘hard cases’ for resilient neo-liberal ideas, which had much weaker roots than say in the UK and which faced powerful competing ideologies. At the same time, debates about and views of the state vary in the two- the French state is generally seen as successful, unitary, a key element in France etc, whereas the Italian state is generally seen as weak, an impediment to development etc. So the comparison also offers us a way of analysing how the perceived success etc of the state affects the development of neo-liberal
ideas within statist polities. Equally, it raises the questions of: whether neo-liberalism means the same in France and Italy? And to what extent were these ideas really resilient in the sense of dominating debates and being persistent despite challenges? On the former, it seems that neo-liberal ideas are often seen as an alien threat to the state in France often from a very limited part of the Right, whereas in Italy, they can seen as progressive attacking an inefficient state and offering modernisation. On the latter, resilience varies greatly between rhetoric and specific policies, where neo-liberalism has had much less impact.

The concluding session discussed publication plans and also saw discussion of key points for the entire volume. One was a clear definition of neo-liberalism (and also which ideas lie outside it). This is vital and calls for greater clarity, underlining that it involves both ideas about the efficiency of markets, but also about the state which is to ensure negative freedom and economic freedom more than political freedom. A second was to underline that neo-liberalism is also a theory about the state- but about the relationship between it and private actors. A third issue concerned the focus on the volume on ideas, albeit policy ideas, as much as about policies as implemented. The need for periodicity was a further point, as papers needed to separate periods more clearly. Finally, the variation of neo-liberalism was emphasised- over country and domain.

3. Assessment of the results

The purpose of the workshop was to explore why neo-liberalism has been so resilient. The key elements in response have been summarised in the six general conclusions set out above, with details in the summary of the workshop. In concrete terms, the papers will be published in a volume entitled Resilient Liberalism: European Political Economy from Boom to Bust, to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2013. The volume will be published in both hardback and paperback versions which should greatly increase its accessibility. In addition, when it is published, Vivien Schmidt and Mark Thatcher will publish a working paper for the Centre d’Etudes Européennes, Sciences Po Paris, with key findings. We are also submitting proposals for panels/roundtables to present the findings at the Conference of European Studies in Amsterdam in June 2013 and the American Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago in August 2013.

4. Final Programme

**Sunday 24 June 2012**

afternoon  
*Arrival*

**Monday 25 June 2012**

8:30-9.00  
*Coffee and Croissants*

9.00-9.15  
**Introduction and Welcome**

*[Renaud Dehousse](#)* (Sciences Po, Centre d’études européennes)

9.15-9.30  
**Presentation of the European Science Foundation (ESF)**

*[Lise Kjølsrød](#)* (Standing Committee for Social Sciences - SCSS)

**Session 1**  
**Chair / Discussants:**

*[Brigid Laffan](#)* (University College, Dublin) and *[Patrick Le Galès](#)* (Sciences Po, Centre d’études européennes)
### Session 2

**Chair / Discussant:**
*Yves Surel* (Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas)

**11.00-12.00**
**Genealogies of Neo-Liberalism**

*Andrew Gamble* (University of Cambridge)

**12.00-13.00**
**The Collapse of the Brussels- Frankfurt Consensus and the Future of the Euro**

*Loukas Tsoukalas* (ELIAMEP, University of Athens)

Commenting on written paper by *Erik Jones* (John Hopkins University)

**13.00-2.30**
**Lunch**

### Session 3

**Chair / Discussant:**
*Charlotte Halpern* (PACTE/Sciences Po Grenoble)

**2.30-3.30**
**EU Regulation of Economic Markets: Interests and Neo-liberal Ideas**

*Mark Thatcher* (London School of Economics)

### Session 4

**Chair / Discussant:**
*Daniel Kinderman* (University of Delaware and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

**3.00-4.30**
**European Corporate Governance: Is There an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism?**

*Sigurt Vitols* (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung) - presented and discussed by *Daniel Kinderman* (University of Delaware and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

**4.30-5.00**
**Tea / Coffee**

**5.00-5.45**
*Ana Maria Evans/Suzanne Lütz* (Freie Universität Berlin) commenting on the paper *Neoliberalism in EU Financial regulation: whence it came, why it stuck* – *Daniel Mügge* (University of Amsterdam)

**5.45-6.45**
**The State: Bête Noire of Neo-Liberalism or its Greatest Conquest?**

*Vivien Schmidt* (Boston University) – discussant *Patrick Le Galès* (Sciences Po, Centre d’études européennes)

**7.30**
**Conference Dinner**

### Tuesday 26 June 2012

**8.30-9.00**
**Coffee and Croissants**

### Session 5

**Chair / Discussants:**
*Bruno Palier* (Sciences Po, Centre d’études européennes) and *Jonathan Hopkin* (London School of Economics)

**9.00-10.00**
**A Working Class Hero is something to be: From Organized to Flexible Labor Markets**

*Cathie Jo Martin* (Boston University)

**10.00-11.00**
**Welfare State Transformations: From Anti-Welfare Neoliberalism to Liberal Welfarism?**

*Maurizio Ferrera* (University of Milan)

**11.00-11.30**
**Tea / Coffee**
PART 3 - COUNTRY COMPARISONS IN DIFFERENT VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM

Session 6
Chair / Discussant:
Ana Maria Evans (Universidade de Lisboa)

11.30-12.30 After Corporatism? The Reorganisation of Coordinated Capitalism in Germany and Sweden
Gerhard Schnyder (Kings College London)

12.30-14.00 Lunch

Session 7
Chair / Discussant:
Jonathan Hopkin (London School of Economics)

2.00-3.00 Global Crisis and EU Constraints: The Challenges to the State-Influenced Market Economies of Italy and France
Elisabetta Gualmini (Università degli Studi di Bologna) and Vivien Schmidt (Boston University)

3.00-4.30 Conclusions and future plans for publication
Departure

5. Final list of participants and statistical information

1) Dr Ana Maria Carvahlo Evans, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Lisbon
2) Professor Maurizio Ferrera, Milan State University
3) Professor Andrew Gamble, Cambridge University
4) Professor Patrick le Galès, Centre des Etudes Européennes, Paris
5) Professor Elisabetta Gualmini, University of Bologna
6) Dr Charlotte Halpern, FNSP-PACTE / Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble
7) Dr Jonathan Hopkin, London School of Economics
8) Dr Daniel Kinderman, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, Berlin and University of Delaware
9) Professor Brigid Laffan, University College Dublin
10) Professor Lise Kjolsrod, University of Oslo
11) Professor Cathie Jo Martin, Boston University
12) Professor Bruno Palier, Centre des Etudes Européennes, Paris
13) Professor Vivien Schmidt, Boston University
14) Dr Gerhard Schnyder, King’s College London
15) Professor Yves Surel, Université de Paris II
16) Professor Mark Thatcher, London School of Economics
17) Professor Lukas Tsoukalis, ELIAMAP, Athens

The participants came from nine different countries. 40% were female and 60% male. We do not have precise information about age, but the age range was from early 30s to early 60s.