

Social Cognition Network

5th Meeting

Padova - Italy

September 4-7 2003



We are grateful to the European Science Foundation (ESF), the University of Padova, the Department of Developmental and Socialization Psychology, and the Department of General Psychology.

PROGRAM

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 4TH

15.00-16.00

REGISTRATION at the old university downtown (Palazzo del Bo')

16.00-17.30

PLENARY SESSION

Vincent Yzerbyt, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5TH

9.15-10.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>On the processing of evaluative information</u>	<u>The representation of the self and social categories</u>	<u>Decision making</u>
<i>Chair:</i> Drozda-Senkowska, E.	<i>Chair:</i> van Overwalle, F.	<i>Chair:</i> Aarts, H.
Peeters, G.	Boca, S., Bocchiaro, P. & Mirisola, A.	Ferreira, M. & Garcia-Marques, L.
<i>One-dimensional and two-dimensional conceptions of evaluation: On the dual role of evaluative meaning as an incentive and an expression of behavioral approach and avoidance</i>	<i>Reconsidering political orientation: The role of domain complexity, implicit theory and entitativity.</i>	<i>Automaticity and cognitive control: A dual process approach to reasoning under uncertainty</i>
de Lange, M. A. & van Knippenberg, A.	Labiouse, C. L.	Pöhlmann, C., Iyengar, S. S., & Hannover, B.
<i>Promoting the positive and preventing the negative: Regulatory focus and the processing of valenced stimuli.</i>	<i>The formation and use of cognitive representations of social categories: Insights from a modified “Who-Said-What” paradigm and psychophysical tasks.</i>	<i>When do “I” change my mind?</i>
van der Wulp, N. Y. & Semin, G. R.	Timmermans, B. & Van Overwalle, F.	Smits, T. & Hoorens, V.
<i>The attention grabbing and holding power of negativity</i>	<i>The processing of quantitative summary in a social context: The activation of implicit exemplars</i>	<i>How people substantiate their likelihood estimates: Evaluating causes of comparative optimism</i>

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5TH

11.00-12.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>Implicit and explicit attitudes</u>	<u>The representation of the self and social categories</u>	<u>Decision making</u>
<i>Chair: van Knippenberg, A.</i>	<i>Chair: Serino, C.</i>	<i>Chair: Fiedler, K.</i>
Hofmann, W., Gschwendner, T., Gawronski, B., & Schmitt, M.	Vanhoomissen, T. & Van Overwalle, F.	Dijksterhuis, A.
<i>A meta-analysis of the implicit-explicit-relationship with focus on the IAT</i>	<i>A connectionist model of diverse social projection phenomena</i>	<i>When not to think: The role of conscious and unconscious processes in decision making</i>
Castelli, L.	Lambert, S., Vanschoenbeek, C. & Azzi, A.	Epstude, K. & Mussweiler, T.
<i>Explicit and implicit attitudes within the families</i>	<i>From categorial perception to its misleading spontaneous use: A developmental approach.</i>	<i>Relatively fast: The comparison heuristic</i>
Calitri, R. & Brown, R.	Broemer, P. & Diehl, M.	van den Berg, H., van der Pligt, J., Wigboldus, D. & Manstead, T.
<i>Group identity moderates correspondence between implicit and explicit prejudice</i>	<i>Feature matching and ingroup identification: Some cognitive implications of self-ingroup social comparison</i>	<i>Seeing the world through coloured glasses: The influence of affect on information processing and decisions</i>
Zogmaister, C., Paladino, M. P., Arcuri, L. & Castelli, L.	Voci, A.	
<i>The impact of social norms on implicit and explicit expression of intergroup attitudes: The moderating role of ingroup identification and essentialism.</i>	<i>Self-categorization and group processes: Effects the interaction between fit and accessibility of social categories</i>	

12.30-14.30

Lunch

14.30-15.30

PLENARY SESSION

Galen V. Bodenhausen, Northwestern University, U.S.A.

Coffee break

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5TH

16.00-17.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>Self-stereotypes and identity threats</u>	<u>Social distance</u>	<u>Persuasion</u>
<i>Chair: Maass, A.</i>	<i>Chair: Koole, S.</i>	<i>Chair: Garcia-Marques, T.</i>
Berjot, S. & Drozda-Senkowska, E.	van Rooijen, M., Semin, G. R. & van Leeuwen, E. A. C.	Elder, T. J., Douglas, K. M. & Sutton, R. M.
<i>Identity management strategies and performances in the Stereotype Threat paradigm</i>	<i>The effects of linguistic abstraction on social distance</i>	<i>Effects of social contextual factors on reactions to, and perceived consequences of messages</i>
Seibt, B., & Förster, J.	Roeder, U. R. & Hannover, B.	Lima, M., Maio, G. & Thomas, G.
<i>The impact of active self-stereotypes on performance: The role of strategies and task demands</i>	<i>Interpersonal distance and self-construal</i>	<i>The role of self-persuasion in temptation.</i>
Buchs, C. & Butera, F.	van Baaren, R.	Mosso, C. O., Zogmaister, C. & Castelli, L.
<i>The effects of information distribution in peer learning.</i>	<i>IAT and mimicry: Mimicry as implicit discrimination</i>	<i>Cognitive processes and minority influence: The effects of linguistic abstraction</i>
Bedynska, S., Brzezicka-Rotkiewicz, A. & Sedek, G.	Holland, R., Roeder, van Baaren, R., Brandt & Hannover, B.	Custers, R. & Aarts, H.
<i>Cognitive deficits in the stereotype threat situation</i>	<i>Don't stand so close to me: The effects of self-construal on interpersonal closeness</i>	<i>Spontaneous activation of means as a function of temporal and chronic goals in goal-relevant settings</i>

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 6TH

9.15-10.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>Stereotypes and impression formation</u>	<u>Automatic affect: Theoretical and methodological issues</u>	<u>Emotion and group processes</u>
<i>Chair: Boca, S.</i>	<i>Chair: Bless, H.</i>	<i>Chair: Capozza, D.</i>
Antczak, E.	Fiedler, K. & Blümke, M.	Mastrorilli, G.
<i>Narrative mode of person impression blocks use of a stereotype at the unconscious level</i>	<i>Faking the IAT: Aided and unaided response control on the Implicit Association Tests</i>	<i>The effects of the logical articulation and the emotional expressiveness of emotional narratives in social sharing of traumatic events: An experimental study.</i>
Garcia-Marques, T.	Koole, S. L.	Collange, J.
<i>Familiarity increases stereotyping</i>	<i>Volitional control of automatic affect: The moderating role of action orientation</i>	<i>The influence of negative emotion and self-threat on stereotype use and prejudice.</i>
Wenneker, C. P. J., Wigboldus, D. H. J. & Spears, R.	Coenen, M., Dijksterhuis, A. & Wigboldus, D.	Dumont, M., Yzerbyt, V., Wigboldus, D. & Gordijn, E. H.
<i>The linguistic expectancy bias as result of biased encoding and communication goals</i>	<i>Subliminal evaluative conditioning of existing attitudes</i>	<i>Social categorization and fear reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks</i>

Coffee break

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 6TH

11.00-12.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>Stereotypes and impression formation</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>Memory models</u>
<i>Chair: Yzerbyt, V.</i>	<i>Chair: Peeters, G.</i>	<i>Chair: Klauer, K. C.</i>
Santos, S. & Garcia-Marques, L.	Chappe, B., Brauer, M., Ginet, M. & Chambon, M.	Garcia-Marques, L. & Macrae, N.
<i>Dynamic representations of stereotypes</i>	<i>Are advantaged groups more variable than disadvantaged groups ?</i>	<i>The vicissitudes of the social DREAM: Applying the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm to social cognition</i>
Brandt, A. & Vonk, R.	Delacollette, N. & Dardenne, B.	Veling, H. & van Knippenberg, A.
<i>Help me make an impression: Impression management through third parties</i>	<i>Prescriptive aspect of stereotypes in inter-group relations: How can structural relations between groups influence what they should be?</i>	<i>Remembering can cause inhibition: Retrieval-induced inhibition as category independent process</i>
Keller, J.	Schubert, T.	Stahl, C. & Klauer, K. C.
<i>The biological component of psychological essentialism: Essentialist beliefs and how they relate to stereotyping and prejudice.</i>	<i>The power in your hand: Gender differences in bodily feedback effects of power-related gestures</i>	<i>Conjoint recognition and the typicality effect: A perceptual encoding advantage for schema-inconsistent information?</i>
Martijn, C. & Alberts, H.	Mondillon, L., Dalle, N., Rohmann, A., Niedenthal, P. M., Brauer, M., & Uchida, Y.	Pandelaere, M.
<i>Carrying on or giving in: The role of (implicit) cognition in the maintenance or loss of self-control</i>	<i>Emotion and power: A Cross-cultural Study</i>	<i>Systematic distortion in trait judgements: A representational overlap theory</i>

12.30-14.30

Lunch

14.30-15.30

PLENARY SESSION

Gün R. Semin, Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

ORGANISED SOCIAL EVENT

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7TH

9.15-10.30

Room 2A	Room 2D	Room 2E
<u>Mental control and self-regulation</u>	<u>Social inference</u>	<u>Priming</u>
<i>Chair: Corneille, O.</i>	<i>Chair: Strack, F.</i>	<i>Chair: Dijksterhuis, A.</i>
Boccatto, G., Corneille, O., Yzerbyt, V., & Wittenbrink, B.	Ham, J. & Vonk, R.	Sassenberg, K.
<i>Stereotype suppression: Stereotypes on OR NOT on the rebound?</i>	<i>Spontaneous and intentional components of the process of social inference</i>	<i>Think different! The impact of priming creativity on subsequent cognition and behavior</i>
Walther, E.	Aarts, H.	Häfner, M. & Strack, F.
<i>Maladaptive consequences of adaptive behavior: The affective rebound effect</i>	<i>Automatic goal inferences and contagion: Being keen on goals implied by another person's actions</i>	<i>How negative mood may facilitate approach behavior</i>
Hermsen, B., Holland, R. & van Knippenberg, A.	Jerónimo, R. & Garcia-Marques, L.	Vaes, J. & Paladino, M. P.
<i>From implicit attitudes to behavior: What's self-regulation got to do with it?</i>	<i>Person memory and spontaneous trait encoding</i>	<i>Human or not human: Perverse effects of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations.</i>
Jostmann, N. B. & Koole, S. L.	Van Overwalle, F.	Utz, S., Ouwkerk, J. W. & Van Lange, P. A. M.
<i>When the going gets tough, the tough get going: Action orientation and cognitive control</i>	<i>Morals, motives, and more on traits: A commentary on Reeder et al. (2002)</i>	<i>Same priming, different effects: The influence of competence primes and social value orientation on cooperation in social dilemmas</i>

Coffee break

11.00-12.00

PLENARY SESSION

Steven J. SHERMAN, Indiana University, U.S.A.

ABSTRACTS

**One-dimensional and two-dimensional conceptions of evaluation:
On the dual role of evaluative meaning as an incentive and an expression of
behavioral approach and avoidance**

Peeters, G.
K.U. Leuven, Belgium

Studies focusing on evaluative meaning have diverged in that some studies have stressed a single encompassing evaluative dimension associated with approach-avoidance tendencies, and other studies have stressed two, more specific, evaluative dimensions: a likableness-related dimension (social good-bad, morality, other-profitability, etc.) and a power-related dimension (intellectual good-bad, competence, self-profitability, etc.). Only the likableness-related dimension would be unconditionally associated with approach-avoidance tendencies. Comparisons between old studies suggested the hypothesis that the evaluative meaning of perceived traits of a target is processed following the two-dimensional model if the traits' incentive value for approach-avoidance acts relative to the target is at stake. However, the evaluative meaning of traits would be processed following the one-dimensional model if the traits are perceived as part and parcel of a description expressing approach-avoidance tendencies of the author of the description relative to the described target. Confirmatory evidence is presented from two experiments designed to test the hypothesis.

ON THE PROCESSING OF EVALUATIVE INFORMATION

**Promoting the positive and preventing the negative:
Regulatory focus and the processing of valenced stimuli**

de Lange, M. A. & van Knippenberg, A.
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Currently, one of the hot topics in social psychology is self-regulation. According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) a fundamental distinction can be made between two types of regulation: Nurturance related (promotion focus) and security related (prevention focus). In a promotion focus self-regulation is concerned with positive outcomes and using eagerness means to ensure the presence of these positive outcomes. Conversely, in a prevention focus self-regulation is concerned with negative outcomes and using vigilance means to ensure the absence of negative outcomes.

In two experiments we investigated whether the two regulatory foci have an effect on the processing of valenced information. Using a maze task (Friedman & Förster, 2001) in the first experiment and a profit/loss manipulation in the second experiment, we manipulated regulatory focus in two different ways. The experimental task in the first two experiments was an interference task wherein participants had to indicate whether a word was presented in upper or lowercase letters. In line with Förster and Strack (1996) we expected less interference (distraction) from stimuli with a valence compatible with the regulatory focus (i.e. positive-promotion and negative-prevention) than from incompatible stimuli. In both experiments, we found the expected interaction of regulatory focus and stimulus valence. Participants in a promotion focus responded faster on positive stimuli, while a prevention focus led to faster responses on negative stimuli.

ON THE PROCESSING OF EVALUATIVE INFORMATION

The attention grabbing and holding power of negativity

van der Wulp, N.Y. & Semin, G. R.
Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

From an evolutionary point of view, people assign more value to negativity than to positivity, because averting danger is more important than obtaining pleasure. A considerable amount of research in diverse fields supports the notion that people have a bias in favor of negativity relative to positivity. This negativity bias is also evident in attentional processes. People are automatically vigilant for negative stimuli, directing their attention faster to negative stimuli than to positive stimuli and once negative stimuli have attracted attention then they hold attention for a longer period relative to positive stimuli. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the detection and processing of negative stimuli relative to positive stimuli, with the attention grabbing property of negativity resulting in faster detection of negativity, and the attention holding property of negativity resulting in slower processing of negativity. To date, the available research has not demonstrated these two attentional phases, namely attention grabbing and attention holding. Moreover, no attempt has been made to differentiate between the attention grabbing and the attention holding property of negativity.

In a series of 4 experiments we advance both a conceptual and experimental paradigm in which conditions for both the attention grabbing and holding features of positive and negative stimuli are specified and shown. In these studies we show that the context in which a negative stimulus appears is predictive for the attention grabbing or the attention holding feature of negativity. Moreover, these studies show that the postulated effects are generalizable across different types of stimuli (valenced faces and words) underlying the generality of the advanced model.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**Reconsidering political orientation:
The role of domain complexity, implicit theory and entitativity**

Boca, S., Bocchiaro, P. & Mirisola, A.
Università di Palermo

This study explores a set of cognitive factors linked with people's politics orientation. To this aim, subjects will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires, the first of which measures their implicit beliefs concerning both their view of the world and moral standards (Dweck, Hong & Chiu, 1993). The second questionnaire is a scale of self complexity (Linville, 1982) adapted to a political domain while the last one is supposed to measure subjects' regulatory focus (Higgins, 2001). Among these instruments, subjects will also be requested to complete the Altemeyer's right wing authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1990), a measure of people's political "rigidity". Through a multivariate regression we expect to find the interplay between all of these variables and, secondly, how people showing a high score on the Altemeyer's scale are identified with a politics ideal (left, centre, right). This identification will be operationalized through the degree of similarity between the importance that these values have for themselves and for the left, centre and right.

Finally, the perception of entitativity (essentialistic vs. agency) showed by authoritarian people towards different Italian politics parts will be investigated. We expect that who shows a low self complexity and a rigid view of the world will perceive both ingroup and outgroup (different politics group) as less articulated than people who shows both a high self complexity and a more articulated view of the world.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**The formation and use of cognitive representations of social categories:
Insights from a modified “Who-Said-What” paradigm
and psychophysical tasks**

Labiouse, C. L.

Department of Cognitive Sciences University of Liege, Belgium

The original “Who Said What” paradigm was proposed by Taylor and colleagues (1978) and had provided an elegant tool to track issues related to social categorization. A traditional element of the paradigm is that within-category differences are minimized and between-category differences are exaggerated. We show that this claim cannot be tested within the original framework. In a first experiment, we propose some refinements to the original paradigm. We added unseen items in the test phase and, instead of using real faces, we used morphed faces progressively modified by constant amounts between two face endpoints, and for which a priori baseline inter-similarities can be computed. We used continua involving inter-ethnic faces. Multidimensional scaling and multinomial modelling techniques were used and evidence for social categorization and accentuation effects were found despite the absence of clear-cut categories, suggesting that people, even implicitly, exaggerate inter-categorical differences and reduce intra-categorical differences in order to cope with complex and demanding situations. In a second experiment, we investigate whether this categorization already impacts on a lower level, namely, on perceptive tasks. We used identification/discrimination paradigms borrowed from the categorical perception research. Participants performed these tasks on the same morphed material. Signal Detection Theory allows us to unravel the sensory and the decisional processes at work, revealing that top-down influences might impact on the perception of socially-embedded stimuli. The overarching goal of these two lines of research is to dissociate different perceptual (bottom-up) and memory (top-down) processes in the formation and use of social categories, using mathematical techniques.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**The processing of quantitative summary in a social context:
The activation of implicit exemplars**

Timmermans, B. & Van Overwalle, F.
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

How do people encode abstract quantitative information as opposed to information of separate exemplars? The more abstractionist rule-based point of view assumes that people develop, based on former experience, extensive meta-knowledge about the way in which exemplars coincide (e.g., causes and effects) or form categories. Based on this meta-knowledge, people then develop rules that they apply to summary information. An alternative explanation that we propose is that people need not necessarily encode this information in an abstract way. Rather, we assume that when making judgments based on summary information, this information is first "transformed" into a number of specific mental models or implicit exemplars, and subsequently processed in a way identical to concrete exemplars. In order to investigate this question, we conducted three experiments. In the first two we demonstrate that, by manipulating the number of activated exemplars through either a priming task or the use of large vs. small categories, it is possible to influence subsequent judgements based on information containing unspecified quantifiers. In the third experiment, we measure the implicitly activated exemplars by means of a lexical decision task.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

A connectionist model of diverse social projection phenomena

Vanhoomissen, T. & Vanoverwalle, F.
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

A recurrent connectionist model is proposed to account for the phenomenon of ingroup projection (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). This psychological phenomenon is revealed when members of two or more groups, which are part of the same superordinate category, are asked to rate their ingroup and the superordinate category. It is observed that there is a high correlation between the ingroup rating and the rating of the superordinate category, as if the features of the ingroup are projected into the superordinate category. Self Anchoring (e.g. Otten & Wentura, 2001) is somewhat the same phenomenon, although in the individual field: properties of the self are projected into the ingroup.

The model we propose is based on the standard auto-associative network, developed by McClelland and Rumelhart, which uses the Delta Learning Algorithm for adjusting connection weights. The stronger connection between the ingroup (self) node and the superordinate category (ingroup) node is explained by the competition property of the Delta Learning Algorithm.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**From categorial perception to its misleading spontaneous use:
A developmental approach**

Lambert, S., Vanschoenbeek, C. & Azzi, A.
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

This research compares young children and adults' misleading spontaneous use of gender categories and the accentuation of intra-category similarities and inter-category differences as a consequence of this use. Previous studies already revealed such a spontaneous use by adults and teenagers with the "Who-Said-What" paradigm. Relying on research in cognitive psychology that shows categorial perception of gender in infants, we propose that its spontaneous use could intervene much earlier than suggested by the existing literature. We also propose that accentuation effect of gender categorisation, already shown with adults, could as well occur in young children as a consequence of its spontaneous use. Using the Who-Said-What paradigm and a classic accentuation task (qualitative judgements), we tested these hypotheses in two studies comparing pre-school and first grade children (n: 60) with an adult sample (n: 60). Analysis so far suggests that spontaneous use of tender categorisation seems indeed to appear earlier than previously thought, supporting our hypothesis. We however obtained diverging patterns of errors between pre-school children and adults. These results will be discussed, as well as differences in the accentuation effect obtained as a function of age.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**Feature matching and ingroup identification:
Some cognitive implications of self-ingroup social comparison**

Broemer, P. & Diehl, M.
Universitaet Tuebingen, Germany

Based on Tversky's (1977) similarity model, we examined how the framing of self-ingroup social comparison affects gender-based ingroup identification. In Experiment 1, male and female participants were asked to compare themselves with other women (men) either under self-focus or under other-focus instructions. They then completed measures of cognitive inclusion of the ingroup in the self (Tropp & Wright, 2001), intergroup similarity (women vs. men) and ingroup identification (modeled after Spears et al., 1997). Inclusion was stronger in the other- than in the self-focus comparison direction. There were no gender differences and no interactions with gender. In a multiple regression analysis, both intergroup similarity (negatively) and inclusion of the ingroup in the self (positively) predicted ingroup identification. In Experiment 2, the main effect for focus of comparison was replicated. Three further conditions were implemented. In the other-focus condition, participants were asked to think of a) four typical exemplars of their gender category (homogeneous condition), b) four atypical exemplars (homogeneous-nonstereotypical condition), or c) four dissimilar exemplars (heterogeneous condition). As expected, the focus of comparison effect was reduced when the category was perceived as heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. This latter finding supports the assumption that simple, clear-cut representations of a social category (e.g., a strong stereotype) facilitate the similarity effect. This finding may have important implications for intergroup social comparison because ingroup-homogeneity as well as ingroup identification moderate reactions to threatening social comparison outcomes. The strength of ingroup identification, however, should also moderate interpersonal comparison outcomes, within particular reference groups.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

**Self-categorization and group processes:
Effects the interaction between fit and accessibility of social categories**

Voci, A.

University of Padova, Italy

According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), group processes such as cohesion and ingroup bias are determined by a causal chain, which starts from the interaction between fit and accessibility of an ingroup-category, passes through depersonalization of self-perception, and then comes to group phenomena. Two experimental studies are presented in which the validity of this chain was fully tested. In the first, participants were football fans, and in the second they were workers in an organization. In each study, two experimental conditions were created, whereby the salience and relevance of the ingroup-outgroup categorization was varied. Starting from frequency distribution task (Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989), meta-contrast ratios were computed with the aim of measuring comparative fit of the ingroup category and depersonalization of the self. Accessibility was measured considering constructs related to identification, past experience and present relevance. Outcome variables were ingroup bias (Studies 1 and 2), ingroup entitativity, organizational citizenship behaviours, job satisfaction and turnover intentions (Study 2). Results show that the interaction between fit and accessibility determined depersonalization, which in turn influenced ingroup bias and the other criterion variables, but only in the conditions in which the ingroup-category was highly relevant and salient. These results are consistent with the hypotheses derived from self-categorization theory.

DECISION MAKING

**Automaticity and cognitive control:
A dual process approach to reasoning under uncertainty**

Ferreira, M. & Garcia-Marques, L.
FPCE, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

We present a dual-process approach to judgment under uncertainty capable of retaining the explanatory power of the heuristics and biases research program (e.g. Tversky, Slovic, & Khaneman, 1982) but also able to delineate the conditions underlying a more systematic mode of reasoning based on deliberate, rule-based inductive reasoning (e.g. Fong, Krantz & Nisbett, 1986). It is assumed that inductive reasoning is based on two different information-processing modes, a heuristic and a systematic mode. These modes are instances of two broadly defined cognitive systems, the associative system and the rule-based system (Sloman, 1996). Heuristic reasoning is largely automatic, based on associative principles of similarity and temporal contiguity; effortless, and often unintentional. Systematic reasoning is rule-based, effortful, and intentional. It is further claimed that the two reasoning modes provide independent contributions to judgment. Accordingly, variables traditionally associated with controlled processing should produce process dissociations by affecting systematic reasoning while leaving heuristic reasoning largely invariant. Variables traditionally associated with automatic processing should produce the inverse kind of dissociation (i.e., affect heuristic reasoning but leave systematic reasoning largely unchanged). Manipulations designed to affect systematic reasoning included varying participants' goals through instructions; and reducing cognitive processing capacity through cognitive-overload. Manipulations designed to affect heuristic reasoning included priming of heuristic reasoning and the level of similarity between priming and target problems. In several studies, we applied the process dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) to judgment under uncertainty in order to obtain separate process estimates of both reasoning modes and test the above predictions.

DECISION MAKING

When do ‘I’ change my mind?

Pöhlmann, C.⁽¹⁾, Iyengar, S. S.⁽²⁾, & Hannover, B.⁽¹⁾¹ Freie Universitaet Berlin, Germany ² Columbia University, U.S.A.

Iyengar, Tsai, Peng, Kitayama and Markus (under review) have suggested that when making choices, people from independent cultures want to be volitional agents whereas members of interdependent cultures try to act as responsible agents. Therefore, variations in choice behavior according to a person’s self-construal shall become obvious once the provided choice options differ in the extent to which they represent responsible choices; with interdependents more likely choosing responsible options than independents.

The Semantic-Procedural-Interface Model of the Self (SPI-model, Hannover & Kühnen, 2002; Kühnen, Hannover & Schubert, 2001) suggests that differences in choice behavior between independents and interdependents are due to different information processing styles. In particular, the model predicts that independents are more inclined to process information in a context-independent manner, i.e., they should focus on task-relevant information while ignoring contextual information. Interdependents, however, are expected to prefer context-dependent processing, i.e., by relating information to the context in which it appears. When applied to the research on choice behavior, the SPI-model predicts that any alteration of the context should bring about a differential pattern of choice behavior in independents and interdependents, i.e., even if this alteration is irrelevant to the dimension of responsible versus volitional choices. In particular, we would predict interdependents to make their choices more dependent on context-alterations than independents.

To test these assumptions, we conducted two studies in which participants were provided with choice options (e.g., choosing a present out of a selection of several objects; like a chocolate bar, a text marker and a pen) that did not differ in the extent to which they served the goal to be a responsible or a volitional agent, respectively. To demonstrate interdependents’ stronger context-dependency in making choices, our participants had to make choices at two different points in time (t1 and t2), with the context being different at both measurement points. In study 1 we varied the total of choice options offered at t1 and t2. As expected interdependents more frequently chose a different option at t2, whereas independents more likely stuck to what they had chosen at t1. Confirming our hypotheses, this differential pattern was due to the fact that interdependents made their choices more dependent on the objects’ relative attractiveness: Aggregated across all objects being offered twice, the mean attractiveness judgments changed significantly more from t1 to t2 in interdependents than in independents. In study 2 we varied a more complex variable of the choice situation. Whereas in one experimental condition the choice situation was identical at both times of measurement (participants had to choose freely out of six choice options), in the other condition the choice situation varied from t1 to t2 (at t1 subjects were assigned one out of six choice options, whereas at t2 they had to choose freely). As expected, when the situation was varied, interdependents were more likely than independents to choose different options at the two measurement points. In contrast, when circumstances remained the same, no differences in choice behavior were observed between independents and interdependents. It will be discussed in how far these findings can explain cross cultural differences in choice behavior.

DECISION MAKING

**How people substantiate their likelihood estimates:
Evaluating causes of comparative optimism**

Smits, T. & Hoorens, V.
Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, Belgium

Most people believe they are less likely than others to experience negative events and more likely to experience positive ones (i.e., comparative optimism). Since Weinstein's seminal paper (1980) many studies have confirmed this finding. Nonetheless, little work has been committed to explain comparative optimism. Moreover, there is a lack of studies that validate and compare the given explanations and these explanations often result in intertwined predictions. Hence, little is known about the construct of comparative optimism or the pieces of information people utilize to make their estimates.

Therefore, a study was conducted in which participants gave likelihood estimates regarding a set of events. They did this either with regard to their own future or the average other's future. Comparable to typical assessment methods concerning comparative optimism, these estimates were either absolute or relative to a comparison target's future (average other as comparison when self was the target and vice versa). Afterwards, participants had to give up to 3 reasons per estimate to indicate why they chose that particular likelihood. These reasons were subsequently classified according to a categorization scheme in order to relate them to existing explanations of comparative optimism.

Comparable to previous findings, participants were comparatively optimistic in their relative estimates (within subjects) as well as their absolute ones (between subjects). It will be discussed to what extent each explanation of comparative optimism is supported by the reasons participants gave for their estimates.

DECISION MAKING

When not to think: The role of conscious and unconscious processes in decision making

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It is a widely held belief that people should consciously think about the decisions they make. When faced with decisions such as whether to buy a house or not or whether to switch jobs or not, thorough conscious contemplation is generally expected to lead to the best decisions. I would like to challenge this notion. Although consciousness can be said to be “smart” and rational, it is also of very limited capacity. This means that when making decisions about rather complex, multifaceted issues, conscious thought can be maladaptive and lead to poor decisions. This conclusion is less sobering than it may seem, because it does not mean that people are poor decision makers: “Unconscious thought” (i.e., chewing on a problem without directed conscious thought) can lead to very sound decisions.

DECISION MAKING

**Seeing the world through coloured glasses:
The influence of affect on information processing and decisions**

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In this paper, we argue that any information processing can follow a more affective pathway or a more cognitive pathway. The special characteristics of affective processing can be shown in two ways; either when measuring affective processing or when activating affective processing. In a first set of studies, we investigated whether affective, cognitive evaluations and more global, valenced evaluations differ in their ability to predict subsequent decisions toward organ donation. We found that in this domain, affect predicts decisions while cognitive and global evaluations do not.

In a second set of studies, we investigated whether affective “focus” can influence the way subsequent information is processed. We manipulated focus unobtrusively by having participants work on a word-search puzzle that consisted of affective words (e.g. emotion, feeling, mood) or cognitive words (e.g. reasoning, thinking). Then, participants read positive and negative affective and cognitive information. Results show that an implicit affective focus manipulation resulted in enhanced memory for affective information relative to this memory after a cognitive focus. Implications for treating affect as a separate information processing route are discussed.

DECISION MAKING

Relatively fast: The comparison heuristic

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When individuals have to make a judgment they do this by using comparisons. Looking for a new flat for instance often requires rather rapid decisions. How is such a complex decision made possible in a relatively short time? A likely answer is, that the new flat is simply judged in comparison to one's current flat. In more general terms, we propose that judgments are based on comparisons. By comparing a target with an accessible standard judgments are facilitated and cognitive capacity is saved. To illustrate this a series of studies will be presented.

In Study 1 participants were asked either to compare or to describe two pictures (comparison vs. control condition). In doing so, a comparative vs. an absolute judgment mode was induced. In an ostensibly unrelated task a description of an unnamed city was presented. Participants had to judge this city on several dimension (e.g. number of inhabitants). It can be shown that participants in the comparison condition are faster in making these judgments than those in the control condition. In addition, the potential comparison standard (participants' home town) is more accessible for participants in the control condition. Taken together the results of Study 1 show that procedurally priming comparisons facilitates judgmental responses. Since a comparison standard is highly accessible after the judgment it can be concluded, that a comparison was really applied.

In Study 2 we combined the paradigm described above with a secondary-task paradigm to show that using comparisons saves cognitive capacity. While participants read the information about the target city they also listened to an audio-taped short story. Results show, that in the comparison condition participants recall more items than those in the control condition. Furthermore the facilitation of responses for judgments about the city as shown in Study 1 is replicated.

Is procedural priming necessary to induce a comparative judgment mode or can the same be achieved by pure semantic activation of comparisons? To answer this question a third study was conducted. Here a subliminal priming procedure was applied. The facilitation of response times and a higher accessibility of a potential comparison standard is shown again for participants in the comparison condition. The results suggest that semantic activation of the comparison mode has the same effects as the procedural priming method applied in Studies 1 and 2.

The present data suggest that comparisons function as a heuristic when making a judgment. Possible mechanisms and the relation to an interindividual difference variable (social comparison orientation) will be discussed.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDES

A meta-analysis of the implicit-explicit-relationship with focus on the IAT

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The correlation between implicit and explicit indicators of dispositions such as personality traits or attitudes is a key issue for the validation of implicit measures. Heterogenous findings in the literature suggest that moderators of the implicit-explicit-relationship do exist. In order to identify such moderators we conducted a meta-analysis of all published English-language and German-language studies in which the Implicit Association Test (IAT) was used. Studies were coded for procedural aspects of the IAT (e.g. compatibility order, randomization of trials), aspects of explicit measures (e.g. polarity, affectivity), and aspects of the topic (e.g. social sensitivity, involvement). Moderator effects were investigated both for the total sample of studies and separately by domains (e.g. stereotypes, self-concept of personality, etc.). As a second objective possible moderator effects of procedural variables on the magnitude of the IAT-effect were examined. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for optimizing the IAT as an implicit measure of dispositions.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDES

Explicit and implicit attitudes within the families

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Recent models about the representation of attitudes assume the existence of a dual component (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2001). Explicit attitudes are consciously endorsed, verbally communicated and strictly connected to controlled behaviors. In contrast, implicit attitudes are largely outside conscious introspection and they are more related to spontaneous nonverbal behaviors. Since, the relation between the attitudes hold by parents and their children is often weak and contradictory we conducted an exploratory analysis separating explicit and implicit attitudes.

In both the presented studies, at least a parent and an adolescent within each family were tested. In Study 1 (N = 176) a racial IAT was administered together with a prejudice scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Overall, results showed a weak correlation between the explicit and the implicit measure. The explicit attitude of parents was correlated to the explicit attitudes of their children. On the other hand, the children of parents who scored higher on the IAT were also more likely to score high on the implicit measure. These findings have been replicated in Study 2 (N = 168) in which the attitudes toward smoking were assessed.

In sum, there is good consistency between the explicit (positive) attitudes endorsed by different members within a family, and there is evidence that parents' implicit attitudes may shape the way their children spontaneously react toward social objects. The virtues of adopting a multi-level analysis about the transmission of social attitudes are thus underlined.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDES

**Group identity moderates correspondence between
implicit and explicit prejudice**

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We report on two studies that assert group identity as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice. We contend that implicit measures do not usually make accessible the social context that determines self-definitions whereas explicit measures of prejudice do. This means that at the implicit level individual's group representations are not shaped in relational terms, a fundamental component of inter-group prejudice (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). By making accessible a relevant inter-group context prior to completion of implicit measures we believe that a greater correspondence with explicit measures will be observed. In our first study (N= 82) we manipulated accessibility of British versus German group identity through a variety of comparisons (i.e., inter-group, temporal and no-comparison). Participants completed a variant of the supraliminal, sequential priming paradigm in the form of a lexical decision task. Various implicit prejudice indices were computed (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) and correlated with a variety of explicit measures including Blatant and Subtle Prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Considerable correspondence (up to .55) was only observed following an inter-group comparison. To assess the generality of these findings and to more fully determine whether these process differences were a function of *group* identity and not just a 'between stimulus comparison' we conducted a second study and introduced an inter-personal comparison frame within a different social context. In a British versus American context (N= 89) considerable relationships emerged (up to .55) only following an inter-group comparison. We discuss the importance of taking into account group identity when employing implicit measures of prejudice.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDES

**The impact of social norms on implicit and explicit expression of intergroup attitudes:
The moderating role of ingroup identification and essentialism.**

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The purpose of the present work is to investigate the impact of automatically activated norms that prescribe or proscribe ingroup bias on intergroup attitudes. The first experiment investigates the role of implicitly activated norms on more controlled expressions of intergroup attitudes, whereas the second one extends the results to a more automatic expression of intergroup attitudes. Using the Scramble Sentence procedure (Srull & Wyer, 1979), we automatically activated either the norm to be loyal to own group, or the norm to be fair to all people. Then, participants were asked to work on a subsequent task, in which either controlled or more spontaneous forms of intergroup attitudes were assessed, using a questionnaire and GNAT. Results of these two studies showed that participants primed in the initial task with a norm of fairness subsequently showed less prejudice in their automatic and controlled attitudes, whereas participants primed with the norm of loyalty displayed more prejudice, as compared to a control condition in which no norm was primed. Furthermore, this effect is moderated by the degree of ingroup identification of the participant and by essentialism, indicating that these results are not just a matter of concept activation.

SELF-STEREOTYPES AND IDENTITY THREATS

Identity management strategies and performances in the Stereotype Threat paradigm

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In this study, we propose to test the hypothesis that stereotype threat, manipulated by the task diagnosticity or by the visibility of the target's membership, can trigger specific identity management strategies in response to the different identity threats that those situations make salient: personal identity (task diagnosticity) or social identity (visibility). So as to be able to observe the expression of these strategies (primary compensation), we first proposed to low and high ses students a task which permit them to invest either in the relevant domain (intelligence), or in a alternative domain (creativity) or to disinvest the task (disengagement). We then measured how they cognitively attempted to restore their identity (secondary compensation). Results show that when personal identity is salient, subjects tend to use an individual mobility strategy (investment *in* the relevant domain). This strategy is detrimental to their performance (lower score, more errors) but also to their identity (self-handicapping, overestimation of performance).

When social identity threat is salient, subjects use a social creativity strategy (strong investment in *another* domain). This strategy (which *can* be expressed here) seems beneficial to the subjects, both in terms of performances and identity management.

Finally, when both types of threat are salient, subjects disengage from the task. This strategy seems also detrimental to their performance and their identity (attribution of discrimination, underestimation of performance), but not for the same reasons as for individual mobility. Here, they have lower performance because they do not attempt a lot of exercises.

SELF-STEREOTYPES AND IDENTITY THREATS

**The impact of active self-stereotypes on performance:
The role of strategies and task demands**

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We hypothesized that active self-stereotypes can influence the strategies with which goals are pursued by inducing regulatory foci. More specifically, positive self-stereotypes should induce a promotion focus state of eagerness, whereas active negative stereotypes should induce a prevention focus state of vigilance. Drawing on research showing that regulatory foci lead to a better recall for focus-consistent means of striving for a goal, we predicted and found in Study 1 that a negative group ascription with regard to task performance leads to better recall for avoidance related statements while a positive ascription leads to a better recall for approach related statements. Thus, positive self stereotypes enhance sensitivity to promotion focus information, whereas negative stereotypes enhance sensitivity to prevention focus information. Given that self stereotypes induce regulatory foci, original conclusions can be drawn for actual task performance. Previous research has shown that in tasks where speed increases the number of potential hits, promotion focus leads to fast performance compared to prevention focus at the expense of accuracy. Prevention focus vigilance, on the other hand, entails the avoidance of mistakes, especially false alarms and slows down performance. In Study 2 and 3, both an experimental manipulation of group performance expectation and the preexisting stereotype of better verbal skills in women than in men had effects on performance speed and accuracy that were equivalent to manipulations of a direct regulatory focus induction. Another prediction derived from regulatory focus literature was that positive ingroup stereotypes should lead to more creative performance while negative stereotypes lead to better analytical performance when these components are measured separately. Data from two further studies supported these predictions.

Our results suggest that self-stereotypes activate regulatory foci, and that fit to task demands moderates the relationship between regulatory focus activation and performance. These results point to the importance of task characteristics and the strategies that likely help or hinder their solution.

SELF-STEREOTYPES AND IDENTITY THREATS

The effects of information distribution in peer learning

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Two studies investigated the effects of information distribution during dyadic peer learning. Working on complementary information should favor partners' involvement due to reciprocal informational dependence, whereas working on identical information should favor partners' confrontations and social comparison of competence. Regarding performance, when working on identical information, a competent partner could threaten self-competence and impair learning. In contrast, when working on complementary information, a competent partner guarantees a good input which allows students to understand information and enhances learning.

Study 1 showed that students report more efforts to understand in the complementary information condition, whereas confrontations and comparison of competence are more frequent in the identical information condition. Learning is overall poorer when working on identical information and this effect is mediated by the social comparison of competence. Moreover, students' perception of their partner's competence is positively linked to students' learning under complementary information and negatively under identical information. Study 2 manipulated the quality of the partner's input (brilliant vs medium) thanks to a confederate. If it is true that the social comparison of competence is threatening when working on identical information, a brilliant partner should impair learning compared to a medium partner. Conversely, a brilliant partner should lead to better learning when working on complementary information. An interaction between information distribution and the partner's input on learning supported this hypothesis. These results have important implications for determining the conditions under which peer learning can be more effective.

SELF-STEREOTYPES AND IDENTITY THREATS

Cognitive deficits in the stereotype threat situation

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Research made by Steele (1995) showed that when a widely known negative stereotype exists about a group it creates for its members a burden of suspicion that acts as a threat. For example, when female students take an math exam, they are subject to the threat that their behavior, if they fail, may confirm a reputation of low math ability. According to Steele and Aronson (1995; also Cadinu et al., 2003) several mechanisms may singly or simultaneously contribute to this “inefficiency of processing”: loss motivation and effort, higher level of anxiety, lower self-efficiency or self-worth.

Our research investigates the mechanism of cognitive limitations in stigmatized group. Because the stereotype threat appeared only in difficult tasks we hypothesized that stereotype does not reduce simple retrieval but instead limits the resources available for systematic, higher order strategies of thinking. In the first studies we used linear order procedure to examine the ability of mental models construction. Females under stereotype threat showed impairments in generative reasoning. In the second line of research we focused on working memory functions, especially on inhibition and coordination, involved in solving special arithmetic tasks. Using the methodology of TAF (Time Accuracy Functions) we analyzed cognitive efficiency in terms of two parameters: A (time needed to exceed the chance level) and B (rate of approach to asymptote). Stigmatized group (blond females) showed impairments in both parameters, comparing to control group. We discuss the findings in terms of cognitive exhaustion model (von Hecker & Sedek, 1999).

SOCIAL DISTANCE

The effects of linguistic abstraction on social distance

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When we talk about positive or negative events involving in- or out-group members, our language use shows systematic differences (e.g., Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). Positive in-group behavior and negative out-group behavior is described abstractly –e.g., is helpful/aggressive-, positive out-group and negative in-group behavior is described concretely –e.g., helps/hurts-. Research on this Linguistic Intergroup Bias (Maass et al., 1989) primarily focused on determinants of this bias. The current research focuses on the consequences.

How do messages varying in valence and abstraction influence their recipients' perception of the social distance to the message source? We hypothesized that abstract positive and concrete negative messages may be a subtle way of signaling interpersonal proximity. In contrast, abstract negative and concrete positive messages may be a means to signal interpersonal distance. We predicted this to occur only if there was an interdependent relationship between the source of the message and the receiver (Semin, Gil de Montes, & Valencia, 2003).

This hypothesis was examined in a 2 (Valence of the feedback: positive, negative) x 2 (Abstraction of the feedback: abstract, concrete) x 2 (Source of the feedback: computer, experimenter) between participants design. Participants received bogus feedback on a task. The feedback was provided either via a computer message (but in the presence of the experimenter) or directly by the experimenter. The results provided support for our hypothesis: the expected pattern of social distance was found only when the experimenter provided the feedback.

The results were in line with our expectations and suggest that the abstraction level of the feedback communicates information about interpersonal distance between the sender and the receiver of the message. It demonstrates that messages varying in linguistic abstraction shape receivers' perception of social distance.

SOCIAL DISTANCE

Interpersonal distance and self-construal

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One of the key elements of nonverbal behavior is the regulation of interpersonal physical distance. While many different situational and personal factors influencing preferred interpersonal distance have been identified, to date no theoretically coherent explanation for these variations has been presented.

In the paper to be presented we trace back individual differences in preferred interpersonal distance to differences in self-construal. The Semantic-Procedural-Interface Model of the Self (Hannover & Kühnen, 2002; Kühnen, Hannover & Schubert, 2001) suggests that while in people with independent self-construal context-independent information-processing prevails, people with interdependent self-construal are inclined to process information in a context-dependent manner. Applied to interpersonal distance behavior, we hypothesized that independents prefer greater spatial distances than interdependents.

In order to demonstrate the association between self-construal and interpersonal distance, we conducted three different studies. Together, results show that interdependent self-construals are associated with physical interpersonal proximity, whereas independent self-construals are linked to a greater interpersonal distance.

SOCIAL DISTANCE

IAT and mimicry: Mimicry as implicit discrimination

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The present research investigated the relation between implicit and explicit attitudes on one hand and non-conscious mimicry on the other hand. There are two possibilities. First, since mimicry occurs automatically and even in the most minimal of circumstances, it is conceivable that mimicry is the default tendency and not moderated by either explicit or implicit liking for the target person. On the other hand does recent research involving the IAT show that the IAT predicts subtle behaviors in interactions (e.g. Asendorf, Banse & Mücke, 2002). The present experiment was designed to settle this issue once and for all. An IAT (Immigrants-Dutch and good-bad) and explicit measures of prejudice were administered to participants. Afterwards, they watched a videotape, consisting of two sessions. In one session a Dutch person performed some clerical task, while he rubbed his face several time a minute. In the other version, a Moroccan person did exactly the same. The order of the sessions was counterbalanced. Participants were secretly videotaped in order to see whether they would mimic the face-rubbing behavior. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their liking for the people on the video. Two judges (blind to condition) scored the participants' amount of mimicry. The difference score between mimicry of the Dutch and the Moroccan person served as the indication of non-conscious discriminatory behavior. The results revealed a double dissociation, meaning that only the implicit attitude predicted the non-conscious mimicry and that only the explicit attitude predicted the self-reported, explicit liking for the confederate.

SOCIAL DISTANCE

**Don't stand so close to me:
The effects of self-construal on interpersonal closeness**

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Three studies investigated the effects of self-construal activation on interpersonal proximity behavior. Study 1 revealed that participants who were primed with the independent (or personal) self sat further away from an anticipated other in a waiting room than control participants. Results of Study 2 indicated that participants primed with the interdependent (or social) self sat closer to an anticipated other than those primed with the independent self. Finally, Study 3 used the chronic self-construal of participants to predict the seating distance in dyadic settings. Results showed that greater independence of participants' self-construals was associated with greater spatial distance during the interaction. Together, the studies provide clear evidence that self-construal activation automatically influences interpersonal behavior as reflected in the actual distance between the self and others. Results are discussed in terms of the functions and motives connected to self-construals.

PERSUASION

The role of self-persuasion in temptation

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This study aims to explore the process of resistance in a temptation paradigm. Pre-adolescents were induced to feel extremely favourable toward an object and to believe simultaneously that they should not have the object. Two factors were manipulated: a motivational factor (high vs. low choice) and ability factor (positive vs. mixed information about the object). Results indicated that participants in the high-choice condition generated more negative traits regarding the object than participants in the low-choice condition. The results suggest that people do engage in self-persuasion to resist the tempting object by changing their cognition regarding the object, in particular when they have the choice to have it. Results are discussed in the light of self-persuasion literature and cognitive dissonance theory.

PERSUASION

Effects of social contextual factors on reactions to, and perceived consequences of messages

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The impact of messages on self and others is best understood with reference to the wider social context (Terry, Hogg & Duck, 1999). The third person effect (TPE) is the tendency for individuals to assume that persuasive messages have a stronger effect on others than on themselves (Davison, 1983). Research has found that the TPE is influenced by the social distance between the self and target other, so that group members accentuate the similarities between self and ingroup members and the differences between ingroup and outgroup members (e.g., Duck, Hogg & Terry, 1995). The present research re-examined this 'social-distance' effect and discovered that depending on message content, it may be reversed. For both naturally occurring and minimal groups, pro-ingroup messages produced a reversal of the social distance effect with self and ingroup members perceived as more influenced than outgroup members and society as a whole. For a pro-outgroup message the traditional social distance effect was found. We then examined the effects of source on reactions to messages about groups. Hornsey, Oppes and Svensson (2002) found that criticism received greater acceptance when it came from an ingroup member than when the same comments came from an outgroup speaker, although the context was ambiguous. Our research addressed this ambiguity and showed that ingroup-criticism was tolerated privately but not when aired in public. Moreover, in public settings, criticism from an ingroup member was no more welcome than criticism from an outgroup member. Overall, the present research demonstrates how social contextual factors and content influence the perceived consequences of messages for self and others.

PERSUASION

Cognitive processes and minority influence: The effects of linguistic abstraction

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The aim of this work is to investigate the cognitive processes activated by a minority source in a persuasive communication. Linguistic abstraction is one of the mediators of the effects of persuasive communication: Abstract language can be used to transmit the expected information in a concise form, conveying in the meanwhile a stable and sound image of the own group, whereas concrete language generally refers to a specific and well defined context.

Our research investigates the way abstract information proposed by a minority source induces in the perceiver not only higher attention, but also higher persuasion, compared with a message formulated in a more concrete form. Synthetically, our results indicate that the amount of time utilized to read the message moderates the impact of linguistic abstraction. This moderating effect is particularly evident in the minority condition. The abstract message has a more persuasive impact than the concrete one. Furthermore, when an abstract message is read in a fast way, the minority source has higher indirect influence than the majority source. These results will be discussed in relation to the most important models on minority influence.

PERSUASION

Spontaneous activation of means as a function of temporal and chronic goals in goal-relevant settings

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It has been well established in social perception and cognition that accessibility of mental constructs – influencing information processing and behavior – depends on both personal (chronic) and situational (temporal) factors. In this contribution we aim to extend this work to the domain of automatic goal pursuit. In three experiments we tested the idea that goal-directed activity (i.e., the selection of means to attain a goal) can be instigated by both chronic and temporal factors, but only in goal-relevant settings in which a discrepancy with a desired state exists. In the first experiment using a probe recognition paradigm (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986), chronic and nonchronic participants as to the goal of “looking well-groomed” were presented with short descriptions of goal-relevant vs. nonrelevant settings (e.g., “the shoes that you put on look dirty” vs. “... have laces”). After each description participants indicated whether the relevant mean (e.g., brushing) appeared in the description, with longer RTs indicating higher accessibility of the mean. In a second experiment using the same paradigm, the goal was either primed or not for chronic and nonchronic participants just before the onset of the descriptions of goal-relevant settings. Finally, in the third experiment we tested behavioral consequences of chronic and temporal goals by placing participants in a real goal-relevant setting. Overall, the results show that applicable means are automatically selected and executed by chronic participants, but only when confronted with a goal-relevant setting, whereas for nonchronic participants these effects only occur when they are primed with the goal at issue.

AUTOMATIC AFFECT: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

**Faking the IAT:
Aided and unaided response control on the implicit association tests**

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One pragmatic goal of implicit tools like the Implicit Association Tests (IAT) is to rule out self-presentation and controlled responding. Two experiments examined whether the IAT meets this goal, using Turkish and German group labels along with positive and negative traits. Experiment 1 was an Internet study. After completing a naïve IAT pretest, participants in three graded conditions received faking instructions, faking instructions plus a hint to the critical trials blocks, or the latter instruction plus the explicit strategy to slow down on compatible trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended the approach in the laboratory, including a fully naïve condition without a pretest. Results demonstrate that most participants succeeded in faking, unless the experience of pretest was missing. Faking was mostly due to slow-down on compatible trials, but a notable speed-up on incompatible trials also occurred. Faking remained unobscured, especially with non-obvious instructions; experts failed to identify faked data sets.

**Volitional control of automatic affect:
The moderating role of action orientation**

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Social cognition research has convincingly demonstrated that affective reactions can be triggered automatically, effortlessly, and unconsciously (Fazio, 2001). Although automatic affect is usually viewed as a adaptive phenomenon, one has to wonder how people manage to maintain stable emotional lives while they are constantly being bombarded with affect-arousing stimuli. In the present research, I argue that action-orientation is a key factor through which people may gain volitional control over automatic affect. To test this hypothesis, I adapted the classic affective priming paradigm (Fazio et al., 1986). In this paradigm, implicit affect regulation skills were indicated by reverse affective priming effects (i.e., quicker responses to positive targets and slower responses to negative targets) in response to negative prime words. Experiments 1 and 2 indeed showed that action-oriented individuals displayed reverse affective priming for negative prime words at priming intervals that are associated with automatic responding (i.e., SOAs of 300 ms). Experiment 3 replicated this finding, and demonstrated that action-oriented individuals are especially likely to engage in this form of implicit affect regulation when a demanding context was primed. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that action-oriented participants display automatic activation of negative affect at very brief SOAs (e.g., 50 ms) and automatic inhibition of automatic negative affect at somewhat longer SOAs (300 ms), suggesting that action-oriented affect regulation is somewhat time-consuming, even though it is highly efficient. Across these four experiments, no parallel effects were observed among participants low in action orientation. Taken together, it appears that automatic affect can be moderated by volitional mechanisms.

AUTOMATIC AFFECT: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Subliminal evaluative conditioning of existing attitudes

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In Evaluative Conditioning (EC) a neutral stimulus (CS = Conditioned Stimulus) is paired with an affective stimulus (US = Unconditioned Stimulus). Repeated pairing changes the valence of the CS (De Houwer, Thomas & Baeyens, 2001). In previous research, EC techniques were used to investigate attitude formation (rather than attitude change) by using novel, neutral stimuli (rather than evaluatively laden stimuli).

Could EC also be effective to change existing attitudes? Take a well-known politician or political party. Could EC lead to attitude change regarding this party? This hypothesis was tested in 3 experiments. In all experiments, pre-experimental attitudes were measured regarding Dutch political parties. After a filler-task, participants were presented with a (subliminal) classical EC-task; the logo of a political party (CS) was presented before subliminally presented negative or positive words (USs). Subsequently, attitudes were measured again. Results were in line with our expectations. Normal EC-effects were obtained among people with relatively neutral initial attitudes. However, people with negative initial attitudes showed a contrast effect of EC on later attitudes. A contrast EC-effect was also among participants with positive initial attitudes, but this was mediated by commitment to the CS (i.e., the political party). The discussion will address the implications of this research.

EMOTION AND GROUP PROCESSES

**The effects of the logical articulation and the emotional expressiveness of emotional narratives in social sharing of traumatic events:
An experimental study**

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Social sharing of emotions is a cognitive and social phenomenon referring to the fact that people who experienced an emotional event tell repeatedly other people about their experiences (Rimé, Finkenauer, Luminet, Zech & Philippot, 1998). The aim of the present study is to investigate the effects of emotional expressiveness (Bucci, 2000; Lang, 1980) and logical articulation (Lavelle, 1997) of emotional narratives on social sharing of emotions. Three variables were manipulated, that is narrative emotionality (high vs. neutral), logical articulation (high vs. low), and emotional expressiveness (high vs. low). Thus the experimental design is between subjects 2*2*2. Undergraduate students read short emotional narratives about traumatic experiences varying in their expressiveness and logical articulation. Immediately after, social sharing with a confederate was recorded. Two weeks later, measures of social sharing and mental rumination of the read narratives were also taken. Social sharing is expected to differ both quantitatively and qualitatively with respect to the level of expressiveness and articulation of the emotional narratives. Results showed that social sharing is higher for less articulated emotional narratives. No significant effect of the emotional expressiveness were found.

EMOTION AND GROUP PROCESSES

**The influence of negative emotion and self-threat
on stereotype use and prejudice**

Collange, J.

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How can we account for increased prejudice and stereotyping that accompany threat to one's positive self-image? On the one hand, the literature suggests that the motivation to restore a positive self-image leads to increased stereotype use (Fein & Spencer, 1997). On the other, emotion can also explain the phenomenon. Indeed, the procedure used to produce a threat to the self is often very similar to the procedure to induce (negative) emotions. In the case of negative emotion, congruence effect may explain increased stereotype use as the studies have mostly focused on negative stereotypes. Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel & Moreno (2001) suggest that self-threat could activate the motivation related to mood repair that could also lead to stereotype use.

My work explores the link between self-threat (decreased self-esteem) and emotion related to stereotype use. The self-referent nature of emotion-eliciting procedure should play a critical role in stereotyping. Using the procedure used by Ikegami (2002), we tried to induce two types of negative emotions, one that involved the self and the other that did not. Preliminary results showed that both types of emotion induction (self vs. non-self related) led to a significantly decreased self-esteem, though to different degrees. The decrease of self-esteem is more important when the negative emotion is a self referent one. The question is then, is it possible to have a negative emotion without a decrease in self-esteem. A study is currently in progress looking at the different types of emotion induction (related to self-involvement) and their consequences on stereotyping and prejudice.

EMOTION AND GROUP PROCESSES

**Social categorization and fear reactions to the September 11th
terrorist attacks**

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Two experiments were run in The Netherlands and Belgium one week after the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Our aim was to investigate whether social categorization affected emotional reactions, behavioral tendencies, and, actual behaviors. Results showed that focusing participants' attention on an identity that included American victims into a common ingroup led them to report more fear and stronger fear-related behavioral tendencies and to engage more often in fear-related behaviors than when victims were categorized as outgroup members. Results are discussed with respect to appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; C.A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and E. Smith's model of group-based emotions (1993, 1999).

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

**Narrative mode of person impression blocks use of a stereotype
at the unconscious level**

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The assumption was that the narrative mode of person impression blocks the use of stereotypes at the conscious and unconscious level. When a person is understood within the narrative framework - as a character in a story - the role of stereotype in the person impression is diminished (Trzebiński, Antczak, 2003). In the present study we have obtain data indicating that the narrative framework blocks activation of stereotypes even at the unconscious, automatic level of person impression formation. In this study 100 secondary school students (17 –18 years old) were presented with a target person description. The target person was presented as a *policeman*. Person description consisted of personality traits (neutral to the stereotype) and two kinds of background aimed to activate narrative or neutral mode of information precessing. Narrative background depicted motives and emotions of the target person. Neutral background consisted information about appearance, hobbies and socioeconomic status of the target person. Subsequently, on the computer screen, the subjects viewed a series of random names of personality traits that were close to stereotype of a *policeman*, or were neutral to it. Participants were asked to decide as fast as possible if a given trait may be attributed to the target person or not. The expected effect of narrative mode was indicated by a shorter time (in milliseconds) of decisions by subjects in the neutral in comparison to narrative condition in case of traits related to the stereotype of *policeman*. There was no such difference in case of traits neutral to this stereotype.

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

Familiarity increases stereotyping

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Different theoretical and empirical approaches in social and cognitive psychology suggest that we process familiar and non-familiar information in quite different ways. Following this suggestion Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2001) have shown that familiarity with persuasive messages reduces analytic or systematic processing. The present studies examine the somewhat counterintuitive hypothesis that, due to reliance on top-down processing, familiar stimuli are more likely to induce stereotyped judgments than unfamiliar stimuli. In three studies we found a consistent tendency for previous exposure to relevant stimuli to reduce individuation and increase stereotyping. In our first study participants made judgments more consistent with targets occupational stereotypes after being briefly exposed to their photographs. In our second and third studies participants made criminal judgments more consistent with an aggressive stereotype when they were previous exposed to target's category and when they were previous exposed to items of individuated information. Some of our evidence suggests that this effect is due neither to familiarity-induced liking (mere exposure effect), nor is it mediated by increased accessibility of the target's social category or by increased perceived social judgeability. Our interpretation of data is that this effect is due to the functional role of the feeling of familiarity as a regulator of processing modes. In everyday life, frequent exposure to another person ordinarily produces not only familiarity but also liking, individuated knowledge, and friendship, factors that may effectively limit stereotyping. But when previous exposure is unconfounded with these other factors, it can be to lead increased stereotyping.

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

**The linguistic expectancy bias as result of biased encoding
and communication goals**

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The Linguistic Expectancy Bias (LEB) is the tendency to describe expectancy-consistent information more abstractly than expectancy-inconsistent information. In three studies we investigated the impact of encoding and retrieval processes on the LEB. Participants had to relate a story in which the actor engaged in different behaviors in their own words. Study 1 established that only when participants received a stereotype-related category label before the behavioral information, stereotype-consistent behaviors were described more abstractly than stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. When participants received this category label afterwards, no LEB-effect emerged. In other words, biased encoding of behavioral information can be sufficient cause for a LEB-effect. In Studies 2 & 3 we investigated the impact of a communication goal at retrieval, in addition to effects of manipulations at encoding. Results indicated that participants described negative information relatively more abstractly than positive information with a negative communication goal than with a positive communication goal. This effect emerged independent of how the behavioral information was encoded. In addition, processes at encoding influenced biased language use, but only under conditions of decreased motivation (Study 2) or under time pressure (Study 3). Thus, processes of retrieval and communication can have an independent influence on the LEB. In short, the results of these studies show how the LEB can result independently from both biased encoding and communication goals.

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

Dynamic representations of stereotypes

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One of the most characteristic features of social stereotypes is its stability and resistance to change even in the face of contrary evidence (e.g., Brigham, 1971; Ehrlich, 1973; Hamilton, 1979). And there are very good reasons for this assertion. Stereotypes play an important role in cognitive economy. The fulfilment of such a role plausibly demands persistent and constant cognitive structures. However, the cognitive literature in categorization has questioned the stability of concepts (e.g., Barsalou & Medin, 1986; Barsalou, 1987) and provided data that speak directly to this issue in ways that many may find surprising. The critical question of the research to be presented is whether stereotypes behave in context-dependent and flexible ways like many object concepts do. In two experiments we provided evidence for the context sensitiveness of stereotypes. In Experiment 1, we found that manipulation of the accessibility of the same or of different specific exemplars across sessions affects the extent to which individuals select the same attributes to characterize a social group across two sessions one month apart. Participants displayed greater group description stability when the same, rather than different, category exemplars are activated. In Experiment 2, we primed a non-stereotyped trait by means of an unrelated linguistic task immediately before stereotype assembling. Results suggest that stereotypes are, in part, at least, constituted by contextually salient attributes. Together, these findings suggest that stereotypes are malleable and fuzzy knowledge structures.

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

**Help me make an impression:
Impression management through third parties**

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In three experiments, light is being shed on the effect of statements made by others about a target on impression formation. It is hypothesized that both positive and negative information have more impact on judgments of a target when communicated by a third party than when communicated by the target itself. A target referring to a third party may lead to impressions either less or more in accordance with the claims compared to a control condition.

In the first two experiments, the hypotheses are tested on the social and competence dimension of person perception, while the claims being made are positive. Results of both experiments show that claims made by a third party lead to more favorable impressions of the target. Impressions formed of the target referring to others are slightly more positive compared to the control condition. The third experiment investigates the effects of negative social information. Results of all three experiments are being discussed in terms impression management and tendencies to ascribe credibility to information about the self or about others.

STEREOTYPES AND IMPRESSION FORMATION

**The biological component of psychological essentialism:
Essentialist beliefs and how they relate to stereotyping and prejudice**

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Recent research and theorizing on stereotyping and prejudice has focused on the role of essentialist beliefs – lay people’s beliefs that social categories are natural and entitative in nature (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Thus, psychological essentialism has re-emerged as a prominent concept in social-psychological theorizing. Research in the field has shown that some social groups are seen as more biological and entitative in nature than others (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000) and that this perception of groups has important implications for cognitive processes (e.g., stereotyping, type of information processing; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The perception of groups as biological/natural and homogeneous entities can be the result of (a) characteristics of the particular groups (e.g., within-group variability, group stability), (b) context factors (e.g., salience of biological bases of social groups), and (c) characteristics of the perceiver (e.g., inter-individual differences in the belief in essentialist lay theories). The goal of this contribution is to analyze the role of the latter two factors as they pertain to stereotyping and prejudice. With regard to inter-individual differences as a determinant of group perception a new scale is introduced, one that assesses the belief in genetic determinism as a measure of the biological component of essentialist beliefs. A series of studies was conducted and the results show that essentialist beliefs are associated with stereotyping and prejudice, socio-political attitudes, and lay theories concerning the stability of traits. In addition, it was found that high status group members are more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs and stereotypes than low status group members. An experimental study found that such status differences in stereotyping increase when genetic determinism is salient in the situation. Moreover, adapting the classic correspondence bias paradigm (Jones & Harris, 1967) it was found that essentialist thinkers tend to dispositional attributions and show a particularly strong correspondence bias.

MENTAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

**Carrying on or giving in:
The role of (implicit) cognition in the maintenance or loss of self-control**

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Previous studies have shown that people often fail to control themselves when they repeatedly exert self-control within a relatively short period of time. Baumeister explains failure of self-control in terms of loss of energy. After an act of self-control, a subsequent act is bound to fail due to energy loss or *ego-depletion*.

Although the finding that successive acts of self-control lead to poorer performance is well replicated, we doubt whether the energy model of ego-depletion provides an adequate description of the underlying process. Prominent theories and studies on suppression and emotion control imply that loss of strength is less inevitable and automatic than the limited strength model suggests. Self-control is not a matter of strength (alone), but is strongly influenced by perceptual, cognitive and motivational factors.

In this presentation, the results are discussed of a series of recent studies that show that success and failure of self-control can be manipulated by changing people's (implicit) cognitions about control. Taken together, results of our studies imply that self-control does not depend on energy (alone) but also on an adequate "state of mind". By default, people assume and act upon the naïve theory that successive acts of self-control wears you out. If this theory is challenged, or if an alternative theory is triggered by, for example, a priming procedure, people are able to keep their performances on the same level, or to even increase them.

POWER

Are advantaged groups more variable than disadvantaged groups?

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Our goal was to test the hypothesis that members of advantaged social groups are objectively more variable than members of disadvantaged social groups (Brauer, 2001; Guinote, Judd & Brauer, 2002). We conducted three studies in which we examined differences in actual heterogeneity of experimental groups. In a first study, we examined the difference in variability between officers and soldiers. We asked all participants to fill out a questionnaire in which we measured a large number of preferences and habits. Officers were objectively more variable than soldiers. In a second study, we manipulated relative power status experimentally and measured variability in a less reactive manner. In fact, participants were randomly assigned to either a powerful role (the investigating officer) or a powerless role (the eye witness) and were asked at the end of the experiment to read out loud an informed consent form and to sign it. The results showed that there was more variability in reading time and in the size of the signatures among powerful than among powerless individuals. In a final study, we contacted soccer players and asked them to fill out a questionnaire after they had just either won or lost a soccer match. We measured participants' attitudes towards a variety of issues related to soccer. The winners generally defended more extreme and more variable attitudes than the losers. The results of the three studies are consistent with the idea that powerful individuals display more behavior disinhibition and are objectively more variable than powerless individuals.

POWER

**Prescriptive aspect of stereotypes in inter-group relations:
How can structural relations between groups influence what they should be?**

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University of Liège, Belgium

The descriptive component of stereotypes consists of beliefs about the characteristics that describe group members, it says *how people are*, whereas the prescriptive component of stereotypes consists of beliefs about the characteristics to which group members are expected to conform, it says *how people should be* (Burgess & Borgida, 1999).

According to Glick and Fiske (2001), prescriptive stereotypes appear because of a dependency by dominant group members on a lower status group. Such dependencies would create a motivation to maintain the status quo and foster the need for dominant group members to keep dominated group members "in their place". Furthermore, the prescriptive component may serve to justify the existing power structure.

Using a role-playing methodology, we have investigated the impact of structural relations between groups (relative status and type of interdependence) on the prescriptive component of stereotypes describing those groups, both on the competence and on the warmth dimensions. We will show that high-status group members seem to hold a substantial level of prescription about their own competence. Concerning low-status group stereotype, we will point out that the dimension (competence or warmth) where prescription appears is dependent upon the type of situation (professional versus interpersonal) wherein the groups are in contact.

Finally, we will stress the importance of differentiating between self-profitable and other-profitable traits in order to have a good understanding of the prescription pattern found on the competence and warmth dimensions.

POWER

**The power in your hand:
Gender differences in bodily feedback effects of power-related gestures**

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Power is often expressed and applied through specific gestures or movements such as pushing (application of bodily force), hitting (bodily punishment), or the demonstration of superior bodily strength by contracting muscles or showing a fist (bodily threat). Through frequent performance of these behaviors in power-related situations, associations between them and mental representations of power will form. We argue that due to these associations, power-related representations can become activated by bodily feedback processes. Given that men and women are socialized differently with regard to the acceptance of such bodily power demonstrations, these bodily feedback processes can be expected to vary with gender. Cultural norms are more permissive towards men's than women's use of bodily force as an active means of social influence. For women, the use of bodily force is rather restricted to situations of threat of domination by others. Consequently, men will have an association between gaining power and bodily force, while women will have an association between power threat and bodily force, resulting in differential bodily feedback effects. This hypothesis was tested in four studies. In order to manipulate power related bodily feedback, participants were asked to make a fist vs. an o.k. sign with their dominant hand. All four studies showed a significant interaction of bodily feedback manipulation and gender.

Study 1 investigated perceptions of the self as being in control or dominated by others, showing that making a fist led men to attribute more social attributes indicative of power and control to themselves, while women showed the opposite effect. Based on this basic finding, it was predicted that the bodily feedback should also affect judgments of self-efficacy, perceptions of situations, and perception of others. Study 2 investigated perceptions of self-efficacy as a power- and control-related variable. It showed that making a fist reduced women's and elevated men's perceived self-efficacy. Study 3 investigated perceptions of situations as affording gaining power; women, but not men, showed less hope for power when they made a fist. Study 4 tested effects on perceptions of others, showing that women perceived an ambiguously acting male target as more hostile when they made a fist, while men perceived him as less hostile when they made a fist, indicating that men perceived more control over others when they made a fist while women had a tendency to perceive more danger when making a fist.

There were no interaction effects of the bodily manipulation and gender on mood or arousal in any of the studies, ruling out mediation by mood. Study 4 assessed also effects on self-reported emotions, without evidence for significant interaction effects or mediation. Furthermore, careful debriefing and cover stories disguising the manipulation as part of the children's game "paper-scissors-stone" assured that the effects were not mediated by self-perception. These results show that bodily feedback from a power-related gesture can activate representations of power or powerlessness, and influence perception of self, others, and situations. These findings extend previously reported bodily feedback effects on feelings to the domain of power and to new dependent variables. Furthermore, the consistent gender difference suggests that different learning histories lead to the acquisition of different body-power associations.

POWER

Emotion and power: A cross-cultural study

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This research examined people's beliefs about what it means to possess social power in four countries (USA, Germany, France and Japan), and beliefs about the emotions persons in power tend to elicit in others, and the emotions that they themselves conceal. Definitions of power were assessed in terms of two components including control (over self or other) and role of upholding vs. transgressing social norms. Beliefs about positive (pride, admiration) and negative (jealousy, contempt) emotions were examined.

Indeed, with regard to the definition of power, analyses revealed that Americans and Japanese tended to define power in terms of self-control than control over others, while French and Germans regarded power in terms of control over others more than the self. The latter also defined power in terms of the liberty to transgress social norms.

Factor analyses of the ratings of the emotions elicited in others revealed two dimensions, those of negative and positive emotions. Factor analyses of the rating of emotions concealed in the self revealed two different dimensions, those of dominant and submissive emotions. Further analyses revealed that power defined as control over others (vs. the self) was related to the elicitation of largely negative emotions in others and the tendency to conceal submissive emotions in oneself. Power defined as the liberty to violate social norms was related with the elicitation of positive emotions in others and the tendency to conceal emotions of dominance in oneself.

MEMORY MODELS

**The vicissitudes of the social DREAM: Applying the
Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm to social cognition**

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The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm is currently a privileged tool in the research of associative processes memory (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this paradigm, participants are presented with a study list constituted by the 12 strongest word associates of a critical (non-presented) concept. This critical concept is, at test, falsely recalled, falsely but confidently recognized, *remembered* and not only *known* (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and even falsely attributed to a plausible but false source (Payne, Elie, Blackwell & Neuschatz, 1996). Although this memory illusion is currently the focus of great interest in cognitive psychology, associative memory based illusions have often been documented in the social psychology and social cognition literature (e.g., expectancy-based illusory correlations, stereotypic encoding or retrieval biases, etc.). In the present work, we adapted the DRM paradigm to social cognition by using the strongest trait associates of a critical (non-presented) trait concept under impression formation versus memory processing goal conditions. In subsequent experiments, we showed that incongruency resolution leads to higher rates of false memories. The methodological limits of our approach are also discussed. It is our contention that the DRM paradigm is useful to the research of associative memory processes in social cognition and that, conversely, the cognitive literature would benefit from a broader conception of memory illusions informed by the findings of social cognition research.

MEMORY MODELS

**Remembering can cause inhibition:
Retrieval-induced inhibition as category independent process**

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Remembering is a pervasive aspect of everyday life. Paradoxically, however, recent research has shown that the act of remembering may cause forgetting (e.g. Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Extending this line of research two experiments were designed to demonstrate that remembering may cause inhibition. This retrieval-induced inhibition was studied adapting a paradigm usually used for studying retrieval-induced forgetting. In experiment 1 it was shown that repeated retrieval of exemplars from a category resulted in longer recognition latencies of non-retrieved exemplars from that same category, compared to recognition latencies of control exemplars. In experiment 2 we obtained the same pattern of results on a lexical decision task. In both the recognition task and the lexical decision task exemplars were presented without their categories as cues. These results suggest that retrieval of information from long-term memory can cause inhibition of related information. Implications for executive function and action control are discussed.

MEMORY MODELS

Conjoint recognition and the typicality effect: A perceptual encoding advantage for schema-inconsistent information?

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Recognition memory favours schema-inconsistent over consistent information (Sherman & Frost, 2000; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). The encoding flexibility hypothesis provides an explanation (Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff & Frost, 1998): consistent information is conceptually fluent, thus requires less elaboration, allowing for a reallocation of attentional resources towards the processing of inconsistent information. Sherman and colleagues (1998) have shown that under conditions of cognitive load, attention is directed more toward inconsistent information (see also Johnston & Hawley, 1994), and that this leads to stronger perceptual encoding of this type of information. At the same time, consistent information receives predominantly conceptual processing (Sherman et al., 1998).

Brainerd, Reyna, and colleagues (Brainerd, Reyna & Mojardin, 1999; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna & Mojardin, 2001) have put forward a theory of memory that assumes two types of memory traces, namely verbatim traces containing perceptual or surface details of items, and gist traces containing conceptual information and meaning. Verbatim and gist traces contribute differently to recognition memory performance. The authors have proposed a method and a multinomial model, called *conjoint recognition*, to disentangle those contributions.

Could it be that typicality of information has an effect on the strength of the different types of memory traces? Does the typicality effect result from stronger verbatim traces for schema-inconsistent information? This research plans to employ a modified conjoint recognition paradigm to investigate the memory basis for the typicality effect. In a pilot study, a person (*priest* or *skinhead*) is described using schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent behaviours. In the test phase, targets and different types of distractors are to be judged as *old* or *new*. When distractors share meaning with presented items, inconsistent items tend to be discriminated better than consistent items. The parameter estimates of a modified conjoint recognition model suggest that this is due to stronger verbatim traces for inconsistent items, and to stronger gist traces for consistent items. Further research is under way to examine the underlying causes of the typicality effect.

MEMORY MODELS

Systematic distortion in trait judgements: A representational overlap theory

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The pattern of correlations between trait judgements is very similar to the pattern of semantic similarities between those traits. To explain this finding, we propose a distributed person memory model, which assumes that the mental representation of semantically similar traits is also very similar. An implication of this model is that judgements of how often a trait has been displayed are affected by the number of times similar traits have been displayed. To test this implication, we presented participants with a list of 20 trait terms, drawn from four distinct clusters of traits. From each cluster, five traits appeared on the list. Within each cluster, the trait terms differed in how often they were presented. In addition, across the four clusters, the average presentation frequency of the traits also varied. Participants had to memorise the trait terms or to form an impression of a target that was described by the trait terms. Afterwards, participants had to estimate how often each trait had appeared on the list. The estimated frequency for any given trait was determined not only by how often it was presented, but also by how often other traits from the same cluster had been presented, irrespective of the goal with which participants had processed the list. This supports the proposed person memory model.

MENTAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

Stereotype suppression: Stereotypes on OR NOT on the rebound?

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A stereotype is stored in memory as a set of associations a social category share with stereotypic traits. Activating a category, through context cues, results in the accessibility of stereotype-related traits. Paradoxically, research in the last decade has shown that trying to control stereotypes by a suppression strategy increases stereotype-related traits accessibility: the rebound effect. The authors propose a four step model of stereotype activation measurement, from a first minimal way (assessing only accessibility of stereotypic traits) to a fourth ideal way of measurement (including the assessment of the associative nature of stereotypes). Two studies were addressed to investigate the subsequent activation of a to be suppressed stereotype, using an associative paradigm. In study 1, Ps, after being engaged in an elderly suppression versus activation task, performed an unrelated lexical decision task (LDT) including elderly stereotypic and counterstereotypic traits: each trait was presented twice, preceded or not by the subliminal prime 'old'. A rebound of elderly stereotype on automatic behaviour emerged from RTs analysis: Ps, in the suppression condition, were slower to respond to any item when preceded by the 'old' prime. In study 2, the first stereotype suppression task was reinforced using an identification versus suppression task: results indicate that, after suppressing the elderly stereotype, stereotypic traits were hyper accessible, a rebound effect, but 'paradoxically' counterstereotypic traits were more accessible than stereotypic when associated to the category prime. This intriguing results will be discussed on the basis of mental control processes and previous findings on stereotype suppression.

MENTAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

**Maladaptive consequences of adaptive behavior:
The affective rebound effect**

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Past research on mental control has shown that attempts to suppress unwanted thoughts may produce paradoxical rebound effects. However, most previous studies did not distinguish between cognitive and affective components involved in the rebound. The present account investigates the suppression of affective reactions (e.g., likes and dislikes) and its social consequences. In an experimental study participants were asked to suppress or express their spontaneous affective reaction towards a series of (un-)favorable human faces. Results indicated that affective control follows many of the same ironic pathways traced by mental control.

MENTAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

**From implicit attitudes to behavior:
What's self-regulation got to do with it?**

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The existence of two distinct information processing systems has been postulated by several self-regulation theories (Kuhl, 2000; Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2002). Van Knippenberg, Holland and van Baaren (2003) proposed an integrated version of such a dual system model. From the latter model, the hypothesis may be derived that in a positive mood, attitudes are activated more automatically and will tend to guide behavior to a greater extent than in a negative mood. This general hypothesis was tested in three studies.

The first, preliminary study revealed that, as predicted, people in a positive mood showed stronger implicit associations between an object and its evaluation than people in a less positive mood. In the second study, mood was manipulated instead of only measured. The results showed that a positive and neutral mood elicit stronger automatic evaluations than a negative mood. It can be concluded from both studies that a positive mood facilitates the activation of automatic evaluations.

In a third study, we measured implicit attitudes towards two political parties in a preliminary session. Two weeks later, mood was manipulated and behavior was measured in a waiting room in terms of the participants' seating distance from posters of the two political parties displayed on opposite walls in the waiting room. It appeared that participants in the positive mood condition sat closer to the poster of their preferred party, while no such effect was observed in the negative mood condition. These results are discussed with regard to their implications for self-regulation theory.

MENTAL CONTROL AND SELF-REGULATION

**When the going gets tough, the tough get going:
Action orientation and cognitive control**

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To maintain behavioral flexibility in complex and demanding situations, people need to be able to override prepotent but inappropriate responses, a capacity here referred to as *cognitive control*. Based on Personality Systems Interactions theory (Kuhl, 2000), we propose that individuals who are competent in planning and initiating behavior (i.e., action-oriented individuals) show superior cognitive control compared to individuals who are less competent (i.e., state-oriented individuals). In addition, since the need for supervisory response control should be heightened when a conflict is detected, we expect the difference between action- and state-oriented individuals to be especially apparent under demanding circumstances. In line with this proposition, action-oriented individuals were less susceptible than state-oriented individuals to process irrelevant peripheral information in a visual attention task when primed with a demanding context (Study 1). Furthermore, priming a demanding relationship caused action oriented individuals to respond faster to inconsistent target words in a gender decision task (Blair & Banaji, 1996), whereas response times for gender inconsistent word pairs were greater for state-oriented individuals under the same condition (Study 2). Finally, after the induction of performance pressure, action-oriented participants, as compared to state-oriented participants, showed a superior memory for activities they were instructed to execute later on (Study 3). In all three studies, no parallel effects were found under no-demanding conditions. We conclude a) that individual differences in behavioral flexibility can be linked to the quality of different workings of cognitive control, and b) that this link is manifested especially under demanding circumstances.

SOCIAL INFERENCE

Spontaneous and intentional components of the process of social inference

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Within the research area of trait attribution, recent three-stage models of the process of social inference remain unclear about the specific nature of the inferences drawn in each stage. For example, the inferences that occur in the second stage are assumed to be spontaneous inferences. However, findings from another research area - that of spontaneous inferences - seem to contradict this assumption. By bridging the differences between these two research areas, the current two studies allow for a specification of the nature of the inferences drawn in each stage. In the first study, social inferences were measured as in the research area of spontaneous inferences, and, in the second study, as in the research area of trait attribution. Furthermore these two studies were identical. To be able to examine all three stages of the models of social inference, processing goals as well as cognitive load were manipulated in both studies. The results fitted our expectations: Spontaneous inferences showed to occur independent of processing goals and cognitive load, whereas social inferences as measured in research of trait attribution showed to be dependent on both. Based on these results, we propose that in the first stage of models of social inference, spontaneous inferences take place, independent of processing goals. In the second stage, another type of social inference – intentional inferences - is drawn, dependent on goals. In the third stage, correction of the inferences drawn in the second stage takes place, dependent on cognitive capacity. Further implications are discussed.

SOCIAL INFERENCE

**Automatic goal inferences and contagion:
Being keen on goals implied by another person's actions**

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Most theories of motivated action emphasize the role of conscious choice in the adoption of goals and in guiding goal-directed behaviors. It is assumed that the mere activation of goals does not directly put the body into motion. Activated goals need to be accompanied by a conscious decision, and goal pursuit needs some form of “expressed mandate” to be initiated. According to this view, then, it is conscious awareness that allows people to get goals and start acting on them. Recently, this widespread view has been challenged. Goals, it is argued, can be automatically put in place by situational cues, and goals can guide behavior without a person's awareness of them. Indeed, in several lines of experimentation it has been shown now that priming of words that are synonyms of, or strongly associated with goal concepts are capable of exerting an unconscious influence on subsequent goal-directed action. The present contribution aims to further explore this conception by examining how goals spread – without intention or awareness -- between people, that is: how goals can be automatically contagious.

SOCIAL INFERENCE

Person memory and spontaneous trait encoding

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The present work explores the cognitive mechanisms underlying the incongruity effect. We propose that the high conceptual fluency expectancy-congruent behavioural information leads to abstract (trait-based) encoding, whereas the low conceptual fluency expectancy-incongruent behavioural information leads to less abstract encoding involving the development of a more contextually based situation model. The development of this situation model often leads to the comparison of an incongruent behaviour with other relevant behavioural information. In one experiment participants were asked to generate personality traits, in an impression formation context, from behavioural descriptions about a social target. We found that more correspondent trait inferences were more often made for congruent than for incongruent behaviours. In a second experiment we manipulated the behaviours conceptual fluency by the inclusion of the correspondent personality trait in the behaviour description. With this procedure we intended to improve the conceptual fluency of either expectancy-congruent or incongruent behavioural information and observe its impact in recall. The results showed that expectancy-incongruent behaviours were better recalled than the congruent ones (i.e., the incongruity effect), both in the standard control condition and when the correspondent traits were included in the sentences describing congruent behaviours. However, this difference disappears when personality traits were included in the sentences describing incongruent behaviours. The two studies seem to support the idea that expectancy-congruent behaviours are encoded in terms of abstract traits, whereas incongruent behaviours are more contextually encoded, and that it is this difference that leads to the better recall of expectancy-incongruent behaviours.

SOCIAL INFERENCE

Morals, motives, and more on traits: A commentary on Reeder et al. (2002)

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I argue that Reeder et al. (2002) were premature in dismissing general theories of dispositional inference on the basis of their finding that morality judgments were not influenced by facilitating situational forces, but only by the perceived motives of the actor. Reeder et al. (2002) did not measure correspondent trait inferences, for which discounting is generally predicted by theories of dispositional inference. In a replication and extension of their study, strong evidence was found for discounting of trait inferences when facilitating situational forces were present, consistent with theories of dispositional inference. In addition, I could not replicate their finding that morality is determined by the perceived motives of the actor, but found that a closely related judgment, selfishness – which may reflect the actor's moral character -- is determined by motives as predicted by Reeder et al. (2002). It is suggested that morality is a more abstract and complex judgment than trait inference, depending on many situational and cultural norms and values which may render it less amenable to discounting and perhaps also render its measurement less reliable.

PRIMING

Think different!
The impact of priming creativity on subsequent cognition and behavior

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The generation of new ideas is a necessary precondition for individual, organizational and societal problem solving and change. Research on idea generation has shown that the generated ideas are closely related to activated knowledge and, thus, restricted to a certain domain of content. This so-called *inadvertent plagiarism* cannot be overcome intentionally. The current research tested the prediction that activating the concept “creativity” lessens inadvertent plagiarism. In Study 1 reminding participants of their former creative behavior led to less inadvertent plagiarism (compared to a no prime and a control prime condition). Study 2 replicated this finding using conceptual priming based on word-fragment completions. These results show that priming can initiate behavior that cannot be shown intentionally. Two additional studies explored the process underlying this finding. Results indicate that “think different” is associated with creativity (Study 3). This association might work as a mindset that guides cognition and behavior after priming “creativity”. This mindset can inhibit activated knowledge and undermine spreading activation. Study 4 provided evidence for this notion: the automatic activation of associations in a lexical decision task with sequential priming did not occur after priming “creativity”. Additional research testing the impact of the “think different” mindset on stereotype activation and stereotype rebound is on its way.

PRIMING

How negative mood may facilitate approach behavior

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Elaborating on the mood as information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) recent findings on the cognitive consequences of mood states suggest that differential information processing strategies are predominant in different mood states. Precisely, positive mood was shown to trigger conceptual, top-down processing (e.g. Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996) whereas negative mood states seem to set off perceptual, piecemeal processing strategies (e.g. Gasper & Clore, 2002). Usually these effects are demonstrated for reflective behaviors like decisions, evaluations or memory biases.

However, affective states may have also a more direct effect on behavior. At greater detail, given that negative mood leads to a thorough processing of information at a perceptual level, the subsequent perceptual fluency should be greater for these stimuli than for stimuli that were encoded in positive mood (i.e. at a more conceptual level). From this it follows that stimuli that were encoded at negative mood (that can thus be processed more fluently) should become more positive in immediate valence and thus facilitate approach behavior.

This hypothesis was tested in two experiments. Participants saw either a positive or a negative movie-scene and were then presented with neutral stimuli. Subsequently, participants were instructed to react to the presented stimuli with either approach or avoidance behavior in an adapted Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST, DeHouwer, in press). In a second experiment, participants were asked to chose spontaneously (under time pressure) between a stimulus previously shown (target) and a related item which was not shown before (distractor). Moreover, participants in this experiment were afterwards asked to evaluate all stimuli at no time pressure. Confirming our hypotheses, approach behavior was facilitated for participants who encoded the stimuli in negative mood as compared to those who encoded in a positive mood (Experiment I). Moreover, the immediate positive valence of the stimuli encoded in negative mood lead participants to chose targets more often than distractors (Experiment II). As predicted, there was no such effect for participants who encoded in positive mood and there were no differences between both groups for the conscious evaluation of the stimuli.

PRIMING

**Human or not human:
Perverse effects of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations**

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Recent work by Leyens and colleagues (2000) documented a new form of intergroup bias in the context of emotions. In their experiments, people showed the tendency to attribute typical and exclusive human emotions (i.e. secondary emotions) to the ingroup and to a lesser extent to the outgroup. The possible behavioral consequences of this phenomenon are presented. Using an approach-avoidance procedure, it was hypothesized and found that when expressing secondary emotions an ingroup member was more easily approached, while an outgroup member was avoided more readily.

In an attempt to explain this result, two studies, using a conceptual priming procedure, endorsed the view that people who are primed with ingroup and outgroup members that are associated with secondary emotions activate the human concept to a different extent. As predicted, it was found that in the case of secondary emotions, the human concept was more activated in an ingroup compared to an outgroup context.

PRIMING

Same priming, different effects: The influence of competence primes and social value orientation on cooperation in social dilemmas

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In four studies it was examined whether the subtle activation of competence by priming influences cooperation in a social dilemma and whether the priming effect is moderated by social value orientation. Social value orientations are relatively stable preferences for certain distributions of outcomes. Usually, three types of social value orientations are distinguished (according to their goal): prosocials (maximizing joint gain/equality), individualists (maximizing own gain), and competitors (maximizing the difference between own and other's outcome). The latter are often combined as proselfs. Research has shown that prosocials and proselfs approach social dilemmas with different types of rationality. Proselfs use individual rationality. For them, competition (maximizing own gain) is the most intelligent behavior in a social dilemma. Prosocials use collective rationality and associate competence with cooperation (maximizing joint gain).

Thus, it was expected that competence primes would activate individualistic rationality in proselfs, but collectivistic rationality in prosocials. Four studies tested this hypothesis, using different priming methods and social dilemmas. Participants always played several rounds of a social dilemma with an alleged interaction partner. Behavior of the preprogrammed interaction partner was varied across studies. In all experiments, competitive participants exhibited lower levels of cooperation when primed with competence compared to a neutral condition, regardless of actual cooperation of the interaction partner. Prosocial participants exhibited higher levels of cooperation, but only when the interaction partner was highly cooperative. Individualists showed inconsistent results in the first two studies. Follow up experiments showed that individualists, although they use "per default" individualistic rationality, know that it is intelligent to cooperate with an interaction partner who punishes non-cooperation (tit-for-tat). That is, in contrast to competitors, individualists exhibited higher levels of cooperation towards a partner playing tit-for-tat when primed with competence.

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