This Research Networking Programme will be organised in four teams. For a list of themes and team members, please see below.
More information is available on the RECODE website: http://www.recode.fi/
The purpose of this section is to assess to what extent a common public sphere has to be based upon one common language. The claim is often made that European multilingualism works against the emergence of a communicative space sustained by interlocking media. Language played indeed a central role in the formation of European nation-states: all over Europe, we find a strong link between political integration and the idea of the national language. Thus, generally speaking, the consolidation of nation-states was reached at the expenses of linguistic minority groups. In Canada, we get a somewhat different picture, as the Canadian state was built from the beginning on the basis of an agreement between two distinct linguistic communities. In this respect, to what extent does Canada’s basically bi-polar linguistic structure make for a more integrated setting for political communication?
In Europe, recent developments seem to have entailed significant changes regarding the relationship between political and linguistic identities which may be considered as typical of the age of nationalism. The dynamics of Europeanization, observable at different levels and in different institutional contexts have led to defining an approach that advocates unity in diversity, being thereby more open to multilingualism. Ultimately, one could argue that the process of building European institutions and the reciprocal recognition of the equality of state languages in the context of the EU have had some spill over effects for the languages of minorities too. In this respect, Europe may ultimately have moved in a Canadian direction and become more multicultural. But to what extent is the use of English as a lingua franca, which rests upon very different socio-linguistic conditions in Canada and Europe, compatible with a strong institutional commitment to promoting cultural diversity?
At the same time, there are also symptoms that language issues are regaining some of their former political salience. The steady influx of immigrants and the increasing importance of new minorities have an obvious linguistic dimension. We can observe a growing emphasis on linking the acquisition of citizenship rights to language proficiency (in the ‘national’ language) in many European states. Apparently, there is great reluctance to grant the languages of numerically significant immigrant groups, such as Turkish or Arabic, any kind of institutional recognition minority status. In this regard, contrasting Europe and Canada, with its more open attitude towards the linguistic claims of immigrant communities, would offer valuable insights for assessing the connection between language, citizenship and integration.
Finally, the process of European integration begs the question of the linguistic foundations of transnational politics. How are the objectives of protecting diversity, i.e. keeping up multilingualism, and of achieving political unity, i.e. creating an integrated communicative space, to be balanced against each other? In this regard, the comparison between Europe and Canada may show that achieving such a balance is not primarily a question of the number of languages involved, but rather contingent upon socio-political factors.
In 1992, at the signature of the Maastricht treaty, when the European Union counted twelve member states, some leaders of immigrants’ voluntary associations involved in building transnational solidarity networks talked about themselves as the thirteenth state or even the thirteenth nation. Such a formulation suggests a feeling of collective belonging that is de-territorialized with regard to a member state and to any nation.The thirteenth idea points also to the emergence of transnational communities on a European level, that is, communities structured by individuals or groups settled in different national societies who share some common references that are not territorially bounded.
In a broader sense, such transnational communities take into account the context of globalization and economic uncertainty that facilitates the construction of worldwide networks. Their institutionalization requires a coordination of activities based most often on common references (objective or subjective), a coordination of resources, information, technology, and sites of social power across national borders for political, cultural, and economic purposes. The mode of action of such a community is de-territorialized even if the references remain territorial. The rhetoric of mobilisation recentralizes, in a non-territorial way, the multiplicity of identities that make for the internal diversity fragmented yet represented in such a structure.
The new transnational community, imagined either out of a religion or an ethnicity that encapsulates linguistic and national differences, seeks self-affirmation across national borders and without geographic limits, as a de-territorialized nation in search of an inclusive (and exclusive) centre around a constructed identity or experience (immigration, dispersion, minority). It aspires to legitimacy and recognition by both the state and supranational or international institutions. The de-territorialization of diversity is best perceived juridically through the Citizenship of the Union, a status defined by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Although the treaty maintains the link between citizenship and nationality, as is the case in nation-states, the practice of citizenship of the Union (direct participation: vote) brings an extraterritoriality with regard to nation-states. But it introduces at the same time an extra-territorial element into the concept of citizenship, extending its practice beyond territorially limited nation-states, therefore de-territorializing the national community and re-territorializing the European space.
From this perspective, territory becomes a broader and unbounded space where nation-states and supranational institutions interact, and where transnational networks build bridges between national societies and Europe. This development raises many questions with relation to citizenship, nationality and identity, territory and space; a space for political participation that goes beyond national territories that re-map a transnational political community and therefore de-territorialized and/ or re-territorialized one. The question therefore is: is de-territoriality the ultimate source of new tensions between states and communities or, more generally, a source of tensions within the international system?
The public sphere has been theorized as a space for political communication in which social actors, political discourse and cultural perspectives interact and give form to competing legitimacy claims on the arrangements of the common life. In its classical liberal version the public sphere was closely connected to the cultural identity of the demos and presupposed a high degree of cultural homogeneity regarding linguistic competence and religious affiliation. Monolingualism and secularisation were not only perceived as the standard path to be followed by modern societies, but also as a structural prerequisite for a successful democratic process. The conventional approach to modernisation as secularisation conceived it as a process in which the religious foundations of political power would be increasingly replaced by alternative and secularised forms of legitimacy (i.e. democratic, populist, nationalist). Accordingly, cultural change in modernising societies would induce the privatisation of religious belief, diminish collective religious practice and push for secularised moral references. However, during recent decades we have witnessed how the relationship between politics and religion has become, once again, a matter of public attention.
The aim of this Section is therefore to explore the changing relationship between the religious and the political spheres in democratic societies. The underlying hypothesis is that, against the prevailing Weberian idea of modernisation as religious “disenchantment” (Entzauberung) of the world, we are facing a profound change in the functional parameters of religion. On the one hand, the emergence of a new form of politically and culturally belligerent Islamism has challenged not only the post-Cold War system of international relationships, but many of the basic tenets of Western democracies as well. We may indeed be witnessing a non-Western process of modernisation in the Islamic world in which religion would work as a global frame for social mobilisation and incorporation. On the other hand, religious values continue to play an important political role in the United States and in many non-Islamic Third World countries.
Even in the largely secularised Canadian and European societies the debate about laicism/secularism in relation to public education and the meaning of marriage, or about the accommodation of religious pluralism and the role of the Christian heritage, has strongly re-emerged, sometimes around ethnic and multicultural issues. Behind all of this we recognise a need to re-evaluate the social role of the religious element in modern societies and the normative principles needed to manage it in the public sphere.
The politics of the welfare state have been reshaped by the complex diversity that lies at the heart of this project. Historically, the development of the welfare state took place within the framework of the nation state, and was driven by the simple diversity of industrial society. The politics of redistribution were rooted in class-based politics, with the most expansive welfare states emerging in societies with high levels of union density, strong labour organizations and dominant parties of the left. The primacy of class politics was never absolute, as religion left its imprint on the social policy regime in many countries, often through the influence of Christian Democratic parties. But the centrality of class was clear.
The contemporary politics of redistribution has been redefined by complex diversity. At the level of political institutions, new patterns of multi-level governance multiply the number of authoritative decision sites. At the level of political coalitions, historic class alignments have weakened, and cultural differences cross-cut traditional economic divisions. At the level of policy debates, new agendas focusing on the recognition and accommodation of cultural difference compete for attention. As a result, the politics of recognition seem to be in tension with the politics of redistribution. Multicultural diversity is central to this debate. Many analysts argue that immigration and ethnic diversity erode trust and solidarity among citizens, fragmenting traditional redistributive coalitions. As a result, they insist, contemporary democracies face a trade-off between the accommodation of ethnic diversity on one hand and support for redistribution on the other. This concern has been labelled the “progressive’s dilemma.”
Complex diversity represents a compelling challenge in Europe. Canada, however, offers an instructive comparator on two levels. First, the highly decentralized Canadian federation reveals striking parallels to European institutions, and comparison between the two cases can increase our capacity to understand the relationships between institutional complexity and social policy outcomes. Second, Canadian experience can contribute to the assessment of the political sustainability of a multicultural welfare state. Canada is no multicultural utopia. Tensions rooted in complex diversity shape its politics as well. Nevertheless, the evidence about public attitudes there stands as a challenge to assertions that ethnic diversity inevitably weakens support for social programs. In this, Canada can represent a useful counterweight to U.S. experience. Many European commentators see the United States as the key test case of the relations between ethnic diversity and solidarity, and there is certainly considerable evidence that the politics of race does erode support for redistribution in that country. But the United States has a distinctive history of race relations, and it is important to expand the range of countries under consideration, in order to explore the variety of possible relationships between diversity and solidarity. Canada provides one such contrasting narrative.
This section of the project addresses one of the most compelling challenges facing western democracies. How can we maintain and strengthen the bonds of community in ethnically diverse societies. How can we reconcile growing levels of multicultural diversity and the sense of a common identity which sustains the norms of mutual support and underpins a generous welfare state? Can we find a stable political equilibrium among immigration, multiculturalism policies and social redistribution?